I didn't see much in these articles about memory being dynamic. I found this interesting article though: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02523/full

It seems to suggest that memories can be dynamic yet also suggest memory as a type of storage. If memories are reconstructed (still not sure what this means), then they must be using a template to reconstruct from, or else it doesn't really qualify as a reconstruction. If memories are not stored information and not reconstructed from a template, then does it even make sense to call them memories instead of imaginings?

To say that memory is "dynamic" means that memories change and therefore would no longer qualify as a memory, but as an imagining.

Erik Rietveld
"Enactive approaches to cognitive science aim to explain human cognitive processes across the board without making any appeal to internal, content-carrying representational states."
But it is the scientists' internal, content-carrying representational states that inform scientists of the way brains work. What other means do scientists have of being informed about the human cognitive processes?

"A challenge to such a research programme in cognitive science that immediately arises is how to explain cognition in so-called ‘representation-hungry’ domains. Examples of representation-hungry domains include imagination, memory, planning and language use in which the agent is engaged in thinking about something that may be absent, possible or abstract. The challenge is to explain how someone could think about things that are not concretely present in their environment other than by means of an internal mental representation. "
The challenge is solved by merely understanding that if thoughts are about things, then thoughts must be representations of those things. In the case of imaginings and dreams, they are simulations of behaviors and their outcomes that we can use to streamline our behaviors in the world when the moment arrives. We can use the memory of a simulated outcome to change our behaviors just as we can use the memory of a real event that happened to change our behaviors. Computers run simulations and the outcome of those simulations are used by humans to understand the world better. So representation-hungry domains are really about certain aspects of the world, or else they would be useless in the world.

The latter 'reconstruction' is involuntary (neurological) and the former voluntary (phenomenal), no? — 180 Proof

:up: That sounds about right to me.

“ "Physicalistic nature," to which we have now advanced,
presents itself in the following way in accord with our
expositions: the thing itself in itself consists of a continuously or discretely filled space in states of motion, states which are called energy forms. That which fills space lends itself to certain groups of differential equations and corresponds to certain fundamental laws of physics. But there are no sense qualities here. And that means there are no qualities here whatever. For
the quality of what fills space is sense quality.”(Ideas II) — Joshs

This is interesting in that it seems to posit that all qualities must be sense qualities. So energy, mass, movement, persistence, change, extension and so on would not be qualities on that view.

This is interesting in that it seems to posit that all qualities must be sense qualities. So energy, mass, movement, persistence, chang — Janus

As long as we keep in mind that such ‘physicalistic’ entities are subjectively constructed as senses themselves.

As long as we keep in mind that such ‘physicalistic’ entities are subjectively constructed as senses themselves. — Joshs

Right, so that would be the phenomenologist view; on the physicalist view they would be objectively apprehended by subjects, and would thus be understood to be subject-independently real, so, real even if not apprehended.