Modern science emerged in the seventeenth century with two fundamental ideas: planned experiments (Francis Bacon) and the mathematical representation of relations among phenomena (Galileo). This basic experimental-mathematical epistemology evolved until, in the first half of the twentieth century, it took a stringent form involving (1) a mathematical theory constituting scientific knowledge, (2) a formal operational correspondence between the theory and quantitative empirical measurements, and (3) predictions of future measurements based on the theory. The “truth” (validity) of the theory is judged based on the concordance between the predictions and the observations. While the epistemological details are subtle and require expertise relating to experimental protocol, mathematical modeling, and statistical analysis, the general notion of scientific knowledge is expressed in these three requirements.
Science is neither rationalism nor empiricism. It includes both in a particular way. In demanding quantitative predictions of future experience, science requires formulation of mathematical models whose relations can be tested against future observations. Prediction is a product of reason, but reason grounded in the empirical. Hans Reichenbach summarizes the connection: “Observation informs us about the past and the present, reason foretells the future.” — Edward Dougherty
Does anyone still believe a “method” of science really exists, and that it essentially defines and differentiates science as a sui generis human endeavor? — Mikie
Shouldn’t we abandon this idea? Is it not both old and obsolete? — Mikie
Does anyone still believe a “method” of science really exists, and that it essentially defines and differentiates science as a sui generis human endeavor?
Shouldn’t we abandon this idea? Is it not both old and obsolete? — Mikie
Scientific practice ideally consists in unbiased and (as much as is humanly possible) presuppositionless inquiry. The abandonment of belief in what is merely imagined and what seems merely intuitively "right" with no other supporting evidence seems to be the essential element of scientific method, and what distinguishes it from speculative practices that existed prior to the advent of this new kind of scientific practice and which of course still exist today. — Janus
The crisis, as Ellis and Silk tell it, is the wildly speculative nature of modern physics theories, which they say reflects a dangerous departure from the scientific method. Many of today’s theorists — chief among them the proponents of string theory and the multiverse hypothesis — appear convinced of their ideas on the grounds that they are beautiful or logically compelling, despite the impossibility of testing them. Ellis and Silk accused these theorists of “moving the goalposts” of science and blurring the line between physics and pseudoscience. “The imprimatur of science should be awarded only to a theory that is testable,” Ellis and Silk wrote, thereby disqualifying most of the leading theories of the past 40 years. “Only then can we defend science from attack.”
Does anyone still believe a “method” of science really exists, and that it essentially defines and differentiates science as a sui generis human endeavor? — Mikie
I also think that there is a scientific attitude, a characteristic way of approaching problems. — Quixodian
I also think that there is a scientific attitude, a characteristic way of approaching problems. — Quixodian
Scientific practice ideally consists in unbiased and (as much as is humanly possible) presuppositionless inquiry. — Janus
In my view, it'd be hard to sincerely act as if anything goes. — plaque flag
However this is itself a danger, because pseudo-science can also cloak itself in the garb of architectonic. Hence the confusion of the modern world. — Pantagruel
As I've mentioned before, I think that the boundaries of our scientific understanding have expanded beyond the limits of convenient observability in space and time. Hence experimentalism has been replaced by modeling and simulation. Science has become much more of an architectonic pursuit. However this is itself a danger, because pseudo-science can also cloak itself in the garb of architectonic. Hence the confusion of the modern world. — Pantagruel
This may serve as a good starting point to understand the demarcation of science - what makes one theory science and another pseudo-science? Is it in the method used? — PhilosophyRunner
This may serve as a good starting point to understand the demarcation of science - what makes one theory science and another pseudo-science? Is it in the method used?
— PhilosophyRunner
I don’t think sweeping, abstract claims can be made. You have to look at specific, real world examples. So, are horoscopes pseudoscience? Yes. Is chiropractic a pseudoscience? It depends - but mostly, yes. Is creation “Science” pseudoscience? Yes. And so on. You can demonstrate each fairly easily. — Mikie
This unverified-but-not-unverifiable direction of research begs for abuse by pseudo-scientific interests. — Pantagruel
I don’t think sweeping, abstract claims can be made. You have to look at specific, real world examples. So, are horoscopes pseudoscience? Yes. Is chiropractic a pseudoscience? It depends - but mostly, yes. Is creation “Science” pseudoscience? Yes. And so on. You can demonstrate each fairly easily. — Mikie
And the same question for the other things you called pseudoscience. There is some reason you call these pseudoscience, something that distinguishes them as not science. What is it? — PhilosophyRunner
↪Pantagruel But what exactly are the pseudo science interests and how do they differ from science interest? And does the answer to that not also answer to a demarcation of science?
Am I correct in saying you are:
1) Unsure about the limits of science
2) Sure that there is pseudo-science
3) Pseudo science is not science
It seems that if 2) and 3) are true, then you are sure of at least some of the limits of science.
If I say theory X is pseudo-science because of a and b, then I am saying a and b are indicators that something is not science. — PhilosophyRunner
It seems that if 2) and 3) are true, then you are sure of at least some of the limits of science. — PhilosophyRunner
Well, we can start with the fact that there’s no credible evidence whatsoever for their claims or their beliefs. There’s very little evidence that manipulating vertebrae has any significant health benefits (beyond placebo), for instance. There’s no evidence that the positions of the planets have any demonstrable effect on human beings. And so forth. — Mikie
Either science is unique in some way — as many claim, and which I myself believe — or it isn’t. If it is, what makes it unique? The scientific method? That’s also been claimed, and I don’t agree with it. — Mikie
I also think that there is a scientific attitude, a characteristic way of approaching problems.
— Quixodian
I agree with you. But I think a similar attitude can exist in philosophy, and that what we call science is an offshoot of this. The difference being that scientists’ ontology is naturalism. — Mikie
While string theory has been highly productive.... — Pantagruel
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