Different thing ≠ Different kind of thing. My Whiskey cup and my Teacup are different things, but the same kind of thing. — Isaac

And the JTB definition is saying something like "you need a whiskey cup and a teacup" and your responses are saying something like "this is redundant, it's actually just saying 'you need a cup'".

To say X's justification is 'sufficient' but X's belief is false is a contradiction. — Isaac

No it isn't. If you tell me that your name is Isaac and show me what looks to me to be a valid driving license that says that your name is Isaac then my belief that your name is Isaac is sufficiently reasonable given the evidence I have. But unknown to me you lied to me and showed me a fake ID. My belief is false. I have a reasonable, albeit false, belief.

To re-quote something you quoted earlier:

Externalists about justification think that factors external to the subject can be relevant for justification; for example, process reliabilists think that justified beliefs are those which are formed by a cognitive process which tends to produce a high proportion of true beliefs relative to false ones.

The above definition of a justified belief is one that can allow for justified false beliefs. Justification, according to the JTB definition, doesn't require certainty. Justifications can be fallible.

If you want to argue that a justified belief must be infallible then you have a very different understanding of knowledge; one that entails that we lack much knowledge that we erroneously believe we have, as very little in life is certain (maths only perhaps?).

Yes (barring my concerns above about the use of 'sufficiently reasonable' in cases where p turns out to be false). Pretty much how I opened when I talked about the role of the beliefs of the community in establishing the truth of "John is a bachelor". But you insisted that... — Isaac

Nothing about the JTB definition of knowledge has anything to do with what I or the language community believes. — Michael

...hence I'm struggling to understand how this new definition fits in with your approach. In this new definition it has everything to do with what I believe and what the beliefs of the language community - those are literally the only measures you're using. — Isaac

I was responding to this:

"It's raining" on the end of

"John knows that it is raining iff:

1. John believes that it is raining,
2. John is justified in believing that it is raining, and
3. It is raining"

...might mean something more akin to "I believe it's raining, and I've good strong justifications for believing so" — Isaac

I was saying that the third condition has nothing to do with what I or the language community believes (although specifically I was referring to the general form "S knows a fact iff the fact is as S justifiably believes it to be", which obviously at least has something to do with what S believes).

In fact, you now agree with me on this point (although you seem to have lost your previous understanding of having "good strong justifications for believing so"). Instead you interpret 3 as "a community of epistemic peers with access to every conceivable technology would believe that it is raining were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis that it is raining." This is of course very different to what I or the language community believe in practice.

And the JTB definition is saying something like "you need a whiskey cup and a teacup" and your responses are saying something like "this is redundant, it's actually just saying 'you need a good enough cup'". — Michael

Yes, that's right (with my little addition). Knowledge doesn't require a whiskey cup and a teacup, it just requires a good enough cup.

If you tell me that your name is Isaac and show me what looks to me to be a valid driving license that says that your name is Isaac then my belief that your name is Isaac is sufficiently reasonable given the evidence I have. But unknown to me you lied to me and showed me a fake ID. — Michael

Well then the fact that I can lie and show you a fake ID makes your having taken my word and examined my ID insufficient. Otherwise what could 'sufficient' possibly mean? Sufficient for what? It's obviously not sufficient for the job at hand (establishing the truth), so what is it you're claiming it's sufficient at?

In fact, you now agree with me on this point. Instead you interpret 3 as "a community of epistemic peers with access to every conceivable technology would believe that it is raining were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis that it is raining." This is of course very different to what I or the language community believe in practice. — Michael

But it's not very different at all. "What the language community believes" and "what a community of epistemic peers come to believe after having exhausted their stock of conceivable tests", are very often almost exactly the same thing.

The 'community of language users' is more often than not a community of epistemic peers (in all but the advanced sciences), and in a large number of matters it doesn't take long to exhaust all conceivable tests (within the context of the sort of knowledge claim we're interested in).

Again, we're talking about an actual word here that people use in real language games. So "this table is solid" - well, it's apparently not, if you test it with techniques of advanced scientific understanding, but that's not the meaning of the claim. The meaning is something entirely more mundane than the 'true' solidity of the table. The claim is about solidity in the ordinary sense. It really doesn't require much exhaustive testing to establish this 'ordinary sense' of solidity, so the beliefs of the language community and the beliefs of a community of epistemic peers who've exhausted all conceivable tests are more often than not one and the same, for certain types of common claim.

Yes, that's right (with my little addition). Knowledge doesn't require a whiskey cup and a teacup, it just requires a good enough cup. — Isaac

The below is the claim of yours that I have been arguing against:

Hence, the 'truth' part of JTB is not distinct from the justification part. — Isaac

It is. There is a difference between "S's belief that p is sufficiently reasonable given the actual evidence that S considered when forming his belief that p" and "A community of epistemic peers with access to every conceivable technology would believe that p were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis that p".

Even if you want to argue that they are both types of justification, it is still the case that they are different things (of the same type), and that the JTB definition requires both of them.

I need you to first understand this before we can discuss whether or not the JTB definition is correct.

Well then the fact that I can lie and show you a fake ID makes your having taken my word and examined my ID insufficient. Otherwise what could 'sufficient' possibly mean? Sufficient for what? It's obviously not sufficient for the job at hand (establishing the truth), so what is it you're claiming it's sufficient at? — Isaac

Im not saying that one's reasoning must be sufficient to prove one's belief, only that one's reasoning must be sufficient for it to be rational to form one's belief. It is rational for me to believe that your name is Tommy if you tell me that your name is Tommy and show me what seems to me to be a valid government-issued ID that shows your name to be Tommy but it isn't rational for me to believe that your name is Tommy if I see you wearing a Tommy Hilfiger T-shirt.

One way to understand this distinction is to adopt the process reliabilist's position that a justified belief is one that is formed by a cognitive process which tends to produce a high proportion of true beliefs relative to false ones, and an unjustified belief is one that is formed by a cognitive process which doesn't produce a high proportion of true beliefs relative to false ones. Although I'm sure there are other ways to make sense of the distinction between a justified and an unjustified belief.

But it's not very different at all. "What the language community believes" and "what a community of epistemic peers come to believe after having exhausted their stock of conceivable tests", are very often almost exactly the same thing. — Isaac

Whether or not they very often share a belief has no bearing on whether or not they mean the same thing. At this point we're arguing over what each condition of the JTB definition means.

And how can you know that they are often almost exactly the same thing? Given that there isn't a community of epistemic peers that has access to every conceivable technology and has comprehensively tested some hypothesis there are no results to compare with what the language community actually believes.

Again, we're talking about an actual word here that people use in real language games. So "this table is solid" - well, it's apparently not, if you test it with techniques of advanced scientific understanding, but that's not the meaning of the claim. The meaning is something entirely more mundane than the 'true' solidity of the table. The claim is about solidity in the ordinary sense. It really doesn't require much exhaustive testing to establish this 'ordinary sense' of solidity, so the beliefs of the language community and the beliefs of a community of epistemic peers who've exhausted all conceivable tests are more often than not one and the same, for certain types of common claim. — Isaac

And how does this track with what you're now saying about truth? We just use the word "true" when we believe something, but you've recently been arguing that truth is what a community of epistemic peers that has access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis. Your definition of truth has gone far beyond the actual occasions of the word's use. Would you like to backtrack and say that the truth just is what each person believes with conviction, or would you like to admit that your interpretation of meaning is an oversimplification?

Well then the fact that I can lie and show you a fake ID makes your having taken my word and examined my ID insufficient. Otherwise what could 'sufficient' possibly mean? Sufficient for what? — Isaac

Sufficient to warrant Michael's belief. Michael, btw, is not a community.

It's obviously not sufficient for the job at hand (establishing the truth), so what is it you're claiming it's sufficient at? — Isaac

That is not the task at hand; it cannot be. Michael can't establish Isaacian truth, because Michael is not a community of epistemic peers. Michael is just an individual in a community. Furthermore, what is a community belief in the first place, if not the aggregation of individual beliefs?

Again, we're talking about an actual word here that people use in real language games. — Isaac

Regarding that, Dr. Richard Kimble did not murder his wife.

The below is the claim of yours that I have been arguing against:

Hence, the 'truth' part of JTB is not distinct from the justification part. — Isaac


It is. There is a difference between "S's belief that p is sufficiently reasonable given the actual evidence that S considered when forming his belief that p" and "A community of epistemic peers with access to every conceivable technology would believe that p were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis that p". — Michael

Yes, well, you have me there. As I said - look hard enough and you'll find that mistake you're searching for. I've been arguing that they are of no different kind (and as such not subject to Gettier's complaint). That particular expression there appears to say that they are no different at all, which is clearly wrong. What now? Do I fall on my sword?

Even if you want to argue that they are both types of justification, it is still the case that they are different things (of the same type), and that the JTB definition requires both of them. — Michael

No, this doesn't work. The difference is one of degree. There's no 'both of them' it makes no sense. There are only justifications of better or worse degree. Knowledge requires a justification held by the subject, and a justification meeting a very high threshold held by the language community. Since the subject is also a part of the language community, these are very often one and the same. Justifications are multifarious and scalar. JTB has them (even assuming a pragmatic definition of 'truth') as of two kinds and binomial.

Im not saying that one's reasoning must be sufficient to prove one's belief, only that one's reasoning must be sufficient for it to be rational to form one's belief. — Michael

This just kicks the can. What is it to be sufficient to rationally form a belief? If you know that I can lie and fake my ID then on what grounds is it sufficient to form a rational belief about my identity from only my spoken word and an unexamined ID? It's clearly flawed.

One way to understand this distinction is to adopt the process reliabilist's position that a justified belief is one that is formed by a cognitive process which tends to produce a high proportion of true beliefs relative to false ones, and an unjustified belief is one that is formed by a cognitive process which doesn't produce a high proportion of true beliefs relative to false ones. — Michael

In what way do we have access to the cognitive process used? EEG, fMRI? I can assure you neither will be of any use. I've used both and neither indicate anything more than a strong indication that our cognition is actually a post hoc process made after the models describing the belief have already sent their various signals to the cortices determining action. I'm not sure where you'd look to find this 'process'.

how can you know that they are often almost exactly the same thing? Given that there isn't a community of epistemic peers that has access to every conceivable technology and has comprehensively tested some hypothesis there are no results to compare with what the language community actually believes. — Michael

But there is (or at least, that's my claim). For most ordinary language claims, the matter being discussed is ordinary (something we establish by touch, sight, smell - everyday stuff). For this category there is indeed an epistemic community who have exhausted all relevant tests. A tree's a tree because everyone agrees it's a tree. If it feels like a tree, looks like a tree, behaves like a tree...it's a tree. Because the language community have defined 'tree' as something which feels, looks and behaves like that. There's no God-written encyclopedia we can look stuff up in to find out what it really, really is.

We just use the word "true" when we believe something — Michael

We=a community of epistemic peers that has access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis - in most cases of ordinary language object recognition - cases such as 'it's raining'.

In advanced science, this is less the case, the community of peers is smaller, you're less likely to be in ti, and the tests are sufficiently advanced that there may well be conceivable, relevant ones which have not been carried out. Historical events are another example. Note in these two cases how rarely we use the word knowledge, in place using the term hypothesis, theory or opinion.

would you like to admit that your interpretation of meaning is an oversimplification? — Michael

I've never denied that, having consistently argued that meaning is contextual, including the meaning of 'true'. Your persistence in trying to pin me down to only one meaning notwithstanding.

Sufficient to warrant Michael's belief. — InPitzotl

As above, this just kicks the can, doesn't answer the question of what 'sufficient' means here.

what is a community belief in the first place, if not the aggregation of individual beliefs? — InPitzotl

I don't know what a community belief could be if not the aggregation of individual beliefs.

Again, we're talking about an actual word here that people use in real language games. — Isaac

Regarding that, did not murder his wife. — InPitzotl

If I recall he was exonerated. The community carried out one of their conceivable tests (assuming you're talking about Sam Sheppard in reality - otherwise, your point is not at all clear)

I see.

JTB definition of truth:

S knows P IFF

1. P is true
2. P is justified
3. S believes P

How do we know P is true? I know you've tried to explain your position on the matter but what I'm having difficulty with is the implicit assumption in stating 1 separately that there's another (not justification, 2) method to decide whether a proposition is true/not. What is this method? How does it differ from justification (2)?

No, this doesn't work. The difference is one of degree. There's no 'both of them' it makes no sense. There are only justifications of better or worse degree. Knowledge requires a justification held by the subject, and a justification meeting a very high threshold held by the language community. Since the subject is also a part of the language community, these are very often one and the same. — Isaac

Except that's not what you've been saying. You've been saying that the truth is what a community of epistemic peers with access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test a hypothesis.

There is a very big difference between the actual reason that I have for believing what I do and a hypothetical belief that a hypothetical group have in some hypothetical scenario.

One difference is that the first is about why I believe what I do and the second is about what they believe. The why is not the what. Another difference is that the first is about something factual and the second about something counterfactual. Another difference is that the first is always accessible and the second can be inaccessible (as you agreed with before, accepting that we can be wrong).

This just kicks the can. What is it to be sufficient to rationally form a belief? If you know that I can lie and fake my ID then on what grounds is it sufficient to form a rational belief about my identity from only my spoken word and an unexamined ID? It's clearly flawed. — Isaac

Of course it's flawed. One's reasoning can be fallible. That's how we can be wrong. That's why the common understanding of knowledge is that it's justified true belief, and not simply certain belief (which would have the reasoning entail the truth, and so only two conditions required). You've accepted before that we can be wrong, and so you understand that the reason we have for believing what we do does not entail the truth.

And surely you understand the difference between good reasons for believing something and bad reasons for believing something? You seemed to understand this before when you said "'[It is raining]' might mean something more akin to 'I believe it's raining, and I've good strong justifications for believing so'". What did you mean by the justifications being good and strong? Were you saying that the reason you believe that it is raining necessarily entails that it is raining - that you can't possibly be wrong? I don't think you were.

And do you really want to argue that I'm not justified in believing any of my friends' names because it's possible that they lied to me and have fake IDs?

But there is (or at least, that's my claim). For most ordinary language claims, the matter being discussed is ordinary (something we establish by touch, sight, smell - everyday stuff). For this category there is indeed an epistemic community who have exhausted all relevant tests. A tree's a tree because everyone agrees it's a tree. If it feels like a tree, looks like a tree, behaves like a tree...it's a tree. Because the language community have defined 'tree' as something which feels, looks and behaves like that. There's no God-written encyclopedia we can look stuff up in to find out what it really, really is. — Isaac

I'm alone in my room right now. A community of epistemic peers has never been here to exhaustively test any hypothesis. The truth of "there is a desk next to the bed" has nothing to do with what the language community believes about my room. But there is a truth. Either there is or there isn't a desk next to my bed.

We just use the word "true" when we believe something — Michael

We=a community of epistemic peers that has access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis - in most cases of ordinary language object recognition - cases such as 'it's raining'. — Isaac

This doesn't answer my question at all. You have defined the truth as "what a community of epistemic peers that has access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis". We each use the word "true" when we believe something to be the case. If the meaning of a word is to be found just in the actual occasions of its use then how have you come to define truth in such a complicated, counterfactual way?

I've never denied that, having consistently argued that meaning is contextual, including the meaning of 'true'. Your persistence in trying to pin me down to only one meaning notwithstanding. — Isaac

And how about the meaning of "knowledge"? If it's possible that an ordinary language approach would have us interpret "it is true that it is raining" and "I believe that it is raining" as meaning the same thing, but that a deeper analysis of the word "true" would have us define "truth" as "what a community of epistemic peers who have access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test a hypothesis" then it's possible that even if an ordinary language approach would have us interpret "I know that it is raining" and "I believe that it is raining" as meaning the same thing, a deeper analysis of the word "know" would have us define "knowledge" as "a well-reasoned belief that corresponds to the facts".

Yes, well, you have me there. As I said - look hard enough and you'll find that mistake you're searching for. I've been arguing that they are of no different kind (and as such not subject to Gettier's complaint). That particular expression there appears to say that they are no different at all, which is clearly wrong. What now? Do I fall on my sword? — Isaac

I don't know why you're wording this as if I'm doing something wrong by pointing out the inconsistencies in your arguments. It is entirely proper for me to do so.

JTB definition of truth:

S knows P IFF

1. P is true
2. P is justified
3. S believes P

How do we know P is true? I know you've tried to explain your position on the matter but what I'm having difficulty with is the implicit assumption in stating 1 separately that there's another (not justification, 2) method to decide whether a proposition is true/not. What is this method? How does it differ from justification (2)? — Agent Smith

We don't need to first know that each of the three conditions are satisfied for us to then have knowledge (that's impossible in principle, we require knowledge to have knowledge?) It is just enough that they are satisfied. And if they are satisfied then it follows that we know P is true.

Note that the JTB definition isn't:

S knows that P iff:

1. S knows that P is true
2. S knows that P is justified
3. S knows that S believes P

It is just enough that they are satisfied. — Michael

How is "P is true" satisfied?

How is "P is true" satisfied? — Agent Smith

Depends on what P is. If it's "it is raining" then it's satisfied if the physical events in the atmosphere (that happen regardless of our beliefs) are such that there are clouds releasing water.

Depends on what P is. If it's "it is raining" then it's satisfied if the physical events in the atmosphere (that happen regardless of our beliefs) are such that water falls from the clouds. — Michael

You mean to say each case of knowledge has its own satisfying conditions? In other words, knowledge is undefined?

Plus, can you go into detail as to how "physical events in the atmosphere"satisfy the proposition "it is raining"? Mind you, no justification/logic is allowed.

You mean to say each case of knowledge has its own satisfying conditions? — Agent Smith

Yes. The thing that makes "it is raining" true isn't the same thing that makes "it is sunny" true. That should be obvious.

In other words, knowledge is undefined? — Agent Smith

No. Defining it as "P is true" is sufficient.

Plus, can you go into detail as to how "physical events in the atmosphere"satisfy the proposition "it is raining"? — Agent Smith

Why would I need to? As an English speaker you know what "it is raining" means, you know what "it is sunny" means, and you know that they mean different things. And unless you want to argue for something like idealism then you should understand that whether or not it is raining or sunny has nothing to do with what I actually believe. The weather is something that happens outside my head and without my involvement.

Yes. The thing that makes "it is raining" true isn't the same thing that makes "it is sunny" true. That should be obvious. — Michael

No, no. Not that kinda difference. I mean in terms of a methodology (a rule).

No. Defining it as "P is true" is sufficient. — Michael

I'm sorry, I don't understand. What do you mean? P is knowledge if P is true? No one has to believe P and nor is there a need to justify P? Discover knowledge! :chin: How does one know that if P is knowledge, P is true?

Why would I need to? — Michael

For me, pleeaaase.

No, no. Not that kinda difference. I mean in terms of a methodology (a rule). — Agent Smith

I don't know what you mean by a methodology.

To say that "it is raining" is true is to say that it is raining, and it is raining if there are clouds and water is falling from them.

To say that "it is sunny" is true is to say that it is sunny, and it is sunny if the sun is visible in the sky.

That's all there is to it.

I'm sorry, I don't understand. What do you mean? P is knowledge if P is true? No one has to believe P and nor is there a need to justify P? Discover knowledge! :chin: How does one know that if P is knowledge, P is true? — Agent Smith

I don't know what you're asking.

I don't know what you mean by a methodology. — Michael

Never mind!

I don't know what a community belief could be if not the aggregation of individual beliefs. — Isaac

As above, this just kicks the can, doesn't answer the question of what 'sufficient' means here. — Isaac

I think you have this backwards. According to Isaacian theory of truth, truth is determined by community beliefs. If truth is determined by community beliefs, and community beliefs are an aggregation of individual beliefs, then truth has as a prerequisite individual beliefs. So regarding the question of how individuals should form beliefs, it is you, sir, who is kicking the can; because according to your theory of truth, it is categorically impossible.

If I recall he was exonerated. The community carried out one of their conceivable tests (assuming you're talking about Sam Sheppard in reality - otherwise, your point is not at all clear) — Isaac

No, I'm not talking about Sam Sheppard in real life; fiction uses language as well. One of the key differences actually makes fictive works more relevant--fictive works can establish in-universe truths canonically. Our eponymous fugitive is such precisely because a community of epistemic peers formally declared him such... a fact that conflicts with his canonical innocence. IOW, I'm directly challenging your notion that you're correctly describing folk theories of truth. It is indeed the case that Dr. Richard Kimble was eventually exonerated, but that was not a fictive guarantee. The folk concept is that people can be in such situations, be formally fugitives, and yet be innocent, if the state of affairs is such that they did not in fact commit the murder... the peers don't define the truth, the state of affairs does (R murdered W is impossible if the state of affairs is such that R did not kill W, regardless of what a community of peers says).

S knows P IFF

1. P is true
2. P is justified
3. S believes P — Agent Smith

How do we know P is true? — Agent Smith

That's a (B) question, so it has a (B) answer.

I know you've tried to explain your position on the matter but what I'm having difficulty with is the implicit assumption in stating 1 separately that there's another (not justification, 2) method to decide whether a proposition is true/not. — Agent Smith

JTB makes no such assumption, even implicitly.

In the case of P="It's raining", it is rain clouds that do the raining, not us; that is, we do not establish P's truth, the weather does. The T condition of JTB, which can be phrased that S does not know P if ~P, is simply saying that S cannot know it's raining if the weather isn't doing that. In the JTB model, the T condition is met independently from what humans believe; this is allowed given the presumption of realism.

Deciding whether P is true or not is what humans do. The method by which humans do that in the JTB model is by applying justification.

So to summarize these two points, P being true is independent of what humans might believe. P's truth is established meteorologically, not that the weather cares about whether it's raining, but rather that it's only the weather's raining that makes P true or lack of raining that makes P false. Discerning whether P is true or not is a human affair; and that is done through J. The T condition of JTB is simply stating that we cannot claim S knows it's raining if the weather isn't doing what we mean by raining.

In the case of P="It's raining", it is rain clouds that do the raining, not us; that is, we do not establish P's truth, the weather does. — InPitzotl

It's obvious that thinking is involved. Can you describe, in detail if possible, the actual ratiocination involved?

It's obvious that thinking is involved. Can you describe, in detail if possible, the actual ratiocination involved? — Agent Smith

I'm not sure I understand your question. When you claim that it's obvious that thinking is involved, to what are you referring? If you're referring to "...in the formation of truth", this is contradicted by the presumption of realism (which would hold that the states of affairs that we talk about have a nature that is independent of whether humans are thinking of them). P="It's raining" would just exemplify this; and the previous post just elaborated on the view. The weather, not humans thinking about the weather, makes P true.

You've been saying that the truth is what a community of epistemic peers with access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test a hypothesis. — Michael

Argh! The meaning of words is different in different contexts. I just don't know what more I can do to get this seemingly simple notion across to you (even if you don't agree with it, you seem to keep acting as if I hadn't even mentioned it). 'Truth' in one context might mean "what a community of epistemic peers that has access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis", in another it might simply mean "everyone agrees with me", or "I'm really, really sure about this".

You keep comparing my use in one context with my use in another.

One difference is that the first is about why I believe what I do and the second is about what they believe. — Michael

You're just assuming correspodence again. It's not 'what they believe', it's what the speaker believes they believe.

Two justifications for a belief "it's raining"...

1) My head's wet.
2) My epistemic peers have done some exhaustive testing and agree that water is falling from clouds.

Both are of the form "I believe that...", I don't have unfiltered, infallible access to either. (1) is good enough for most purposes, but with (2) the speaker might say "I know that it's raining - their justification is sufficient to use the term.

For a third party, it's different (different context, different meaning). Here it's the observer's belief about what their epistemic community have concluded that matter, but the subject's justifications. Here, I'd agree they're of different sorts.

Surely you understand the difference between good reasons for believing something and bad reasons for believing something? — Michael

No. Not in the least. That's why I'm asking for you to explain it to me. I understand reasons can be better or worse, but I've no idea how you might (in your scheme), go about putting all reasons into one of two bins, those that are 'good', and those that are 'bad'.

What did you mean by the justifications being good and strong? Were you saying that the reason you believe that it is raining necessarily entails that it is raining - that you can't possibly be wrong? I don't think you were. — Michael

No. For me, in that context, 'good and strong' just means that I'm confident enough that other people around me will reach the same conclusion. If you say, "I'm going out", and I say, "you'll need a hat, it's raining". I'm confident that's what you'll think too when you go out, so I'm not going to treat it as a subjective opinion, but an objective state of the world we share. With more doubt I might say "I believe it's raining, emphasising that I don't have the sort of justification I expect you to share.

As I said right at the beginning, the difference in use mainly has to do with the expectation that others (epistemic peers usually) will share my belief. "I know" means that I think other will share my belief, "John knows" means I think others will share my belief - which is the same as John's. "I thought I knew, but turns out I didn't" means I though my epistemic peers would agree, but turns out they don't/wouldn't. And so on...

And do you really want to argue that I'm not justified in believing any of my friends' names because it's possible that they lied to me and have fake IDs? — Michael

Again, you're assuming there's two bins 'justified' and 'not justified'. No-one behaves that way outside of these types of academic discussion. Your belief in your friend's names is justified enough for some uses, but insufficiently justified for others.

I'm alone in my room right now. A community of epistemic peers has never been here to exhaustively test any hypothesis. The truth of "there is a desk next to the bed" has nothing to do with what the language community believes about my room. But there is a truth. Either there is or there isn't a desk next to my bed. — Michael

That's juts you re-asserting your original claim. I disagree. We've gone through this - you can't just argue by assertion, it doesn't lead anywhere. Why do you believe that to be the case - on what grounds do you claim that "The truth of "there is a desk next to the bed"" is determined by "Either there is or there isn't a desk next to my bed"? You're just asserting a correspondence theory of truth. There are other theories of truth, it's insufficient, then, to just assert one of them is the case.

You have defined the truth as "what a community of epistemic peers that has access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis". — Michael

...in one example...

We each use the word "true" when we believe something to be the case. If the meaning of a word is to be found just in the actual occasions of its use then how have you come to define truth in such a complicated, counterfactual way? — Michael

Because those seem to me to be the actual occasions of it's use, obviously. Again, that they don't seem to you to be doesn't alone constitute an argument that they aren't, we need to build from shared beliefs to reach any conclusions. If all we're going to do is assert contrary positions there's little point in continuing is there?

And how about the meaning of "knowledge"? If it's possible that an ordinary language approach would have us interpret "it is true that it is raining" and "I believe that it is raining" as meaning the same thing, but that a deeper analysis of the word "true" would have us define "truth" as "what a community of epistemic peers who have access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test a hypothesis" then it's possible that even if an ordinary language approach would have us interpret "I know that it is raining" and "I believe that it is raining" as meaning the same thing, a deeper analysis of the word "know" would have us define "knowledge" as "a well-reasoned belief that corresponds to the facts". — Michael

Possible, yes. But you're assuming your 'ordinary understanding' is shared universality. And your assumption is so strong that you've even determined to take the line that I 'm lying here and don't really believe what I say I do. It isn't. People really do believe different things. they really do reach different conclusion from the same evidence. Your 'deeper analysis' is was seems superficially obvious to some, your 'ordinary use' is what seems detached and academic to others. To me, understanding truth as "what a community of epistemic peers who have access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test a hypothesis" (in some uses) doesn't seem at all 'a deeper analysis' it seems the obvious ordinary use of the word (in those cases).

To me, if someone says "I didn't take the last slice slice of cake" and I say "nonsense, you're lying ", they say "no, it's true!", their meaning seem absolutely transparent to me. It means 'believe me!'

I don't know why you're wording this as if I'm doing something wrong by pointing out the inconsistencies in your arguments. It is entirely proper for me to do so. — Michael

Because there's two paths. (1) I've made a mistake - you can ask for clarification or suggest that I might have done so, or (2) I've no idea what I'm talking about and keep irrationally changing my opinion. (1) is the most charitable, you're repeatedly choosing (2) seems odd in the circumstances (a discussion forum). If you're not interested in what I actually believe about this, then why are you here? Is it very important to you that I retreat, tail-between-legs, for some reason? I could understand that in an ethical or political discussion - there might be some import to 'winning', but in an academic one...? If you've no incentive to actually find out what I really mean, I'm unclear as to what the purpose of this discussion is.

No, I'm not talking about Sam Sheppard in real life; fiction uses language as well. — InPitzotl

regarding the question of how individuals should form beliefs, it is you, sir, who is kicking the can; because according to your theory of truth, it is categorically impossible. — InPitzotl

Well then I'm afraid I have no idea what point you're making. What you've said doesn't seem related to what I'm arguing in the slightest.

Argh! The meaning of words is different in different contexts. I just don't know what more I can do to get this seemingly simple notion across to you (even if you don't agree with it, you seem to keep acting as if I hadn't even mentioned it). 'Truth' in one context might mean "what a community of epistemic peers that has access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis", in another it might simply mean "everyone agrees with me", or "I'm really, really sure about this".

You keep comparing my use in one context with my use in another. — Isaac

We are talking specifically about its meaning in the context of the JTB definition of knowledge. For me to know that there is a desk next to my bed I must believe that there is a desk next to my bed, I must have a good reason for believing that there is a desk next to my bed, and it must be true that there is a desk next to my bed.

What does it mean for "there is a desk next to my bed" to be true? Clearly it can't mean that the language community believes that there is a desk next to my bed because the language community doesn't believe anything about there being or not being a desk next to my bed, and yet either "there is a desk next to my bed" is true or it isn't. And it can't mean that I believe that there is a desk next to my bed because I can be wrong.

You can make sense of this by explaining that "there is a desk next to my bed" is true iff a community of epistemic peers with access to every conceivable technology would believe that there is a desk next to my bed if they were to comprehensively test the hypothesis that there is a desk next to my bed, but then you would have to admit that this (the T) is a very different thing to the actual reason why I believe what I do about there being a desk next to my bed and whether or not this actual reason is a good one (the J), and so you must admit that the T and the J in the JTB definition are different conditions (as you finally admitted to here).

And after you have admitted that the T and the J in the JTB definition are different conditions you must either accept that both are required for me to know that there is a desk next to my bed or you must explain which (if either) is sufficient.

Can I know that there is a desk next to my bed if "there is a desk next to my bed" is false? I say that I can't. I can only know that there is a desk next to my bed if there is a desk next to my bed.

Can I know that there is a desk next to my bed if I have no good reason for believing that there is a desk next to my bed? I say that I can't. I can only know that there is a desk next to my bed if I have a good reason for believing so, otherwise it's just a lucky guess.

To me, understanding truth as "what a community of epistemic peers who have access to every conceivable technology would believe were they to comprehensively test a hypothesis" (in some uses) doesn't seem at all 'a deeper analysis' it seems the obvious ordinary use of the word (in those cases). — Isaac

And to me and most others, understanding knowledge as requiring a justified true belief seems the obvious ordinary use of the word.

And after you have admitted that the T and the J in the JTB definition are different conditions you must either accept that both are required for me to know that there is a desk next to my bed or you must explain which (if either) is sufficient. — Michael

OK, that'll do now. It's no use flogging a dead horse. If you can't even bring yourself to acknowledge (even for that sake of argument) that the same expressions can mean different things in different contexts, then I can't possible explain my preferred model to you. It's like trying to explain atomic theory to someone who refuses to acknowledge that atoms could, even in theory, exist, it just can't be done

Because there's two paths. (1) I've made a mistake - you can ask for clarification or suggest that I might have done so, or (2) I've no idea what I'm talking about and keep irrationally changing my opinion. (1) is the most charitable, you're repeatedly choosing (2) seems odd in the circumstances (a discussion forum). — Isaac

I think what's happening is that you start by arguing that the truth is what someone believes, I prove that wrong, you try to save your position by saying that you really mean that the truth is what the language community believes, I prove that wrong, you try to save your position by saying that you really mean that the truth is what a community of epistemic peers would believe were they to comprehensively test some hypothesis, I prove that this entails that truth and justification are distinct and both required for knowledge, and so you circle back to saying that the truth is what the language community believes.

I think what's happening is that you start by arguing that the truth is what someone believes, I prove that wrong, you try to save your position by saying that you really mean that the truth is what the language community believes, I prove that wrong, you try to save your position by saying that you really mean that the truth is what a community of epistemic peers would believe were they to comprehensively test some hypothesis, I prove that this undermines your position against the claim that truth and justification are distinct and both required for knowledge, and so you circle back to saying that the truth is what the language community believes. — Michael

See above.

'True' means different things in different contexts.
'Know' means different things in different contexts.
'Actually' means different things in different contexts.
'Fact' means different things in different contexts.
and so on...

You keep asking in one context, then when you bring up a different context claim that I'm being inconsistent, despite me explaining every time that these words have different meanings in different contexts.

OK, that'll do now. It's no use flogging a dead horse. If you can't even bring yourself to acknowledge (even for that sake of argument) that the same expressions can mean different things in different contexts, then I can't possible explain my preferred model to you. It's like trying to explain atomic theory to someone who refuses to acknowledge that atoms could, even in theory, exist, it just can't be done — Isaac

See above.

'True' means different things in different contexts.
'Know' means different things in different contexts.
'Actually' means different things in different contexts.
'Fact' means different things in different contexts.
and so on...

You keep asking in one context, then when you bring up a different context claim that I'm being inconsistent, despite me explaining every time that these words have different meanings in different contexts. — Isaac

I'll remind you of something I said at the very start of our discussion:

You're conflating the strict meaning of the sentence with its use in practice. This is addressed in Moore's paradox: "It is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining". The sentence is consistent, and possibly true, but not something that anyone would say in real life as assertions of something's truth tacitly imply that one believes that thing to be true. — Michael

In practice people just use the phrases "it is true that it is raining" and "I believe that it's raining" interchangeably but in the abstract we understand the meaning of "it is true that it is raining" as something like "a community of epistemic peers with access to every conceivable technology would believe that it is raining were they to comprehensively test the hypothesis that it is raining".

And to repeat something I said yesterday:

Even if an ordinary language approach would have us interpret "I know that it is raining" and "I believe that it is raining" as meaning the same thing, a deeper analysis of the word "know" would have us define "knowledge" as "a well-reasoned belief that corresponds to the facts". — Michael

Even if in practice people just use the phrases "I know that it's raining" and "I believe that it's raining" interchangeably, when asked to consider it in the abstract we will admit that our beliefs can be wrong and that if our belief is wrong then we don't have knowledge, and so understand the meaning of "I know that it's raining" as something like "I am justified in believing that it's raining and my belief is true".

From the beginning I have accepted that the meaning of words can be interpreted differently in different contexts. But I don't think this is what is happening here. You're just changing your argument when its flaws are exposed. And depending on what day it is, your argument is that there’s nothing more to the truth than what I believe, and so if I believe that your argument is flawed then your argument is flawed.

Well then I'm afraid I have no idea what point you're making. What you've said doesn't seem related to what I'm arguing in the slightest. — Isaac

Argument:

Again, we're talking about an actual word here that people use in real language games. So "this table is solid" - well, it's apparently not, if you test it with techniques of advanced scientific understanding, but that's not the meaning of the claim. The meaning is something entirely more mundane than the 'true' solidity of the table. The claim is about solidity in the ordinary sense. — Isaac

Counter: In the ordinary sense (of folk language games, of the type we would play when we say "the table is solid"), "R murdered W" can only be true if the state of affairs is such that R murdered W, regardless of what a community of peers agrees on.

regarding the question of how individuals should form beliefs, it is you, sir, who is kicking the can; because according to your theory of truth, it is categorically impossible. — InPitzotl

I'm not sure you understand what you're arguing. Here was your claim:

To say X's justification is 'sufficient' but X's belief is false is a contradiction. — Isaac

...and this is what you just said:

Two justifications for a belief "it's raining"...

1) My head's wet.
2) My epistemic peers have done some exhaustive testing and agree that water is falling from clouds.

Both are of the form "I believe that...", I don't have unfiltered, infallible access to either. (1) is good enough for most purposes, but with (2) the speaker might say "I know that it's raining - their justification is sufficient to use the term. — Isaac

The underlined already concedes the point as far as JTB is concerned; "good enough for most purposes" and "sufficient to warrant belief" mean the same thing. So what, then, are you arguing Isaac?

In the ordinary sense (of folk language games, of the type we would play when we say "the table is solid"), "R murdered W" can only be true if the state of affairs is such that R murdered W, regardless of what a community of peers agrees on. — InPitzotl

Counter: In the ordinary sense (of folk language games, of the type we would play when we say "the table is solid"), "R murdered W" can need not only be true if the state of affairs is such that R murdered W, regardless of what a community of peers agrees on.

See just repeating an assertion about what you believe to be the case doesn't constitute a counter, I'm already quite clear on what you think is the case. Either find some common ground from which to build up to your position or walk away shaking your head at my heterdoxy. Just repeating your opinion over and over doesn't get us anywhere.

The underlined already concedes the point as far as JTB is concerned; "good enough for most purposes" and "sufficient to warrant belief" mean the same thing. — InPitzotl

The first was a long exchange following on from the example of using tarot cards, the second was about warning a companion about the weather. Two different contexts. Of course the criteria for sufficiency are going to be different in each.

So what, then, are you arguing Isaac? — InPitzotl

I'm arguing that both 'know' and 'true' have different meanings in different contexts and as such JTB has no special claim to be a definition of 'knowledge'. Further, that issues like Gettier problems are best resolved by other definitions of knowledge.

Revision:

In the ordinary sense (of folk language games, of the type we would play when we say "the table is solid"), "R murdered W" can only be true if the state of affairs is such that R murdered killed W, regardless of what a community of peers agrees on.

This was the intended point; a murder versus a killing is partially socially determined and thus is not a matter of state of affairs (in the relevant sense), though a murder requires a killing.

Either find some common ground — Isaac

Good idea. I'll start attempting to do that multiple posts ago. However, finding common grounds is strictly not in my control; it critically requires your cooperation.

See just repeating an assertion about what you believe to be the case doesn't constitute a counter — Isaac

You're losing focus. You replied to a post of mine that explicitly quoted this:

Well then I'm afraid I have no idea what point you're making. What you've said doesn't seem related to what I'm arguing in the slightest. — Isaac

Counters are not just arguments... they are more critically points being made, with said points challenging some previously made point; without these two aspects the argument isn't even relevant. It is precisely these more critical factors that were in question in the quote above.

So, assuming you are cooperative in finding common ground, it is premature to discuss the argument... we must first establish that this is making a point ("I have no idea what point you're making") and that it is challenging what you're arguing ("What you've said doesn't seem related to what I'm arguing in the slightest").

The first was a long exchange following on from the example of using tarot cards, — Isaac

That would be this?:

I believe that it rained last night because the cars and road are wet. ...
If in another scenario I believe what I do because it’s my interpretation of a Tarot card reading then my belief would be true but unjustified, and so not knowledge. — Michael

the second was about warning a companion about the weather. — Isaac

This is too vague; I have a possible match but you could be referring to other things, so I'm going to ask for specificity here.

Two different contexts. — Isaac

Sure.

Of course the criteria for sufficiency are going to be different in each. — Isaac

Okay. But I've heard nothing here challenging the notion of sufficient to warrant belief.

I'm arguing that both 'know' and 'true' have different meanings in different contexts and as such JTB has no special claim to be a definition of 'knowledge'. — Isaac

It's up to you, but you may want to clarify this; there are readings where this is trivially true, readings where it is trivially false, and readings where you just got something wrong, and possibly other readings. I can only do my best to interpret what I think you mean by what you actually write. I don't think the trivially true or trivially false readings are consistent with what you have been arguing here, so I'm just going to take a stab at it based on what you previously wrote.

In particular, you brought up an example of two contexts applied to the proposition P="This table is solid"; an ordinary context, and a scientific one. By the reading I'm guessing at, you're arguing that P can be judged in these two contexts; by one, P is true. By the other, P is false. Since the truth of P differs in these contexts, you argue, there can be no T for P in the JTB model, and therefore, the JTB model fails. Does that sound right?

If so, it does not follow. You have a P in the ordinary sense, PO; and you have a P in the scientific sense, PS. PO is true. PS is false. Those are different truth values. But if PO and PS have different truth values, they cannot possibly be applying the same truth criteria. Since they have different truth criteria, they cannot possibly be the same proposition. So all that really follows is that a particular sentence can express different propositions in different senses/contexts.

Further, that issues like Gettier problems are best resolved by other definitions of knowledge. — Isaac

I'm sure the nod to bringing this back in line with the thread is appreciated, but it's a bit of a stretch. The issues that Gettier problems bring up related to the JTB model of knowledge are far removed from what you're arguing here.

Math is knowledge.

Is math discovered or invented?

If math is discovered (knowledge), the B (belief) in the JTB definition of knowledge is an error.

If math is invented (knowledge), the T (true) in the JTB definition of knowledge loses significance.