That A=A is not dependent on your or my mind, or on your or my assent. But it can nevertheless only be grasped by a rational intelligence. That is why I favour the form of objective idealism which says there are real ideas that are not dependent on our minds, but which can only be grasped by a mind. — Wayfarer
Is that a Kantian notion? — Joshs
Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that that... in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking* is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally. — Lloyd Gerson Platonism v Naturalism
Hope you don't mind my chipping in here. There are domains of discourse within which meanings are fixed. Those classical domains, such as classical theology or Advaita Vedanta, have deep roots, i.e. their basic terms are defined in terms of fundamental values. The fact that they are so defined doesn't guarantee their veracity, although I think their longevity and adaptability provide support for that. Within those domains, there is what amounts to 'peer review', in that successive generations of adherents of those traditions authenticate the various texts and ideas of the domains. That is also the basis of the idea of lineage. In fact arguably those practices were the origins of peer review in science itself. — Wayfarer
I suppose the marvel universe is very effective at providing meaning within its particular domain (let's call that the realm of the imaginary). — emancipate
There doesn't need to be any criteria distinguishing validity or invalidity in this case because they each have their own respective, and different, domains. Choosing the valid/invalid modes would only be needed if science and the marvel universe covered the same domain. Obviously they do not, and no one seriously claims that they do. — emancipate
I think it's fundamental to philosophy generally. It's the law of identity. I can't see how temporarility is intrinsic to it or even connected with it (although will acknowledge that my own attitude has been deeply influenced by my understanding of Kant). — Wayfarer
thinking* is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally. — Lloyd Gerson Platonism v Naturalism
"A thing is identical with itself."—There is no finer example of a useless proposition, which yet is connected with a certain play of the imagination. — Joshs
We see particulars ( objective aspect) under accounts (formal aspect) , but are not these accounts subjective rather than objective? — Joshs
It is largely the very peculiar kind of being that belongs to universals which has led many people to suppose that they are really mental. We can think of a universal, and our thinking then exists in a perfectly ordinary sense, like any other mental act. Suppose, for example, that we are thinking of 'whiteness'. Then in one sense it may be said that whiteness is 'in our mind'. ... In the strict sense, it is not whiteness that is in our mind, but the act of thinking of whiteness. The connected ambiguity in the word 'idea'...also causes confusion here. In one sense of this word, namely the sense in which it denotes the object of an act of thought, whiteness is an 'idea'. Hence, if the ambiguity is not guarded against, we may come to think that whiteness is an 'idea' in the other sense, i.e. an act of thought; and thus we come to think that whiteness is mental. But in so thinking, we rob it of its essential quality of universality. One man's act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man's; one man's act of thought at one time is necessarily a different thing from the same man's act of thought at another time. Hence, if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.
I think Gerson misses an important circumstance that Aristotle observes in De Anima. — Paine
I think it's more than imaginary. It's metaphor and allegory used to provide comfort and guidance. At least that's what I've seen. And yes, imaginative power can guide or temper behavior in real life — Tom Storm
What are the rules (or practice principles) for determining where science should be and where religion should be for instance? — Tom Storm
What is often missed, is that mathematics itself is a value structure, and is therefore dependent on, and based in "value judgement". What has occurred through the history of humanity is that we have achieved significant levels of agreement, convention, concerning these value judgements of mathematics, and this has produced great confidence in the notion that "objective knowledge" is produced by mathematics. In reality this knowledge is better classed as 'inter-subjective'. — Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein, AC Grayling tells us, read almost no philosophy at all
— Tom Storm
Sorry for dropping in on a thread I haven't read but...
Where does AC Grayling say this ?
He is wrong but that doesn't surprise me — Amity
It's the law of identity. I can't see how temporarility is intrinsic to it or even connected with it ( — Wayfarer
But you're equivocating the meaning of 'value'. In maths,'value' is a number signifying the result of a calculation or function. In ethics and philosophy, values are basic and fundamental beliefs that guide or motivate attitudes or actions. So the meaning of 'value' is different according to the context. — Wayfarer
Assuredly. That A=A is not dependent on your or my mind, or on your or my assent. But it can nevertheless only be grasped by a rational intelligence. That is why I favour the form of objective idealism which says there are real ideas that are not dependent on our minds, but which can only be grasped by a mind. — Wayfarer
Can you give an example of how mathematics is a value judgement. I suppose they are very few. — EnPassant
The symbols used in mathematics represent values, as I described, "2" represents a value. — Metaphysician Undercover
The proposition A=A only makes sense as a reflection. The second A is being compared to the first in one’s mind and determined to be identical. — Joshs
For Spir the principle of identity is not only the fundamental law of knowledge, it is also an ontological principle, expression of the unconditioned essence of reality (Realität=Identität mit sich), which is opposed to the empirical reality (Wirklichkeit), which in turn is evolution (Geschehen). The principle of identity displays the essence of reality: only that which is identical to itself is real, the empirical world is ever-changing, therefore it is not real. Thus the empirical world has an illusory character, because phenomena are ever-changing, and empirical reality is unknowable. — Wikipedia entry on Afrikan Spir
A value is the estimated worth of a thing, whether the principle of estimation is numerical (providing the basis for quantity), or the principle is moral (providing the basis for ethics). — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't see it that way. Numbers are sets that arise out of iteration and partition.
Start with /
Iterate //
Reiterate ///
etc /////////////////////////////...
Partition each step into {/} {//} {///} {////} {/////}...These are sets. Numbers are sets.
In familiar symbols these are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,...
This is how set theory defines numbers. There are no values ascribed here. — EnPassant
I really don't believe that is the point. I think the point is that the expression '=' or 'is', strictly speaking is only completely accurate in the case of A=A. In other arithmetical expressions, the "=" sign denotes an exactness which is never the case for empirical objects. Mathematical statements have an exactitude which is never truly characteristic of the sense-able realm. Statements about the empirical world are always approximations, because the objects of empirical analysis always consist of an admixture of being and becoming. The reason that 'the law of identity' is being dismissed as a trivial tautology is because this is not seen. It goes back to Parmenides' discussion of the 'nature of what is'. — Wayfarer
Not buying, sorry. I think this obliterates a distinction of the first order. — Wayfarer
Clearly they are both "values", under the same general definition of "value", meaning "a thing's estimated worth". — Metaphysician Undercover
Likewise, when we judge the morality of a human act, we are assigning an "estimated worth" to that action. — Metaphysician Undercover
. Numerical values originate with counting, 'how many'. Qualitative values originate with judgement. ' — Wayfarer
Counting, "how many", is a judgement. How could you think it is not? — Metaphysician Undercover
:clap: :roll:Wittgenstein [ ... ] boasted he'd never read Aristotle. But I've never read Wittgenstein, so I'd better shut up. — Wayfarer
One thinks not because "counting" is a practice; "judgment", however, consists in participating or not participating in a practice.Counting, "how many", is a judgement. How could you think it is not? — Metaphysician Undercover
What you are demonstrating is that the set {///} has the value signified by 3. Do you not accept the fact that mathematics works with values? If "{///}" means the same as "3", and "3" means the same as "{///}" then you have a vicious circle of definition. But clearly this is not the case in set theory. Sets have all sorts of different values like cardinality, extensionality, etc.. To say "there are no values ascribed here" is rather ridiculous. — Metaphysician Undercover
It is not a value judgement. — Wayfarer
One thinks not because "counting" is a practice; "judgment", however, consists in participating or not participating in a practice. — 180 Proof
But you are talking about subjective value: something that can be open to disagreement. How can there be disagreement about the cardinality of a finite set? — EnPassant
And if there was disagreement about the cardinality of infinite sets it would not be because of subjective opinion it would be highly technical and concerned with Godel's undecidable cardinals - such as in the continuum hypothesis. — EnPassant
What I am saying is that all opinion is subjective (of the subject). Agreement produces a sort of "intersubjectivity", whereby we say one's opinion is the same as another's. But intersubjectivity is still dependent on subjects, so it cannot support a definition of "objective" (of the object) which extends beyond the existence of subjects. — Metaphysician Undercover
Godel's theorem demonstrates the reality of undecidables.That something is "undecidable" is an opinion.
the point is that the expression '=' or 'is', strictly speaking is only completely accurate in the case of A=A. In other arithmetical expressions, the "=" sign denotes an exactness which is never the case for empirical objects. Mathematical statements have an exactitude which is never truly characteristic of the sense-able realm. Statements about the empirical world are always approximations, because the objects of empirical analysis always consist of an admixture of being and becoming. The reason that 'the law of identity' is being dismissed as a trivial tautology is because this is not seen. — Wayfarer
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