Moyal-Sharrock uses "Hinge certainties", a small improvement over "Hinge propositions", although to my eye a certainty is propositional. — Banno

As is a belief. Which makes me wonder what motivates this denial that they are truth-apt, particularly since no one seems to be able to give a coherent argument for why we should doubt or deny that they have a truth-value, while simultaneously characterizing them as the sorts of things that are truth-apt (propositions, certainties, beliefs). I mean, where did this notion even come from?

Language is something I add on to that basic certainty, it's a further linguistic action. — Sam26

"Here is a floor, here is a broom" - this statement is an act that expresses the same certainty as sweeping the floor. Sweeping and stating are both acts that are grounded on hinges.

I don't think you would disagree with this. I'm just making it explicit.

Yep.

But in this context, its being asked/disputed whether they are truth-apt, and so the fact that hinge propositions are propositions, and that W refers to them as propositions, is directly relevant and hard to omit. — Seppo

As far as the question of truth, I have stated that they are true or false. Sam and I started arguing about this years ago, starting on another forum.

Of course hinge propositions are propositions! The question is whether all hinges should be regarded as propositional. Sam and I argued about this as well.

From another thread ten months back:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/523914

The best way to proceed, when dealing with quasi-technical words like ‘proposition’, may be to stipulate a definition and proceed with caution, making sure not to close off any substantive issues by definitional fiat. (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/)

It is not Moore's statements about his hand that function as a hinge. If Moore's propositions about his hands are hinges then what revolves around them? Most people do not know who Moore is. It makes little or no difference if he claimed to have hands. Not much hinges on the statements that any of us make about having hands.

It is the fact of our having hands around which things pivot. Our doing things with our hands, our holding tools and other things designed for hands. Even our statements about hands hinge on our having hands.

and:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/523937

Language games are an extension of man's acting in the world. Primitive hinges are pre-linguistic. They are not language games, they are an essential part of the form of life in which language games come to play a part. It is not that they cannot be doubted, it is simply that they are not.

A mistake that is frequently made is to treat hinges as if they are all the same. There are propositional hinges and pre-linguistic hinges. Empirical hinges and mathematical hinges.

what motivates this denial that they are truth-apt, — Seppo

Earlier I suggested it was creeping anti-realism. Those who think only justified propositions are true are obliged to think unjustified propositions are not true. The muddled notion of a hinge proposition leads them to the contradiction that hinges are not true.

If basic propositions are not true, they could not be used to justify anything.

And that should be the end of the issue.

There is an anti-realist reading of Wittgenstein, but I don't think it can be made consistent. The term "anti-realism" post-dates his writing on the topic, so he uses "idealism" and "realism", and explicitly states that neither is quite right (PI §402)

The question is whether all hinges should be regarded as propositional. — Fooloso4

That wasn't the question I was addressing in the post you quoted, which was my point. The question was whether hinge propositions are truth-apt, to which the fact that hinge propositions are propositions (and that W refers to them as such) was directly relevant.

I mean, I think the question of whether all epistemic hinges are propositional is a good and valid question... it simply wasn't the one I was discussing.

The question was whether hinge propositions are truth-apt — Seppo

I think my answer was clear. They are.

In my previous post to you:

As far as the question of truth, I have stated that they are true or false. — Fooloso4

And before that, in response to Sam:

As stated this is misleading. It not not that they are neither true nor false, but rather that the question of their being true is not there from the beginning. — Fooloso4

To which you responded:

Exactly, good analogy. — Seppo

I think my answer was clear. They are. — Fooloso4

We've clearly had a miscommunication or misunderstanding here, I wasn't saying it was unclear. You had said that "the question is whether all hinges should be regarded as propositional", and I pointed out that that wasn't the question I was talking about in the post you had quoted.

I also was agreeing that analyzing hinge propositions as propositions isn't necessarily a helpful way to frame the matter... except when, as in the discussion I was having with Luke (and previously Sam), the question is explicitly whether hinge propositions are propositional and therefore truth-apt.

"Here is a floor, here is a broom" - this statement is an act that expresses the same certainty as sweeping the floor. Sweeping and stating are both acts that are grounded on hinges.

I don't think you would disagree with this. I'm just making it explicit. — Banno

It depends on what you mean by grounded? Are you using grounded as a synonym for justification?

If I utter, "Here is a broom," to someone familiar with English they would probably say, "Ya, what's your point?" So, one way of seeing a context where such a statement would be useful, is in the context of teaching the word broom to someone who doesn't know English. We are justified or grounded in calling the object a broom, because that is part of the language-game associated with the concept. In other words, it's justification or grounding lies in linguistic training, or in its grammar.

All linguistics are depended on hinges or basic/bedrock beliefs, i.e., they grow out of these beliefs necessarily, so in this sense they are grounded in hinge's. However, I'm not sure if I would say that the hinge's justify their use, so, grounding here is a bit different than justification. This would get into the development of language against the backdrop of these basic beliefs. This relationship has to be seen as a kind of evolutionary process, which eventually leads to very sophisticated language-games, including the language-game of epistemology.

I wouldn't agree that sweeping the floor and the statement "Here is a floor," have the same certainty. They both express a certainty, that's true, but in different senses. My act of sweeping the floor shows a kind of certainty that's grounded in the world itself, so any act of knowing, and by extension justification and truth claims, is dependent on this backdrop. Moreover, any act of doubting is also dependent on this backdrop (contingent states-of-affairs). One can see the difference, as a function of certainty, in these two acts, if one compares the doubting of one (the act of sweeping) with the doubting of the other "Here is a floor." I don't see the language-game of doubting getting any footing as I sweep the floor, but I can see in certain contexts how I could doubt "This is a broom," viz., in contexts where I'm unsure of how to use the English word broom.

The act of sweeping the floor shows my certainty. It's not the kind of certainty that is justified in some sense, it's a certainty has it's footing in the very act itself. One could say they are almost one and the same thing.

So, would I disagree with your statements? It depends on a more careful assessment of what you mean.

Finally, as a side note, we must keep in mind that W. never finalized OC, so almost any dogmatic assessment of what he's saying is problematic. We don't know what would have been left in or out once edited. Although we can compare OC with his other writings and get a clearer picture of some passages.

If I utter, "Here is a broom," to someone familiar with English they would probably say, "Ya, what's your point?" So, one way of seeing a context where such a statement would be useful, is in the context of teaching the word broom to someone who doesn't know English. We are justified or grounded in calling the object a broom, because that is part of the language-game associated with the concept. In other words, it's justification or grounding lies in linguistic training, or in its grammar. — Sam26

I think you're missing an important point Sam. When you say "here is a broom", as a proposition, it is a proposal which may or may not be accepted. If someone has reason not to accept the proposal, then you asserting that there is a language-game, in which this object is called a broom, is not justification. In fact, that is exactly what the person is rejected, the language game in which the thing is called a broom. Therefore justification must consist of more than reference to a "language-game". The game itself, (calling this a broom) needs to be justified (reasons given). And that's where the problem is.

You cannot refer to the act of sweeping the floor, and say that it is necessary to call this a broom in order to be able to sweep the floor, because that is not true. Hence we have a separation between knowing-how and knowing-that. I can know how to sweep the floor without knowing that I am sweeping the floor.

The question now is whether there is a real distinction, in the means of justification, between these two types of knowledge. It appears like knowing how to sweep the floor is justified by the act. But a description of "sweeping the floor" is required for this justification, to compare the act with. So "knowing-how" can only be justified with "knowing-that". Obviously though, we cannot place "knowing-that" as more fundamental, or prior to "knowing-how", because we need to know how to use words, before we can make the required description.

Therefore we are left with the conclusion that knowing-how fundamentally cannot be justified, and this is simply a type of knowledge which exists without justification. Any attempt to demonstrate its justification will be a failure, because that justification does not exist. This is the problem we encounter with any attempt to justify knowing how to use language. Knowing how to use language cannot be justified because it is a type of knowledge which cannot be justified.

Instead of invoking an idea such as "grounding" which creates an image of some lessor form of justification, we ought to dispense with the idea of justification altogether. Instead, we might move toward the internal feelings of certitude and doubt, which influence our actions. Then we can see that these descriptive terms, which may be applicable toward "knowing-that", are inadequate for describing these feelings and motivations behind "knowing-how". For example, we commonly proceed with an activity when we still have a large degree of doubt as to whether the outcome will be a success. Furthermore, we employ strategies such as trial and error, in this case we act when we are very unsure.

So as much as certitude and doubt constitute descriptive features of knowing-how, they are not the best terms to employ, because I can still be said to know-how to sweep the floor, without being certain that there will be a successful outcome every time I try. In fact, it doesn't even make sense to ask me, when I pick up the broom, 'are you certain that you will get the floor swept?'. Likewise, it doesn't make sense to ask someone using language, 'are you certain that the other person will properly understand what you're saying when you open your mouth to speak?' That's why talking is a rapid back and forth, often consisting of many clarifications, so texting and email are not the best choice for any complicated discussion. Then we can see that this discussion of certitude and doubt, in relation to hinge propositions, is completely misguided, barking up the wrong tree, in an activity which will never get us anywhere, because it is instead irrelevant to the true nature of knowing how to use language.

Knowledge is a success word, it refers to a process that achieves its goal. What is that goal? The goal is simply the truth. So, an attack on knowledge is necessarily an attack on truth, and the process of arriving at truth. It follows by extension that W.'s attack on Moore's propositions, viz., that he doesn't know what he claims to know, is an attack on the process Moore uses to determine the truth. Therefore, if you agree that W. is correct in his assessment of Moore's propositions, i.e., that they are not knowledge claims, then it follows by necessity that they are not truth claims either.

Put in argument form it looks like the following:

(1) If knowledge claims are necessarily about the process of arriving at truth, then Moorean propositions are necessarily about truth claims.
(2) If Moorean propositions are about truth claims, then necessarily W.'s attack is an attack on the truth of Moorean propositions.
(3) Hence, if knowledge claims are necessarily about the process of arriving at truth, then necessarily W.'s attack is an attack on the truth of Moorean propositions. (Hypothetical Syllogism)

It also follows from the above argument that Moorean propositions are not propositions at all, since they have no truth value (they are not truth-apt either) in Moore's context, i.e., they have no epistemological status. They are simply contingent arational bedrock beliefs based on our interactions between mind, body, and the world.

I would further make the claim that this argument is definitive. A denial is contradictory, and strips from W. anything of value, in terms of his attack on what Moore is claiming.

(1) If knowledge claims are necessarily about the process of arriving at truth, then Moorean propositions are necessarily about truth claims. — Sam26

Or about justification claims. Truth is only one aspect of knowledge claims, there is also justification. To claim to know some P isn't only to claim that P is true, it is also to claim that one has good and sufficient reasons for believing P to be true: i.e. that the belief is justified.

(2) If Moorean propositions are about truth claims, then necessarily W.'s attack is an attack on the truth of Moorean propositions. — Sam26

Or on the justification of these propositions, as above.

Wittgenstein is saying that Moore's claim to know such propositions is incorrect, not because the claims aren't truth-apt, but because they are not justified. Because hinge propositions/beliefs/certainties are not justified. They are taken to be true, in order that we can justify propositions in general. In order that the door may swing, the hinge must hold firm.

Or about justification claims. Truth is only one aspect of knowledge claims. Knowledge claims are also claims about justification. — Seppo

Of course there about justification. Why do you think I say there about the process of arriving at truth. That is the justification process.

Wittgenstein is saying that Moore's claim to know such propositions is incorrect, not because the claims aren't truth-apt, but because they are not justified. — Seppo

It's not that justification stands alone in this process, apart from truth, the very act of justification is supposed to lead to the the goal of knowledge, viz. truth. You're stuck in a contradictory place. The goal of knowledge and the justification process, is, again, the truth of the claim; and here it's Moorean claims.

Knowledge claims are logically intertwined with justification and truth claims.

Of course there about justification. — Sam26

Well but that shipwrecks the above argument, since you argue that since knowledge is about truth, W's attack on Moore's claim to know is an attack on the truth of the claims.

But, since a claim to know isn't just a claim about truth, but also a claim about justification, the conclusion doesn't follow: instead of attacking the truth of the claims, W could also be attacking the justification of the claims.

Which is precisely what he's doing: Moore is incorrect to say he knows these propositions (according to W), not because they are not true (or cannot be true, even in principle), but because the belief in their truth isn't justified.

Don't spin my argument into what it isn't, since it's about justification and truth. Justification and truth are necessarily intertwined. What in the world do you think I mean by the process of arriving at truth if not justification? The process of arriving at truth, is the process of giving evidence or reasons, for example, to support the truth of the claim.

I'm not "spinning your argument", your argument was unclear. But if by "arriving at truth" you meant justification, then the argument is just nakedly invalid, since (2) cannot follow, for the reason already mentioned: from the fact that W criticizes Moore's claim to know these propositions, we cannot infer that he is attacking the truth of the claims, because he could instead be attacking the justification, since claiming to know something entails both a claim that it is true and a claim that it is justified.

Either way, the argument you presented above doesn't work.

Are you using grounded as a synonym for justification? — Sam26

No.

It also follows from the above argument that Moorean propositions are not propositions at all, — Sam26

No, it doesn't, unless one also adopts an anti-realist view that is not found in Wittgenstein. Hence is correct. Conflating knowledge and truth is an error. Wittgenstein is saying that Moore's knowledge claimed are not incorrect because they are not true, but because they are unjustified.

It seems you have hidden the anti-realism in your reading in the notion of "arriving at the truth"... what could that be if not providing a justification? Arriving at a truth is not being true. Propositions can be true regardless of wether you have "arrived" at their truth.

It also follows from the above argument that Moorean propositions are not propositions at all, since they have no truth value — Sam26

No, it doesn't, unless one also adopts an anti-realist view that is not found in Wittgenstein. Hence ↪Seppo is correct. Conflating knowledge and truth is an error. Wittgenstein is saying that Moore's knowledge claimed are not incorrect because they are not true, but because they are unjustified. — Banno

Moreover, the claim that they are not propositions directly contradicts Wittgenstein, who refers to them as "propositions" throughout OC. Maybe Sam doesn't think they are propositions, but evidently W did.

"I've never been to the moon" is a meaningful assertion, we all understand what the moon is, and what I am asserting/denying when I say this. "I have two hands" is a meaningful assertion, we know what hands are, and we understand what I am asserting when I say this.

Now, either I've been to the moon or I haven't. I either have two hands, or I do not. The assertion "I've never been to the moon" is true iff I've never been to the moon, and the assertion "I have two hands" is true iff I have two hands.

I hope you'll believe me when I tell you, I've never been to the moon, and I do have two hands. Both the assertions "I've never been to the moon" and "I have two hands" are true; they have a truth-value. So, they are propositions (propositions being defined as the sort of things that have a truth-value).

Now, Moore would say I know that I've never been to the moon, and that I have two hands. Wittgenstein, however, says I do not know these propositions. And to deny that I know these propositions, W could either be saying that the propositions are not true, or that I do not have good and sufficient reasons to believe them, or both; to know a proposition, that proposition must be true, and I must have good and sufficient reasons for it (it must be justified/warranted).

As above, they are propositions. Not only are they propositions, they're both true- I assure you, I've never been to the moon ("I've never been to the moon" is true), and I have two hands ("I have two hands" is true). And W is a reasonable guy, and he never gives any explicit indications he believes these claims are not true (or are not truth-apt; he refers to them as "propositions", after all), so its not unreasonable to conclude that he isn't disputing that they are truth-apt, or even that they're true.

He does, however, seem to be saying that we don't believe these things on the basis of a process of reasoning and evidence-gathering and weighing of reasons, but rather that we take them to be true, fundamentally or axiomatically; they are the rules of the game. In other words, we do not believe them on the basis of good and sufficient reasons: they are not justified or warranted. And we do not believe them on the basis of good and sufficient reasons, since those reasons would have to involve propositions that we are even more certain about. But what could those reasons look like? What am I more certain about, than the fact that I've never been to the moon? You might say that, if anything is true, its that I haven't been to the moon. That much is certain. So we believe and indeed are certain about these propositions, but not on the basis of good and sufficient reasons: they are not justified, even though they are true. The help form the basis on which we evaluate and justify other propositions.

But since they themselves cannot be justified, we cannot say we know them, according to Wittgenstein.

Having a truth-value is an essential, characteristic trait of propositions. Just as having three sides is an essential, characteristic trait of triangles. Different types of triangles can and do differ from one another... just not in having three sides, since if they don't have three sides they aren't a triangle. And in exactly the same fashion, different types of propositions- hinge propositions, for instance- may differ from one another in various ways, but not in having a truth-value or not. — Seppo

You've made a category error. Equilateral triangles and triangles (in general) are not two different types of triangle. Triangles (in general) are simply triangles. Likewise, propositions (in general) are not a type of proposition, and cats (in general) are not a type of cat. Therefore, hinge propositions and propositions (in general) are not two different types of proposition. This is why I said "it remains to be demonstrated that hinge propositions are of the same type as propositions in general."

An isosceles triangle may be a different type to a scalene, but a particular type of triangle cannot be different from triangles in general. Triangles in general are simply triangles, so if a particular "type" of triangle is different from triangles (in general) then it is not a triangle. Likewise, if hinge propositions are different from propositions in general then they are not propositions, and if siamese cats were different from cats in general then they would not be cats. You have acknowledged that hinge propositions are different from propositions in general, which implies your acknowledgement that hinge propositions are not propositions.

Even if this was not implied, you would still need to specify in what respects hinge propositions and propositions (in general) are the same, despite being different (as you have acknowledged), without merely presupposing that hinge propositions are propositions.

If hinge propositions lack a truth-value, then they are not propositions, just as a triangle that didn't have three sides wouldn't be a triangle. — Seppo

This is not a problem for me, because I agree that hinge propositions are not propositions. While you and Banno have been patting each other on the back so loudly that you cannot hear anyone else, this has been my point the entire time. It's sad that this isn't even an exaggeration or caricature.

This is why this is frustrating, neither I nor anyone else should have to explicitly make such an argument. — Seppo

You really shouldn't have. Not because it's so obvious, but because you've been oblivious to the possibility that "hinge proposition" could be a misnomer. Your repeated argument of "otherwise it wouldn't be a proposition" has been both futile and tone deaf.

Not a very rewarding discussion from my perspective. — Seppo

Join the club.

Right, he never uses the phrase "hinge propositions"... but, as I have already pointed out, and you either ignored and forgot, he does refer to them as "propositions". — Seppo

As Moyal-Sharrock points out in her book, Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty, Wittgenstein was "still in the process of determining whether a certain kind of statement is a proposition or not (e.g. OC 167)" while writing OC. Furthermore, it is "his translators who are more often than not responsible for its [the word "proposition"'s] appearance in his works."

Which makes me wonder what motivates this denial that they are truth-apt, particularly since no one seems to be able to give a coherent argument for why we should doubt or deny that they have a truth-value, while simultaneously characterizing them as the sorts of things that are truth-apt (propositions, certainties, beliefs). I mean, where did this notion even come from? — Seppo

As Moyal-Sharrock says in the same book, "For Wittgenstein, to be a proposition is to be bipolar; that is, to be susceptible of truth and falsity." Given that a hinge (qua hinge) cannot be false, then it is not susceptible of both truth and falsity, so it cannot be a proposition and neither can it be true. The same applies to grammatical and mathematical "propositions" (rules). As the author notes more generally: "nonpropositionality is attributed to any string of words that constitutes a rule or a norm".

Moyal-Sharrock does not use the phrase "hinge proposition".

He talks of "hinges" — Banno

She.

I do not think it is the case that hinges are unknowable and lack truth value:

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of
incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your
dispute can turn."

Certainly we know that 12x12=144 and that this is true. — Fooloso4

Could it be false? (see my post to Seppo above regarding bipolarity)

It's a fair point, but I don't consider mathematical propositions to be the sort of hinge propositions that Wittgenstein is concerned with in the text. What motivates W's concern in OC is the "peculiar logical role" of Moore's statement "Here is a hand", which has the form of an empirical (i.e. bipolar) proposition, but which functions more like a mathematical or logical proposition:

136. When Moore says he knows such and such, he is really enumerating a lot of empirical propositions which we affirm without special testing; propositions, that is, which have a peculiar logical role in the system of our empirical propositions.

308. [...] we are interested in the fact that about certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if making judgments is to be possible at all. Or again: I am inclined to believe that not everything that has the form of an empirical proposition is one.

401. I want to say: propositions of the form of empirical propositions, and not only propositions of logic, form the foundation of all operating with thoughts (with language).[...] — Wittgenstein, OC

I believe W would categorise mathematical propositions in the same or a similar class as logical propositions. Wittgenstein draws the distinction and compares mathematical/logical propositions (i.e. rules) with empirical propositions, for instance:

350. "I know that that's a tree" is something a philosopher might say to demonstrate to himself or to someone else that he knows something that is not a mathematical or logical truth.[...] [W's italics, indicating that the philosopher does not technically (JTB) know this] — Wittgenstein, OC

The assertion "I've never been to the moon" is true iff I've never been to the moon, and the assertion "I have two hands" is true iff I have two hands. — Seppo

But this is more or less a correspondence view of truth, if the aim is to understand what Wittgenstein was getting at in OC, what do you think using such a non-Wittgensteinean definition of truth brings to that project? Aren't you liable to end up with no less an incoherence, just from a different angle?

If we're expecting Wittgenstein to be consistent (which, with an unfinished work is not by any means a given) then surely we'd be best at least fitting the important concepts to Wittgenstein's own understanding of them.

Expecting Wittgenstein's view of certainty to be explicable in terms of, say, Davidson's understanding of truth seems quite a tall order.

No, it doesn't, unless one also adopts an anti-realist view that is not found in Wittgenstein. Hence ↪Seppo is correct. Conflating knowledge and truth is an error. Wittgenstein is saying that Moore's knowledge claimed are not incorrect because they are not true, but because they are unjustified. — Banno

Where did I conflate knowledge with truth? The problem is in how you're interpreting what I'm saying, not that I'm conflating knowledge with truth.

A proposition standing alone, i.e., without justification, can have a value of either being true or false, it's a simple claim or belief. Thus, we say propositions are truth-apt. Knowledge on the other hand, refers to propositional claims that have been justified in some way (evidence or good reasons, for e.g.). In my argument I make this clear. At least it should be clear with a little thought.

(1) If knowledge claims are necessarily about the process of arriving at truth, then Moorean propositions are necessarily about truth claims.
(2) If Moorean propositions are about truth claims, then necessarily W.'s attack is an attack on the truth of Moorean propositions.
(3) Hence, if knowledge claims are necessarily about the process of arriving at truth, then necessarily W.'s attack is an attack on the truth of Moorean propositions. (Hypothetical Syllogism) — Sam26

The first premise in my argument says, "knowledge claims are necessarily about the process of arriving at truth." The process of arriving at truth, is any process (I use the word process because there are many different ways of justifying a claim) that justifies that claim, belief, statement, or proposition. I've said this plenty of times, so to say I'm conflating the two, isn't so.

The force of this argument ends the discussion as far as I'm concerned. To deny that Wittgenstein's attack on knowing isn't an attack on justification and truth, fails, in my opinion, to understand the gist of what W. is arguing. Moreover, it fails to understand the implications of W. attack on Moore's claims to know.

Happy Hunting!

Could it be false? (see my post to Seppo above regarding bipolarity) — Luke

Could a mathematical proposition that is true be false? No. Could a mathematical proposition be false? Yes.

It's a fair point, but I don't consider mathematical propositions to be the sort of hinge propositions that Wittgenstein is concerned with in the text. — Luke

This much I know: he uses several examples of mathematical propositions in the text.

Wittgenstein draws the distinction and compares mathematical/logical propositions (i.e. rules) with empirical propositions, for instance:

350. "I know that that's a tree" ... — Luke

See his rejoinder:

352. "... And what is it supposed to be doing?"

As I understand it, Wittgenstein's concern is not with a theory of knowledge @banno @Seppo @Sam26. He is examining how ordinary (non-philosophical) claims of knowledge function in our language games and with one of his ongoing concerns, how philosophers confuse themselves:

31. The propositions which one comes back to again and again as if bewitched - these I should like
to expunge from philosophical language.
32. It's not a matter of Moore's knowing that there's a hand there, but rather we should not
understand him if he were to say "Of course I may be wrong about this." We should ask "What is it
like to make such a mistake as that?" - e.g. what's it like to discover that it was a mistake?
33. Thus we expunge the sentences that don't get us any further.

Moore might as well have waved his hand about or wiggled his fingers.

Knowledge is a success word, it refers to a process that achieves its goal. What is that goal? The goal is simply the truth. — Sam26

These two statements are fundamentally incompatible. If "knowledge is a success word", then success is its goal, and knowledge is reduced to justification. Then there is no necessity for a specific type of success called "truth". In fact, that truth is a form of success would need to be justified. This would require a purpose for truth, then truth would simply be a means to a further end. So truth cannot be treated as a form of success, nor can it be a form of justification, therefore "truth" and "justification" (as a type of success) must be distinct things.

The result of this is that if "truth" is proposed as a goal, and "justification" is the means toward this end, then the two must be classed separately. Truth, as a goal, is an object, and must be understood in relation to other goals. Justification, is an act, therefore the means to achieving a goal. The danger of misunderstanding, which we must avoid is that justification and success are more general than the particular object, truth, therefore an act of justification can be judged as successful without producing truth, if it is judged in relation to a goal other than truth. And the notion that truth actually is a goal still needs to be justified or the whole appeal to truth falls apart.

As I understand it, Wittgenstein's concern is not with a theory of knowledge banno @Seppo @Sam26. He is examining how ordinary (non-philosophical) claims of knowledge function in our language games and with one of his ongoing concerns, how philosophers confuse themselves: — Fooloso4

I agree with you on this point. Wittgenstein is not concerned with a theory of knowledge. And, he definitely believes that ordinary use (not to be confused with every utterance the ordinary man on the street makes), viz., a kind of general picture of how language is used in our ordinary forms of life, can keep us from philosophical (I'm using philosophical in a very broad sense, because even the man on the street is subject to these confusions) confusion.

But this is more or less a correspondence view of truth — Isaac

No, its the deflationary view of truth (i.e. "snow is white" is true iff snow is white), to which Wittgenstein's later views (i.e. post-Tractatus) are very sympathetic/consistent. But this is to miss the point in any case: the point is that not only are these claims/beliefs truth-apt, they are true, for all but the rarest cases (the handful of people who actually have been to the moon, and the people who don't have two hands, for whatever reason).

So, hinge propositions are propositions, they have a truth-value, and at least in the examples considered here, they are true.

The argument is invalid, its conclusion doesn't follow (as has already been pointed out to you) and the "force" of an invalid argument can't really "end the discussion", obviously. If you want to end the discussion, you could venture a reply to my post here.

Moore is incorrect to say he knows these propositions (according to W), not because they are not true (or cannot be true, even in principle), but because the belief in their truth isn't justified. — Seppo

What, if anything, would justify such a clam?