Maybe small changes in neural structure and brain chemistry. — RogueAI

Right. There is some physical difference that’s the cause. That’s all that’s needed to allow us to know what others are seeing.

The clone would occupy a different point in space, would physically diverge from me right after the cloning process. These are very small changes, but who's to say whether they result in different mental states. — RogueAI

It’s very simple to confirm that neither of those have an effect. If being in different points of space changes perception of color, your perception of color should change as you move. That doesn’t happen. If minor physical divergences of the kind you’re describing change perception of color, then your perception of color would be changing all the time. That doesn’t happen.

And similarly we can continue eliminating variables. If we hypothesize that changes in neural structure and chemistry change our perception of color, it is theoretically possible to try changing those and checking what changes the subjects report if any.

With enough testing (let’s not consider practicality of ethics right now) we will be able to map out all the relevant variables and their effects.

Since the contents of my mind are a black box to you and vice-versa — RogueAI

False, they aren’t. As stated above, if you concede that differences in perception are due to physical differences, then theoretically, it is possible to discover each relevant physical difference and it’s corresponding effect.

If, say, we find that toe size affects perception of color by increasing the red value proportionally to toe size, and that’s the only physical difference between me and you, then I can easily see exactly the contents of your mind. All I need is a color spectrum and I transform it accordingly, and the result will be what you see.

We just need to repeat this for every relevant physical difference and each of us can figure out exactly what’s in the other’s mind.

↪Agent Smith In a mirror, one can see a reflection of the eye, but one doesn't see the act of seeing, one only sees an image. This lecture (pdf format) elaborates the point — Wayfarer

Brain is a noun. Mind is a verb. They aren't identical but they're related - what the brain does is the mind. Functionalism? — Agent Smith

I want to retract my statement above.

Think about it.

Functionalism (as I understand the word)

1. Brain is to thinking as legs is to walking

However, there's something fishy going on:

2. I can't walk about walking BUT I can think about thinking.

Also,

3. I can't breathe about breathing BUT I can talk about talking.

And so on...

Breath (etymology of psyche; soul?), talk/language (self-reference paradoxes), think/mind (self-awareness).

Good points. Also, if mind is what the brain does, why is it just the brain that does mind? Why doesn't the heart do mind as well? Why do only specific parts of the brain do mind?

I can't walk about walking BUT I can think about thinking. — Agent Smith

This distinction relies on the assumption that thinking is an exclusively subjective activity that can point at objects or point at its own subjectivity. Walking , by contrast, is assumed as an objective activity, and so doesn’t ‘point’ at anything to begin with. But we only know we’re walking becuase we are conscious of it. We can shift our awareness from what we are walking on ( the sidewalk) or where we are walking to( the store) to the act of walking itself, for instance, when we are afraid we might stumble , or we are recovering from a stroke. Being self-consciously aware of any physical activity is a meta-aboutness.

:up:

:up:

'Intentionality' is a key term in modern philosophy. Intentionality is the power of minds to be about something: to represent or to stand for things, properties and states of affairs.

The whole underlying impulse of 'mind=brain' is because it gives science hopefuls something to work with. Mind is, you know, squishy, vague, indeterminate, it's almost impossible to nail it down. But neuroscience - leading edge! Lots of fantastic equipment and an endlessly enormous field of research! However.....

1. Brain is to thinking as legs is to walking

However, there's something fishy going on:

2. I can't walk about walking BUT I can think about thinking. — Agent Smith

That's good - is it yours? If not, what's the source?

Searle makes the comparison that mind is to brain as digestion is to stomach. This does not fall to the recursion you point out, since the stomach might digest the products of the digestion process, and hence recursion might happen.

We might digest what we have already digested. It's just that the results will be of increasingly low quality.

That might also be analogous to thinking.

about — Wayfarer

meta-aboutness — Joshs

:up:

Interesting! Thinking, then, is either not reducible to a function or, if philosophers insist it is one, it's in a category if its own, it stands out from the rest. That should mean something!

What links, if such exist, language [self-reference (paradoxes)] to meta-aboutness [self-awareness (anatta)]?

stomach — Banno

Are you referring to peptic ulcers? False analogy: I can't digest about digesting!

'Intentionality' was one of the major themes of a philosopher called Franz Brentano. And he was one of the seminal figures behind phenomenology, which is the school or orientation which Joshs is expert in. It's a big study, I'm not going to try and summarize it in a forum post.

We might digest what we have already digested. It's just that the results will be of increasingly low quality.

That might also be analogous to thinking. — Banno

It's certainly analogous to a lot of your thinking but I fail to see any connection between that and philosophy proper.

You can digest the product of digestion, as you can think about the product of your thinking.

Eat shit and die. So to speak.

You can digest the product of digestion, as you can think about the product of your thinking.

Eat shit and die. So to speak. — Banno

:chin:

Can you digest about digesting? I can't!

Nor can you think thinking.

Nor can you think thinking. — Banno

I can, that's the whole point! Can't you?

It's certainly analogous to a lot of your thinking but I fail to see any connection between that and philosophy proper. — Wayfarer

Your notion of 'philosophy proper' is a nonsense. Cheers.

'Intentionality' was one of the major themes of a philosopher called Franz Brentano. And he was one of the seminal figures behind phenomenology, which is the school or orientation which Joshs is expert in. It's a big study, I'm not going to try and summarize it in a forum post. — Wayfarer

:up: I'll check it out when I have the time to do so.

You can think about the product of your thinking, as you can digest the product of your digestion.


But in both cases it's probably not something to do in polite company.

You can think about the product of your thinking, as you can digest the product of your digestion. — Banno

As per you,

Digestion = Cogitation

Products of digestion (nutrients) = Products of cogitation (thoughts)

My thoughts can be about thoughts. Check.

Can my nutrients be about nutrients? I don't think so.

You can think about the product of your thinking, as you can digest the product of your digestion — Banno

You can think about thinking. You can't digest digestion. Anyone competent in English knows this.

Apparently you aren't.

But in both cases it's probably not something to do in polite company. — Banno

Good advice but then philosophers can't afford to be finicky, right?

Husserl derived many important concepts central to phenomenology from the works and lectures of his teachers, the philosophers and psychologists Franz Brentano and Carl Stumpf. An important element of phenomenology that Husserl borrowed from Brentano is intentionality (often described as "aboutness"), the notion that consciousness is always consciousness of something. The object of consciousness is called the intentional object, and this object is constituted for consciousness in many different ways, through, for instance, perception, memory, retention and protention, signification, etc. Throughout these different intentionalities, though they have different structures and different ways of being "about" the object, an object is still constituted as the identical object; consciousness is directed at the same intentional object in direct perception as it is in the immediately following retention of this object and the eventual remembering of it.

Though many of the phenomenological methods involve various reductions, phenomenology is, in essence, anti-reductionistic; the reductions are mere tools to better understand and describe the workings of consciousness, not to reduce any phenomenon to these descriptions. In other words, when a reference is made to a thing's essence or idea, or when the constitution of an identical coherent thing is specified by describing what one "really" sees as being only these sides and aspects, these surfaces, it does not mean that the thing is only and exclusively what is described here: the ultimate goal of these reductions is to understand how these different aspects are constituted into the actual thing as experienced by the person experiencing it. Phenomenology is a direct reaction to the psychologism and physicalism of Husserl's time. — Wikipedia, Phenomenology

'Psychologism' and 'physicalism' are the attempts to account for the mind in terms of psychological attributes or in terms of neuro-science. Physicalism is the default in mainstream Western culture.

, No sense of humour. I won't labour the point.

the reductions are mere tools — Wikipedia, Phenomenology

I think it's become a habit, a not so helpful one.

Physicalism is the default in mainstream Western culture. — Wayfarer

How very unfortunate. Reminds me of the drunkard's search and Maslow's hammer. The good news, it isn't a lost cause.

No sense of humour. I won't labour the point. — Banno

Believe me, I tried to see the funny side to your comments. Tell you what, I actually don't have a problem with the gut being capable of aboutness - it (the digestive system) has its very own complex neural network. Gut feelings! Ring any bells? :grin:

Eat shit and die — Banno

I would've liked it to have been the other way round! Die and eat shit! :rofl:

A missing comma?

@Wayfarer

Phenomenologists reject the concept of objective research. — Wikipedia

Like I shared with you once before, to be conscious, broadly speaking, is to have a unique (subjective) point of view. This is either an essence or a significant aspect of having a mind. I don't see how any approach that's predicated on objectivity can make any headway into understanding the mind for that reason. What's the sense in being objective about something (the mind) that has subjectivity written all over it? De gustibus non est disputandum!

Like I shared with you once before, to be conscious, broadly speaking, is to have a unique (subjective) point of view. This is either an essence or a significant aspect of having a mind. I don't see how any approach that's predicated on objectivity can make any headway into understanding the mind for that reason. — Agent Smith

One of the key factors of the 'scientific revolution' that occured in the early modern period was the conjunction of Galileo, Kepler, and Newton's discoveries with Descartes' discovery of algebraic geometry. From this emerged the outlines of the modern scientific worldview. Aristotle's physics and medieval cosmology were swept away and replaced with this mathematized structure ruled by the seemingly universal Laws of Motion. Of course this has unfolded over centuries, and a lot of ink has been spilled in describing it, but here we have to keep it in highly compressed form.

In any case, and by common assent, one of characteristics of this new philosophy was the division between the primary and secondary qualities of objects. The primary qualities were held to be those attributes which were describable in mathematical terms and within the framework provided by this new science which was felt to be, at least potentially, universal in scope. At the same time, the so-called 'secondary attributes' were those of colour, taste, and so on, which were held to be essentially in the mind of the observer. This lined up with Descartes' philosophy of the separation of mind and matter giving rise to the basic framework of the modern worldview. Thomas Nagel, an American philosopher and cultural critic, describes it thus:

The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. — Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, Pp35-36

There's another one of Nagel's books about the same general topic, called 'The View from Nowhere' - about how science proceeds by eliminating or bracketing out the subjective dimension, to arrive at a precise mathematical description of the phenomena under analys.

It is within this presumed framework of the purely quantitative that a lot of this debate is nowadays conducted. ('Show me the data!') It's very much an intellectual and cultural construction, a model. But it's so deeply embedded in our culture that you tend to look at everything through it - and then, of course, you won't see it, because you're looking through it, and not at it. And that's what that essay I linked, The Blind Spot of Science, is about.

Where phenomenology comes in, is that it attempts to step outside that whole construction by the discipline awareness of the nature and quality of experience - it's a 'philosophy of experience'. It's generally more influential in European philosophy than in British-American, for various reasons. But the times they are a'changin. I think, and a lot of people think, that that characteristically modern materialist mindset is on the way out.

I think, and a lot of people think, that that characteristically modern materialist mindset is on the way out. — Wayfarer

The mindset you refer to, I think has never been more than half the total picture that is philosophy. The other half is the phenomenological tradition, a position which formerly was occupied by the classical metaphysical tradition until Kant put paid to it. (Metaphysics has re-surged but is now a part of the analytic, externally focused schools of philosophy). the two approaches have things to offer each other and they touch at various points.
So, I think both sides have value, but, unfortunately, there are many partisans on both sides who can't go beyond their polemical thinking and constantly indulge and express their wish to eliminate the other side. The self-righteous puritan spirit is alive and well on both sides and walking among us, to our detriment.

To think about something is plain thinking. The "about" comes from your consciousness which is ultimately plain thinking. With respect to the walking analogy, thinking about something would be equivalent to walking in a different way (backwards, sidewards, moonwalk, etc); the end result of any type of walk is (a change in) displacement, just like the end result of thinking about anything is a change in thoughts.

Walking in different ways, yes. Kama Sutra-like, different sex positions; no, as luck would have it, I'm not an expert on sex although I do enjoy an orgasm every now and then.But I digress, no? yes?

Anyway, which specific gait, would you say, corresponds to thinking about thinking?

I dont really know how to answer your question. How I see it, legs (or extremities, in general) allow you navigate the environment (they help you move from one place to another and overcome obstacles in the process). Walking cannot be about anything, of course; but just because walking does not have the capacity to be about something, it doesnt mean it is not a complex function; for example, walking in snow is different to walking in sand, and legs are fine tuned to respond to changes in topography, terrain, viscosity, etc; they have the capacity to move really slowly or as fast as their physiology allows; they can jump, stand in different positions, and some can use them as their hands when they have lost them; they help you swim, play sports, etc. Thinking about is an ability of minds, just like moving around is an ability of legs. So, thinking about thinking I would say does not correspond to a given kind of gait but instead would be somehow similar to legs moving in a given walking pattern; legs do not only have the ability to move in a walking pattern (they can jump, swim, crouch, etc) in the same way the brain does not only have the ability to contain/produce a mind (it is in charge of controlling motor activities, autonomous functions, hormonal cycles, etc).