the summary is altogether mistaken now — creativesoul
Are we in agreement that the farmer sees a cloth and mistakes cloth for cow at time t1, but he does not know that? — creativesoul
My apologies for not recognizing what all you've said here. — creativesoul
Ought we report what the farmer believes (that a piece of cloth is a cow), or what the farmer would likely say at that particular time (that he believes a cow is in the field)? — creativesoul
the summary is altogether mistaken now
— creativesoul
@invizzy apparently he changed his views. — neomac
Are we in agreement that the farmer sees a cloth and mistakes cloth for cow at time t1, but he does not know that?
— creativesoul
Yep. — neomac
"Report" implies that we are talking to someone other than the farmer. So we report in the first way. If we were talking to the farmer, he would obviously not recognize what we would say. But to repeat to him the words he would use would suggest that we share his belief, so I can't use those. Before I can say anything to him, I have to ensure that we both understand the reference of the sentence. I must correct his mistake. “You know that cow in the field? Well actually it’s a piece of cloth.” or “I’m afraid that cow in the field is actually a piece of cloth” would do the trick. — Ludwig V
I'm afraid I'm one of those who people who see every sentence as a (potential) speech-act so the context, including the audience, always needs to be considered. — Ludwig V
I don't understand your diagnosis of Gettier's case 1. I think you've misremembered it. — Ludwig V
If I understand you rightly (and I'm not sure I have), your diagnosis of Case 2 is complicated by the fact that "P or Q" is true iff P is true or Q is true. So, according to Gettier and me, if Smith believes that P, they are justified in believing that P or Q. But, as you say P is false, yet, as Gettier tells us, Q is true. Smith's justification relies on P and the truth relies on Q. It's that mismatch that creates the problem. My solution to this example is to point out that Smith's justification fails and so he cannot know P or Q, which can be summarized as "no false lemmas".
In short, it seems to me that Gettier case ought to be possible. Perhaps the real Gettier problem is why it is so hard to develop one that commands general agreement or to articulate a general solution. — Ludwig V
Do we agree that at time t1, the farmer believed that the cloth in the field was a cow, but he does not know that? — creativesoul
Not sure how to understand your questions, but I could say that there are 2 conditions to take into account: 1. perceptual evidences 2. justificatory practices. So e.g. the fact that available evidences fit enough into a cow-shape perceptual template, plus the fact that no other justificatory practice more reliable than judging by habit is applied may suffice to explain the mistaken belief.How does the "there is a cow in the field" follow from mistaking cloth for cow? How does mistaking cloth for cow serve as sufficient reason to state "there is a cow in the field"? — creativesoul
Smith believed the disjunction was true because Jones owned a Ford (because P was true). The disjunction was not true because P was true. It was true because Q was true. Smith's belief was false. — creativesoul
Belief that "'P or Q' is true because P" is not equivalent to belief that "P or Q" is true. — creativesoul
Seems to me that all Gettier cases show problems with the conventional accounting practices. — creativesoul
I agree to the extent we can derogate to the de-dicto way of reporting beliefs, as explained. — neomac
I don't understand what you mean by the de dicto (or de re) way(s) of reporting beliefs. I do know what di dicto and de re mean. Can you please explain? — Ludwig V
On second thought, however, I can't see how an example could be constructed without a false belief, so I am very sceptical of the possibility. There are some attempts, but they haven't convinced me. — Ludwig V
In short, it seems to me that Gettier case ought to be possible. Perhaps the real Gettier problem is why it is so hard to develop one that commands general agreement or to articulate a general solution. — Ludwig V
You've shown a penchant recently for not answering questions posed to you. — creativesoul
Does "there is a cow in the field" follow from mistaking cloth for cow? — creativesoul
Does the act of mistaking cloth for cow serve as sufficient reason to believe and/or state "there is a cow in the field"? — creativesoul
Does mistaking cloth for cow warrant concluding that there is a cow in field? — creativesoul
I'm afraid I don't have any ideas about where we should go next. — Ludwig V
I would claim "mistaking cloth for cow explains the belief that there is a cow in field" — neomac
Are we in agreement that the farmer sees a cloth and mistakes cloth for cow at time t1, but he does not know that?
— creativesoul
Yep. — neomac
...the fact that available evidences fit enough into a cow-shape perceptual template — neomac
...plus the fact that no other justificatory practice more reliable than judging by habit... — neomac
Smith believed the disjunction was true because Jones owned a Ford (because P was true). The disjunction was not true because P was true. It was true because Q was true. Smith's belief was false.
— creativesoul
I agree with this. There's a question you don't include in your summary - whether Smith was justified in believing that Jones owned a Ford. Gettier's answer is that he was. That's the situation that generates the confusion that people feel about these cases. — Ludwig V
Belief that "'P or Q' is true because P" is not equivalent to belief that "P or Q" is true.
— creativesoul
But surely is one part of a disjunction is true, the whole disjunction is true. "Jones owned a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true if Jones owned a Ford. Yes? Also "Jones owned a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true if Brown is in Barcelona. Yes? That's all I'm saying. — Ludwig V
Seems to me that all Gettier cases show problems with the conventional accounting practices.
— creativesoul
I'm sorry, but I don't understand what you mean by conventional or unconventional accounting practices. Can you please explain? — Ludwig V
Do you agree that at time t1, this particular farmer looked out into a particular field at a particular piece of cloth and mistook it for a cow? — creativesoul
Starting at "there is a cow in the field" does not consider the false belief, the case of mistaking cloth for cow, the belief that a particular piece of cloth in a particular field is a cow. — creativesoul
As if any judgment habit counts... — creativesoul
Do you agree that at time t1, this particular farmer looked out into a particular field at a particular piece of cloth and mistook it for a cow?
— creativesoul
Yep. And?
Starting at "there is a cow in the field" does not consider the false belief, the case of mistaking cloth for cow, the belief that a particular piece of cloth in a particular field is a cow.
— creativesoul
So what? — neomac
Are you claiming that the farmer's belief that there is a cow in the field
justified? — creativesoul
as if you didn't want to talk about justification before talking about belief.It makes no sense to judge whether or not the farmer's belief is justified unless we carefully examine what grounds that target belief. — creativesoul
we could say he is validly justified in believing that there is a cow — neomac
Since you refuse to take a position — creativesoul
or offer valid criticism of mine — creativesoul
We could say it. It would not make it so. — creativesoul
Belief that there is a cow does not follow from mistaking cloth for cow. — creativesoul
I didn't even get what your point is. — neomac
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