Of course not. Suppose instead we observe such a chain in nature, imbedding it in our minds. It now exists in two realms. — jgill
Does an act of "measurement" affect FC? — jgill
Yes and no. There are two modes of explanation involved and much difficulty about the relationship between the two. There is, presumably, a causal chain involved. There is also what is usually called a rational or purposive explanation involved. These two are in different categories or frameworks. We are finding out a good deal about the first kind. We use the second kind every day. We (well, philosophers,) are in a good deal of confusion about the relation between the two. It won't do to say that they are just different kinds of explanation and leave it at that - though that was popular a few decades ago. Nor will it do to "reduce" one to the other or identify one or other as the "real" explanation. How much more do you want? It would take us miles beyond this thread. Perhaps I should post that paragraph as the beginning of a discussion. — Ludwig V
A random event is not about our current ability to measure to predict, it is about a hard logical limitation to predict. A first cause is something self-explained, there is nothing prior that causes it. Such a thing cannot be predicted to arise as there is absolutely nothing causing it.
The point I'm trying to make is that randomness due to lack of knowledge is not the same as randomness with even perfect omniscience could not predict. — Philosophim
Its actually been determined that people can make unconscious decisions up to 11 second prior to them being aware of it. https://qz.com/1569158/neuroscientists-read-unconscious-brain-activity-to-predict-decisions — Philosophim
A constraint is part of what causes an outcome. A first cause cannot have constraints or anything that would lead a particular outcome. Because that would 'cause' the first 'first cause' to be. Meaning its not really a first cause. A first cause is as simple as "No quark is there, not a quark is there." There is nothing that caused the quark. It exists purely because it does. — Philosophim
This again would need to be proven. I don't think science points that way. I think its pretty clear the brain has a sense of timing and it can be traced through causality. But, as I noted earlier, you have an interesting idea that could be tested. — Philosophim
We don't get to create the chain. — Philosophim
From the free will perspective, such a relationship cannot be established, because there is another active force involved, that of the soul, and this active force actually ends and begins causal chains. — Metaphysician Undercover
OK then, by your definition, "a first cause" is "truly random", not even omniscience could predict it. So, what I am arguing is that this is consistent with "free will" as a first cause, not even omniscience could predict it. — Metaphysician Undercover
Its actually been determined that people can make unconscious decisions up to 11 second prior to them being aware of it. https://qz.com/1569158/neuroscientists-read-unconscious-brain-activity-to-predict-decisions
— Philosophim
I don't see how this is relevant. If a type of decision can be made in this way, it does not imply that all decisions are made in this way. Many human acts for example, are shown to be simply reflexive, but this does not mean that all human acts are reflexive. — Metaphysician Undercover
Constraints do not necessarily lead to "a particular outcome", constraints limit the possibilities. Therefore your appeal to constraints in this context does nothing to imply that a free will act does not produce a first cause. — Metaphysician Undercover
As mentioned above, in my reply to Ludwig, I think this idea of "a sense of timing" is from a naive form of scientism, based in determinism. In reality there is probably thousands, or millions, of causally chains occurring in the brain at the same time, extremely rapidly, far beyond the brain's capacity to understand its own mechanics. — Metaphysician Undercover
We don't get to create the chain.
— Philosophim
As explained above, this is an unsound premise. You insist that the idea of a free will act being an uncaused cause cannot be accepted without prove, but the inverse principle holds just as well. — Metaphysician Undercover
And the vast multitude of causal chains which are active within the brain, in an extremely rapid way, make it very difficult to understand with any degree of certainty, whether some are actually beginning and ending there. If the causal chains are beginning within the brain, then we cannot say "we don't get to create the chain". — Metaphysician Undercover
While a first cause is logically necessary, — Philosophim
I'm not intending at all to debate the soul, so lets assume one exists. If free will comes from the soul, then free will is not a first cause. Is the soul a first cause then? For it to fit within a first cause it would need to be to be randomly created. There should be no reason a soul should or should not exist. Meaning that a God could not have created them. For if God created souls, then souls are not first causes. I just want you to be aware of this. — Philosophim
To think about the issue, lets say then that a soul is not behind free will but free will is its own thing uncaused by anything else. To prove this, we would have to show that free will is limitless and unconstrained. Except there are a few things we find.
1. Free will is constrained to living things. Free will does not exist on its own in the universe.
2. Free will is constrained to certain biological functions like the brain and nerves. Unless you think your toes or rocks can have free will.
3. Free will shouldn't be contained or limited by intelligence, and yet it is. A roach does not have the same will as a human being.
All of these things refute the idea that free will is a first cause. There are clearly only certain areas where free will can form and is constrained by that biology. — Philosophim
You should read the article, its pretty interesting. Here's the second paragraph:
"Using the fMRI to monitor brain activity and machine learning to analyze the neuroimages, the researchers were able to predict which pattern participants would choose up to 11 seconds before they consciously made the decision. And they were able to predict how vividly the participants would be able to envisage it."
That's not a reflex, that's a choice. — Philosophim
Let me explain. Take a die roll. Can you roll a die and have a pink elephant appear? No. There are plenty of causes that explain the die roll. A '1' is a result because someone created the die to have a 1. It rolled because of the force of a human putting it into a cup, shaking it, and dropping it. It rattled because of gravity and reactions to force. It stopped moving because of friction. The die result is not a first cause. It is caused by many other forces and constraints. — Philosophim
A first cause has zero reason for its existence besides the fact that it exists. This means there can be no constraints as to what or why it exists. Of course, once it forms, its part of causality and may be limited. Once a thing lasts longer than a measure of time, it is no longer a first cause. At that second tick of time, it is caused by the previous tick in time. It is only at that first tick of time where nothing prior has formed, restricted, or influenced its appearance that it is a first cause. — Philosophim
I agree 100%. As we come to understand the basics of what I wrote, we realize that tons of chains interlink all over the place. A first cause is not an interlink though. It is the end of prior causality somewhere in that mess. While there logically must be at least one, there could be several. And each would be exceedingly difficult to prove. How to you prove that prior to a certain point, a "X" (variable) has no reason for its existence? There's always the question that we simply missed something with our instruments or understanding. Proving that there is no instrument or understanding that could show some prior cause is very difficult. While a first cause is logically necessary, proving that "X" is one is a very high bar. — Philosophim
No, this is not the case. A first cause necessitates that it be uncaused by something prior. If there is evidence at all that some other type of causality is in place, then a claim of a first cause fails. Here's one last nail in the coffin. Free will must respond to a stimulous, or choice. Do I go left, or right? What caused me to go left or right? One part of the prior cause is that I had an option to go left or right. Choices are necessarily caused by the limitations in front of us. Something which has no prior cause has no restraint as to what it must be. — Philosophim
Choices are necessarily caused by the limitations in front of us. Something which has no prior cause has no restraint as to what it must be. — Philosophim
An inability to understand something completely is not evidence of a first cause. Evidence of a first cause requires that there be no possible explanation for why "X" occurs. Our comprehension of it is irrelevant. Free will has too much evidence that it is constrained and influenced by other factors. Therefore it is not possible that free will is a first cause. — Philosophim
:smile:The uncaused caused cannot have an effect (therefore it cannot be "a cause") unless there is something already existing which it will have an effect on — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, I agree. But that means whenever we think we have found a first cause, we must ask ourselves whether that is due to the limitations of our tools and evidence or to it really being a first cause. I would always bet on the former. Under what circumstances could I confidently bet on the latter? Given the ingenuity and determination human beings have displayed over the last 400 or 500 years, I can't imagine any.I meant that there are no existing proven discoveries of anything that is a first cause. No one to my mind, has ever conclusively proven that any "x" exists without something prior causing it to be. A belief or limitation in current capabilities is not evidence of a first cause. We must have the tools and evidence to conclusively demonstrate something is a first cause. — Philosophim
"Prepared" is the right word. I regard it as an unsolved problem; perhaps I'll have something to offer one day. If not me, it will be someone else.I take it that you are not prepared to make any judgements about the relationship between the two "modes of explanation". — Metaphysician Undercover
I'm sorry, It was not helpful to use the word "popular" in different senses in successive sentences. This observation refers to Ryle and his followers. They thought that identifying categories was the end of the story, but that isn't satisfactory on its own - at least, not in this case. Ryle seems to recognize this in the context of his discussion of perception in "Dilemmas"I don't agree with your claim that in the past it was popular to just say that the two were different, and leave it at that. — Metaphysician Undercover
It was certainly popular amongst some philosophers. Whether that way is the way things appear to us or is an analysis from a specific philosophical point of view (dualism) is another question.I think the popular way was just to take it for granted that intention, purpose, free will, acts to produce a first cause. It was popular just to accept the way things appear to us, — Metaphysician Undercover
The first cause must have an effect on the causal chain it initiates. Therefore, by definition, it is an element of that chain and not something prior and abstract. — jgill
I'm sorry, It was not helpful to use the word "popular" in different senses in successive sentences. This observation refers to Ryle and his followers. They thought that identifying categories was the end of the story, but that isn't satisfactory on its own - at least, not in this case. Ryle seems to recognize this in the context of his discussion of perception in "Dilemmas" — Ludwig V
Common sense explanations cannot possibly depend on unknown and unseen events in the brain (or mind); if that were so, common people like us could never explain what people do. In their simplest form, explanations of action give the agent's rationale for action (together with indications how sound that rationale is). — Ludwig V
That cannot be the same as a causal explanation, because a rationale justifies the action, whereas a causal explanation does not justify or fail to justify what it explains. A major difference is that a rationale explains the values that provoke or motivation the action, and causal explanations have no equivalent to the question what motivates an action. — Ludwig V
It is a tempting hypothesis and could be particularly useful when we want to link incommensurable theories. But I wouldn't be sure unless I had some examples.Would you agree that we can have two distinct types, or categories of "cause", in the way I describe above, such that the "first cause" in a chain of one particular category of causes, has a prior cause of a different type? — Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not sure I can cope with different types of actuality. Can't we just talk about the actuality of contingent things and the actuality of necessary things?There is the contingent type of actuality which always has the prior potential, and there is the logically necessary type of actuality, demonstrated by the logic to be prior to the contingent actuality, as necessary for the existence of a contingent actuality — Metaphysician Undercover
One can always dive deeper into an explanation (i.e. ask why a particular causal link holds). There's nothing special there. But there must be something known about A and B as a basis of the explanation. No doubt we all had a moment of illumination when we were presented with the causal explanation of a rainbow. We don't abandon what we knew beforehand and we knew fine what a rainbow is before that. Indeed, we couldn't understand the explanation unless we did know. We add the causal explanation in to our understanding of what a rainbow is. Similarly with wants and needs, beliefs and assumptions and their physical counterparts.I do not see the problem here. I think that common sense explanations do, very often, rely on unknown events. This is because we explain things without knowing in completion the thing we are explaining. So the unknown is always lurking within the explanation somewhere. — Metaphysician Undercover
"Cause" is defined by the theory/hypotheses that it is part of, or theories and hypotheses have different ideas of what a cause is. I recognize those as different types of causation. Common sense explanations of actions are incredibly complicated. I would not rule out the possibility that some of the factors we appeal to might be considered causal. Examples would be needed. But I'm pretty clear that such explanations are often, even primarily, interpretations of actions. Analysis of all this is further complicated by the familiar fact that actions are mostly describable in different ways and can form into hierarchical structures, and explanations may address just one level of the hierarchy.Would you accept, that the rationale, the values etc., which motivate an action, are "causal"? But this would mean that we obviously need to distinguish two distinct types of causation, one being the sense of a causal chain of physical events, the other being the motivators for actions of living beings. — Metaphysician Undercover
A hypothetical chain going back to infinity doesn't have to have a first cause. — jgill
I would prefer more emphasis on the chain itself and its origin than on what comes before its origin. — jgill
The first cause must have an effect on the causal chain it initiates. Therefore, by definition, it is an element of that chain and not something prior and abstract. — jgill
Although you are not being theological here, your assertion is equivalent to the existence of God. — jgill
I only wish this thread wasn't ultimately so existential and debatable. — jgill
I'm not sure I can cope with different types of actuality. Can't we just talk about the actuality of contingent things and the actuality of necessary things? — Ludwig V
One can always dive deeper into an explanation (i.e. ask why a particular causal link holds). There's nothing special there. But there must be something known about A and B as a basis of the explanation. No doubt we all had a moment of illumination when we were presented with the causal explanation of a rainbow. We don't abandon what we knew beforehand and we knew fine what a rainbow is before that. Indeed, we couldn't understand the explanation unless we did know. We add the causal explanation in to our understanding of what a rainbow is. Similarly with wants and needs, beliefs and assumptions and their physical counterparts. — Ludwig V
"Cause" is defined by the theory/hypotheses that it is part of, or theories and hypotheses have different ideas of what a cause is. I recognize those as different types of causation. Common sense explanations of actions are incredibly complicated. I would not rule out the possibility that some of the factors we appeal to might be considered causal. Examples would be needed. But I'm pretty clear that such explanations are often, even primarily, interpretations of actions. Analysis of all this is further complicated by the familiar fact that actions are mostly describable in different ways and can form into hierarchical structures, and explanations may address just one level of the hierarchy. — Ludwig V
So it is not that the soul is a first cause, nor strictly speaking, is free will itself the first cause, but there are first causes, and the soul is able to utilize them for its purposes toward effecting change in the world. The reality of the free will is what provides us evidence that there are first causes, and the evidence is that the soul is using first causes toward its goals. The soul itself is not a first cause, but the soul has free will, and the free will requires first causes for its existence. — Metaphysician Undercover
So the issue of constraints is not relevant, as I said above. The soul has free will, and it is free because of the reality of uncaused causes which are happening within the living body, but the soul is still constrained by the physical reality of that body at the same time. — Metaphysician Undercover
I've read similar articles already. The point I made about reflex was to demonstrate your illogical use of that article. That some human actions are reflex, does not mean that all human actions are reflex. That is my analogous example. Likewise, that some decisions occur in the way indicated in the article, does not imply that all decision occur in this way. So the article doesn't provide any point to argue, it's like someone arguing that since some human actions are by reflex, therefore free will is not real. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't see any relevance here. We are talking about the free will act which rolls the die, and how this act utilizes first causes, we are not talking about the action of the die rolling after being thrown. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't agree with this. I do not think that you understand the relationship between first causes and constraints.
The first cause comes into being without any reason for its existence, as you say, but it comes into being into an already existing environment. It is not caused by that environment, nevertheless it comes into being in that environment. Therefore there are constraints which are prior to it, which necessarily limit (constrain) its coming into being as it does so, specifically the effect it will have. There are no constraints as to why it exists, but there are constraints as to what effect it will have. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think the existence of free will provides very good evidence of the reality of first causes. Look at all the causal chains which must come to an end within us, much of the energy we eat gets stored, so it turns passive. And all the causal chains of all information we absorb through sensation must come to an end if they do not cause a reflex. — Metaphysician Undercover
Again, you are misrepresenting the role of constraints. The uncaused cause comes into being without a cause, in the middle of preexisting constraints. The limitations, are not causal, they are only restrictions to the cause. So it is incorrect to say that the uncaused cause has no restraint on it. — Metaphysician Undercover
It's simple logic. The uncaused caused cannot have an effect (therefore it cannot be "a cause") unless there is something already existing which it will have an effect on. Therefore it necessarily comes into an existing environment. And the already existing thing which the uncaused cause has an effect on, will be a constraint to the uncaused cause. Therefore the uncaused cause will necessarily be constrained. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, I agree. But that means whenever we think we have found a first cause, we must ask ourselves whether that is due to the limitations of our tools and evidence or to it really being a first cause. I would always bet on the former. Under what circumstances could I confidently bet on the latter? Given the ingenuity and determination human beings have displayed over the last 400 or 500 years, I can't imagine any. — Ludwig V
My point was that every time something like a first cause or brute fact has been found, we have redefined (or perhaps better "re-invented") the concept of "cause" and carried on. — Ludwig V
I'm not sure what doing metaphysics is. It seems to be simply discussing issues in first-order mode - using terms rather than mentioning them. One could frame this debate as an issue about the concept or logic of causation.If you don't want to do the metaphysics, we can avoid it, but if you don't want to do the metaphysics then what's the point in discussing "first causes"? — Metaphysician Undercover
On the other hand, it would not be difficult to link your desire to a physical basis - dehydration, perhaps, or level of alcohol in the bloodstream. But they are neither necessary not sufficient for desiring a beer, so they cannot be straightforward causes. Social context etc. might also be factors and those are rules or habits and so, again, not causal.An example could be something like my desire for a beer caused me to go to the fridge to look for one. "Cause" in this sense would be completely different from "cause" in the sense of the heat from the stove caused the water to boil. Notice how "desire" is not a physical activity which can be quantified and shown to be actively causing effects through a physical process. — Metaphysician Undercover
Well, I prefer to say that people are not infallible, so I would put the point differently. Notice, however, that providing a causal explanation for a rainbow does not conflict with the ordinary descriptions of it, though it may conflict with common sense explanations of it (such as that God put it there as a promise that he would not repeat the Flood.but knowledge is not infallible, and depending on the unknowns which are hidden underneath that "something known", the knowledge which constitutes the "something known" may even turn out later to be wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover
Well, if a first cause is the first cause of its universe, it may be unconstrained. But if your first cause photon can happen (in an already existing universe), then any constraints may only constrain it after it comes into being, but will apply the moment it does come in to being. But the consequences will, presumably, be unpredictable. Indeed, they must be.There are no constraints prior to it coming into being, there are constraints after it comes into being. But what those constraints are cannot be predicted. Meaning it could be a photon, an explosion, or anything else you can imagine. — Philosophim
Isn't that part of the fun though? Didn't you get to think about something new and different? Did you stretch your mind? Perhaps similar lines of thinking may do you well in your applications of theoretical math moving forward. I really do hope you enjoyed thinking about it. — Philosophim
Careful, now. If you say the Big Bang is the known starting-point of universal creation, you are saying, not only that it is the starting-point of universal creation, but that we know that it is. What you mean is that the Big Bang is the starting-point of universal creation so far as we know or, perhaps better, on the bases of the existing best theories.This time there is no re-invention needed. We have a clear definition of what it is, and what it would take to prove it exists. The Big Bang for example would be changed to, "The known starting point of universal creation" instead of "The first cause of creation". — Philosophim
This is an interesting idea, but interesting ideas are not proof. With the idea of first causes, anyone can propose an equally competitive idea. For example, I could just say that a God created souls, and souls create free will. Or I could say there are no souls and free will is deterministic. All these claims require proof now. You must prove without a doubt that something is a first cause.
Your description of a soul using first causes needs specifics. How can a soul channel something which the soul would not know would exist? After all, first causes are 100% unpredictable, and could be anything. So what you're really stating is that there are very specific first causes that follow very specific rules that pop into reality every time we make a choice. That doesn't make any sense or line up to the complete randomness of a first cause. So its an interesting idea, but logically doesn't make sense, let alone without proof. — Philosophim
There are no constraints prior to it coming into being, there are constraints after it comes into being. — Philosophim
Meaning it could be a photon, an explosion, or anything else you can imagine. — Philosophim
Causal chains do not end unless existence itself disappears. A causal chain is not a creation of measurement by people, it is the reality of X influences Y's outcome. Even the disappearance of an existence may cause an outcome elsewhere. — Philosophim
To be clear once again, there is no restriction on what can occur. — Philosophim
Yes, I am confirming that you understood this perfectly! I'm just pointing out that you're drawing incorrect conclusions from this that necessitate free will is a first cause. — Philosophim
The logic points out that there must be a first cause, but it does not make any claim as to what that first cause might be. — Philosophim
On the other hand, it would not be difficult to link your desire to a physical basis - dehydration, perhaps, or level of alcohol in the bloodstream. But they are neither necessary not sufficient for desiring a beer, so they cannot be straightforward causes. Social context etc. might also be factors and those are rules or habits and so, again, not causal. — Ludwig V
There is an issue with your theory. You sweep everything up into one classification, and brush aside the variety and difference in the concepts of causation under one term. This is not wrong, exactly, because we do apply that term to all the different ideas. — Ludwig V
to be giving Philosophim some difficulty, the relationship between the first cause, and the resulting causal chain. In the descriptions, or definitions which Philosophim provides, there appears to be some ambiguity as to whether the first cause is part of the chain, or something separate from the chain. — Metaphysician Undercover
These are the principles laid out by Aristotle in the cosmological argument. A "cause" (in the modern sense which corresponds with Aristotelian efficient cause) is a contingent event. This means that it consists of two parts, the temporally prior potential for the event, and the posterior actuality, after the event. The "contingency" is due to the fact that the prior potential is always a potential for a multitude of possible events, and the resulting actuality is the one particular event which actually occurs. — Metaphysician Undercover
Now, if we ignore the "contingency" aspect and represent the causal chain as a simple cause precedes effect model, in a determinist way, then we effectively remove the "potential" from the model. One actual state precedes another actual state, and this determinist representation provides no real principle whereby we could say that the potential for an event precedes its actual occurrence, all there is is another actual event as cause. — Metaphysician Undercover
Careful, now. If you say the Big Bang is the known starting-point of universal creation, you are saying, not only that it is the starting-point of universal creation, but that we know that it is. — Ludwig V
There is an issue with your theory. You sweep everything up into one classification, and brush aside the variety and difference in the concepts of causation under one term.
But it is no more significant that the conclusion that something exists, which neglects the differences between rainbows and trees, numbers and lines, arguments and theories, myths and fables, and all the rest of the many different kinds of object - and hence different kinds of existence (and of logic) that also exist. We have Aristotelian causes, Newtonian causes, Einsteinian causes, Quantum causes, not mention reasons for action, premises and conclusions in mathematical arguments. — Ludwig V
There are no constraints prior to it coming into being, there are constraints after it comes into being.
— Philosophim
This is incorrect, as demonstrated by my argument, there necessarily is constraints prior to its coming into being. "Constraints after it comes into being" doesn't even make sense. If the constraints only exist after the cause, then they have no capacity to act as constraints on the cause. — Metaphysician Undercover
In other words, your idea of an absolutely unconstrained "cause" is self-contradicting, because the concept of "cause" has constraints inherent within it. if you want to talk about a completely, or absolutely, unconstrained act, this act cannot be known as a "cause" in the common sense which relates "cause" to "effect", because that completely unconstrained act could not be said to have an "effect", effect being described in terms of "change". — Metaphysician Undercover
Your proposal of things to imagine as examples of first cause are all constrained by what is described in the terms of the examples, therefore those proposed "first causes" are actually constrained. In reality, if you can imagine it, then what you are imagining is the effects of the supposed "first cause" on the preexisting constraints, therefore constraint is implied by the image. So your requirement of no constraints is nonsense. This is what makes "first cause" as you propose, completely unimaginable, incomprehensible, unintelligible, and self-refuting nonsense. — Metaphysician Undercover
We certainly have tools to assess hypotheses and we certainly use "know" when we have discovered it. Knowledge isn't truth; it is applied when someone has discovered the truth. When we have only discovered what is most likely to be true, we use "believe". You can decide to use "know" differently, but if you do, the distinction between knowledge and belief is blurred and pointless. True, people can get things wrong. But that's not a problem. We just withdraw the claim to know.Knowledge is not truth to me. It is a tool we use to best assess what is most likely to be true with the observations and reason we have at the time. — Philosophim
I don't think you are going to succeed. There are questions beyond the Big Bang. Whether you call them causal or not, they will, no doubt, be answered. And further questions will develop. And people will call all of these things causes. You can insist they are not, but that won't affect the process.I'm using general causality because I want to end a debate that's been going on far too long. — Philosophim
Knowledge isn't truth; it is applied when someone has discovered the truth. — Ludwig V
And further questions will develop. And people will call all of these things causes. You can insist they are not, but that won't affect the process. — Ludwig V
Then this I need to be clearer. The idea is that a first cause is not separate from the chain but is part of the chain, or the chain itself. A first cause is not explained by anything outside of itself, therefore must be explained by itself, and is the start of its impact on causality. — Philosophim
Yes, this is the way it is. Of course, if you disagree with this, that is of course your choice. I have never seen real randomness proved in science, only an inability to measure properly. — Philosophim
By the way, I like your previous idea that first causes can influence the brain. If it is the case that we had very tiny things popping into existence all over the place constantly, it could very well apply a real randomness to outcomes as they bounce against the chemistry of the brain. But this is the only way randomness, according to the definitions I've provided, could ever come into the universe. — Philosophim
So there is no rule as to what should appear as a first cause without referring backwards from any chain. Meaning if I'm staring at a blank area of the universe, there's no prediction as to what could appear as a first cause. — Philosophim
But once that first cause appears, it is what it is. And what a thing is, is defined by rules based on its makeup and the way it consistently interacts with other things in the universe. The status of 'first cause' lasts for only one time tick in the universe. Once a second tick happens the cause of the existence of the thing at the second time tick is the existence of the thing at the first time tick. — Philosophim
A first cause is extremely literal and simple. "That which is not caused by anything else besides the fact of it existing." — Philosophim
What I'm noting is that because a first cause has no prior causation for its existence, there can be no constraints on its initial existence. Now this is only if we have no causal chain to examine. If we have a causal chain, we can work its way back up and see specifically what the first cause of that chain is. — Philosophim
For example, if the big bang is the actual first cause of existence in the universe, then we can trace physics back to it, and attempt to demonstrate conclusively that there is nothing prior to the big bang. It doesn't mean that we can trace physics back to the big bang and then randomly claim, "It was actually a little bang". — Philosophim
When I speak of a chain receding to infinity that doesn't leave much to grasp at philosophically, so one resorts to the "being" of the chain , like yanking on an emergency cord. — jgill
That a first cause is necessary may be proven logically, but it does not follow that there can be no reason for the first cause. — Metaphysician Undercover
Because of this difference we must class it as categorically different from all the other causes in that causal chain, and the same for all the other causal chains. In other words, the "first cause" does not abide by the inductive (general) principles by which we describe all the other causes of causal chains, it cannot be observed to have a cause, therefore we must categorize it separately. — Metaphysician Undercover
You say that the first cause is not explained by anything other than itself, but this claim is not justified. What is justified is that there is no cause for the first cause, "cause" being as described in the sense of the causal chain. But now we've determined a different type of "cause". — Metaphysician Undercover
Since we have now determined the reality of a different type of cause, there is nothing to indicate that there cannot be any reason for the first cause, the first cause being a completely different type of cause itself. Therefore there could be a reason for the first cause, that reason being a type of cause which is other than a "cause" as described in the causal chain. — Metaphysician Undercover
What this means is that it is not predictable in the same way that other causes are predictable. But this does not imply that it is not predictable in an absolute way. — Metaphysician Undercover
Once we start to identify the real existence of first causes, we may start to understand that they have patterns of occurrence, and that they are, through some mathematical principles, predictable. That there is not a cause for their occurrence, in the sense that "cause" is used to describe the causal chain, does not imply that their occurrence is absolutely unreasonable. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore you do not have the premises required to conclude that the first cause is not caused by anything. It may just be caused by a different type of cause. — Metaphysician Undercover
Taking this example, "the big bang", we trace the causal chain to that event, and as you say, we determine it to be a "first cause". This does not imply that there is "nothing prior to the big bang. — Metaphysician Undercover
This notion of first cause being the existence of the chain is no more than interesting speculation. When I speak of a chain receding to infinity that doesn't leave much to grasp at philosophically, so one resorts to the "being" of the chain , like yanking on an emergency cord. — jgill
What I find in metaphysics is logical demonstrations as to why this idea of "a chain receding to infinity" is unrealistic. — Metaphysician Undercover
First, I'm not a physicist which is why I linked you the material to read. But I think what you're looking for is that we either do not know the exact mechanisms or we are unable to know after the fact. Our lack of knowledge or inability is of course not enough to declare it as a first cause however. That's because we've clearly defined what a first cause is so can easily identify it. — Philosophim
We know the mechanism - and the randomness in outcomes is baked into the mechanism. This is not like rolling the dice or flipping a coin - these can be predicted with sufficiently accurate measuring systems.we do not know the exact mechanisms — Philosophim
secondly that it must fit into your definition of random - i.e. the atom can decay into a refrigerator. — EricH
While the decay of an atom is not random per your definition, if is completely and totally random with respect to the time at which it decays. It could decay 10 seconds from now or 10 billion years from now - but there is no prior event which determines when this happens. — EricH
This is not a matter of lack of knowledge or our inability to measure something. — EricH
In the interest of completeness it should be noted that there are still a small number of folks in the scientific community who are trying to keep some notion of causality alive - but at best causality is on life support. — EricH
Oh, I never claimed that there was no reason for a first cause. The reason for a first cause is that, "It exists without prior cause." Meaning that there is no other reason for why it exists. — Philosophim
The only difference is that it does not have a prior cause. — Philosophim
You've lost me here. How is it different? — Philosophim
The reason for the first cause is its own existence simply being. — Philosophim
Can you explain why? I've presented a clear argument why it is absolutely not predictable which I'll post again. The reason why patterns, rules, and laws happen is because there is a solid reason besides itself. A reason that does not involve itself, is a cause that is separate from itself. A first cause can have no other cause besides itself. There can be no outside constraint that forces it to be. There can be no outside constraint that forces it not to be. It simply is. Thus it is completely unpredictable and not constrained by any outside cause. — Philosophim
This is almost true. First, first causes will never be predictable no matter how much we study them. Study assumes that what is consistent today will be consistent tomorrow. The appearance of a first cause can never be consistent, because some other cause was making it consistent. It would be consistent if it just happened to appear consistent. — Philosophim
This right here is the crux. No, this is a contradiction. A first cause cannot, by definition, be caused by another cause. — Philosophim
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