That's because "hinge-propositions" are a neurological phenomenon. Meaning, the acceptance of a truth value, much like logical validity itself, does not imply the accurate conclusion of truth value one way or the other. But, that such an acceptance must take place before action, and thereby function, can be initiated. — Garrett Travers
Sorry, but I don't really know what you're trying to say. Could you express it more plainly? — Luke
There is a kind of certainty that is expressed in our actions, i.e., as we act within the world, our actions show our certainty. However, this use is similar to subjective certainty above, but without the use of language. I act with certainty as I open the door. My actions show that I'm certain there is a door, that I have hands, etc. — Sam26
Given Wittgenstein's assumption that mathematics is a human construct, it follows that 1+1=2 is neither true nor false in that it not an empirical statement and so is outside the concept of truth as correspondence.
But is he going against his own admonition to just look? — Fooloso4
Hinge-propositions are not that at all. There propositions that emerge in thought, and are either accepted by us individually, or rejected. The acceptance or rejection of those propositions inform our behavior, and behavior is function. — Garrett Travers
Thus, if I'm to move to open a door to leave my home, I must have accepted the hinge proposition that the door will open in the first place to let me out. Furthermore, if I am leaving the house to go to whole-foods, the action is predicated on the belief of such a places existence. Does that make sense? — Garrett Travers
Not sure that I agree with this. Hinge "propositions" are not conscious judgments, so we do not accept/reject them in any rational or considered manner. — Luke
Yes, this sounds more like it. — Luke
They are conscious, but they are exclusively operating in the domain of your neural systems, not on paper in logical formality. — Garrett Travers
I don’t know what this means. They are conscious but they are not conscious? — Luke
I believe W's view is that "1+1=2" is not counting, but is instead a rule or a preparation for counting, much like learning the meaning of a word is not actually using the word, but is instead a rule or preparation for the use of that word in a language-game. This also helps to explain why W considers it neither true nor false that the Paris metre is one metre long - because it is a rule or a preparation for making metric measurements and is not itself a measurement. — Luke
(Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics)Put two apples on a bare table, see that no one comes near them and nothing shakes the table; now put another two apples on the table; now count the apples that are there. You have made an experiment; the result of the counting is probably 4. (We should present the result like this: when, in such-and-such circumstances, one puts first 2 apples and then another 2 on a table, mostly none disappear and none get added.) And analogous experiments can be carried out, with the same result, with all kinds of solid bodies.---This is how our children learn sums; for one makes them put down three beans and then another three beans and then count what is there. If the result at one time were 5, at another 7 (say because, as we should now say, one sometimes got added, and one sometimes vanished of itself), then the first thing we said would be that beans were no good for teaching sums. But if the same thing happened with sticks, fingers, lines and most other things, that would be the end of all sums.
The child does not learn a rule or preparation for counting, she learns how to count. If she learned correctly she not only affirms that it is true that there are 4 apples on the table, but by counting beans, sticks, fingers and other things she can affirm that it is true that 2 units + 2 units, or, in short, that 2+2=4. — Fooloso4
it upturns a huge portions of my understanding of Wittgenstein's approach to truth — Isaac
620. In particular circumstances one says "you can rely on this"; and this assurance may be justified or unjustified in everyday language, and it may also count as justified even when what was foretold does not occur. A language-game exists in which this assurance is employed.
196. Sure evidence is what we accept as sure, it is evidence that we go by in acting surely, acting without any doubt.
What we call "a mistake" plays a quite special part in our language games, and so too does what we regard as certain evidence.
197. It would be nonsense to say that we regard something as sure evidence because it is certainly true.
198. Rather, we must first determine the role of deciding for or against a proposition.
199. The reason why the use of the expression "true or false" has something misleading about it is that it is like saying "it tallies with the facts or it doesn't", and the very thing that is in question is what "tallying" is here.
200. Really "The proposition is either true or false" only means that it must be possible to decide for or against it. But this does not say what the ground for such a decision is like.
201. Suppose someone were to ask: "Is it really right for us to rely on the evidence of our memory (or our senses) as we do?"
Much of what I've argued for has not even been addressed. — Sam26
Oh, that's not my understanding of the deflationary position at all (which, for me, is admittedly mostly from reading Ramsey). Do you have to hand any sources you use for yours? — Isaac
One needs to learn the rule first, — Luke
and the meanings of the terms (“1”, “2”), before they can actually count anything — Luke
We learn the meaning of "2" and "3" by counting, saying the name for the number that comes next. Correcting them when they get it wrong. — Fooloso4
...if I were to say to the cloakroom attendant as I hand him my token: ‘This is a token’, he would look at me nonplussed. That is not information for him, so why am I saying it? Nothing warrants my saying it. The information he requires in order to retrieve my coat is not that this is a token, but what the number on the token is. That this is a token is the ineffable hinge upon which his looking for the number on the token revolves. Our shared certainty that ‘this is a token’ can only show itself in our normal transaction with the token; it cannot qua certainty be meaningfully said. To say a hinge in an ordinary context is to suggest that it does not go without saying, that it needs support, grounding, context. To say a hinge within the language-game invariably arrests the game, produces a caesura, a hiatus in the game. Conversely, think of the fluidity of the game poised on its invisible hinges: I hand the attendant my token, he glances at the number on it and fetches my coat. Our foundational certainty is operative only in action, not in words. This is well conveyed by Wittgenstein’s image of a certainty which is like a taking hold or a grasp:
It is just like directly taking hold of something, as I take hold of my towel without having doubts. (OC 510)
And yet this direct taking-hold corresponds to a sureness, not to a knowing. (OC 511) — Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty
That's a bit sad. — Banno
to the point, there is nothing here about propositions that are neither true nor false. — Banno
Wittgenstein had a more pragmatic idea of truth. It was never outlined as some are doing in this thread. It was never, something is true, iff such and such (unless you're thinking in terms of the Tratatus), — Sam26
Reading Wittgenstein as anti-realist is a post hoc back construct; the term was invented long after his demise. It is not the only, nor the main, reading. — Banno
And the problem with anti-realism per se is Fitch's paradox; “all truths are knowable” entails “all truths are known”. Of corse, there may be ways to make sense of this. — Banno
Yes, "'P' is true iff P" (the classic example is "'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white") is the standard deflationary formulation. — Seppo
In the instances of schema (T) (sometimes called “Convention (T)”), the ‘X’ gets filled in with a name of the sentence that goes in for the ‘p’, making (T) a version of (ES). Tarski considered (T) to provide a criterion of adequacy for any theory of truth, thereby allowing that there could be more to say about truth than what the instances of the schema cover. Given that, together with the fact that he took the instances of (T) to be contingent, his theory does not qualify as deflationary.
there is no property of being true at all, or, if there is one, it is of a certain kind, often called “thin” or “insubstantial”.
That this is a token is the ineffable hinge upon which his looking for the number on the token revolves. — Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Understanding Wittgenstein's On Certainty
The proposition that this is a token is completely irrelevant, and not even taken into consideration when the person retrieves the coat. The person reads the number and gets the coat without considering whether it is a token or not. You could steal someone else's coat by making something which looks like a token, but is a false token, and the attendant would not even notice. — Metaphysician Undercover
At some point, in retrospect, one might analyze the action and say something like the idea that this is a token must underlie the attendant's action. — Metaphysician Undercover
It simply represents the mode of analysis, which is to proceed from the particular toward the more general. — Metaphysician Undercover
its supported by a synthesis of all sorts of different ideas and associations which for some reason seem relevant to the person in the situation. — Metaphysician Undercover
Being a token is irrelevant but being a false token is not? — Luke
It is not the only certainty underlying the attendant’s actions, but one example. There are also the underlying certainties (e.g) that coat checking is a custom, that people own coats, that people have jobs, that there are other people, etc, etc. It’s unthinkable that any of these could be false or doubted. Of course it is imaginable, but not within the confines of our actual lives and what we know of life and society as it is today. — Luke
I’m happy to discuss further if you think that my reading of Wittgenstein is incorrect, but not if you think that Wittgenstein himself is incorrect. — Luke
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