...not doubting what a block is is not sufficient for doing the correct thing. — Fooloso4
Where is it you think your argument leads? What's the point of your comment? Do you think it shows a problem with hinge propositions? — Banno
What would be the hinge propositions here?
"Here is a bock"
"Here is a slab"
"Here is a beam" — Banno
For something to be a hinge something must turn on it. "Here is an X" is not a hinge proposition. Even a primitive language like the builder's consists of more than just identifying or naming objects. — Fooloso4
Strictly speaking, "block", "slab", "beam" are the commands. — Fooloso4
What to do when you hear ""Slab!". is not a command but an explanation. — Fooloso4
Both what a slab isis and what to do with it are learned ostensibly. Both what a slab is and what to do with it must be the same for both of us. — Fooloso4
I gather that you do not think "This is a slab" a suitable example of a hinge proposition, but I am unable to see why. — Banno
I would only be repeating myself. In the builder's language "slab" means more than "This is a slab." Knowing what a slab is is requisite, but knowing what to do with it is as well. — Fooloso4
Do you think Moore's "here is a hand" is a hinge proposition? — Fooloso4
I can't make sense of the idea of a proposition that does not have a truth value - not a proposition for which we don't know if it is true or false, but a proposition which is not eligible for truth or falsehood. Sam26 was entertaining that idea here. — Banno
It may be worth noting that Wittgenstein doesn't use the phrase "hinge proposition" in OC. — Luke
So a hinge is not so much a type of proposition as a way one might make use of some propositions."Here is a bock"
"Here is a slab"
"Here is a beam" — Banno
One gets to hinge propositions by then inferring that one could state what it is that is indubitable — Banno
Hinge propositions are indubitable, and hence true. — Banno
It is not that they cannot be known because they do not have a truth value... — Banno
Is that what he was doing? Is it only in certain games that it to count and not others? — Fooloso4
I’m asking why they must have a truth value when they are not ordinary propositions and they are distinguished from ordinary propositions in other ways. — Luke
That is a damn good question. — Banno
If hinge propositions are just ordinary propositions then why does W appear to indicate that they cannot be doubted or known? We can doubt and know ordinary propositions. — Luke
I don’t follow why you would accept that hinge propositions are not like ordinary propositions in the sense that hinge propositions are indubitable (and therefore unknowable) whereas ordinary propositions are not. Yet you insist that hinge propositions must be like ordinary propositions in the sense of having a truth value. — Luke
What is an "ordinary" proposition here? — Banno
Those things can presumably be stated.
Some folk call such statements hinge propositions.
Hence hinge propositions are true. Hinge propositions are undoubted. Hinge propositions are unjustified. — Banno
Your argument appears to be that if a proposition can be stated then it must have a truth value — Luke
But this is just to ignore the distinction between ordinary propositions and hinge propositions and does not explain why hinge propositions must have a truth value — Luke
But that is also in question here. Again, W does not refer to “hinge propositions” in OC. Also, if they cannot be doubted or known, then they are unlike (ordinary) propositions in at least some other ways. — Luke
, ordinary propositions are those which are not hinge propositions. Do you acknowledge that ordinary propositions are not the same as hinge propositions? — Luke
What gave you that impression? Where'd I say that? Arguably, "the present king of France is bald" does not have a truth value...Your argument appears to be that if a proposition can be stated then it must have a truth value. — Luke
No, the argument is that if its a proposition, then must have a truth-value, because that just is what a proposition is (i.e. the sort of thing that has a truth-value). — Seppo
The distinction that myself, Banno, and Jamalrob have urged between ordinary propositions and hinge propositions is that the difference lies in the latter's inability to be justified (and that because of the role hinge propositions play in language, particularly in the process of justification). — Seppo
And a proposition without a truth-value would be a contradiction in terms. — Seppo
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