The fact that “Michael wasn’t born in Germany because he was born in France” isn’t equivalent to “Michael wasn’t born in Germany” doesn’t mean that someone who believes the former doesn’t also believe the latter. — Michael

Right.

For your argument to work you must show that everyone who believes the former to be true doesn’t believe the latter to be true. You haven’t done that, and I don’t think you can.

Well, no. In order for my argument to work, I need to show that what you're claiming is S's belief is not equivalent to S's belief and that the difference between S's belief and your report is clearly shown by virtue of looking at the differences in what it takes for each to be true.

I can and have done that.

Well, no. In order for my argument to work, I need to show that what you're claiming is S's belief is not equivalent to S's belief and that the difference between S's belief and your report is clearly shown by virtue of looking at the differences in what it takes for each to be true.

I can and have done that. — creativesoul

You haven't shown that someone who believes “Michael wasn’t born in Germany because he was born in France” doesn't also believe “Michael wasn’t born in Germany”.

I think it self-evident that someone who believes the former also believes the latter. And the latter is true.

You haven't shown that someone who believes “Michael wasn’t born in Germany because he was born in France” doesn't also believe “Michael wasn’t born in Germany”. — Michael

Nor need I. What I have shown is that "Michael was not born in Germany" is not equivalent to believing that Michael was not born in Germany because he was born in France, which is precisely what S believes. The charge made by me was one of an academic accounting malpractice of S's belief. I've more than shouldered that burden.

"Michael was not born in Germany."
"Michael was not born in Germany, because he was born in France."

According to the argument you offered earlier, which of the above is an accurate report of S's belief regarding your birthplace?

We both know that the second is. You want to say that because he believes the first, the second entails the first, and the first is true, that his belief about your birthplace is true even though you were not born in France, because the proposition is true regardless of where you were born, so long as you were not born in Germany.

S does not just believe that you were not born in Germany. Academia neglects to keep that in mind, and in doing so conflates a naked proposition with S's belief by virtue of conflating what it would take for them to be true. S's belief about your birthplace(and thus about that proposition)does not share the same truth conditions as the naked proposition. S's belief about your birthplace(and that proposition) is true only if, only when, and only because you were born in France. S believes the proposition is true because you were born in France. The proposition is true because you were born in England, contrary to S's belief. S's belief about your birthplace is justified, valid, and false. What S believed to be the case was not.

Let's consider a situation where we have five different people who believe that you were born in five different places. None of these people believe that you were born in Germany. None of these people believe that you were born in England.

According to you(and current convention's belief attribution practices) all of them have the same true belief about your birthplace.

You and current convention are wrong, because none of them believe the same thing and all of their beliefs about your birthplace are false.

Joe believes you were born in Croatia. Dan believes you were born in Ireland. Veronica believes you were born in Utah. Kevin believes you were born in British Columbia. John believes you were born in Egypt.

None of them believe the same thing about your birthplace.

The proposition "Michael was not born in Germany" can be attributed to each of them according to current conventional belief attribution practices. That would be to say that they believe the same thing.

None of them believe the same thing about your birthplace.

Joe believes you were not born in Germany, because you were born in Croatia. Dan believes you were not born in Germany, because you were born in Ireland. Veronica believes you were not born in Germany, because you were born in Utah. Kevin believes you were not born in Germany, because you were born in British Columbia. John believes you were not born in Germany, because you were born in Egypt.

None of them believe the same thing about your birthplace.

"Michael was not born in Germany" is not equivalent to Joe, Dan, Veronica, Kevin, and/or John's belief about your birthplace.

If that does not convince you, nothing will...

It's been fun. Hate to run, but have a real, life changing emergency situation to deal with. No worries, just needs settled. I'll return after the dust does the same.

"Michael was not born in Germany."
"Michael was not born in Germany, because he was born in France."

According to the argument you offered earlier, which of the above is an accurate report of S's belief regarding your birthplace? — creativesoul

Both. Someone who believes the latter also believes the former. They are not mutually exclusive. As I have said, you need to show that someone who believes the latter doesn't also believe the former. You haven't done that.

S does not just believe that you were not born in Germany. — creativesoul

I do not just believe that Joe Biden is President. I believe that Joe Biden is President and is a man and is white and is married and is American and is 80 years old, and so on. The fact that I believe multiple things about Joe Biden doesn't mean that if any one of these things is false that I don't truthfully believe other things about him.

And so for the same reason, the fact that S believes that I was not born in Germany because I was born in France doesn't entail that if I wasn't born in France then S doesn't truthfully believe that I was not born in Germany.

The proposition "Michael was not born in Germany" is equivalent to neither S's belief about that particular proposition nor S's belief about your birthplace. The proposition is true regardless of where you were born so long as it was not in Germany. S's belief about your birthplace as well as their belief about that proposition are true only if, only when, and only because you were born in France.

S believes the proposition is true because you were born in France. The proposition is true because you were born in England, contrary to S's belief.

You're treating S's belief about that proposition and the proposition as though they share truth conditions. They do not.

"Michael was not born in Germany" is not S's belief.

"Michael was not born in Germany."
"Michael was not born in Germany, because he was born in France."

According to the argument you offered earlier, which of the above is an accurate report of S's belief regarding your birthplace?
— creativesoul

Both. Someone who believes the latter also believes the former. They are not mutually exclusive. As I have said, you need to show that someone who believes the latter doesn't also believe the former. You haven't done that. — Michael

I'm charging you and convention with getting S's belief wrong. I'm saying that you're treating S's belief as though it is equivalent to the proposition.

All I need to show is that it is not. The mutual exclusivity between those two propositions or any lack thereof has nothing at all to do with whether or not the proposition is equivalent to S's belief.

S does not just believe that you were not born in Germany.
— creativesoul

I do not just believe that Joe Biden is President. — Michael

Perhaps I should not have left such a low hanging fruit. That's cute.

S does not just believe that "Michael was not born in Germany" is true. S believes "Michael was not born in Germany" is true because you were born in France.

I hesitate to add to your discussion which is difficult enough already. But perhaps it has got to the point where there is not much to lose.

You seem to be disagreeing about the criteria of identity of beliefs. But there are none, so far as I know. People seem happy to accept that belief, like knowledge and a number of others, is a "propositional attitude" and I use that term because it groups together a number of concepts which have interesting features in common, as well as a striking grammatical feature - the "that" clause.

So it seems to be widely accepted that a belief is an attitude to a proposition, and hence that identity of proposition is the criterion of identity of beliefs. Fair enough. What is/are the criteria of identity for propositions? The only one that I've ever seen is sameness of meaning. And the criteria for that?

My point is that there are no criteria of identity for beliefs. The best I can do is define a proposition as a sentence together with its use in a given context. But then we have to face the fact that the context of a belief-sentence is complicated, so that we have to take account of, for example, the de dicto/de re distinction, where the speaker may be the believer, but may be someone reporting the believer's belief to someone else.

In spite of all this, I'm still confused about whether "John is a bachelor" and "John is unmarried and male" are the same proposition or different ones. A complicated definition may not be fully known or understood by a particular speaker, or a speaker may not be aware of the definition of various terms s/he uses, so you can't take for granted that the two sentences will mean the same to everyone.

Another feature which is not clear affects your discussion directly - and analysis of the Gettier problem. Standard definitions would say that the truth-conditions of a proposition/sentence are part of its meaning. It is perfectly possible that a proposition can be verified by quite a wide range of states of affairs, not all of which are required at the same time. So you might recognize me by my face or by my voice. If you recognize me by one of these - say my face - it is called a truth-maker or truth-making condition. Now, what is not clear whether the truth-maker on a particular occasion of a proposition is part of the meaning of the proposition in that use. If it is, I expect you can see that this dismembers a Gettier package so that the paradox does not work.

But your argument seems to be yet more complicated because it is a case like to the colour exclusion problem. Forgive me if you know about this already. It was the turning-point or the rock on which WIttgenstein eventually began to abandon the logical atomism of the Tractatus. In essence "this is red (all over)" and "this is blue (all over)" cannot both be true, yet they are not contradictory. Similarly, "Michael was born in France" and "Michael was born in Germany" exclude each other and yet are not contradictory. This problem is created by treating simple propositions as atoms, which are completely independent of each other, logically speaking. WIttgenstein finally developed the idea that propositions are not true or false independently, but as part of a system - i.e. there are no atomic propositions.

I've gone on for long enough, but I hope this helps to clarify why you could not agree.

"Michael was not born in Germany" is not S's belief. — creativesoul

S believes many related things:

1. S believes that Michael was not born in Germany because he was born in France
2. S believes that Michael was born in France
3. S believes that Michael was not born in Germany
4. S believes that France is not in Germany
5. S believes that Michael cannot have been born in more than one place
etc.

Your claim is that if (1) is true then (3) is false. My claim is that if (1) is true then (3) is true. I think my claim is supported by common sense logic: (1) entails (2) and (3).

"I believe that Michael was not born in Germany because he was born in France but I do not believe that Michael was not born in Germany" is an absurd claim.

You seem to be disagreeing about the criteria of identity of beliefs. But there are none, so far as I know. — Ludwig V

Are you sure? It seems that there are several commonly used notions of "belief". They are not on equal footing. I think it plain to see that there does not seem to be much agreement on that front though. Convention has been plagued by the inevitable consequences of having gotten that wrong. It is a century's old problem.

I would not say that there are no criteria(no standard regarding what counts as a belief) being employed though. It's a matter of unpacking everything to see them.

Hume openly admitted having no clue. The fire example refutes Hume's speculation about the nature of causality. It takes touching fire only once in order for a toddler to learn from experience and immediately come to know that touching fire causes pain. It does not require language in any way shape or form to come to know that touching fire causes pain.

Epistemology led to propositional attitudes. The fire example refutes that as well.

The main objection that I levy against current convention is that the conventional notion of belief as propositional attitude cannot bridge the evolutionary gap between language and language less creatures' beliefs. We can grant the notion and see where it leads...

If all belief is equivalent to an attitude towards some proposition or another such that the candidate under our consideration takes it to be true or to be the case, then either language less creatures have no belief, or propositions exist in such a way that a language less creature can have an attitude towards one such that they take it to be true or to be the case.

Convention has largely chosen to deny that language less creatures form, have, and/or hold belief... on pains of coherency alone.

Your claim is that if (1) is true then (3) is false. — Michael

I've neither stated that, nor does anything I've claimed only lead to saying that.

My claim is that if (1) is true then (3) is true. I think my claim is supported by common sense logic: (1) entails (2) and (3).

I'm pointing out that you're treating propositions as though they are equivalent to belief. They are not. They are not equivalent to propositional attitudes either.

"I believe that Michael was not born in Germany because he was born in France but I do not believe that Michael was not born in Germany" is an absurd claim.

Indeed it is. Who has said that or written anything that only leads to saying that?

Seems Moore's lesson has been forgotten.

... there are no atomic propositions. — Ludwig V

Indeed.

Individual beliefs are picked out of an ongoing process. As a result, as with events, we have to draw a line somewhere. I'm showing that the conventional line that is drawn severs S's belief about Michael's birthplace into pieces, setting the foundational pieces aside. The piece being treated as though it counts as S's belief about Michael's birthplace(the proposition "Michael was not born in Germany") is not equivalent to S's belief about Michael's birthplace, or S's belief about the proposition(the dissected piece), or S's attitude towards that particular proposition.

It does not follow from the fact that S takes "Michael was not born in Germany" to be true or to be the case, that "Michael was not born in Germany' is equivalent to S's belief about Michael's birthplace. What makes S's belief true is strikingly different from what makes the proposition true. It only follows that they are not the same thing. Nevermind that one consists entirely of meaningful marks and the other does not.

The emergent nature of belief formation carries along with it an existential dependency between the different elemental constituents of any given belief. S's belief about Michael's birthplace is not equivalent to the proposition "Michael was not born in Germany". S believes the proposition is true because Michael was born in France. That is not the case. The proposition is true because Michael was born in England, contrary to S's belief. Severing "Michael was not born in Germany" from "Michael was born in France" severs S's belief about Michael's birthplace into pieces. They count as different propositions. They are both irrevocable elements of S's belief; namely that Michael was not born in Germany because he was born in France.

The main objection that I levy against current convention is that the conventional notion of belief as propositional attitude cannot bridge the evolutionary gap between language and language less creatures' beliefs. — creativesoul

I agree that there is a problem about that, and that it is annoying. I suppose it is inevitable that philosophers who believe that philosophy is all about language will tend to focus on language. But I agree that it is clear that dogs and horses etc. do have beliefs even though they cannot express them in language. They express them through their actions and reactions - non-verbal behaviour. That does mean they do have ideas and concepts.

I use the term "propositional attitude" because it groups together a collection of terms with a common feature - a "that" clause - (grammatically known as indirect speech, which it can be, but isn't always). That group starts with "believe" and "know" but there are many others. They are mostly to do with cognition, which is why they are philosophically interesting.

But I'm not a fan of the concept of a "proposition" for several reasons, one of which is that the crtterion of identity seems to be that two sentences with the same meaning express the same proposition. But that is a very weak criterion and I notice that philosophers very seldom, if ever, rely on it. There's a particular problem about this criterion because it is not clear whether two sentences that are logically related express the same meaning.

One result of this is the colour exclusion problem, much pondered by Wittgenstein between the two world wars in the first half of the last century. "This is red all over" and "This is blue all over" clearly do not express the same meaning, but are nonetheless logically related, because each excludes the other, that is it logically follows from "This is red all over" that it is not blue anywhere. Hence, Wittgenstein concluded, propositions are organized into systems and one specific proposition gets its meaning from its relationshipi to the other propositions in the system. Hence, the abandonment of logical atomism and the development of the concept of language games.

When you translate all of that into the context of belief or knowledge, it becomes something of a mess. I'm not altogether convinced by your way of handling it; it has admirable clarity and certainty, but I think it is too rigid to cope with the complexities of the language game with propositional attitudes, specifically the fact that the appropriate expression of a belief is affected not only by the believer, but also by the person uttering the sentence/proposition and by who is receiving it.

Whether you agree or not, I hope that is reasonably clear.

The main objection that I levy against current convention is that the conventional notion of belief as propositional attitude cannot bridge the evolutionary gap between language and language less creatures' beliefs.
— creativesoul

I agree that there is a problem about that, and that it is annoying. — Ludwig V

That puts it very lightly, to say the least. It looks to me to be a very serious foundational problem. If we think about it in terms of explanatory power and/or adequacy, "propositional attitude" language games are incapable of explaining how language less belief works. If language less belief existed in its entirety prior to language, and with enough time and/or mutation, gave rise to both language and the belief of language users, it only follows that we've gotten belief wrong at a very basic level.

I'm not sure how to square the public promotion of talking in terms of propositional attitude with an equally public rejection of propositions. I'm left feeling quite a bit puzzled about that. I do agree with you about propositions though. At least, I think we do. The notion is certainly fraught. From my vantage point, it would have been much better had we not attempted to use "propositions" as an ad hoc explanation for shared meaning(how meaning exists independently from and/or travels between language users).

Meaning is another thing convention has gotten historically wrong. That is an inevitable consequence of having gotten belief wrong, for meaning is itself a bi-product of belief formation, as is correspondence to what's happened, is happening, and/or will happen, as well as the presupposition thereof.<-----that last bit is directly relevant and pertains to an idea that you may agree with; that all belief presupposes its own truth.

It seems you're promoting the belief that approach. I am fond of it as well. It is very useful. I'm not at all certain that anything I've been arguing here inevitably conflicts with it or belief as propositional attitude, so long as we further qualify that (some belief(s) are equivalent to a propositional attitude - not all). I think that much of current convention is amenable to and/or dovetails perfectly with my view. I'm growing particularly fond of much of Davidson's work.


Pertaining to Witt...

I admire Witt for having shaken some philosophical sense into philosophy proper regarding the importance of paying attention to how people use language for more than just communicating thought and/or belief to one another. However, while there is merit to the notion of language games, and plenty of it, it is still based upon an inadequate notion of meaning, and that clearly shows up, to me anyway, in the quote below...

...one specific proposition gets its meaning from its relationship to the other propositions in the system... — Ludwig V

I do not outright disagree with the thrust of what Witt was said to be doing there. I mean, I wholeheartedly agree that many propositions become meaningful solely by virtue of being used in conjunction with other(different) propositions(in their language game). I just do not find that explanation/descriptive practice to be adequate enough. It's correct enough in the main. I mean, we can say the same about all sorts of words as well. It's useful as well. Here though, I'm thinking particularly about several dichotomies that have been used in academia throughout the history of Western philosophy, where they amount to being akin to being two sides of the same meaningful coin. All of which clearly have their use. None serve as adequate terminological frameworks for taking proper account of that which consists of both, and is thus, adequately described by neither side of the dichotomy.

Belief is one such thing.

The result of attempting to use those dichotomies as a means to properly take account of belief has been a self-imposed bewitchment(nod to Witt, of course). Flies in bottles.

When you translate all of that into the context of belief or knowledge, it becomes something of a mess. — Ludwig V

Indeed. That is evidence that there are inadequate conceptual schemes, linguistic frameworks, language games at work attempting to take account of that which existed in its entirety prior to them all.

I'm not altogether convinced by your way of handling it; it has admirable clarity and certainty, but I think it is too rigid to cope with the complexities of the language game with propositional attitudes, specifically the fact that the appropriate expression of a belief is affected not only by the believer, but also by the person uttering the sentence/proposition and by who is receiving it.

Whether you agree or not, I hope that is reasonably clear.

I think that I understand you. It seems we understand one another, by and in large. It would be both helpful and interesting, to me anyway, to unpack that last bit above.

Are you referring to current belief attribution practices when mentioning "the appropriate expression of a belief"?

Those accounting practices have not been clearly discussed here as a subject matter in their own right. They are certainly worthy. However, because those practices are clearly in use regarding Gettier's paper, and very much a part of the problem, I'd like to hear more about why you think my view is too rigid to cope with how the appropriate expression of a belief is affected by the believer, an author/speaker reporting the belief, and the reader/listener.

Thank you for the interesting avenue.

:smile:

Well, how about starting with this:-

Starting with two observations:-

First, our ways of talking about actions constitute a language game, a practice and a (let's say) paradigm. Part of this paradigm is the idea that an action is explained (on one level) by the idea of a reason for doing something. "Believe" (and other words) play a part in this because they identify (potential or actual) the reasons for a particular agent doing something.

Second, although one can, for some purposes, think of language as consisting of propositions or, better, the equipment for constructing expressions of propositions, it is nothing without its practice, i.e. people uttering sentences. (The best definition for me is that a proposition is a sentence with its use in a context that includes actual and/or potential audiences.) In some uses, that is not very relevant, but in the case of "believe" and "know" it is very relevant.

Returning to our original case

Suppose our long-suffering farmer stands by the gate to his field, looking out over it. Without speaking, he turns, goes back to his Land-Rover and emerges with a length of rope. He comes back, opens the gate and walks out into the field towards a piece of cloth. How do we make sense of his action? We know a good deal about him, so I say to you that he believes that the piece of cloth is a cow that is in the wrong place and he is going to rescue her and return her to her right place. This has nothing to do with anything that it is in his mind, though we could infer something about what he would say if we asked him. But this is not about what he would say; it is about what he is doing.

I'm afraid I got lost in the business about where Michael was born, so I won't comment on that, beyond saying that the propositions (!) you were discussing are clearly in a network and the relationships between them are quite complicated and even more complicated if you include "believes" in the mix.

I haven't worked out exactly how this would apply to Gettier cases, except that Gettier treats beliefs as if they were in precise correlation with propositions and as if propositions presented themselves one by one in a neat row and I don't really accept either proposition (!!)

There are lots of questions and obscurities, but perhaps that it is basis for discussion?

Maybe.

The core issue is the stark difference between our notions of "belief". Your last reply shows a few more as well.

While I agree with rejecting belief as something in the head(mind), I differ on how to best handle that.

Does the farmer do all those things if he does not believe that that particular piece of cloth is a cow? I think not. I suspect you'd agree. How does focusing upon his actions tell us anymore regarding exactly what his(and all) belief are?

I'm also still curious about why you think my view is too rigid to cope with how the appropriate expression of a belief is affected by the believer, an author/speaker reporting the belief, and the reader/listener.

...one specific proposition gets its meaning from its relationship to the other propositions in the system... — Ludwig V

I think that this line of thought would be well served by introducing a bit more regarding how the relationship emerges, how the relationship persists, what the relationship consists of/in, what the relationship is existentially dependent upon, etc.

The role of the users, in as precise a manner as possible.

I apologize for my silence. Life has been rather busy and pre-occupied for the last couple of weeks. You may have lost interest by now, but just in case, here are my replies.

Does the farmer do all those things if he does not believe that that particular piece of cloth is a cow? I think not. I suspect you'd agree. How does focusing upon his actions tell us anymore regarding exactly what his(and all) belief are? — creativesoul

I don't think we need to focus on S's actions to understand belief. I do think we need to recognize that belief is shown by actions just as much as words. Certainly ordinary life pays attention to both and people often claim that when it comes to divining what people believe, actions speak louder than words. In addition, belief is extremely useful in making sense of actions that would otherwise be nonsensical. I can't think of another way of doing it.

I'm also still curious about why you think my view is too rigid to cope with how the appropriate expression of a belief is affected by the believer, an author/speaker reporting the belief, and the reader/listener.
8 days ago — creativesoul

Because your view can't make sense of actions that are based on false beliefs or actions that are not expressed in language. "Embedded beliefs" seems a neat way of describing them. But I don't clearly understand what your view is, so perhaps I'm wrong.

I think that this line of thought would be well served by introducing a bit more regarding how the relationship emerges, how the relationship persists, what the relationship consists of/in, what the relationship is existentially dependent upon, etc. — creativesoul

Well, that would be needed if I wanted to create a Theory or an Ism. For various reasons, I just don't see that happening.

I don't understand what "how the relationship emerges" means. The relationship between propositions, belief and action isn't hidden. The relationship between the three persists for as long as S's belief persists. The relationship between belief and action is the relationship between reason for action and action and depends on the mental state of the believer - and, yes, that seems to conflict with my remark that it is not a question of the mental state of the believer. That remark over-simplifies the complex relationship between the mental state of the believer and the way that someone else may report it.

One thing that puzzles me is whether a belief that p implies a commitment to all the analytic implications of p. On the one hand, if S believes that p, it would seem that S must understand p - in some sense of "understand". On the other hand, it seems quite unlikely that most people understand all the implications of any proposition they believe. A similar point could be made about the causal implications of specific facts or events. There's another complicated issue for philosophy about disentangling beliefs that have values built in to them (such as the belief that X committed murder or that COVID is dangerous) and their factual content.

No worries about the delay. This conversation may have many. I'm very busy as well. Too busy to offer anything other than this at the moment...

:wink:

Cheers. Happy Holidays, happy new year, and all that jazz!!!

I'm not sure what makes you think that my view cannot make sense of actions based on false belief. The farmer believed a piece of cloth was a cow. He acted just like someone who believed that. His subsequent speech act could very well have been "Oh, there's a cow in the field". That is exactly what I would expect someone to say if they mistook cloth for cow.

The last paragraph in your reply deserves more attention than I can currently give it. I want to, but it will have to wait. Again...

Cheers!

Thanks for your reply. There's no deadline for this. Whenever you are ready.

I'm glad we have got the farmer sorted out.

I look forward to your help with the last paragraph.

I don't want to get in amongst the weeds of the Gettier problem, but there's a link between the last paragraph and Gettier and it sits behind that last paragraph. If S is justified in believing that p and p implies q, is S justified in believing that q? Even if if p is false? I want to say no, but I'm not sure I can.

I don't understand what "how the relationship emerges" means. The relationship between propositions, belief and action isn't hidden. The relationship between the three persists for as long as S's belief persists. The relationship between belief and action is the relationship between reason for action and action and depends on the mental state of the believer - and, yes, that seems to conflict with my remark that it is not a question of the mental state of the believer. That remark over-simplifies the complex relationship between the mental state of the believer and the way that someone else may report it. — Ludwig V

Greetings!

We can revisit the above at a later date.

I don't want to get in amongst the weeds of the Gettier problem, but there's a link between the last paragraph and Gettier and it sits behind that last paragraph. If S is justified in believing that p and p implies q, is S justified in believing that q? Even if if p is false? I want to say no, but I'm not sure I can. — Ludwig V

Oh, we most certainly can deny that. I already do, for different reasons than you, however. Those reasons have nothing to do with whether or not P is true.

We're already up to our neck in Gettier overgrowth! That's exactly what the cottage industry cases are. :wink:

It is my understanding that one of Gettier's targets was that specific formulation. If S is justified in believing P and P entails Q, then S is justified in believing Q. I cannot remember whose formulation it was but that doesn't really matter here.

One thing that puzzles me is whether a belief that p implies a commitment to all the analytic implications of p. On the one hand, if S believes that p, it would seem that S must understand p - in some sense of "understand". On the other hand, it seems quite unlikely that most people understand all the implications of any proposition they believe. — Ludwig V

Indeed. That is a problem.

In addition, even if and when S does understand P and that P entails Q, S's belief that Q is true is not adequately represented by Q and Q alone. Such beliefs are more complex than just Q. They are directly connected to P. Q because P. Not merely Q.

The earlier example that Michael was using demonstrates this all rather nicely. "Michael was not born in Germany" is entailed by a plurality of completely different beliefs about Michael's birthplace. Many of these directly conflict with one another. Three people with mutually exclusive beliefs about Michael's birthplace all have belief that entails Q.

"Michael was not born in Germany" is entailed by all of the following...

Michael was born in Botswana.
Michael was born in Israel.
Michael was born in Russia.

We cannot justifiably arrive at believing that Michael was not born in Germany, unless we are already justified in believing that he was born somewhere else. P and Q are entwined by S's belief formation process, and irrevocably so. It is only as a result of severing P from Q and treating Q as if it is an accurate report of S's belief that problems arise.

Hence...

"Michael was not born in Germany" cannot stand alone as S's belief about Michael's birthplace. Current conventional practice leads to our claiming otherwise, and in doing so it also results in saying that all three individuals share the exact same belief about Michael's birthplace.

They - quite clearly - do not.

The only way to properly discriminate between the three individuals is to report their belief as Q because P, where P is any of the three beliefs written above. Upon doing so, we find Gettier's problem dissolved. Justified false belief is not a problem for JTB.

"Michael was not born in Germany" cannot stand alone as S's belief about Michael's birthplace. Current conventional practice leads to our claiming otherwise, and in doing so it also results in saying that all three individuals share the exact same belief about Michael's birthplace.

They - quite clearly - do not.

The only way to properly discriminate between the three individuals is to report their belief as Q because P, where P is any of the three beliefs written above. Upon doing so, we find Gettier's problem dissolved. Justified false belief is not a problem for JTB. — creativesoul

Well, that clarifies a great deal, and I agree that this dissolves the Gettier problem.

But I do have qualifications.

First, is this a diagnosis that you would accept? Gettier thinks that beliefs, propositions and sentences neatly align with each other. Each belief, proposition and sentence is clearly distinct from all other beliefs, propositions and sentences. I doubt that he would accept that, but his formulation of the problem sweeps all the complexities under the carpet and trades on the resulting ambiguities.

Second, if you focus on "Michael was not born in Germany" and the fact that all three people would agree on that, you will think that they all have the same belief, and with reason. If you focus on the fact that they each have a different reason for believing that, you will think that they all have different beliefs, and with reason. So I prefer to stick with what I have just said and refuse to adopt either that they do, or that they do not, have the same belief. So long as the situation is clear, which it is, the classification doesn't matter very much. Or at least, I need to be persuaded that it matters, and for what purposes.

I observe that this issue seems to me to parallel the problems that Wittgenstein had with the colour exclusion problem - which, if I have the history right, eventually led to him abandoning logical atomism.

Third, (the Gettier problem seems to have a kind of gravity in that one cannot help returning to it), I think that there is a real problem which he also exploits. The quickest way to articulate this is through an example.

Suppose S is waiting at a bus stop and observes to T that the bus will arrive soon, meaning in the next five minutes. S is justified in believing this, because he has checked the timetable. The bus arrives six minutes later. Was S right or not? Did S know, or not? Again, suppose that the bus that was supposed to arrive has broken down and a replacement bus has been sent out and manages to arrive within five minutes. Was S right or not? Did S know or not? One could invent such cases indefinitely.

Another example, drawing on Gettier's first case. (I should look up the article here, but I'm going to chance my arm and work from memory). The target proposition in this case is "The person who is appointed will have ten coins in their pocket". This proposition turns out to be true, but not in the way that S expects. In this case, S's belief and the truth are nested in different contexts and I would say that the differences are such that Smith does not know. I think (though it is hard to be sure) that all Gettier problems turn on this issue.

The point here is an application of what we've agreed about beliefs. Sometimes belief/knowledge may be confirmed in ways that S has not taken into account; such cases may or may not impinge on a knowledge claim, and even result in an undecidable case. In practice, what we say will depend on the context, particularly what matters to our project at the time.

That's an imperfect formulation of the issue but I hope it takes us forward a bit.

Gettier Problem

JTB theory of knowledge
S = somebody
P = a proposition

S knows P IFF
1. S believes P
2. P is justified
3. P is true

Justification

1. Deduction: An argument that is sound (true premises + valid form). If a deductive argument is sound, it's impossible for the conclusion to be false or, phrased differently, the conclusion of a sound deductive argument is necessarily true.

In other words, P (deductively) justified implies and is implied by P is true i.e. (deductive) justification (for P) is both necessary and sufficient for truth (P is true).

In this case, criterion 3 (P is true) is unnecessary as 2 (P is justified) implies 3 (P is true). The JTB theory can be shrunk down to JB (justified belief).

2. Induction: A cogent inductive argument is one in which the premises are true and the argument strong which translates as the conclusion is likely to be true. There's no necessity that the conclusion be true i.e. the conclusion's truth is partially independent of an inductive argument, cogent or otherwise. Criterion 3 (P is true) is necessary (it must be mentioned separately).

Are Gettier problems about induction rather than deduction? Gettier problems occur when chance (re induction which is probabilistic) is invovled (re Gettier cases).

Also, if I include criterion 3 (P is true) in my definition of knowledge, I'm also claiming truth is (partially/wholly) independent of justification - this is a hallmark of induction.

Type specimen, Gettier case
Smith & Brown go for a job interview. Smith overhears the interviewer saying "White will be hired". Smith known Brown has 10 coins in his pocket. Smith then, so Gettier claim, justified to form the belief that the man with 10 coins in his pocket will be given the job¹.

Later ... Smith is the one who actually bags the prize (is hired). Smith checks his pockets - he has exactly 10 coins. Smiths belief is true.

To sum up, Smiths's belief (the man with 10 coins will be hired) is true and justifed, but then his having 10 coins in his pocket was a chance occurrence i.e. a justified, true, belief that is not knowledge (the no luck principle)

1. Is Smith justified in inferring from what he heard about Brown and what he knows about Brown (10 coins in Brown's pocket) that the man with 10 coins in his pocket will get hire?

I don't think so because there are many people with 10 coins in their pocket who haven't even attended the interview, forget about being rejected/accepted. Smith fails to realize that he himself could have 10 coins in his pocket. In other words Smith's premise $10 ~ coins ~ in ~ pocket \to hired$ is false because e.g. Jones has 10 pockets in his pocket and he hasn't even applied for the job i.e. he is definitely not going to get hired (10 coins in pocket & Not hired).

Well, that clarifies a great deal, and I agree that this dissolves the Gettier problem. — Ludwig V

Is that alone not enough to warrant assent?

I agree that the Gettier problem has an element of ambiguity.

Each belief, proposition, and sentence is clearly distinct from all other beliefs, propositions and sentences... — Ludwig V

What counts as "clearly distinct"?

I disagree with it at face value. Doesn't this hark back to atomic propositions?

...if you focus on "Michael was not born in Germany" and the fact that all three people would agree on that, you will think that they all have the same belief, and with reason. If you focus on the fact that they each have a different reason for believing that, you will think that they all have different beliefs, and with reason. So, I prefer to stick with what I have just said and refuse to adopt either that they do, or that they do not, have the same belief. — Ludwig V

The reason for agreeing that they all have the same belief has been shown to be fraught.

They cannot have the same belief about Michael's birthplace if they have contradictory beliefs about Michael's birthplace. It's one or the other, not both. It has been clearly stipulated that they have mutually exclusive beliefs about Michael's birthplace. It only follows that they cannot have the same belief about Michael's birthplace. Saying that they all believe that the same proposition is true is not a problem. Treating the proposition as though it is equivalent to their belief, and holding belief as equivalent to a propositional attitude is.

Acknowledging that they do not have the same belief about Michael's birthplace requires us, on pains of coherency alone, to deny that they do. Hence, "Michael was not born in Germany" serves just fine as a meaningful proposition. One who believes that Michael was born somewhere other than Germany will believe that that proposition is true. However, if we stick with belief as propositional attitude, we're forced to conclude that they all share the same belief about Michael's birthplace. <--------that's an unacceptable logical consequence. It's false.

How do we square that with the fact that they all hold mutually exclusive beliefs about Michael's birthplace?

Seems to me that belief as propositional attitude has been shown to be lacking in yet another way. Earlier it was found lacking the ability to take proper account of language less belief. I find that rendering all belief as propositional attitude has hindered our understanding.

In the case of deductively conclusive justification, I basically agree with you, with some qualifications, which probably don’t matter.

I agree with you also about the type specimen.

But I don’t think this is Gettier’s case. Smith’s deduction is (Brown is the man who will get the job) & (Brown has 10 coins in his pocket) so (The man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket). I want to say that even though this deduction is valid, it is not sound, because Brown is not the man who will get the job, so the antecedent is false. Gettier would accept that, but claim that Smith is justified in his conclusion even though one of the premises is false.

Smith’s evidence for (Brown is the man who will get the job) is that the president told him so - not conclusive but not unreasonable. More like your inductive cases than the deductive cases. So the question becomes whether the events that confirmed Smith’s conclusion (and refuted his premise) are sufficient for us to conclude that Smith knew. I don’t think so (and I’m not sure that Gettier thinks so, either). The puzzle is why not.

It seems to me that there are two options.

One is to deny Smith’s premise, not on the grounds that it is less than deductively certain, but on the grounds that one component of it (Brown will be appointed) is certainly false. So his justification fails. Smith does not know that is so and has evidence that it is true. Is he justified in believing it, or does he just believe that he is justified in believing it? I believe the latter, but many don’t.

The other is to deny that the proposition that Smith believes the same proposition as the one that is true. In this case “the man who will get the job” refers to Brown in the context of Smith’s belief but to Smith in the context of the final outcome. But the criteria of identity of propositions are not well formulated. So it is no surprise that not everyone seems to accept that there are two distinct propositions here, even if there are two distinct uses of the sentence in two different contexts. In any case, it isn’t clear that the same objection will apply to all the Gettier cases constructed since the original article. (I read somewhere that there are over a hundred of them, all constructed specifically to get round one objection or another.)

I disagree with it at face value. Doesn't this hark back to atomic propositions? — creativesoul

I disagree with it as well. I was specifying a belief that I think Gettier’s practice shows that he holds. Yes, it does hark back to atomic propositions.

How do we square that with the fact that they all hold mutually exclusive beliefs about Michael's birthplace?
Seems to me that belief as propositional attitude has been shown to be lacking in yet another way. Earlier it was found lacking the ability to take proper account of language less belief. I find that rendering all belief as propositional attitude has hindered our understanding. — creativesoul

I don't like "propositional attitude" much either. For me, it is a useful classification that groups together a number of different verbs that share a grammatical feature, that they are require a clause in what grammarians call “indirect speech”. Many, if not all, of these verbs are cognitive and hence of interest to philosophy. I wouldn’t have any objection to using “cognitive”, so long as other people would understand what I mean.

I would like to express the point about "language-less" belief by saying that a proposition is (usually) an expression of a belief, but not necessarily the form of expression used by the believer. Actions, in which the belief is attributed as a reason for the action, are another way of expressing belief. Beliefs are reasons for action, if you like; and since that formulation includes speech-acts, it seems general enough to cover everything it needs to.

But that doesn’t really explain the concept. The core of it is a most the useful property. Without belief, there is no coherent way to say that someone acted for a reason but the reason is false. In other words, attributing beliefs enables the speaker to express an assessment of the truth or otherwise of the belief.

Trying to work out a way of expressing where I think we have got to, I have to start from my understanding of what the standard use of “proposition” amounts to. A proposition, on my account, is a sentence with its use in a context. This implies that each proposition comes entangled in a cloud of other propositions which are essential to understanding it. This includes, but is not limited to, its truth-conditions and its truth-maker (if I may use that term). An attribution of belief includes a proposition but locates it in a specialized context which requires special treatment.

The crux of the problem is

1. A premise is false (in this case Brown is not the man who'll get the job)

and yet

2. The conclusion is true (coincidentally Smith has 10 coins in his pocket)

This happens with invalid arguments. In short the conclusion isn't justified and so, there's no problem at all, oui? All we have is an invalid argument.