//edit// because universals are just that - they are universal. They're not peculiar to the human intellect, or they wouldn't be universal, as a matter of definition.// — Wayfarer

Most universals are created. Only after the fact they are called universals. It depends on the people if they are valued or not. Correct me if I'm wrong.

I have found Dennett's 2017 writing good in some ways, but it is here that he does come up with the idea that consciousness is an illusion. This does seem as if it is taking the neurological aspects of understanding consciousness to the extreme. It denies the reflective aspects, but it is with language and concepts that human beings have freedom of thought and choices.

I have come across another book, which I have started reading by Steven Pinker, 'Enlightenment Now: The Case For Reason, Science, Humanism and Progress (2018). This points to the importance of reason since the time of the enlightenment. In many ways, science offers reason and solutions to problems in the world. This is important, so it may be about science which is bound up with values and their examination rather than as knowledge which is flat and unquestioning of the social order and politics.

Show me where Thomas Aquinas says that the human intellect produces its own ideas and forms. — Wayfarer

We've been through this already Wayfarer, and I've provided the reference. Also, I explained to you how I understood this issue in a way very similar to the way that you do, in my earlier days of studying philosophy. I studied both Plato and Aristotle quite a lot, before moving on to Neo-Platonists and Augustine. I was completely under the impression that "universals" were understood to have separate, independent existence, as modern day Platonism holds.

But then I began to study Aquinas, and found that he explicitly rejects this theory, and he refers to Aristotle for the principles of his rejection. I was taken aback, and had to reread a lot of Aristotle's material to find where I misunderstood. The point of revelation for me was what is referred to as the cosmological argument. This is where he lays down the difference between potential and actual in a temporal framework. What he shows, Metaphysics Bk.9, is that actuality must be prior to potentiality in an absolute way. This is because any potential needs something to actualize it (efficient cause), So if potentiality was prior to actuality, in an absolute way, that potential could not ever be actualized. Therefore, he concludes that anything eternal must be actual. (This is a fundamental difference between Christian theology which holds the eternal God to be actual, and Neo-Platonism of Plotinus, which holds the first principle, the One, to be an unlimited potency.)

Then Aristotle proceeds to demonstrate that if ideas exist prior to being "discovered" by human minds, it is the activity of the human mind, which discovers them, that actualizes these ideas. The ideas only have actual existence after being discovered, and prior to being discovered they exist only potentially. But according to the cosmological argument, these "potential" ideas cannot be eternal. So this effectively refutes Pythagorean idealism, and what Aristotle referred to as "some Platonists" who posited these ideas as eternal.

That revelation inspired me to revisit Plato, and there I saw the seed for the division between human Ideas, which are passive potential, as tools in the minds of human beings, and the divine Forms which are separate, and active in the causal creation of the world. The material world, I now see as a medium of separation between the human minds seeking to understand reality, and the divine Forms which are separate, independent, and active in the creation of the material world.

If you look at Aquinas' Summa Theologica you'll see a section called "Treatise On Man", Questions 75-102. It is a long section, but I recommend a thorough reading to understand Aquinas' portrayal of the relationship between the soul, the human body, and the intellect, and how the human body is a sort of medium between the soul and the intellect, even though it is proper to attribute the intellect as a property of the soul. Understanding this relationship is very important and significant in understanding the distinction between the active intellect and the passive intellect.

I will direct you expressly to Q.84, "How the Soul While United to the Body Understands Corporeal Things Beneath It". Art.4 "Whether the Intelligible Species are Derived by the Soul from Certain Separate Forms". You'll see a discussion questioning why (the sufficient reason) the soul is united to a body. If the human intellect derives its intelligible objects directly from separate Forms, there would be no reason for the soul to be united with a body. However, the soul is united to a body, and uses the senses to "receive" intelligible forms. At Art.6 I believe you'll find what you asked me for, a description of how "the active intellect...causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelligible, by a process of abstraction."

However, I will add that there is still the matter of the "passive intellect". So this explanation does not account for the totality of intellectual knowledge, it accounts only for the material cause, as Aquinas says. The "passive intellect" is the controversial aspect of Aquinas' portrayal. Something passive is required to act as the receptor, when we say that the intellect receives forms. But if we see this "receiving" as a misrepresentation, and portray the intellect as creating the forms entirely, rather than receiving some aspect of the form through sensation, then the issue is resolved.

It is the supposed separation between the senses and the intellect, coming from antiquity, which causes this problem. Due to this separation, the intellect must receive something from the senses, which in turn receive something from the objects, and at each step of the way there must be a passive and an active aspect. If we dissolve the separation between senses and intellect, and allow that the two are one thing with two parts, then the senses become the passive part, and the intellect becomes the active part, thereby removing the need for the controversial "passive intellect".

This distinction between receiving and creating forms, is the same as the distinction between discovering and producing ideas. In order to account for the reality of the fallibility of the human intellect we must allow that the intellect creates the intelligible forms which it utilizes, rather than representing the intellect as receiving the forms which it uses.

Due to this separation, the intellect must receive something from the senses, which in turn receive something from the objects, and at each step of the way there must be a passive and an active aspect. If we dissolve the separation between senses and intellect, and allow that the two are one thing with two parts, then the senses become the passive part, and the intellect becomes the active part, thereby removing the need for the controversial "passive intellect". — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm still reminded of that passage I've quoted before:

if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality. — Sensible Form and Intelligible Form

It is the nous, the 'rational soul of man' that corresponds with the incorporeal element, is it not? (Regardless, I will try and slog through more of the Summae.)

I have found Dennett's 2017 writing good in some ways, but it is here that he does come up with the idea that consciousness is an illusion. — Jack Cummins

I'm tellin ya, he's a lumpen materialist, an ultra-darwinist. Give him a miss. Pinker is more interesting, more cosmopolitan, but he's still basically the cheer squad for scientific rationalism. It has to have its reps, and he's a pretty high-profile one, but he's philosophically shallow. (Liked this review.)

But then I began to study Aquinas, and found that he explicitly rejects this theory, and he refers to Aristotle for the principles of his rejection. I was taken aback, and had to reread a lot of Aristotle's material to find where I misunderstood. The point of revelation for me was what is referred to as the cosmological argument. This is where he lays down the difference between potential and actual in a temporal framework. What he shows, Metaphysics Bk.9, is that actuality must be prior to potentiality in an absolute way. This is because any potential needs something to actualize it (efficient cause), So if potentiality was prior to actuality, in an absolute way, that potential could not ever be actualized. Therefore, he concludes that anything eternal must be actual. (This is a fundamental difference between Christian theology which holds the eternal God to be actual, and Neo-Platonism of Plotinus, which holds the first principle, the One, to be an unlimited potency.)

The ideas only have actual existence after being discovered, and prior to being discovered they exist only potentially. But according to the cosmological argument, these "potential" ideas cannot be eternal. So this effectively refutes Pythagorean idealism, and what Aristotle referred to as "some Platonists" who posited these ideas as eternal.

That revelation inspired me to revisit Plato, and there I saw the seed for the division between human Ideas, which are passive potential, as tools in the minds of human beings, and the divine Forms which are separate, and active in the causal creation of the world. The material world, I now see as a medium of separation between the human minds seeking to understand reality, and the divine Forms which are separate, independent, and active in the creation of the material world. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is interesting to me even as a lazy physicalist who has never taken much interest in idealism. Other than scholarly interest, how does this model of reality play out in your daily life? What value is there in accepting this version of idealism?

How does Aristotle demonstrate that if ideas exist prior to being "discovered" by human minds, it is the activity of the human mind, which discovers and actualizes these ideas? Do you have any views about how this model reflects upon the nature of the human mind? It seems to be something more than a receiver, but more of a collaborator.

Here is the passage Metaphysician Undiscovered referred to:

https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1084.htm

It's extremely recondite, although I can understand more of it now than I would have ten years ago, due to the reading I've been doing.

My approach is not as detailed as that laid out by Metaphysician Undiscovered. It's simply defending the assertion that 'there are real ideas'. This means that there are ideas that are not dependent on some particular mind entertaining them or that are casually dependent on individual minds. It doesn't mean that these ideas exist in a separate domain, other than in the sense understood by expressions such as 'the domain of real numbers'. In that usage, I'm inclined to say that 'domain' should not be understood to exist temporally or spatially as an actual place, but is nevertheless real - hence, transcendent, or 'real in all possible worlds'.

Physics is the question of what matter is. Metaphysics is the question of what is real. People of a rational, scientific bent tend to think that the two are coextensive—that everything is physical. Many who think differently are inspired by religion to posit the existence of God and souls; Nagel affirms that he’s an atheist, but he also asserts that there’s an entirely different realm of non-physical stuff that exists—namely, mental stuff. The vast flow of perceptions, ideas, and emotions that arise in each human mind is something that, in his view, actually exists as something other than merely the electrical firings in the brain that gives rise to them—and exists as surely as a brain, a chair, an atom, or a gamma ray. — Thomas Nagel: Thoughts are Real

But the point is, such ideas are not objectively real, they do not exist as objects of perception, or in the realm of time and space, but as the constituents of the understanding - hence the link to the question raised in the OP. Whereas I think there's an implicit view that ideas, being the product of the brain, are at root understandable in terms of the physical constituents of being - that they're the product of a physical process. It's bottom-up vs top-down. I'm arguing that modern thinking in general tends to be implicitly oriented to the realm of objectivity, without being critically aware of the implications of that.

It is the nous, the 'rational soul of man' that corresponds with the incorporeal element, is it not? (Regardless, I will try and slog through more of the Summae.) — Wayfarer

I believe it is the soul itself which is the incorporeal element. And this is the same for all living things. This is the Aristotelian structure. Then it is the various powers, capacities, or potencies, of the soul which define the type of living being. Plants have the power of self-nourishment, other things have self-movement, and some have sensation, while human beings are rational. Each of these powers, being a potency, is in that way incorporeal. But the specific nature of any particular potency is determined by the material body which it depends on. So the rational power of the human being differs from the power of thought which other animals have, because the human being's material body differs.

My approach is not as detailed as that laid out by Metaphysician Undiscovered. It's simply defending the assertion that 'there are real ideas'. This means that there are ideas that are not dependent on some particular mind entertaining them or that are casually dependent on individual minds. It doesn't mean that these ideas exist in a separate domain, other than in the sense understood by expressions such as 'the domain of real numbers'. In that usage, I'm inclined to say that 'domain' should not be understood to exist temporally or spatially as an actual place, but is nevertheless real - hence, transcendent, or 'real in all possible worlds'. — Wayfarer

What comes from the work of Plato and Aristotle, and culminates in Aquinas, is the reality of a completely separate domain of Forms. This is the realm of the divinity, God. These separate, or independent Forms are responsible for, as cause of, the material universe, just like human ideas are the cause of artificial things.

It is very important to acknowledge the separation between the independent Forms, and human ideas, because this is recognition of the fallibility of human knowledge. You can think of it as the idea that the laws of physics are meant to represent something which has causal influence in the material world, but how well these laws actually represent the independent Forms, is questionable. So as much as we desire to be God-like, it is fundamental to theology, that having the power of God is not possible for any human beings.

This lesson is told by Aquinas with reference to the fallen angels. Lucifer, or Satan, desires not only to be like God, but to be equal to God, or to actually be God. This required that Lucifer relinquish the belief that God is higher. But to position oneself as equal to God is the greatest sin.

This is why we need to maintain the separation between the independent Forms of divinity, and the ideas of the human mind. The former being properly immaterial, the latter being dependent on material existence.

Other than scholarly interest, how does this model of reality play out in your daily life? What value is there in accepting this version of idealism? — Tom Storm

It helps me to obtain mental peace.

How does Aristotle demonstrate that if ideas exist prior to being "discovered" by human minds, it is the activity of the human mind, which discovers and actualizes these ideas? — Tom Storm

Aristotle explains this by describing what he calls "geometrical constructs". We must assign some causality to the act of the mind which "discovers" the geometrical figure. But the principle discovered must in some way exist prior to being discovered. So he assigns actualizing to the process of discovery, and potential to the existence which the principle has, prior to being discovered. He proposes this as a way to avoid the difficulties which arise from Plato's demonstration of the theory of recollection.

What comes from the work of Plato and Aristotle, and culminates in Aquinas, is the reality of a completely separate domain of Forms. This is the realm of the divinity, God. These separate, or independent Forms are responsible for, as cause of, the material universe, just like human ideas are the cause of artificial things. — Metaphysician Undercover

But I don't think that any of those sources presume the radical division between the human and the divine that you are suggesting. It is precisely because of the ability of reason to discern the Ideas that differentiates humans from animals.

It seems odd that, on the one hand, you deny the radical difference between humans and animals, which traditional philosophy ascribes to reason, and claims is a fundamental distinction, but on the other hand, you wish to ascribe a radical difference between the human and the divine, when according to Christianity man is created 'imago dei'.

It is very important to acknowledge the separation between the independent Forms, and human ideas, because this is recognition of the fallibility of human knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover

This passage seems to address this exact point:



Here, it is said 'the blessed who see God know all things in the eternal types'. The blessed are able to see something which the run of the mill do not. So again the separation from the human and the divine is by no means absolute.

As for being 'God-like', what is the meaning of 'theosis'?

But I don't think that any of those sources presume the radical division between the human and the divine that you are suggesting. — Wayfarer

I think you misunderstand classical philosophy if you do not apprehend this as a radical division. It is the division represented by Kant as the distinction between phenomena and noumena. It starts with Plato, who produced a vague outline in the cave allegory. Notice the difference between the fire in the cave, and the sun itself. Suppose the fire represents what people think is "good", then the sun represents the true or divine "good". This division, or separation between what people think, and what is the true, or divine Idea, is paramount in the method of Platonic dialectics.

Aristotle expounded on this separation, and firmly refuted the Pythagorean cosmology which held that the universe was composed of mathematical objects. This is the problem which occurs if we do not uphold the radical division. The principles of mathematics which are being applied at any particular point in history, being observed as extremely successful in their application, are assumed to actually be the constituent parts of the universe. This negates the possibility of truth as correspondence, because the principles are supposed to be the very thing which correspondence theory would say that they must correspond with.

It is precisely because of the ability of reason to discern the Ideas that differentiates humans from animals. — Wayfarer

It is this differentiation by species of animal, that I am arguing is wrong. It fails in it's ability to account for the reality of evolution by falling into the trap of the incompatibility between being and becoming, which Plato and Aristotle exposed. This incompatibility is exploited in sophistry to produce all sorts of absurd conclusions.

Here's another example of this incompatibility. In the science of the psyche, the concept of a "state of mind" is often employed. But the mind is always active, and such a concept is a generalization which is very useful in many ways, but it doesn't truthfully represent the reality of an active mind. This is the same problem we have in representing life forms as "species". It is a very useful for many purposes to represent life forms as static "species" which exist at any moment in time, but it doesn't truthfully represent the reality of actively evolving beings because it doesn't properly represent the temporal extension.

It seems odd that, on the one hand, you deny the radical difference between humans and animals, which traditional philosophy ascribes to reason, and claims is a fundamental distinction, but on the other hand, you wish to ascribe a radical difference between the human and the divine, when according to Christianity man is created 'imago dei'. — Wayfarer

The divisions I propose are well justified. The divine Forms are temporally prior to, as cause of, matter, and all material existence. Living beings on earth are temporally posterior to matter, and material existence. That is a radical difference. There is no such radical difference between the individual species of living beings, as genetics and evolution demonstrate to us.

Where we need to impose divisions is with respect to types of matter, or substance. We have divine Forms, which as I explained are prior to, as cause of, matter and substance. But there are levels of priority, some types of substance or matter, are temporally prior to others. So Aquinas for example, posits angels to account for the different levels of priority. Then we have the soul, which is prior to, and cause of all the organic matter, or substance on earth, but not prior to other types of matter.

So in as much as I divide the divine from the living soul, by placing matter as the medium between them, I allow for different types of matter, some temporally prior to others. This is the complexity of material existence. Immateriality can be defined as temporally prior to matter, but since there is a temporal order to the types of matter, the living soul might be immaterial in relation to one type of matter, as temporally prior to it, but still posterior to other types of matter, placing the soul at a lower degree of immateriality than the angels and God. An immaterial being is required as cause of each and every material existence.

Here, it is said 'the blessed who see God know all things in the eternal types'. The blessed are able to see something which the run of the mill do not. So again the separation from the human and the divine is by no means absolute. — Wayfarer

To "see God", and to know that God knows, in no way implies that the person who sees God knows what God knows. And this is where the division between types of intelligible objects lies. If there was no way of knowing that there is anything at all on the other side of the division, it would not be a division, just a boundary, and we'd all be atheist. But since there is a medium between the immateriality of the living soul, and the divine immateriality, and the medium we know as matter, we understand matter as a divisor rather than a boundary.

You're misunderstanding what I'm trying to say to such an extent that it is clearly pointless to continue, thanks all the same.

//ps// one more thing - how do you interpret this definition from an online dictionary:

Definition of rational soul: the soul that in the scholastic tradition has independent existence apart from the body and that is the characteristic animating principle of human life as distinguished from animal or vegetable life
— compare ANIMAL SOUL, VEGETABLE SOUL

//ps// one more thing - how do you interpret this definition from an online dictionary:

Definition of rational soul: the soul that in the scholastic tradition has independent existence apart from the body and that is the characteristic animating principle of human life as distinguished from animal or vegetable life
— compare ANIMAL SOUL, VEGETABLE SOUL — Wayfarer

It's not a definition of "soul" which I would accept. I really try to steer away from online dictionaries, especially for philosophical purposes they're often pop oriented. Even SEP I find is heavily slanted in a direction heading toward popularism, in relation to IEP for example, which itself is quite deficient.

I completely accept the Aristotelian tradition, in which "soul" is defined as the animating principle, the first form of a living body, as the actual cause of existence of that material body. This is similar to vitalism. So, as "soul", there is no difference between the soul of a plant and the soul of an animal, or even the soul of a human being. And the soul is the immaterial base, being prior to the material body. Any other attribute of a living being is posterior to the material body, therefore not properly Immaterial in the sense of being independent from matter.

It is evident that what differs between the living beings is their material bodies. And, the difference between these material bodies is what enables the distinct and particular activities of the immaterial soul; rational thinking being one of those activities.

The level of immaterial existence, from which the soul comes, is unknown to us because we barely even recognize the reality of immaterial existence, let alone have a real understanding of the different levels of immaterial existence. Suffice it to say, that I believe all earthbound living beings are of the same level of immaterial existence, being like one big family. But unless we accept the reality of immaterial existence, and bring this idea back into mainstream culture so that proper study of it is appropriately encouraged, and we can achieve adequate education in this field, any suggestion of different levels to immaterial existence by you, I, or anyone else, are just statements of opinion.

So, as "soul", there is no difference between the soul of a plant and the soul of an animal, or even the soul of a human being. — Metaphysician Undercover

In De Anima 413a23 Aristotle says there is a nested hierarchy of soul functions or activities
1. Growth, nutrition, (reproduction)
2. Locomotion, perception
3. Intellect (= thought)
This gives us three corresponding degrees of soul:
1. Nutritive soul (plants)
2. Sensitive soul (all animals)
3. Rational soul (human beings)
These are nested in the sense that anything that has a higher degree of soul also has all of the lower degrees. All living things grow, nourish themselves, and reproduce. Animals not only do that, but move and perceive. Humans do all of the above and reason, as well.

Note this is an hierarchical ontology. Critical point.

Maybe it is true that the 'anima' is the same in many forms of life. What Aristotle introduced is a correspondence of perception. Plants respond to other forms of life, but they cannot change location. Animals respond in various ways according to how well they move in response to others. Humans can wonder why things change and put such matters as problems for the mind.

From that perspective, the idea is not so much about what is stuff or not but what is the overriding design that keeps showing up in stuff.

Look closely at what Aristotle is saying here. These are called "powers" of the soul. They are not distinct souls, or degrees of soul, but capacities of "the soul". You'll understand this better if you read what he says about "habits" (I'm sorry I can't remember the references). The word "habit" is very closely related to "to have", in the sense of a property or attribute. So the capacities of the soul manifest in a way like habits. So these "powers" are not different "degrees of soul" as if one power makes an individual more of a soul than another, they are properties of the soul, as in what the soul has, as a habit. Habits, including intellectual habits are discussed at length by Aquinas.

The key point is the levels of dependency of the powers, what you call being "nested". The lowest power, self-nutrition is first, so it is dependent on nothing but the soul itself. Therefore we can say that this power is separable from the others, and not dependent on any of the others. But as we move to the higher powers, sensation and local motion, we see that they are not separable from the lower power, but dependent on it. And the even higher power, intellection, is not separable from the lower ones, but is dependent on them.

So, when we look at the rational being, with the power of intellection, we must conclude, by these principles, that the rational soul is not a separate soul from the nutritive soul, the rational part being dependent on the nutritive part, therefore inseparable from it, while the nutritive part is not dependent on the rational part, and is separable from it. Notice that this dependency is within the parts, the attributes of the soul, not the soul itself.

You'll see that at 413b25 he says the power to think "seems to be a widely different kind of soul...", but he proceeds to describe how this is contrary to the evidence already stated. Therefore I think we need to conclude that the rational soul cannot be a distinct, or separate kind of soul.

Look closely at what Aristotle is saying here. — Metaphysician Undercover

I've looked closely enough to know that Aristotle differentiates humans from animals on the basis of rationality, that we're 'the rational animal', and it's a difference that makes a difference. But unfortunately for you, it doesn't fit in with your wholly idiosyncratic intepretation, so you have to try and obfuscate it. That's all I have to say on it.

You're not seeing the big picture Wayfarer. "Human being" is a classification of animal defined as "rational animal". Therefore all human beings are animals, and it is illogical to separate "human being" from "animal". That would contradict the definition. Have you read Aristotle's "Prior Analytics"? The defining idea is said to be "within" the idea defined. So "animal" is a defining idea of "man", therefore the idea of "animal" is within the idea of "man". Human beings cannot be separated from animals in the way that you propose, because "animal" inheres within "human being".

In a similar way, both "plant" and "animal" are described as living, aka things with a soul. Just like it is illogical to separate "rational animal" from "animal", because "animal" is inherent within "rational animal", it is also illogical to separate "the soul" of the rational animal from "the soul" of the plant. This would be like saying that it means something different for a rational animal to be living (have a soul) from what it means for a plant to be living (have a soul). That would make "soul" mean something different for every different type of living being, defeating any logical attempt to understand the reality of the immaterial (soul) with the consequent equivocation. If we follow this route, ultimately "soul" would mean something different for every particular, distinct living being, and the real immaterial existence which is represented as "soul" would be rendered as unintelligible, meaning something different in every particular instance where it appears.

Instead, we ought to allow as Aristotle describes, that "soul" means the same for all living beings, thereby making "soul" something intelligible. So it is defined as the first cause of actual being of a living body. Therefore to say that "the soul" of a rational animal is something different from "the soul" of a plant is to contradict this definition.

De Anima went into why the different kinds of life are different from each other. The potentials of what can be experienced are sharply contrasted against each other. From that point of view, the observation:
"soul" would mean something different for every particular, distinct living being" is exactly the point.

How the universal works is harder to observe than the singular quality of each life as a life.

I've read "On the Soul" a number of times. Book two starts with a definition of "soul".
"That is why the soul is the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it. The body so described is a body which is organized." 412a28

There is nothing to indicate that "soul" means something different for every different living thing. In fact Aristotle is very clear to say that he is asking "what is soul?", in general. And his answer indicates that he will use It always to mean the very same thing, the first grade of actuality of a living body, no matter what type of living body it is.

The capacity to perceive other beings reaches the highest level when a being is actually what they are in one's presence. That is possible because of the activity of the intellect. Other forms of life share in some aspect of that activity but are revealed by their partial involvement in the dynamic.

Your description lacks any vision of what such a capacity would be good for.

Therefore to say that "the soul" of a rational animal is something different from "the soul" of a plant is to contradict this definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

The soul, according to Aristotle, is the animating principle of all living things (hence the name of the text 'De Anima'). The soul is the principle that enables a body to engage in the necessary activities of life. The more parts of the soul a being possesses, the more evolved and developed s/he is. The three types of soul are the nutritive, the sensible, and the rational.

The nutritive soul is the first and common to all living things. For it can be said that anything that takes in nutrition, grows from this nutrition, and eventually decays over time has a soul. Plants possess only the nutritive soul, which is one of two or three parts of the soul possessed by animals and humans. The nutritive soul is what urges any creature to protect itself whenever possible, but also to produce offspring.

The sensible soul is the part of the soul by which the environment is perceived. It encompasses the senses but also allows the creature to remember, experience pain and pleasure, and have appetites and desires. Most animals and all humans possess the sensible soul while plants do not. Of course, not all animals have the same abilities of perception. Those who solely possess sense organs for a single sense can potentially not be actualized by the sensible soul and are more like plants, possessing only the nutritive soul, for instance insects or molluscs.

Aristotle believed that animals and humans both possess the sensible soul. However, he raises the question whether animals have the capacity for belief. Belief would seem to imply conviction. Conviction would seem to imply that a creature was persuaded, because one can not be convinced of something without being persuaded in some way. Accordingly persuasion would seem to imply a rational function of measuring possibilities and drawing conclusions, a function that Aristotle believed animals did not possess.

The rational soul belongs to man alone. The rational soul is that by virtue of which we possess the capacity for rational thought. Aristotle divides rational thought into two. The first is the passive intellect, the part of our mind that collects information and stores it for later use. This is almost an extension of the sensible soul in that it allows us to act upon the information gathered by that part of the soul.

The active intellect is the part that allows us to engage in the actual process of reasoning. It allows us to take our sensory input, combine it with our memories and skills and apply it to an end. Aristotle also believed that the active intellect was responsible for our ability to consider abstract concepts that can't be perceived by the senses. Through active intellect, philosophy becomes possible, and it is this ability that distinguishes humans from animals.

Needless to say, it is nowadays believed that all of this philosophy is archaic and has been thoroughly displaced by modern neuro- and evolutionary science. Nevertheless, if you wish to discuss Aristotelian philosophy, it is essential to acknowledge that Aristotle believed that the 'rational soul' belonged only to the human.

The capacity to perceive other beings reaches the highest level when a being is actually what they are in one's presence. — Paine

I don't understand what you're saying here. Could you explain?

The soul, according to Aristotle, is the animating principle of all living things (hence the name of the text 'De Anima'). The soul is the principle that enables a body to engage in the necessary activities of life. The more parts of the soul a being possesses, the more evolved and developed s/he is. The three types of soul are the nutritive, the sensible, and the rational. — Wayfarer

These are not called "three types of soul" by Aristotle. This is clearly a misreading, and he is quite explicit. These are stated as "powers" of the soul, potencies, or capacities. Also, it is questioned whether the soul is one and indivisible, as is commonly said of the "soul", or in what sense can these be said to be "parts" of the soul.

He explains why they are described as "potentials" (powers) when he discusses sensation. Rather than something actual, as the soul is, he explains how the powers are not always in activity. A being is not always eating, one is not always sensing (we sleep), so these powers are potencies which need to be actualized. The soul is the principle of activity, the actuality which actualizes the distinct powers. So there is necessarily a logical separation between the soul itself, and its powers, the former being actual, the latter being potential.

Now, "potential" according to the principles of Aristotle's physics and metaphysics, is the defining principle of "matter". Therefore we can conclude that the "powers" of the soul are proper to the material body.

Aquinas tackles this issue extensively. He questions where does the "habit" reside. A habit being a property which a living being has, which is the propensity to act in a specific way. He concludes that habits, including intellectual habits like reasoning, must be seated in the material aspect of the being. The free-will is a completely different issue though, which complicates the subject. The actions of the free will cannot be classed as habits. Free will is a capacity to act independently, even from the conclusions of reason, which is an habitual action.

This was one of the biggest problems Plato, Augustine, and the early Christian theologists faced. How is it that we can act in a way which is contrary to what we know is good, right, and reasonable? That principle provides the strength by which Plato attacked the sophists who proposed "virtue is knowledge", and claimed to be able to teach virtue. Augustine developed the concept of "free will" as the solution to this problem.

Are you familiar with Lamarckian evolutionary theory? Jean-Baptiste Lamarck proposed an evolutionary theory prior to Darwin. His theory delved deeply into the relationship between habits and the material body of a living being. He proposed that a living being developed a habit, and that the material body of the being evolved in such a way as to support the habit. You can see how this is somewhat contrary to Aquinas who concluded that a habit is only supported by the appropriate material body. And western science scoffed at Lamarck when Darwin produced an evidence based theory.

The problem of course is that scientific evidence is material, and material arrangements (organization), are apprehended as the cause of specific activities. So unless we include final cause (intent, desire, and want) as an immaterial cause of action, we cannot ever conceive of how the propensity to act in a specific way could produce a material body suited toward that activity. This is the problem which Lamarckian evolution faces.

So if we position "free will" (being the capacity to act in any way, free from the influence of material or efficient cause), at the base of the powers of the soul, then we have the principle required for such an evolutionary theory. We can say that the soul itself is a first actuality, which has the capacity to act freely from causal influence. However, then we still must account for intent, desire, and want. So we need to place final cause (intention) as inherent within the soul. This places what we call "free will" as fundamental to all living things, at the base of life itself, allowing that things such as desire and want may be responsible for the souls activities, and such activities may cause the existence of a material body to support habituation, and Lamarckian evolution.

Aristotle is very clear in Bk2, Ch4, to state that the soul is the cause of the material body. Where you and I seem to disagree is whether it is a distinct type of soul which causes a distinct type of body. I think that this would render "the soul" as unintelligible, being particular to a material object, and this is exactly what Aristotle was trying to avoid.

The nutritive soul is the first and common to all living things. — Wayfarer

"The nutritive soul" is a misrepresentation. Look at Bk2, ch2, 413a, 31-34, for example: "The power of self-nutrition... This is the originative power...".

A "power" is a potential, a capacity, as Aristotle explains. The soul is an actuality. So "nutritive soul", "sensible soul", and "rational soul" are all misconceptions. The powers which are described as nutritive, sensible, and rational, are all potentials, so they cannot be said to be souls, as the soul is something actual.

The sensible soul is the part of the soul by which the environment is perceived. — Wayfarer

And this is incoherent. You are saying the sensible "soul" is a part of the soul. If it's a soul, how can it be a part of the soul. That's why Aristotle calls it a "power". It is an attribute, something which the soul has as a property. But all these parts, being powers, capacities, or potentials, are all housed in the material body, which consists of parts.

I highly recommend that you read Aristotle's work yourself, to avoid the sloppy terminology you present here. That is the problem with most modern, popular representations of classical philosophy. The modern attitude has already dismissed the classics as irrelevant, so they are presented in a careless way which demonstrates this dismissal. Aristotle was very logical, and he was very clear to represent self-nutrition, self-movement, sensation, and intellection, as powers of the soul, not as distinct souls.

Where you and I seem to disagree is whether it is a distinct type of soul which causes a distinct type of body. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. Aristotle says the rational soul is a power unique to the human which enables her to speak and think. You can write another 10,000 words of circumlocution but it won't make any difference.

Aristotle was very logical, and he was very clear to represent self-nutrition, self-movement, sensation, and intellection, as powers of the soul, not as distinct souls. — Metaphysician Undercover

OK - 'powers of the soul'. The rational power is unique to humans. That is the point at issue, which you've spilled thousands of words obfuscating.

Are you familiar with Lamarckian evolutionary theory? Jean-Baptiste Lamarck proposed an evolutionary theory prior to Darwin. His theory delved deeply into the relationship between habits and the material body of a living being. — Metaphysician Undercover

In modern-day language, Lamarck would have said that the organism is in control over the genes, while Dawkins (a Darwinist) says it's the genes that are in control. The whole of modern biology is based on the view that organisms can't influence the genes and that the real battle between the species is the battle between the genes. This central dogma of biology is set up specifically to keep up this image. There isn't a shred of evidence though. It's just a dogma.

But all these parts, being powers, capacities, or potentials, are all housed in the material body, which consists of parts. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's a nice image. I once read that the ancient Greek saw the human body as loosely connected parts, instead of the harmonious whole it seems to be nowadays. Seems a whole lot closer to reality. In fact, it looks that my hands have some kind of life of their own, typing and holding!

Aristotle says the rational soul is a power unique to the human which enables her to speak and think. — Wayfarer

Sorry to be blunt Wayfarer, but I don't think you've read the material. If so you wouldn't be saying "the rational soul is a power", you'd be saying that the soul has a power which is rationality. There's a big difference between these two. At Bk4 Ch.3 he turns to the rational "part of the soul". "Turning now to the part of the soul with which the soul knows and thinks...". And what he means by "part of the soul" has already been explained in BK3, as a power of the soul.

We cannot describe "the soul" as rational because "the soul" is the fundamental actuality of all plants and animals, but only human beings have rationality. And we cannot say that the soul of the human being is rational because the soul of the human being, as "soul" is no different from the soul of a plant.

But for Aristotle a soul is necessarily united with a material body, just like the union of matter and form in material things. So when we say that a human being is rational, we do not say this of the human being's soul, that it is rational, we say that of the union of body and soul, the human being is rational.

In relation to the soul itself, rationality is a potential, and this allows that the human being may act rationally and may not act rationally. We say the human being is a rational animal, but since rationality is related to the soul as a power, or potential, this means that the specified animal has the potential to be rational, but is not necessarily rational all the time. So we cannot describe the soul (the first principle of actuality) of the human being as "rational", because it is not rational all the time, it only has the power to be rational. If we defined it as necessarily rational that would be a false premise leading to unsound logical conclusions.

There is no mention of "the rational soul". That would be a completely different concept from "the rational part of the soul", which is what he is talking about.

OK - 'powers of the soul'. The rational power is unique to humans. That is the point at issue, which you've spilled thousands of words obfuscating. — Wayfarer

That the rational power is unique to humans is not the point of disagreement. I said that when we first engaged, it is unique, but as explained by Aristotle it is dependent on the lower powers. What is at issue is the relationship between the soul (which is actual) and the power (which is potential).

That's a nice image. I once read that the ancient Greek saw the human body as loosely connected parts, instead of the harmonious whole it seems to be nowadays. Seems a whole lot closer to reality. In fact, it looks that my hands have some kind of life of their own, typing and holding! — Raymond

I think the view was that the soul is what causes the body to hold together as a harmonious whole.

Sorry to be blunt Wayfarer, but I don't think you've read the material. If so you wouldn't be saying "the rational soul is a power", you'd be saying that the soul has a power which is rationality. — Metaphysician Undercover

It doesn't make any difference to the point whether the rationality is 'a power of the soul' or 'rationality is a power'.

That the rational power is unique to humans is not the point of disagreement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course it is! That is the whole point! You said:

it is not the case that a human being, through the use of reason, has any more participatory capacity in the realm of the immaterial, then any other creature — Metaphysician Undercover

This is in direct contradiction to the understanding of rationality that is in both Aristotle and Aquinas. Reason, rationality, the power of abstract thought, is unique to humans. It is through that power that humans grasp the essence or forms of things, though in a limited way (except, as noted, for 'the blessed' who see in a way that the rest of us don't.)

Of course it is! That is the whole point! You said: — Wayfarer

Of course the rational power is specific to human beings. It is that way by definition. We have no disagreement with this. What I said is that the rational power is not separable from the lower powers, because it is dependent on them. Therefore we cannot separate a "rational soul" from a "sensitive soul", nor can we separate a "sensitive soul" from a "vegetative soul", though we can make the inverse separations. The higher power is dependent on the lower. That is the point which Aristotle makes at your reference. This has nothing to do with how we define the rational power as being specific to human beings.

The key point is the levels of dependency of the powers, what you call being "nested". The lowest power, self-nutrition is first, so it is dependent on nothing but the soul itself. Therefore we can say that this power is separable from the others, and not dependent on any of the others. But as we move to the higher powers, sensation and local motion, we see that they are not separable from the lower power, but dependent on it. And the even higher power, intellection, is not separable from the lower ones, but is dependent on them. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is in direct contradiction to the understanding of rationality that is in both Aristotle and Aquinas. Reason, rationality, the power of abstract thought, is unique to humans. It is through that power that humans grasp the essence or forms of things, though in a limited way (except, as noted, for 'the blessed' who see in a way that the rest of us don't.) — Wayfarer

You've already demonstrated to me that you are not very well-read in either Aristotle or Aquinas, so the fact that you think what I say directly contradicts them both doesn't hold much weight for me.

Consider, that reasoning and abstract thinking are the way that we apprehend the immaterial, but this does not mean that reasoning and abstract thinking are themselves immaterial. Actually, they are clearly dependent on the material, as Aristotle demonstrates, and so they cannot be truthfully said to be immaterial. For both, Aristotle and Aquinas, the immaterial aspect of a living being is the soul, and this is the same whether the living being is a plant or an animal.

That the human being can grasp the reality of an immaterial soul which is proper to all living beings, as necessarily prior in time to the material body of a living being, does not imply that the tool used to apprehend that reality, the rational intellect, is itself immaterial. This leads us into the need for a duality, the passive intellect, and the active intellect. As Aristotle explains at 432a, no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense, as the activity of the mind depends on images which provide sense content.

Consider, that reasoning and abstract thinking are the way that we apprehend the immaterial, but this does not mean that reasoning and abstract thinking are themselves immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

I answer that, It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent. For it is clear that by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. Now whatever knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of anything else. Thus we observe that a sick man's tongue being vitiated by a feverish and bitter humor, is insensible to anything sweet, and everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if the intellectual principle contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies. Now every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is likewise impossible for it to understand by means of a bodily organ; since the determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies; as when a certain determinate color is not only in the pupil of the eye, but also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase seems to be of that same color.

Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an operation per se apart from the body. Now only that which subsists can have an operation "per se." For nothing can operate but what is actual: for which reason we do not say that heat imparts heat, but that what is hot gives heat. We must conclude, therefore, that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent. — Aquinas

What I said is that the rational power is not separable from the lower powers, because it is dependent on them. Therefore we cannot separate a "rational soul" from a "sensitive soul", nor can we separate a "sensitive soul" from a "vegetative soul", though we can make the inverse separations. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, would you claim that Aquinas does not accept the immortality of the soul? This would put him in rather a tricky position as a Doctor of the Church, would it not?

That's a very good passage, and the sick man's tongue being affected by a bitter humour, is very similar to the tinted glass analogy which I think you and I discussed at some other time.

The fact that Aquinas holds "the soul" to be separate and immaterial is not at all debatable. That's what I've been saying all along, and it's consistent with how I interpret both Aristotle and Aquinas. The soul is necessarily prior (in time) to the living body, therefore it is not dependent on matter, it is separable in theory, and is therefore an immaterial principle.

The issue at hand is in what way the intellect is related to the soul. The passage you have provided states "...the human soul which is called the intellect...", so it equates the "human soul" with "the intellect".

I don't know where that passage is from, but a thorough reading of the section of the Summa Theologica, which I referenced, will demonstrate to you that we cannot equate "the soul" with "the intellect", as is demonstrated by Aristotle and accepted by Aquinas. Now, "soul" here in your passage is qualified with "human", which is a descriptive term of a living being with a material body. Therefore if there was a type of "soul" like the one referred to as "human soul" it would be dependent on a material body, the human body, and this dependence would negate the principle by which we say that the soul is immaterial, i.e. that it is prior to, and therefore not dependent on a material body.

In other words, saying "the human soul", implies that the soul referred to is dependent on the human body. And, if it is dependent on the human body, then the "soul" defined in this way as "human soul" cannot be immaterial by the principles employed to demonstrate the immateriality of the soul.

That is the problem which Christian theologians have with the type of immortality promised by Jesus and his disciples. I believe it's Paul, who offers a lecture on 'personal' immortality following human resurrection. This idea of personal resurrection, and personal immortality, is basic to early Christianity. It is however fundamentally inconsistent with Aristotelian principles which assign the uniqueness of the individual person to material accidentals, therefore one's personality is attributed to one's material existence. So when we release the soul from its material confines, which provide for the material descriptive terms, "plant", "animal", "human", "Wayfarer", etc., to allow for the true immateriality of the soul, we also lose personal identity (under Aristotelian principles). The soul cannot be immaterial, and also personal.

So Aquinas had a fine line to walk here, between two completely incompatible doctrines, personal immortality, as a traditional tenet of the Church, and the immateriality of the soul according to Aristotelian principles (science?). Aristotelian immateriality is based in the concept of "prior to matter", and assigns particular, individual, and personal identity to an object's material presence, posteriority. This directly conflicts with the classic Christian teaching of personal resurrection. What is prior, the immaterial soul, cannot be postulated as posterior, to support personal resurrection.

If you look closely into Aquinas' metaphysics and theology, you'll see that ultimately he chooses the Aristotelian doctrine, as it is more scientific, and consistent with the evidence. Take a look at the first line from your quoted passage. "I answer that, It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent." This is consistent with Aristotle. The soul, as the source of activity, actuality, is the first principle of intellectual operation. This is the very same for all the powers of the soul. The soul is the first principle, as the source of activity, for self-nutrition, sensation, and self-movement, each and every power of a living being.

So we have no substantial difference between "the soul" as the principle of intellectual activity, and "the soul" as the principle of sensitive activity, and "the soul" as the principle of self-movement, and "the soul" as the principle of nutritive activity. This is very consistent with Aristotle, and vitalism in general, where the soul is the first principle of actuality of a living body. Where the difficulty for Aquinas, and the Scholastics in general, arises, is that this actuality, or first activity, which is responsible for, as cause of the activities of the living body, requires something passive, something receptive, to receive that immaterial activity which is proper to "the soul", and be 'actualized' into motion by the soul.

In the case of the power which is called intellection, this calls for "the passive intellect". And here begins the debate. We have two distinct approaches to the passive intellect, analogous to top-down, and bottom-up, each of which provides an understanding in an 'opposite way' to the other. The Aristotelian approach is most properly described as a bottom-up approach, because "the soul" is understood to be at the base, prior to the material body, and the material body is constructed by the soul in a bottom-up manner. The power of intellection is therefore something produced by the soul through the means of the material body. The top-down approach starts with intellection as a direct activity, derived directly from the soul. There is no medium of passivity between the soul and the intellect, and the intellect is an active part of the active immaterial soul.

You can see that the top-down approach has the intellect directly united to the soul, immediately active, with nothing passive between the soul and the intellect. Then the intellect itself is directly active, and the passive element is the forms, ideas, phantasms, etc., which are derived from the senses. The bottom- up approach has the biological, material body, as a medium between the soul and the intellect. The material body therefore serves as the passive element, which receives the activity of the soul. Under this view, the intellect itself is essentially passive, a potency or power, which is actualized by the soul. And you can see how there is a medium of separation (matter) between the activity of the soul, and the activity of the intellect. In this way the intellect can passively receive the actual forms, phantasms and images received through the senses, and also be receptive to the actuality of the soul. This makes the intellect itself the divisor between the two distinct types of actuality (substance dualism) described by Aristotle, the immaterial actuality of the soul, and the actuality of material objects.

A thorough analysis will reveal that the bottom-up way of understanding is more consistent with the evidence and the scientific understanding which we have. We can learn this lesson from Plato's description of vision in the Theaetetus. Here, sight is described as an activity, a motion which is emitted from the eye, and meets with the object, similar to a bat's sonic sensing. This is analogous to the top-down understanding of the intellect within which the intellect is directly united with the activity of the soul, acting on things. In reality though, we need to understand the intellect as a passive receiver, just like the eye is a passive receiver, and it is acted upon from both sides, the forms which it receives, and its primary actualization from the soul.

If you proceed onward in your study of Aquinas, toward understanding the appetites, you will see more clearly why it is necessary to posit this separation between the soul and the intellect, to account for the reality of the will. The will must be placed as higher than the intellect, in an absolute way, to account for the reality of the free will. That the rational human being can move and think in a way which is irrational, is very clear evidence of the medium between the soul and the intellect. And to postulate that the intellect always controls the will is simply an unreal representation.

Objectivity is a theoretically adoptable disposition that leads many to mistakenly believe that pretending to be on the outside looking in somehow cleanses them of the subjectivity inherent to being where they actually are; there is no outside.