Of course not. Suppose instead we observe such a chain in nature, imbedding it in our minds. It now exists in two realms. — jgill

I don't see any separation between realms, or a loss of causal connectivity. You observe, your mind stores the observation and definition as memory in your neurons. We can trace the causal chain from your first observation on. We are not separated in another realm.

Does an act of "measurement" affect FC? — jgill

No.

Yes and no. There are two modes of explanation involved and much difficulty about the relationship between the two. There is, presumably, a causal chain involved. There is also what is usually called a rational or purposive explanation involved. These two are in different categories or frameworks. We are finding out a good deal about the first kind. We use the second kind every day. We (well, philosophers,) are in a good deal of confusion about the relation between the two. It won't do to say that they are just different kinds of explanation and leave it at that - though that was popular a few decades ago. Nor will it do to "reduce" one to the other or identify one or other as the "real" explanation. How much more do you want? It would take us miles beyond this thread. Perhaps I should post that paragraph as the beginning of a discussion. — Ludwig V

I take it that you are not prepared to make any judgements about the relationship between the two "modes of explanation". I don't agree with your claim that in the past it was popular to just say that the two were different, and leave it at that. I think the popular way was just to take it for granted that intention, purpose, free will, acts to produce a first cause. It was popular just to accept the way things appear to us, that causal chains begin with a freely willed act, and this constitutes the relationship between the two, the free will act begins a causal chain.

I believe that the recent rise of physicalism and scientism has produced the idea that if we follow a causal chain, created from a freely willed event backward, we would see that chain extends beyond the point of decision by the will, into some neurological activity or something like that. The issue that develops though, is what @jgill points to, the matter of a vast multitude of causal chains within the neurological system, and the temporal overlapping of them. So from the physicalism/scientism perspective, which is the determinist perspective, it is a matter of relating the temporality of numerous causal chains to each other, to represent the point of willing. From the free will perspective, such a relationship cannot be established, because there is another active force involved, that of the soul, and this active force actually ends and begins causal chains.

A random event is not about our current ability to measure to predict, it is about a hard logical limitation to predict. A first cause is something self-explained, there is nothing prior that causes it. Such a thing cannot be predicted to arise as there is absolutely nothing causing it.

The point I'm trying to make is that randomness due to lack of knowledge is not the same as randomness with even perfect omniscience could not predict. — Philosophim

OK then, by your definition, "a first cause" is "truly random", not even omniscience could predict it. So, what I am arguing is that this is consistent with "free will" as a first cause, not even omniscience could predict it.

Your reference to omniscience really does nothing except emphasize that human intelligence is not omniscient, and a failure of that intelligence to find "the cause" does not mean that a cause might not still be found by a higher intelligence. What the concept of "free will" signifies, is that there is no such cause in the sense of the causal chain, therefore a cause cannot be determined even by omniscience.

Its actually been determined that people can make unconscious decisions up to 11 second prior to them being aware of it. https://qz.com/1569158/neuroscientists-read-unconscious-brain-activity-to-predict-decisions — Philosophim

I don't see how this is relevant. If a type of decision can be made in this way, it does not imply that all decisions are made in this way. Many human acts for example, are shown to be simply reflexive, but this does not mean that all human acts are reflexive.

A constraint is part of what causes an outcome. A first cause cannot have constraints or anything that would lead a particular outcome. Because that would 'cause' the first 'first cause' to be. Meaning its not really a first cause. A first cause is as simple as "No quark is there, not a quark is there." There is nothing that caused the quark. It exists purely because it does. — Philosophim

Constraints do not necessarily lead to "a particular outcome", constraints limit the possibilities. Therefore your appeal to constraints in this context does nothing to imply that a free will act does not produce a first cause.

This again would need to be proven. I don't think science points that way. I think its pretty clear the brain has a sense of timing and it can be traced through causality. But, as I noted earlier, you have an interesting idea that could be tested. — Philosophim

As mentioned above, in my reply to Ludwig, I think this idea of "a sense of timing" is from a naive form of scientism, based in determinism. In reality there is probably thousands, or millions, of causally chains occurring in the brain at the same time, extremely rapidly, far beyond the brain's capacity to understand its own mechanics. So the temporal relations between the various causal chains, and the beginnings and endings of those causal chains (which the doctrine of free will indicates are real) occurring within the brain cannot be grasped by the brain's "sense of timing". The "sense of timing" which the conscious mind actual has, indicates that causal chains end and begin with the free will.

We don't get to create the chain. — Philosophim

As explained above, this is an unsound premise. You insist that the idea of a free will act being an uncaused cause cannot be accepted without prove, but the inverse principle holds just as well. Equally, we cannot exclude ourselves as first causes without proof. As Ludwig implies, there are relations between causal chains and "reasons" (in the sense of purpose and intentions), which are not understood by us. This implies that when a being acts for a purpose we cannot exclude the possibility that the being is utilizing first causes in this type of act. And the vast multitude of causal chains which are active within the brain, in an extremely rapid way, make it very difficult to understand with any degree of certainty, whether some are actually beginning and ending there. If the causal chains are beginning within the brain, then we cannot say "we don't get to create the chain".

From the free will perspective, such a relationship cannot be established, because there is another active force involved, that of the soul, and this active force actually ends and begins causal chains. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not intending at all to debate the soul, so lets assume one exists. If free will comes from the soul, then free will is not a first cause. Is the soul a first cause then? For it to fit within a first cause it would need to be to be randomly created. There should be no reason a soul should or should not exist. Meaning that a God could not have created them. For if God created souls, then souls are not first causes. I just want you to be aware of this.

Even then, souls would be causing free will. So there's no real free will then either. If a soul is causing something, then it is constrained by rules and limitations. There is no limitation or rule as to what can be a first cause, but once its formed, it then causes other things. For example, lets say a photon appeared with no prior causality. It still acts like a photon once formed. It can be influenced, influence, etc. The only part that is a first cause is its appearance.

OK then, by your definition, "a first cause" is "truly random", not even omniscience could predict it. So, what I am arguing is that this is consistent with "free will" as a first cause, not even omniscience could predict it. — Metaphysician Undercover

To think about the issue, lets say then that a soul is not behind free will but free will is its own thing uncaused by anything else. To prove this, we would have to show that free will is limitless and unconstrained. Except there are a few things we find.

1. Free will is constrained to living things. Free will does not exist on its own in the universe.
2. Free will is constrained to certain biological functions like the brain and nerves. Unless you think your toes or rocks can have free will.
3. Free will shouldn't be contained or limited by intelligence, and yet it is. A roach does not have the same will as a human being.

All of these things refute the idea that free will is a first cause. There are clearly only certain areas where free will can form and is constrained by that biology.

Its actually been determined that people can make unconscious decisions up to 11 second prior to them being aware of it. https://qz.com/1569158/neuroscientists-read-unconscious-brain-activity-to-predict-decisions
— Philosophim

I don't see how this is relevant. If a type of decision can be made in this way, it does not imply that all decisions are made in this way. Many human acts for example, are shown to be simply reflexive, but this does not mean that all human acts are reflexive. — Metaphysician Undercover

You should read the article, its pretty interesting. Here's the second paragraph:

"Using the fMRI to monitor brain activity and machine learning to analyze the neuroimages, the researchers were able to predict which pattern participants would choose up to 11 seconds before they consciously made the decision. And they were able to predict how vividly the participants would be able to envisage it."

That's not a reflex, that's a choice.

Constraints do not necessarily lead to "a particular outcome", constraints limit the possibilities. Therefore your appeal to constraints in this context does nothing to imply that a free will act does not produce a first cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let me explain. Take a die roll. Can you roll a die and have a pink elephant appear? No. There are plenty of causes that explain the die roll. A '1' is a result because someone created the die to have a 1. It rolled because of the force of a human putting it into a cup, shaking it, and dropping it. It rattled because of gravity and reactions to force. It stopped moving because of friction. The die result is not a first cause. It is caused by many other forces and constraints.

A first cause has zero reason for its existence besides the fact that it exists. This means there can be no constraints as to what or why it exists. Of course, once it forms, its part of causality and may be limited. Once a thing lasts longer than a measure of time, it is no longer a first cause. At that second tick of time, it is caused by the previous tick in time. It is only at that first tick of time where nothing prior has formed, restricted, or influenced its appearance that it is a first cause.

As mentioned above, in my reply to Ludwig, I think this idea of "a sense of timing" is from a naive form of scientism, based in determinism. In reality there is probably thousands, or millions, of causally chains occurring in the brain at the same time, extremely rapidly, far beyond the brain's capacity to understand its own mechanics. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree 100%. As we come to understand the basics of what I wrote, we realize that tons of chains interlink all over the place. A first cause is not an interlink though. It is the end of prior causality somewhere in that mess. While there logically must be at least one, there could be several. And each would be exceedingly difficult to prove. How to you prove that prior to a certain point, a "X" (variable) has no reason for its existence? There's always the question that we simply missed something with our instruments or understanding. Proving that there is no instrument or understanding that could show some prior cause is very difficult. While a first cause is logically necessary, proving that "X" is one is a very high bar.

We don't get to create the chain.
— Philosophim

As explained above, this is an unsound premise. You insist that the idea of a free will act being an uncaused cause cannot be accepted without prove, but the inverse principle holds just as well. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, this is not the case. A first cause necessitates that it be uncaused by something prior. If there is evidence at all that some other type of causality is in place, then a claim of a first cause fails. Here's one last nail in the coffin. Free will must respond to a stimulous, or choice. Do I go left, or right? What caused me to go left or right? One part of the prior cause is that I had an option to go left or right. Choices are necessarily caused by the limitations in front of us. Something which has no prior cause has no restraint as to what it must be.

And the vast multitude of causal chains which are active within the brain, in an extremely rapid way, make it very difficult to understand with any degree of certainty, whether some are actually beginning and ending there. If the causal chains are beginning within the brain, then we cannot say "we don't get to create the chain". — Metaphysician Undercover

An inability to understand something completely is not evidence of a first cause. Evidence of a first cause requires that there be no possible explanation for why "X" occurs. Our comprehension of it is irrelevant. Free will has too much evidence that it is constrained and influenced by other factors. Therefore it is not possible that free will is a first cause.

While a first cause is logically necessary, — Philosophim

A hypothetical chain going back to infinity doesn't have to have a first cause. At this point your preferred alternative is the existence of the chain. But this definition doesn't logically follow. Although you are not being theological here, your assertion is equivalent to the existence of God. And that's OK. I only wish this thread wasn't ultimately so existential and debatable. But that is the nature of philosophy, I suppose. I would prefer more emphasis on the chain itself and its origin than on what comes before its origin.

But this is your baby, so continue the fun. :smile:

I'm not intending at all to debate the soul, so lets assume one exists. If free will comes from the soul, then free will is not a first cause. Is the soul a first cause then? For it to fit within a first cause it would need to be to be randomly created. There should be no reason a soul should or should not exist. Meaning that a God could not have created them. For if God created souls, then souls are not first causes. I just want you to be aware of this. — Philosophim

Let me put it another way. The free will itself is not a first cause, because it is a property of the soul, and it is therefore guided by the intention, or purpose of the soul. What I propose is that free will is evidence of the reality of first causes. What I think, is that the soul uses first causes to exercise free will so that there could not be free will if there was no first causes. So it is not that the soul is a first cause, nor strictly speaking, is free will itself the first cause, but there are first causes, and the soul is able to utilize them for its purposes toward effecting change in the world. The reality of the free will is what provides us evidence that there are first causes, and the evidence is that the soul is using first causes toward its goals. The soul itself is not a first cause, but the soul has free will, and the free will requires first causes for its existence.

To think about the issue, lets say then that a soul is not behind free will but free will is its own thing uncaused by anything else. To prove this, we would have to show that free will is limitless and unconstrained. Except there are a few things we find.

1. Free will is constrained to living things. Free will does not exist on its own in the universe.
2. Free will is constrained to certain biological functions like the brain and nerves. Unless you think your toes or rocks can have free will.
3. Free will shouldn't be contained or limited by intelligence, and yet it is. A roach does not have the same will as a human being.

All of these things refute the idea that free will is a first cause. There are clearly only certain areas where free will can form and is constrained by that biology. — Philosophim

So the issue of constraints is not relevant, as I said above. The soul has free will, and it is free because of the reality of uncaused causes which are happening within the living body, but the soul is still constrained by the physical reality of that body at the same time. In other words, the soul's capacity to utilize the uncaused causes which are occurring is limited, or constrained by the physical body, but the reality of these constraints does not mean that the uncaused causes are not real. So you are correct to say " There are clearly only certain areas where free will can form and is constrained by that biology", but this is irrelevant to the issue of first cause.

You should read the article, its pretty interesting. Here's the second paragraph:

"Using the fMRI to monitor brain activity and machine learning to analyze the neuroimages, the researchers were able to predict which pattern participants would choose up to 11 seconds before they consciously made the decision. And they were able to predict how vividly the participants would be able to envisage it."

That's not a reflex, that's a choice. — Philosophim

I've read similar articles already. The point I made about reflex was to demonstrate your illogical use of that article. That some human actions are reflex, does not mean that all human actions are reflex. That is my analogous example. Likewise, that some decisions occur in the way indicated in the article, does not imply that all decision occur in this way. So the article doesn't provide any point to argue, it's like someone arguing that since some human actions are by reflex, therefore free will is not real. There are all sorts of different types of "habit" involved in the actions of living things. The habit is what makes a living thing's actions predictable. Free will decisions are distinctly non-habitual.

Let me explain. Take a die roll. Can you roll a die and have a pink elephant appear? No. There are plenty of causes that explain the die roll. A '1' is a result because someone created the die to have a 1. It rolled because of the force of a human putting it into a cup, shaking it, and dropping it. It rattled because of gravity and reactions to force. It stopped moving because of friction. The die result is not a first cause. It is caused by many other forces and constraints. — Philosophim

I don't see any relevance here. We are talking about the free will act which rolls the die, and how this act utilizes first causes, we are not talking about the action of the die rolling after being thrown.

A first cause has zero reason for its existence besides the fact that it exists. This means there can be no constraints as to what or why it exists. Of course, once it forms, its part of causality and may be limited. Once a thing lasts longer than a measure of time, it is no longer a first cause. At that second tick of time, it is caused by the previous tick in time. It is only at that first tick of time where nothing prior has formed, restricted, or influenced its appearance that it is a first cause. — Philosophim

I don't agree with this. I do not think that you understand the relationship between first causes and constraints. The first cause comes into being without any reason for its existence, as you say, but it comes into being into an already existing environment. It is not caused by that environment, nevertheless it comes into being in that environment. Therefore there are constraints which are prior to it, which necessarily limit (constrain) its coming into being as it does so, specifically the effect it will have. There are no constraints as to why it exists, but there are constraints as to what effect it will have. This is how the soul can utilize uncaused causes without being able to predict them, by constraining them as they come into being.

I agree 100%. As we come to understand the basics of what I wrote, we realize that tons of chains interlink all over the place. A first cause is not an interlink though. It is the end of prior causality somewhere in that mess. While there logically must be at least one, there could be several. And each would be exceedingly difficult to prove. How to you prove that prior to a certain point, a "X" (variable) has no reason for its existence? There's always the question that we simply missed something with our instruments or understanding. Proving that there is no instrument or understanding that could show some prior cause is very difficult. While a first cause is logically necessary, proving that "X" is one is a very high bar. — Philosophim

I think the existence of free will provides very good evidence of the reality of first causes. Look at all the causal chains which must come to an end within us, much of the energy we eat gets stored, so it turns passive. And all the causal chains of all information we absorb through sensation must come to an end if they do not cause a reflex. And then there are self-directed actions derived from decisions, which com from within us. If these actions were just a continuation of the causal chains which enter into us through sensation, eating etc., it would be impossible for us to direct them as we do.

No, this is not the case. A first cause necessitates that it be uncaused by something prior. If there is evidence at all that some other type of causality is in place, then a claim of a first cause fails. Here's one last nail in the coffin. Free will must respond to a stimulous, or choice. Do I go left, or right? What caused me to go left or right? One part of the prior cause is that I had an option to go left or right. Choices are necessarily caused by the limitations in front of us. Something which has no prior cause has no restraint as to what it must be. — Philosophim

The issue was whether or not we "create the chain", not whether or not we create the first cause. The first cause is not created, we know that by definition. However, the particular chain it produces is dependent on the environment within which it arises. So we "create the chain" by preparing the environment for it, while still not predicting it.

Choices are necessarily caused by the limitations in front of us. Something which has no prior cause has no restraint as to what it must be. — Philosophim

Again, you are misrepresenting the role of constraints. The uncaused cause comes into being without a cause, in the middle of preexisting constraints. The limitations, are not causal, they are only restrictions to the cause. So it is incorrect to say that the uncaused cause has no restraint on it.

It's simple logic. The uncaused caused cannot have an effect (therefore it cannot be "a cause") unless there is something already existing which it will have an effect on. Therefore it necessarily comes into an existing environment. And the already existing thing which the uncaused cause has an effect on, will be a constraint to the uncaused cause. Therefore the uncaused cause will necessarily be constrained.

An inability to understand something completely is not evidence of a first cause. Evidence of a first cause requires that there be no possible explanation for why "X" occurs. Our comprehension of it is irrelevant. Free will has too much evidence that it is constrained and influenced by other factors. Therefore it is not possible that free will is a first cause. — Philosophim

This point is irrelevant due to your misunderstanding of the relationship between first causes and constraints.

The uncaused caused cannot have an effect (therefore it cannot be "a cause") unless there is something already existing which it will have an effect on — Metaphysician Undercover

:smile:

The first cause must have an effect on the causal chain it initiates. Therefore, by definition, it is an element of that chain and not something prior and abstract.

I meant that there are no existing proven discoveries of anything that is a first cause. No one to my mind, has ever conclusively proven that any "x" exists without something prior causing it to be. A belief or limitation in current capabilities is not evidence of a first cause. We must have the tools and evidence to conclusively demonstrate something is a first cause. — Philosophim

Yes, I agree. But that means whenever we think we have found a first cause, we must ask ourselves whether that is due to the limitations of our tools and evidence or to it really being a first cause. I would always bet on the former. Under what circumstances could I confidently bet on the latter? Given the ingenuity and determination human beings have displayed over the last 400 or 500 years, I can't imagine any.

My point was that every time something like a first cause or brute fact has been found, we have redefined (or perhaps better "re-invented") the concept of "cause" and carried on.

I take it that you are not prepared to make any judgements about the relationship between the two "modes of explanation". — Metaphysician Undercover

"Prepared" is the right word. I regard it as an unsolved problem; perhaps I'll have something to offer one day. If not me, it will be someone else.

I don't agree with your claim that in the past it was popular to just say that the two were different, and leave it at that. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm sorry, It was not helpful to use the word "popular" in different senses in successive sentences. This observation refers to Ryle and his followers. They thought that identifying categories was the end of the story, but that isn't satisfactory on its own - at least, not in this case. Ryle seems to recognize this in the context of his discussion of perception in "Dilemmas"

I think the popular way was just to take it for granted that intention, purpose, free will, acts to produce a first cause. It was popular just to accept the way things appear to us, — Metaphysician Undercover

It was certainly popular amongst some philosophers. Whether that way is the way things appear to us or is an analysis from a specific philosophical point of view (dualism) is another question.

Common sense explanations cannot possibly depend on unknown and unseen events in the brain (or mind); if that were so, common people like us could never explain what people do. In their simplest form, explanations of action give the agent's rationale for action (together with indications how sound that rationale is).

That cannot be the same as a causal explanation, because a rationale justifies the action, whereas a causal explanation does not justify or fail to justify what it explains. A major difference is that a rationale explains the values that provoke or motivation the action, and causal explanations have no equivalent to the question what motivates an action.

Finally, a false belief, a delusion or mistake can explain an action but only facts can explain events that are subject to causality.

Mathematical and logical explanations are, of course, different again.

The fact that all three modes of explanation rely on "why?" and "because" can mislead one into thinking that they are more similar than they really are.

The first cause must have an effect on the causal chain it initiates. Therefore, by definition, it is an element of that chain and not something prior and abstract. — jgill

That, I would say is an interesting problem, which appears to be giving Philosophim some difficulty, the relationship between the first cause, and the resulting causal chain. In the descriptions, or definitions which Philosophim provides, there appears to be some ambiguity as to whether the first cause is part of the chain, or something separate from the chain. This is due to the way that we understand causes, as something contingent on a prior cause. If we remove the prior cause (in "first cause"), we have the question of whether this is really a "cause" as we understand, because we understand causes in a causal chain as contingent on a prior cause. So it becomes ambiguous as to whether the firat cause is part of the chain or not.

I would argue that a first cause must be something prior to, and separate from the causal chain, not an element of the chain. This is because the elements of the chain are known through science and inductive reasoning, such that they are all of the same category, and being that way implies that there is another cause prior to each one. That is the way that we know "events".

These are the principles laid out by Aristotle in the cosmological argument. A "cause" (in the modern sense which corresponds with Aristotelian efficient cause) is a contingent event. This means that it consists of two parts, the temporally prior potential for the event, and the posterior actuality, after the event. The "contingency" is due to the fact that the prior potential is always a potential for a multitude of possible events, and the resulting actuality is the one particular event which actually occurs. This implies the necessity of an actuality which actualizes the particular event, from the multitude of possibilities. You might consider this to be a sort of 'selection' process.

Now, if we ignore the "contingency" aspect and represent the causal chain as a simple cause precedes effect model, in a determinist way, then we effectively remove the "potential" from the model. One actual state precedes another actual state, and this determinist representation provides no real principle whereby we could say that the potential for an event precedes its actual occurrence, all there is is another actual event as cause.

So to be consistent with our true empirical observations, we must include "potential" into our descriptions of real events, and allow that events are contingent. This implies that the potential for any physical event always precedes, in time, the actual occurrence of that event, and something acts to cause, or 'select', the particular occurrence from the multitude of possibilities . This we can take as an inductive principle, a physical law, and on its own it appears to create an infinite regress of potential preceding actual, extending backward in time. However, we still need to account for the 'selection' process which determines the particular actual outcome from any instance of existing potentiality.

Things get complex now because we tend to assign the selection process to another chain of efficient causes Causal chains interact.. Therefore the various relations between causal chains appears to suffice for explanation of the selection required to account for the contingency of potential. However, this is just a superficial appearance. What the cosmological argument shows is that this provides an incomplete representation. If we look at the relationship between potential and actual, in an absolute way, we see that potential cannot really precede actual in this way. If there was ever a time when there was only potential, it would not have the capacity to actualize itself, and there would always be only potential. Potential cannot precede actual in an absolute way. Therefore to account for the reality of the actual existence, which we live and experience, we need to allow for a distinct form of actuality which is prior to the actuality which we observe as physical events. The actuality of physical events requires a preceding potential. The actuality of physical events is known by inductive reasoning to have a preceding potential, but this distinct actuality, the 'prior actuality', the one I described as the one which 'selects', requires no preceding potential, and therefore is a completely different type of actuality.

What we have here is two distinct types of "cause", therefore two distinct types of actuality. There is the contingent type of actuality which always has the prior potential, and there is the logically necessary type of actuality, demonstrated by the logic to be prior to the contingent actuality, as necessary for the existence of a contingent actuality. Philosophim appears to be getting confused due to a failure of recognizing and separating these two distinct types of cause.

So Philosophim appears to understand the requirement of a "first cause" in a causal chain of contingent events, but does not allow that whatever it is which produces the first cause in such a chain, could itself be a "cause", but a different type of cause. Because "first cause" signifies that there is no cause prior to this, Philosophim denies causation to the first cause in a causal chain, insisting on true randomness. But this problem is avoided if we recognize the two distinct types of actuality, and allow that the "first cause" is simply the first cause in a causal chain, the first contingent actuality. This allows that a completely different type of actuality, the one that 'selects' from potential is temporally prior, to the first cause in a causal chain, thereby resolving the issue pointed to by Philosophim, that a first cause must be uncaused in an absolute way.

I'm sorry, It was not helpful to use the word "popular" in different senses in successive sentences. This observation refers to Ryle and his followers. They thought that identifying categories was the end of the story, but that isn't satisfactory on its own - at least, not in this case. Ryle seems to recognize this in the context of his discussion of perception in "Dilemmas" — Ludwig V

Would you agree that we can have two distinct types, or categories of "cause", in the way I describe above, such that the "first cause" in a chain of one particular category of causes, has a prior cause of a different type?

Common sense explanations cannot possibly depend on unknown and unseen events in the brain (or mind); if that were so, common people like us could never explain what people do. In their simplest form, explanations of action give the agent's rationale for action (together with indications how sound that rationale is). — Ludwig V

I do not see the problem here. I think that common sense explanations do, very often, rely on unknown events. This is because we explain things without knowing in completion the thing we are explaining. So the unknown is always lurking within the explanation somewhere. Sometimes people might use a form of "magic", or similar things like "random occurrence", "spontaneous generation", "abiogenesis", etc., to stand in for the unknown. So it is a simple fact that often when we explain things, there is within the explanation, elements of the unknown, which are very often in some way glossed over or ambiguated, to give the impression that the explanation is better than it really is. "Events in the brain" is a very complex subject, so we ought to expect an abundance of unknown factors. In fact, "events in the brain" has inherent within the expression, this type of ambiguity or glossing over, because the nervous system extends beyond the brain, and there is not a clear boundary which would separate an event in the brain from being in other parts of the body as well, at the same time, as part of the same event.

That cannot be the same as a causal explanation, because a rationale justifies the action, whereas a causal explanation does not justify or fail to justify what it explains. A major difference is that a rationale explains the values that provoke or motivation the action, and causal explanations have no equivalent to the question what motivates an action. — Ludwig V

Would you accept, that the rationale, the values etc., which motivate an action, are "causal"? But this would mean that we obviously need to distinguish two distinct types of causation, one being the sense of a causal chain of physical events, the other being the motivators for actions of living beings.

Would you agree that we can have two distinct types, or categories of "cause", in the way I describe above, such that the "first cause" in a chain of one particular category of causes, has a prior cause of a different type? — Metaphysician Undercover

It is a tempting hypothesis and could be particularly useful when we want to link incommensurable theories. But I wouldn't be sure unless I had some examples.

There is the contingent type of actuality which always has the prior potential, and there is the logically necessary type of actuality, demonstrated by the logic to be prior to the contingent actuality, as necessary for the existence of a contingent actuality — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure I can cope with different types of actuality. Can't we just talk about the actuality of contingent things and the actuality of necessary things?

I do not see the problem here. I think that common sense explanations do, very often, rely on unknown events. This is because we explain things without knowing in completion the thing we are explaining. So the unknown is always lurking within the explanation somewhere. — Metaphysician Undercover

One can always dive deeper into an explanation (i.e. ask why a particular causal link holds). There's nothing special there. But there must be something known about A and B as a basis of the explanation. No doubt we all had a moment of illumination when we were presented with the causal explanation of a rainbow. We don't abandon what we knew beforehand and we knew fine what a rainbow is before that. Indeed, we couldn't understand the explanation unless we did know. We add the causal explanation in to our understanding of what a rainbow is. Similarly with wants and needs, beliefs and assumptions and their physical counterparts.

Would you accept, that the rationale, the values etc., which motivate an action, are "causal"? But this would mean that we obviously need to distinguish two distinct types of causation, one being the sense of a causal chain of physical events, the other being the motivators for actions of living beings. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Cause" is defined by the theory/hypotheses that it is part of, or theories and hypotheses have different ideas of what a cause is. I recognize those as different types of causation. Common sense explanations of actions are incredibly complicated. I would not rule out the possibility that some of the factors we appeal to might be considered causal. Examples would be needed. But I'm pretty clear that such explanations are often, even primarily, interpretations of actions. Analysis of all this is further complicated by the familiar fact that actions are mostly describable in different ways and can form into hierarchical structures, and explanations may address just one level of the hierarchy.

A hypothetical chain going back to infinity doesn't have to have a first cause. — jgill

No, it is the first cause. Its entire existence is uncaused by anything prior.

I would prefer more emphasis on the chain itself and its origin than on what comes before its origin. — jgill

That's exactly what this is. If the universe is infinitely regressive, why? Logically there is no causal explanation besides the fact it simply is. Meaning all the rest of the logic flows.

The first cause must have an effect on the causal chain it initiates. Therefore, by definition, it is an element of that chain and not something prior and abstract. — jgill

Exactly.

Although you are not being theological here, your assertion is equivalent to the existence of God. — jgill

Its really not. Its the assertion that eventually we necessarily reach a point in causality where there is something which is not explained by something prior. This is something that is identifiable and testable. A far cry from a God.

I only wish this thread wasn't ultimately so existential and debatable. — jgill

Isn't that part of the fun though? Didn't you get to think about something new and different? Did you stretch your mind? Perhaps similar lines of thinking may do you well in your applications of theoretical math moving forward. I really do hope you enjoyed thinking about it.

I'm not sure I can cope with different types of actuality. Can't we just talk about the actuality of contingent things and the actuality of necessary things? — Ludwig V

Sure, but I think that these two are incompatible, so then we might just as well accept that they are different types of actuality. This is the metaphysics part, getting to the basic categories. If you don't want to do the metaphysics, we can avoid it, but if you don't want to do the metaphysics then what's the point in discussing "first causes"?

One can always dive deeper into an explanation (i.e. ask why a particular causal link holds). There's nothing special there. But there must be something known about A and B as a basis of the explanation. No doubt we all had a moment of illumination when we were presented with the causal explanation of a rainbow. We don't abandon what we knew beforehand and we knew fine what a rainbow is before that. Indeed, we couldn't understand the explanation unless we did know. We add the causal explanation in to our understanding of what a rainbow is. Similarly with wants and needs, beliefs and assumptions and their physical counterparts. — Ludwig V

The rainbow explanation is a good example. The classical explanation refers to the refraction of waves. But modern understanding of photons interacting with electrons shows that this explanation is really inadequate. So it's true that there must be "something known" which forms the basis for the explanation, but knowledge is not infallible, and depending on the unknowns which are hidden underneath that "something known", the knowledge which constitutes the "something known" may even turn out later to be wrong.

"Cause" is defined by the theory/hypotheses that it is part of, or theories and hypotheses have different ideas of what a cause is. I recognize those as different types of causation. Common sense explanations of actions are incredibly complicated. I would not rule out the possibility that some of the factors we appeal to might be considered causal. Examples would be needed. But I'm pretty clear that such explanations are often, even primarily, interpretations of actions. Analysis of all this is further complicated by the familiar fact that actions are mostly describable in different ways and can form into hierarchical structures, and explanations may address just one level of the hierarchy. — Ludwig V

An example could be something like my desire for a beer caused me to go to the fridge to look for one. "Cause" in this sense would be completely different from "cause" in the sense of the heat from the stove caused the water to boil. Notice how "desire" is not a physical activity which can be quantified and shown to be actively causing effects through a physical process.

So it is not that the soul is a first cause, nor strictly speaking, is free will itself the first cause, but there are first causes, and the soul is able to utilize them for its purposes toward effecting change in the world. The reality of the free will is what provides us evidence that there are first causes, and the evidence is that the soul is using first causes toward its goals. The soul itself is not a first cause, but the soul has free will, and the free will requires first causes for its existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is an interesting idea, but interesting ideas are not proof. With the idea of first causes, anyone can propose an equally competitive idea. For example, I could just say that a God created souls, and souls create free will. Or I could say there are no souls and free will is deterministic. All these claims require proof now. You must prove without a doubt that something is a first cause.

Your description of a soul using first causes needs specifics. How can a soul channel something which the soul would not know would exist? After all, first causes are 100% unpredictable, and could be anything. So what you're really stating is that there are very specific first causes that follow very specific rules that pop into reality every time we make a choice. That doesn't make any sense or line up to the complete randomness of a first cause. So its an interesting idea, but logically doesn't make sense, let alone without proof.

So the issue of constraints is not relevant, as I said above. The soul has free will, and it is free because of the reality of uncaused causes which are happening within the living body, but the soul is still constrained by the physical reality of that body at the same time. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it is entirely relevant. A constraint, by definition, is caused by something. You cannot have a restrained first cause. Its a contradiction.

I've read similar articles already. The point I made about reflex was to demonstrate your illogical use of that article. That some human actions are reflex, does not mean that all human actions are reflex. That is my analogous example. Likewise, that some decisions occur in the way indicated in the article, does not imply that all decision occur in this way. So the article doesn't provide any point to argue, it's like someone arguing that since some human actions are by reflex, therefore free will is not real. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let me clarify my point then. My point is that we have evidence that some decisions of the brain are caused prior to conscious awareness. Meaning something caused you to make a decision. Does that mean all causes are? Not necessarily. But there must be evidence that this is so, not merely a claim that it is so. Since we have evidence that some choices are clearly causal, we cannot easily claim that some other choices are not.

I don't see any relevance here. We are talking about the free will act which rolls the die, and how this act utilizes first causes, we are not talking about the action of the die rolling after being thrown. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, the relevance is that 'randomness' is not random. It has clear causal constraints. The only truly thing that would be random is the existence of a first cause. There can be no restraints on what is possible or what should or should not happen.

I don't agree with this. I do not think that you understand the relationship between first causes and constraints.

The first cause comes into being without any reason for its existence, as you say, but it comes into being into an already existing environment. It is not caused by that environment, nevertheless it comes into being in that environment. Therefore there are constraints which are prior to it, which necessarily limit (constrain) its coming into being as it does so, specifically the effect it will have. There are no constraints as to why it exists, but there are constraints as to what effect it will have. — Metaphysician Undercover

We're really close on agreement here. I've bolded the sentence, your conclusion, which does not follow from the rest of the premises that are correct.

There are no constraints prior to it coming into being, there are constraints after it comes into being. But what those constraints are cannot be predicted. Meaning it could be a photon, an explosion, or anything else you can imagine. What you're doing with free will is constraining what comes into existence as a first cause. Something that the soul can turn into free will, and that appears without prior cause that can somehow be molded by the soul without issue.

Just one of several problems here to think about is that free will is consistent. True randomness could be consistent for a time, but is unlikely to. Meaning that it most often should come and go if it were a first cause. You can't just claim a first cause anymore knowing what it is. You have to give evidence and prove it. Free will is a predictable constrained behavior within intelligent beings and brains. This is a far cry from being a first cause.

I think the existence of free will provides very good evidence of the reality of first causes. Look at all the causal chains which must come to an end within us, much of the energy we eat gets stored, so it turns passive. And all the causal chains of all information we absorb through sensation must come to an end if they do not cause a reflex. — Metaphysician Undercover

Causal chains do not end unless existence itself disappears. A causal chain is not a creation of measurement by people, it is the reality of X influences Y's outcome. Even the disappearance of an existence may cause an outcome elsewhere.

Again, you are misrepresenting the role of constraints. The uncaused cause comes into being without a cause, in the middle of preexisting constraints. The limitations, are not causal, they are only restrictions to the cause. So it is incorrect to say that the uncaused cause has no restraint on it. — Metaphysician Undercover

To be clear once again, there is no restriction on what can occur. Once it occurs, it of course has its own restrictions on what it is. The problem I'm seeing is that you're putting a restriction on what can occur in a very specific situation and place. That is not a first cause. Free will is very specific to intelligent beings and is consistent. This is evidence of prior causality, not it being a first cause.

To clarify with another example. Lets say a God did exist. Its appearance would be a first cause. But what makes up that God, and what that God does are all causal at that point. If that God found something that was uncaused in existence and used it, this would also be causal. The appearance of the first cause would of course not be caused, but anything done with that first cause would be causal.

It's simple logic. The uncaused caused cannot have an effect (therefore it cannot be "a cause") unless there is something already existing which it will have an effect on. Therefore it necessarily comes into an existing environment. And the already existing thing which the uncaused cause has an effect on, will be a constraint to the uncaused cause. Therefore the uncaused cause will necessarily be constrained. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I am confirming that you understood this perfectly! I'm just pointing out that you're drawing incorrect conclusions from this that necessitate free will is a first cause.

Yes, I agree. But that means whenever we think we have found a first cause, we must ask ourselves whether that is due to the limitations of our tools and evidence or to it really being a first cause. I would always bet on the former. Under what circumstances could I confidently bet on the latter? Given the ingenuity and determination human beings have displayed over the last 400 or 500 years, I can't imagine any. — Ludwig V

I largely agree. The logic points out that there must be a first cause, but it does not make any claim as to what that first cause might be. There are SEVERAL difficulties in proving a first cause. I'll list just one.

To keep it simple, imagine a photon appeared as a first cause right now. The thing is, it could also appear with momentum considering that there are no constraints on what a first cause could be. As such, if we were to find that photon we would assume because it has velocity, that something else caused that velocity. The more reasonable conclusion based off of our previous knowledge, is that we simply didn't find exactly what started the velocity of the photon.

In fact, it is possible that all of creation only happened five minutes ago, but we have all of our memories and observations that lead us to think its billions of years old. So even if we stumbled upon a situation in which there was a first cause, if the first cause appeared in such a way that would lead us to believe something else caused it, we would have no logical choice but to assume something else caused it.

This means there must be a VERY specific situation to prove something is a first cause. To my mind, the only thing I can think of is a perfect and absolute vaccum, which I'm not sure is possible to make. As in, absolutely nothing must exist, then suddenly something would form into existence. Even then, we would be scouring to see if it was our own measurement tools that were the issue, as we should.

The point of the idea is to simply note what logically must be true, then think about what it would take to prove such a thing true. As we can tell, proving anything is a first cause is a nigh impossible undertaking. It doesn't mean we shouldn't keep the knowledge around in the back of our minds however. Maybe one day, we'll find something that fits the bill.

My point was that every time something like a first cause or brute fact has been found, we have redefined (or perhaps better "re-invented") the concept of "cause" and carried on. — Ludwig V

This time there is no re-invention needed. We have a clear definition of what it is, and what it would take to prove it exists. The Big Bang for example would be changed to, "The known starting point of universal creation" instead of "The first cause of creation".

I will reply more later today, I'm out of time for now.

If you don't want to do the metaphysics, we can avoid it, but if you don't want to do the metaphysics then what's the point in discussing "first causes"? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure what doing metaphysics is. It seems to be simply discussing issues in first-order mode - using terms rather than mentioning them. One could frame this debate as an issue about the concept or logic of causation.

An example could be something like my desire for a beer caused me to go to the fridge to look for one. "Cause" in this sense would be completely different from "cause" in the sense of the heat from the stove caused the water to boil. Notice how "desire" is not a physical activity which can be quantified and shown to be actively causing effects through a physical process. — Metaphysician Undercover

On the other hand, it would not be difficult to link your desire to a physical basis - dehydration, perhaps, or level of alcohol in the bloodstream. But they are neither necessary not sufficient for desiring a beer, so they cannot be straightforward causes. Social context etc. might also be factors and those are rules or habits and so, again, not causal.

but knowledge is not infallible, and depending on the unknowns which are hidden underneath that "something known", the knowledge which constitutes the "something known" may even turn out later to be wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, I prefer to say that people are not infallible, so I would put the point differently. Notice, however, that providing a causal explanation for a rainbow does not conflict with the ordinary descriptions of it, though it may conflict with common sense explanations of it (such as that God put it there as a promise that he would not repeat the Flood.

There are no constraints prior to it coming into being, there are constraints after it comes into being. But what those constraints are cannot be predicted. Meaning it could be a photon, an explosion, or anything else you can imagine. — Philosophim

Well, if a first cause is the first cause of its universe, it may be unconstrained. But if your first cause photon can happen (in an already existing universe), then any constraints may only constrain it after it comes into being, but will apply the moment it does come in to being. But the consequences will, presumably, be unpredictable. Indeed, they must be.

Isn't that part of the fun though? Didn't you get to think about something new and different? Did you stretch your mind? Perhaps similar lines of thinking may do you well in your applications of theoretical math moving forward. I really do hope you enjoyed thinking about it. — Philosophim

Thanks, Pal. Same to you. :cool:

This time there is no re-invention needed. We have a clear definition of what it is, and what it would take to prove it exists. The Big Bang for example would be changed to, "The known starting point of universal creation" instead of "The first cause of creation". — Philosophim

Careful, now. If you say the Big Bang is the known starting-point of universal creation, you are saying, not only that it is the starting-point of universal creation, but that we know that it is. What you mean is that the Big Bang is the starting-point of universal creation so far as we know or, perhaps better, on the bases of the existing best theories.

There is an issue with your theory. You sweep everything up into one classification, and brush aside the variety and difference in the concepts of causation under one term. This is not wrong, exactly, because we do apply that term to all the different ideas. But it is no more significant that the conclusion that something exists, which neglects the differences between rainbows and trees, numbers and lines, arguments and theories, myths and fables, and all the rest of the many different kinds of object - and hence different kinds of existence (and of logic) that also exist. We have Aristotelian causes, Newtonian causes, Einsteinian causes, Quantum causes, not mention reasons for action, premises and conclusions in mathematical arguments. All of these are answers to the question "why" and begin with "because", but they operate in different ways and different fields.

So I don't say you are wrong. But I do say that you are brushing aside most of the interesting questions - and if you were to explain to me why you are doing that, you would misunderstand me if you explained the cause of your doing so.

This is an interesting idea, but interesting ideas are not proof. With the idea of first causes, anyone can propose an equally competitive idea. For example, I could just say that a God created souls, and souls create free will. Or I could say there are no souls and free will is deterministic. All these claims require proof now. You must prove without a doubt that something is a first cause.

Your description of a soul using first causes needs specifics. How can a soul channel something which the soul would not know would exist? After all, first causes are 100% unpredictable, and could be anything. So what you're really stating is that there are very specific first causes that follow very specific rules that pop into reality every time we make a choice. That doesn't make any sense or line up to the complete randomness of a first cause. So its an interesting idea, but logically doesn't make sense, let alone without proof. — Philosophim

That was just and idea. What I really believe is what I wrote later in the next post, that you need to consider two distinct types of cause. This way, "first cause" refers to the first in a chain of efficient causes, while allowing that there is a completely different type of "cause" which is prior to it. Here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/875937

There are no constraints prior to it coming into being, there are constraints after it comes into being. — Philosophim

This is incorrect, as demonstrated by my argument, there necessarily is constraints prior to its coming into being. "Constraints after it comes into being" doesn't even make sense. If the constraints only exist after the cause, then they have no capacity to act as constraints on the cause.

Look, here's the argument again, in short form. There must be something preexisting the "first cause" which the first cause acts on, in order for the cause to have an "effect", therefore to be known as a "cause". So the "first cause" cannot be absolutely unconstrained because the thing which preexists it, which it will have an effect on, will be a constraint to it.

In other words, your idea of an absolutely unconstrained "cause" is self-contradicting, because the concept of "cause" has constraints inherent within it. if you want to talk about a completely, or absolutely, unconstrained act, this act cannot be known as a "cause" in the common sense which relates "cause" to "effect", because that completely unconstrained act could not be said to have an "effect", effect being described in terms of "change".

Meaning it could be a photon, an explosion, or anything else you can imagine. — Philosophim

Your proposal of things to imagine as examples of first cause are all constrained by what is described in the terms of the examples, therefore those proposed "first causes" are actually constrained. In reality, if you can imagine it, then what you are imagining is the effects of the supposed "first cause" on the preexisting constraints, therefore constraint is implied by the image. So your requirement of no constraints is nonsense. This is what makes "first cause" as you propose, completely unimaginable, incomprehensible, unintelligible, and self-refuting nonsense.

Causal chains do not end unless existence itself disappears. A causal chain is not a creation of measurement by people, it is the reality of X influences Y's outcome. Even the disappearance of an existence may cause an outcome elsewhere. — Philosophim

Again, you are just demonstrating why your supposed conception of "first cause" is unintelligible nonsense. The very sane thing which you say about a causal chain ending also holds for a causal chain beginning. If X is the supposed "first cause", it must have a influence of Y, like you say. Y is the preexisting conditions which constitute the constraints on X.

To be clear once again, there is no restriction on what can occur. — Philosophim

The conditions you describe, "no restriction on what can occur", are conditions which eliminate the possibility of anything "occurring". That is why your proposal of the requirements for a "first cause" amount to unintelligible nonsense, self-contradiction.

Yes, I am confirming that you understood this perfectly! I'm just pointing out that you're drawing incorrect conclusions from this that necessitate free will is a first cause. — Philosophim

And I am pointing out to you, that your conception of "first cause" is simply unintelligible, as self-contradicting. So I propose that we dismiss it, and move along to something more rational, like what I propose in the link above, a distinction between types of cause. This would allow that a "first cause" in a causal chain would still have a prior "cause", but the prior cause would be of a distinctly different type, and not be describable as a part of the causal chain.

The logic points out that there must be a first cause, but it does not make any claim as to what that first cause might be. — Philosophim

So, let's start from this premise, and I'll show you where you go wrong. The use of "cause" here is strictly determined by the logical demonstration. We cannot stray outside of the meaning intended for "cause" within the argument, without invalidating the argument, and that argument produces the conclusion you refer to.

Now, the next question is how does a first cause arise. You assert that it must be absolutely unconstrained, and truly random, but this insistence is unjustified. All that is required as what is prior to the "first cause", is that it is something other than what is implied by "cause" in the sense of a causal chain. So it is not necessary to conclude that what is prior to the first cause is absolutely unconstrained randomness. This is not a valid conclusion, there may simply be something which doesn't qualify as a "cause" by the terms of the argument. So this is why Aristotle distinguished different senses of "cause". This allows that a "final cause" is actually prior to the "first cause" of a causal chain, when we recognize that "cause" in the sense of final cause is not consistent with "cause" in the sense of "efficient cause" as used in the argument of causal chains, which produces the conclusion of a first cause.

On the other hand, it would not be difficult to link your desire to a physical basis - dehydration, perhaps, or level of alcohol in the bloodstream. But they are neither necessary not sufficient for desiring a beer, so they cannot be straightforward causes. Social context etc. might also be factors and those are rules or habits and so, again, not causal. — Ludwig V

This lack of necessity is what necessitates, logically, that the type of causation is distinct. In the determinist causal chain there is no room for choice, selection, or any form of directing efficient causes toward an outcome, there is only a necessary relation. But to understand intentional actions we need to allow for selection, and this means that the relation between cause and effect is not necessary. So we have two senses of "cause" one with necessity one without, and these two are incompatible, therefore requiring the distinction between them.

There is an issue with your theory. You sweep everything up into one classification, and brush aside the variety and difference in the concepts of causation under one term. This is not wrong, exactly, because we do apply that term to all the different ideas. — Ludwig V

That is exactly the problem, but I would say that it is wrong, because we do use the term "cause" in very different ways. We do use "cause" to answer "why?", commonly in the form of "because". Failing to recognize the difference between very distinct and fundamentally incompatible uses of "cause", and attempting to restrict one's definition of "cause" to one or the other, as Philosophim does, will leave the aspects of reality which are understood by the other usage as unintelligible. This is demonstrably "wrong".

to be giving Philosophim some difficulty, the relationship between the first cause, and the resulting causal chain. In the descriptions, or definitions which Philosophim provides, there appears to be some ambiguity as to whether the first cause is part of the chain, or something separate from the chain. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then this I need to be clearer. The idea is that a first cause is not separate from the chain but is part of the chain, or the chain itself. A first cause is not explained by anything outside of itself, therefore must be explained by itself, and is the start of its impact on causality.

These are the principles laid out by Aristotle in the cosmological argument. A "cause" (in the modern sense which corresponds with Aristotelian efficient cause) is a contingent event. This means that it consists of two parts, the temporally prior potential for the event, and the posterior actuality, after the event. The "contingency" is due to the fact that the prior potential is always a potential for a multitude of possible events, and the resulting actuality is the one particular event which actually occurs. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't use this definition because I do not believe, except in cases of first cause, that there is a potential difference in outcomes. There is a difference between our inability to measure and predict, and real randomness as I've noted.

Now, if we ignore the "contingency" aspect and represent the causal chain as a simple cause precedes effect model, in a determinist way, then we effectively remove the "potential" from the model. One actual state precedes another actual state, and this determinist representation provides no real principle whereby we could say that the potential for an event precedes its actual occurrence, all there is is another actual event as cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, this is the way it is. Of course, if you disagree with this, that is of course your choice. I have never seen real randomness proved in science, only an inability to measure properly. The conclusion that a first cause logically exists only works with the idea that that everything is deterministic except first causes. By the way, I like your previous idea that first causes can influence the brain. If it is the case that we had very tiny things popping into existence all over the place constantly, it could very well apply a real randomness to outcomes as they bounce against the chemistry of the brain. But this is the only way randomness, according to the definitions I've provided, could ever come into the universe.

Careful, now. If you say the Big Bang is the known starting-point of universal creation, you are saying, not only that it is the starting-point of universal creation, but that we know that it is. — Ludwig V

Oh, let me clarify the way I define of knowledge. Knowledge is not truth to me. It is a tool we use to best assess what is most likely to be true with the observations and reason we have at the time. Meaning what is known can change without issue to me depending on context and tools. So I am in agreement with you. :)

There is an issue with your theory. You sweep everything up into one classification, and brush aside the variety and difference in the concepts of causation under one term.
But it is no more significant that the conclusion that something exists, which neglects the differences between rainbows and trees, numbers and lines, arguments and theories, myths and fables, and all the rest of the many different kinds of object - and hence different kinds of existence (and of logic) that also exist. We have Aristotelian causes, Newtonian causes, Einsteinian causes, Quantum causes, not mention reasons for action, premises and conclusions in mathematical arguments. — Ludwig V

The subdivision and different interpretations of general causality into specifics is done for different purposes. I'm using general causality because I want to end a debate that's been going on far too long. Is there a first cause. Yes. Done. Does this note that there must be a specific first cause? No, it can be anything we could imagine, but once in reality it is part of the chain of causality and can be found with evidence and proof. Done.

That's the problem that's trying to be solved. And I believe it is. It doesn't need a subdivision or a reexamination of causality beyond the simple and basic understanding all of us know. If causality exists, logically there must be a first cause. Its not about creating something interesting, its about solving a problem I see in philosophy, and giving a strong base for other ideas to be built on.

I appreciate your contribution Ludwig, its nice to see intelligent and friendly replies and critiques that understand what's being stated here.

Hey Metaphysician, I'll address your second post as well. I see it bleeds into my other response to you, so I'll try to address anything that was left out of my reply.

There are no constraints prior to it coming into being, there are constraints after it comes into being.
— Philosophim

This is incorrect, as demonstrated by my argument, there necessarily is constraints prior to its coming into being. "Constraints after it comes into being" doesn't even make sense. If the constraints only exist after the cause, then they have no capacity to act as constraints on the cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let me give an example so I can clarify. Imagine our photon again. Now a photon is a photon because of what it is and how it reacts to other existences. In other words, a photon doesn't suddenly produce a million dollar bills at its location. It also doesn't start talking or turn into an eggplant. It has rules, restrictions, and laws based on what it is.

So there is no rule as to what should appear as a first cause without referring backwards from any chain. Meaning if I'm staring at a blank area of the universe, there's no prediction as to what could appear as a first cause. But once that first cause appears, it is what it is. And what a thing is, is defined by rules based on its makeup and the way it consistently interacts with other things in the universe. The status of 'first cause' lasts for only one time tick in the universe. Once a second tick happens the cause of the existence of the thing at the second time tick is the existence of the thing at the first time tick.

Or, taken together as a set of infinite regressive causality, the first cause is the entire set itself. There is nothing prior. But if the first set made a second set, the second set is not a first cause, it is actually subsumed under the first set, as its a continuation of causality. A first cause is extremely literal and simple. "That which is not caused by anything else besides the fact of it existing."

In other words, your idea of an absolutely unconstrained "cause" is self-contradicting, because the concept of "cause" has constraints inherent within it. if you want to talk about a completely, or absolutely, unconstrained act, this act cannot be known as a "cause" in the common sense which relates "cause" to "effect", because that completely unconstrained act could not be said to have an "effect", effect being described in terms of "change". — Metaphysician Undercover

So to clarify, it is not self-contradicting. A first cause is defined as something which has no prior cause. If you are setting up a situation in which there must necessarily be a prior cause, then you aren't talking about a first cause. If a photon comes into the universe unbidden by anything, it is uncaused. From that moment on while it exists, it is then part of the chain of causality formed by that first initial formation.

Your proposal of things to imagine as examples of first cause are all constrained by what is described in the terms of the examples, therefore those proposed "first causes" are actually constrained. In reality, if you can imagine it, then what you are imagining is the effects of the supposed "first cause" on the preexisting constraints, therefore constraint is implied by the image. So your requirement of no constraints is nonsense. This is what makes "first cause" as you propose, completely unimaginable, incomprehensible, unintelligible, and self-refuting nonsense. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not seeing this. These are all examples of potential first causes, not assertions that they are first causes. What I'm noting is that because a first cause has no prior causation for its existence, there can be no constraints on its initial existence. Now this is only if we have no causal chain to examine. If we have a causal chain, we can work its way back up and see specifically what the first cause of that chain is. Once a first cause appears, it is constrained by its causal influence on reality. So while I'm noting that there is nothing that constrains what a first cause could potentially be, I'm not stating that any specific first cause that does exist, could potentially be something it is not.

For example, if the big bang is the actual first cause of existence in the universe, then we can trace physics back to it, and attempt to demonstrate conclusively that there is nothing prior to the big bang. It doesn't mean that we can trace physics back to the big bang and then randomly claim, "It was actually a little bang".

But, lets say suddenly another universe appears out of nowhere and we have no causal chain to work up to. The first cause of that universe could potentially be anything. The actuality of what it is can in theory be discovered. But there was no rule that necessitated that universe appear at all, or that the first cause had show up right there. Does that clear up the issue?

Knowledge is not truth to me. It is a tool we use to best assess what is most likely to be true with the observations and reason we have at the time. — Philosophim

We certainly have tools to assess hypotheses and we certainly use "know" when we have discovered it. Knowledge isn't truth; it is applied when someone has discovered the truth. When we have only discovered what is most likely to be true, we use "believe". You can decide to use "know" differently, but if you do, the distinction between knowledge and belief is blurred and pointless. True, people can get things wrong. But that's not a problem. We just withdraw the claim to know.

I'm using general causality because I want to end a debate that's been going on far too long. — Philosophim

I don't think you are going to succeed. There are questions beyond the Big Bang. Whether you call them causal or not, they will, no doubt, be answered. And further questions will develop. And people will call all of these things causes. You can insist they are not, but that won't affect the process.

Knowledge isn't truth; it is applied when someone has discovered the truth. — Ludwig V

I've written my own viewpoints on knowledge that I've developed over years here if you're interested. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1 There's a summary by the immediate next poster that nails the paper 100%, so feel free to check it out if you're curious.

And further questions will develop. And people will call all of these things causes. You can insist they are not, but that won't affect the process. — Ludwig V

I don't think I'm asserting anything as a first cause that would later be found to have a prior cause. Claiming something is a first cause is not a trivial task. It must be proven, and proving such a thing is rather difficult. I think my points greatly reduce the need to label something as a first cause, and I am for sure not asserting that anything in our universe that we know of should be labeled as a first cause. I do not believe the Big Bang is an actual first cause, I was simply using it as a hypothetical in examples to remove a bit of abstraction from the overall points.

Then this I need to be clearer. The idea is that a first cause is not separate from the chain but is part of the chain, or the chain itself. A first cause is not explained by anything outside of itself, therefore must be explained by itself, and is the start of its impact on causality. — Philosophim

This is what I think makes your sense of "first cause" unintelligible, the stipulation that it cannot be explained by anything other than itself. So let me explain why I believe this.

The first cause is stipulated to be part of the causal chain, therefore it is the supposed to be the same type of cause as any other of the causes in the chain. However, it has a fundamental difference, the chain does not extend beyond it to the earlier time. That makes the "first cause" actually a completely different type of "cause", its existence cannot be said to have been contingent on the occurrence of a prior cause as is the case with the other causes in the chain. Because of this difference we must class it as categorically different from all the other causes in that causal chain, and the same for all the other causal chains. In other words, the "first cause" does not abide by the inductive (general) principles by which we describe all the other causes of causal chains, it cannot be observed to have a cause, therefore we must categorize it separately.

Now, we have a distinct type of cause, the "first cause", which is stipulated as different from all the other causes in the causal chain. You say that the first cause is not explained by anything other than itself, but this claim is not justified. What is justified is that there is no cause for the first cause, "cause" being as described in the sense of the causal chain. But now we've determined a different type of "cause". Since we have now determined the reality of a different type of cause, there is nothing to indicate that there cannot be any reason for the first cause, the first cause being a completely different type of cause itself. Therefore there could be a reason for the first cause, that reason being a type of cause which is other than a "cause" as described in the causal chain.

Yes, this is the way it is. Of course, if you disagree with this, that is of course your choice. I have never seen real randomness proved in science, only an inability to measure properly. — Philosophim

What you do not seem to grasp is that there is no need to assume real randomness. That a first cause is necessary may be proven logically, but it does not follow that there can be no reason for the first cause. It only follows that there cannot be a cause of the first cause, in the sense that "cause" is used in the chain of causes. However, as I explain above, by determining a "first cause" you have already shown that there is a type of cause which is other than how "cause" is used to refer to causes in the causal chain. Therefore we have the premise (a different type of cause) which is required to say that the cause of the first cause may be a different type of cause, rather than concluding randomness.

By the way, I like your previous idea that first causes can influence the brain. If it is the case that we had very tiny things popping into existence all over the place constantly, it could very well apply a real randomness to outcomes as they bounce against the chemistry of the brain. But this is the only way randomness, according to the definitions I've provided, could ever come into the universe. — Philosophim

The problem though, is that this explanation doesn't quite work. If the first causes are truly random as you insist, then the brain would have absolutely no way of predicting the occurrence of them, so it could not construct itself around them, or have any way to possibly use them. That's why I backed away from that idea. But free will demonstrates that the brain can and does make use of the first causes as they pop into being, so there must be some way to, in some sense, predict their occurrence. This is why I decided there must be some type of cause for their occurrence, but the cause is a "cause" in a sense other than "cause" in the sense of the causal chain.

So there is no rule as to what should appear as a first cause without referring backwards from any chain. Meaning if I'm staring at a blank area of the universe, there's no prediction as to what could appear as a first cause. — Philosophim

I don't agree with this. The "first cause" is simply a special type of cause, different from other causes because it marks the beginning of a causal chain. What this means is that it is not predictable in the same way that other causes are predictable. But this does not imply that it is not predictable in an absolute way. Once we start to identify the real existence of first causes, we may start to understand that they have patterns of occurrence, and that they are, through some mathematical principles, predictable. That there is not a cause for their occurrence, in the sense that "cause" is used to describe the causal chain, does not imply that their occurrence is absolutely unreasonable.

But once that first cause appears, it is what it is. And what a thing is, is defined by rules based on its makeup and the way it consistently interacts with other things in the universe. The status of 'first cause' lasts for only one time tick in the universe. Once a second tick happens the cause of the existence of the thing at the second time tick is the existence of the thing at the first time tick. — Philosophim

I don't quite follow this. Once the cause appears, it is in the past, and what persists at that time is not the cause, but the effect. Any posterior interaction is the effect of the first cause acting as a cause, and this is not a first cause, but a regular part of the causal chain. Therefore I do not see how you can talk about "the way it consistently interacts with other things in the universe". That appears to be contradictory.

A first cause is extremely literal and simple. "That which is not caused by anything else besides the fact of it existing." — Philosophim

The problem, as I've shown you, is that this definition of "first cause" is not necessitated by your argument. The argument shows that the first cause is not caused in the same way that other causes in the causal chain are caused. But, by showing that there is necessarily a first cause, you also show the first cause to be a type of cause which is not the same as the other causes. Since the argument demonstrates that there is more than one type of cause, this allows that the cause of the first cause might just be a different type of cause. Therefore you do not have the premises required to conclude that the first cause is not caused by anything. It may just be caused by a different type of cause.

What I'm noting is that because a first cause has no prior causation for its existence, there can be no constraints on its initial existence. Now this is only if we have no causal chain to examine. If we have a causal chain, we can work its way back up and see specifically what the first cause of that chain is. — Philosophim

See, you are denying the possibility that the reason for the first cause might be something other than what is evident as a causal chain. But this denial is unjustified. Further more, we see that it is very common place that the reason for an event is other than a causal chain, and that is the case with intentional acts. So not only is your assertion that if something occurs without a prior causal chain it cannot have any reason whatsoever for its occurrence, unjustified, it is also demonstrated by evidence to be false.

For example, if the big bang is the actual first cause of existence in the universe, then we can trace physics back to it, and attempt to demonstrate conclusively that there is nothing prior to the big bang. It doesn't mean that we can trace physics back to the big bang and then randomly claim, "It was actually a little bang". — Philosophim

Taking this example, "the big bang", we trace the causal chain to that event, and as you say, we determine it to be a "first cause". This does not imply that there is "nothing prior to the big bang. What it implies is that there is not a cause of the big bang in the sense that "cause" is used in tracing the causal chain to the big bang. So we must allow the possibility that the reason for the big bang is something other than a "cause" in the sense of the causal chain which was traced, i.e. a different type of cause.

:up:

This notion of first cause being the existence of the chain is no more than interesting speculation. When I speak of a chain receding to infinity that doesn't leave much to grasp at philosophically, so one resorts to the "being" of the chain , like yanking on an emergency cord. That's all there is, so that must be it.

Entertaining speculative exercise.

When I speak of a chain receding to infinity that doesn't leave much to grasp at philosophically, so one resorts to the "being" of the chain , like yanking on an emergency cord. — jgill

What I find in metaphysics is logical demonstrations as to why this idea of "a chain receding to infinity" is unrealistic. That type of chain is shown to be logically consistent and therefore logically possible, and even attractive to some people, as seductive in a a sort of aesthetic or emotional way. That is the rhetoric of sophistry, which persuades by evoking pleasant feelings like pride, confidence, power, and courage. However, our experience, empirical evidence, can produce inductive principles which when employed as premises demonstrate logically why such a chain is not physically possible. Of course there is an issue with inductive principles as shown by Hume, so those who enjoy thinking about, and conceiving, chains receding to infinity, often feel justified in presenting these as if they could be real physical existents.

That a first cause is necessary may be proven logically, but it does not follow that there can be no reason for the first cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh, I never claimed that there was no reason for a first cause. The reason for a first cause is that, "It exists without prior cause." Meaning that there is no other reason for why it exists. If there is no other reason for its existence, there cannot be any rule which made it come into being. Meaning the only logical conclusion is that its existence is truly random as I've defined above.

Because of this difference we must class it as categorically different from all the other causes in that causal chain, and the same for all the other causal chains. In other words, the "first cause" does not abide by the inductive (general) principles by which we describe all the other causes of causal chains, it cannot be observed to have a cause, therefore we must categorize it separately. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, its category is merely the first right? Categorizing it or naming it differently doesn't make it any different from what I've noted. The only difference is that it does not have a prior cause. Trying to overcomplicate it doesn't change what it is.

You say that the first cause is not explained by anything other than itself, but this claim is not justified. What is justified is that there is no cause for the first cause, "cause" being as described in the sense of the causal chain. But now we've determined a different type of "cause". — Metaphysician Undercover

You've lost me here. How is it different? If something is not caused by something else, how is my claim not justified? I hear the claim, but I'm not seeing the evidence or reasoning. The first cause is something which is not explained by something else, but is a cause when it interacts with other existences forming the normal chain of causality we understand. Its not different besides the fact that it is an uncaused existence.

Since we have now determined the reality of a different type of cause, there is nothing to indicate that there cannot be any reason for the first cause, the first cause being a completely different type of cause itself. Therefore there could be a reason for the first cause, that reason being a type of cause which is other than a "cause" as described in the causal chain. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, there is no reason that this follows. The reason for the first cause is its own existence simply being. If you have another cause 'cause' a first cause, its not a first cause. This is a clear contradiction Metaphysical.

What this means is that it is not predictable in the same way that other causes are predictable. But this does not imply that it is not predictable in an absolute way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you explain why? I've presented a clear argument why it is absolutely not predictable which I'll post again. The reason why patterns, rules, and laws happen is because there is a solid reason besides itself. A reason that does not involve itself, is a cause that is separate from itself. A first cause can have no other cause besides itself. There can be no outside constraint that forces it to be. There can be no outside constraint that forces it not to be. It simply is. Thus it is completely unpredictable and not constrained by any outside cause.

If you say its not absolutely random, how? What is causing it to not be absolutely random? That's the question that you'll have to answer without introducing another cause.

Once we start to identify the real existence of first causes, we may start to understand that they have patterns of occurrence, and that they are, through some mathematical principles, predictable. That there is not a cause for their occurrence, in the sense that "cause" is used to describe the causal chain, does not imply that their occurrence is absolutely unreasonable. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is almost true. First, first causes will never be predictable no matter how much we study them. Study assumes that what is consistent today will be consistent tomorrow. The appearance of a first cause can never be consistent, because some other cause was making it consistent. It would be consistent if it just happened to appear consistent.

Now what I have done in other posts is compared the likelihood of a first cause appearing based on the limitations of space and time. I do not promise that my math is perfect at all and I was hoping for someone to give their own take on it, but it seems that we can use cardinality to demonstrate that first causes would most likely be small. If anything can happen in a cube of space, there is a much higher degree of cardinality that something would appear within in a slice of that cube than the cube itself. I can go into more detail next time if you wish, but we need to settle the point of absolute randomness first.

Back to the point, no amount of study will ever show a first cause to be consistent, because the definition of a first cause prevents there from being any other cause which would constraint it to consistency.

Therefore you do not have the premises required to conclude that the first cause is not caused by anything. It may just be caused by a different type of cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

This right here is the crux. No, this is a contradiction. A first cause cannot, by definition, be caused by another cause.

Taking this example, "the big bang", we trace the causal chain to that event, and as you say, we determine it to be a "first cause". This does not imply that there is "nothing prior to the big bang. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. If it is proven and determined to be a first cause, and it is a first cause, there is nothing prior to the big bang. That's the definition. Anything which has a prior cause does not meet the criterion of a first cause.

This notion of first cause being the existence of the chain is no more than interesting speculation. When I speak of a chain receding to infinity that doesn't leave much to grasp at philosophically, so one resorts to the "being" of the chain , like yanking on an emergency cord. — jgill

I really wish you would stop demeaning the post without anything but a deriding opinion. I have answered your questions and critiques, so I would like a little more respect for what I've written here. Either demonstrate the argument is false, or not.

What I find in metaphysics is logical demonstrations as to why this idea of "a chain receding to infinity" is unrealistic. — Metaphysician Undercover

I also agree, but I decided to take an approach of, "What if it was real?" Turns out it still results in a first cause so the idea of infinite prior causality is moot.

First, I'm not a physicist which is why I linked you the material to read. But I think what you're looking for is that we either do not know the exact mechanisms or we are unable to know after the fact. Our lack of knowledge or inability is of course not enough to declare it as a first cause however. That's because we've clearly defined what a first cause is so can easily identify it. — Philosophim

I still have not communicated. I'll try one more time. BTW - not that it's truly relevant but I was a physics major in college (albeit not a very good physicist). I gave the example of an atom decaying because it's easy to visualize - but in fact this is only one of many examples in physics where causality falls apart.

Anyway your definition of first cause seems to have two components - firstly that is is the beginning of a causal chain and secondly that it must fit into your definition of random - i.e. the atom can decay into a refrigerator.

While the decay of an atom is not random per your definition, if is completely and totally random with respect to the time at which it decays. It could decay 10 seconds from now or 10 billion years from now - but there is no prior event which determines when this happens. This is not a matter of lack of knowledge or our inability to measure something. When quantum mechanics were first formulated there was intense discussion/debate amongst the scientific community about what this meant. We have Einstein's famous quote that "[God] doesn't play dice' . But it has been proven over and over again that this is how the universe works - and Bell's Theorem has removed all reasonable doubt. *

we do not know the exact mechanisms — Philosophim

We know the mechanism - and the randomness in outcomes is baked into the mechanism. This is not like rolling the dice or flipping a coin - these can be predicted with sufficiently accurate measuring systems.

Every time an atom decays it is the start of a new causal chain.

So this gets to your second element - the lack of complete and total randomness in outcomes. And here we are getting into metaphysical definitions about which I have no opinion. I leave that part of the discussion between you and @Metaphysician Undercover.

I've said all I can say here - I give you the last word.

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* In the interest of completeness it should be noted that there are still a small number of folks in the scientific community who are trying to keep some notion of causality alive - but at best causality is on life support.

secondly that it must fit into your definition of random - i.e. the atom can decay into a refrigerator. — EricH

That still does not explain a first cause. An atom decaying into a refrigerator would have a prior cause of the atom's existence. Its really just the case of nothing, then something.

While the decay of an atom is not random per your definition, if is completely and totally random with respect to the time at which it decays. It could decay 10 seconds from now or 10 billion years from now - but there is no prior event which determines when this happens. — EricH

The first part is true. The second part has no evidence that it is true. The second must be proven to be true, not believed or assumed because we cannot currently see the exact moment before decay occurs.

This is not a matter of lack of knowledge or our inability to measure something. — EricH

No, it is. Look, the quantum mechanics scale is so difficult to measure that our very measurements affect the outcome. Its a ton of estimation and probability combined with limited measurements. In no way would any quantum physicist ever state that our calculations are based on absolute precision measurements and a full understanding of the exact location of electrons and quarks.

In the interest of completeness it should be noted that there are still a small number of folks in the scientific community who are trying to keep some notion of causality alive - but at best causality is on life support. — EricH

I have had this notion told to me only by people on these boards. I have not heard of any scientists who are peddling this notion. Causality is alive and well in science. I would require of examples that show causality is not useful or used instead of broad and unbacked accusations like this.

Good conversation EricH, the last word does not mean I'm correct, it just means we've reached the end of where we can go. :)

Oh, I never claimed that there was no reason for a first cause. The reason for a first cause is that, "It exists without prior cause." Meaning that there is no other reason for why it exists. — Philosophim

This is what I dispute. You do not have the principles required to say "there is no other reason why it exists. You have your own reason for assuming a first cause, the logic you demonstrated and this produces your conclusion, that the reason for it is "It exists without prior cause", but you cannot be certain that this is the correct reason for it. Therefore unless you know that your logic (the logic which concludes the reason for the first cause is solely to be the first cause) is absolutely certain, without any flaws, then you are not justified in claiming this reason. And, I've already shown you that your treatment of infinite regress and the eternal circle is flawed, so I think you ought to also accept that your reason for the first cause is also flawed.

The only difference is that it does not have a prior cause. — Philosophim

This is an essential difference though. All the other causes are known to be contingent, dependent on a prior cause, and that is how we know these causes through empirical evidence and inductive reasoning. This cause, the "first cause", has an essential difference, it is not known directly by inductive reasoning, but by deductive logic, which makes it necessary. Therefore what you call "the only difference" is a very significant difference, which makes the two types of causes categorically distinct, one type contingent, the other necessary.

You've lost me here. How is it different? — Philosophim

It is different because causation in the causal chain is defined by empirical observations, and inductive principles. Being an inductive generalization, the causes must be all of the same type, by the defining principles, to be placed in the same category. That there is a prior cause to any contingent cause is a defining feature. If it was not a defining feature we would not have the appearance of infinite regress. The "first cause" does not have this defining feature, therefore it cannot be placed in that category, it must be a distinct type of cause. However, it is still a "cause" in some sense because it has a similar type of effect, which allows you to make it part of, the base for, the causal chain. Therefore we need to allow for the reality of at least two distinct types of "cause".

The reason for the first cause is its own existence simply being. — Philosophim

That's your reason for the first cause, but you may be wrong.

Can you explain why? I've presented a clear argument why it is absolutely not predictable which I'll post again. The reason why patterns, rules, and laws happen is because there is a solid reason besides itself. A reason that does not involve itself, is a cause that is separate from itself. A first cause can have no other cause besides itself. There can be no outside constraint that forces it to be. There can be no outside constraint that forces it not to be. It simply is. Thus it is completely unpredictable and not constrained by any outside cause. — Philosophim

I've already explained, but I'll try again. When you say " A first cause can have no other cause besides itself", this is not a sound conclusion. What the logic shows is that the first cause cannot have a "cause" in the same sense of "cause" as in the causal chain. This does not exclude the possibility that the first cause may have a "cause" in another sense of the word. And, that there is at least one other type of cause is a necessary conclusion from the argument, due to the fact that the first cause is another type of cause.

This is almost true. First, first causes will never be predictable no matter how much we study them. Study assumes that what is consistent today will be consistent tomorrow. The appearance of a first cause can never be consistent, because some other cause was making it consistent. It would be consistent if it just happened to appear consistent. — Philosophim

You are simply not accepting the reality that the first cause could have a "cause" in another sense of the word "cause", a different type of cause. And, that there is at least one other type of cause is a conclusion made necessary by the argument.

This right here is the crux. No, this is a contradiction. A first cause cannot, by definition, be caused by another cause. — Philosophim

Again, you are not accepting the possibility of other types of causes. The argument demonstrates that the first cause cannot be caused by the type of cause which constitutes the causal chain. But the argument also demonstrates that the first cause is itself a different type of cause, like I explained. That is how the infinite regress is avoided. Therefore the reality of other types of causes is already demonstrated by your own argument, and there is nothing to prevent us from hypothesizing that there is another type of cause which is the cause of the first cause. There is no contradiction, just different types of causes, which the argument demonstrates is a necessary conclusion.