Did you find a PDF for Kenny? Happy to read it with you. — Banno

I did, and I really prefer his language; I'm telling I can't stand the word salad shit. It's the quickest way for me to dismiss someone. But, no, it wouldn't make sense, in the basic logic sense of truth tables and, well, propositional logic. All true propositions are tautological in the nature of their premises, as I am seeing Kenny remark upon, and all untrue are contradictive. It quite literally doesn't make sense for a proposition to be devoid of a truth value. Which again, is what I though Witt was saying in regard to hinges. As a rationalist, I can't even let that type of assertion slide; my hinge proposition of the human faculty for reason and all. Actually, you should check my hinge proposition in my bio and tell me what you think. I'd love to test it against someone knowledgeable, see if it can withstand some heat. Let me know if that sounds fun.

"Hinge proposition" is not a term that Kenny uses; if you wish to cut to the chase, look for "Certainty" and "Doubt".

Will take a look for your essay.

If i were you, I would skip trying to decipher Wittgenstein's informal, vague and incomplete prose which constitutes the beginning of post-analytic philosophy, and jump straight into reading Quine's Word and Object, which gives a more developed and precise account of the semantic holism that both he and Wittgenstein arrived at. From their similar points of view, the classical distinction between idealism and materialism loses it's intelligibility.

Yeah, I mean I might as well posit the idea of door frame propositions, because even hinge propositions have to have a stable set of facts to work with, so as to remain stationary in use. In which case, I'll then have to have wall propositions, as door frames have to be constructed from... so on and so on...... — Garrett Travers

Yes, I see your point, but facts are not propositions, and this is what gives so many people the problem in understanding what supports the hinge propositions. Is it facts (objective reality), or attitude (subjective disposition) which supports hinges? People seem to be hesitant to consider that both are required, because it leads into dualism and a conception of reality which is far to complex for a simple mind to understand.

I had written an essay on Wittgenstein the other day where I characterized his view on hinges entirely inaccurately. — Garrett Travers

I wouldn't worry about that. There are as many different interpretations of Wittgenstein as there are people who read him. It's very clear that he is intentionally ambiguous. Banno distorts what Wittgenstein has actually written, by cherry picking items, to make it appear as if "hinge proposition" is a conception which is coherent and reasonable. Likewise, Banno might argue that the author of your article, Siegel, cherry picks in a way to create the opposite impression. Of course this is a reflection of the ambiguity which is inherent in Wittgenstein's writing. Ambiguity is a very common feature of word use which makes itself particularly evident in philosophy.

Wittgenstein was very much aware of the role of ambiguity in language. Hence Banno's claim that one and the same hinge proposition can change over time, like a river bed. But despite Banno's cherry picking to make Wittgenstein appear to be intelligible, Banno doesn't even seem to understand what it means to have a changing proposition.

I can't make sense of the idea of a proposition that does not have a truth value - not a proposition for which we don't know if it is true or false, but a proposition which is not eligible for truth or falsehood. — Banno

How could a proposition which changes over time (therefore necessarily ambiguous) have a truth value? What it means for a proposition to not have a truth value, is that the proposition is ambiguous. And that is also what it means for the same proposition to change over time; the proposition is mutable, and may be adapted by the different human minds who put it to use, to different purposes.

The outcome of all this is that Wittgenstein is completely wrong. It is not such ambiguous propositions, which can be molded and shaped at the will of human beings to maintain relevance in an evolving body of knowledge, which forms the foundation of that knowledge. To the contrary, it is actually clear and precise propositions, which in philosophy are called self-evident truths, because they appear to be impossible to be wrong, which forms the base for knowledge. But as you and Siegel indicate, a self-evident truth might still be wrong. It is only when we try to justify the claim that it is impossible for them to be wrong, that we get led down the path of deception, into believing that ambiguity (in the form of ambiguous propositions which change their meaning to maintain relevance in an evolving world)), are at the base of knowledge.

So stick with what Siegel tells you Garrett, as a fair enough representation, and don't get drawn into the ambiguity of Wittgenstein. Allowing ambiguity (which is the only way to support the idea of a proposition without a truth value) to be a first principle of knowledge, is simply wrong, for obvious reasons.

Hinges are obsolete. Now we have sliding door! :joke:

According to my copy of On Certainty, Wittgenstein only used the word "hinge" in 3 places, two of which concern the same remark, and none of which refer to a type of proposition.

"
340. We know, with the same certainty with which we believe any mathematical proposition, how
the letters A and B are pronounced, what the colour of human blood is called, that other human
beings have blood and call it "blood".

341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in
deed not doubted."

343. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason
we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put. "


From which it becomes clear that 'hinges' refer to the calculations that determine the meaning of "truth" in a given instance of reasoning.

"
653. If the proposition 12x12=144 is exempt from doubt, then so too must non-mathematical
propositions be.

654. But against this there are plenty of objections. - In the first place there is the fact that "12x12
etc." is a mathematical proposition, and from this one may infer that only mathematical propositions
are in this situation. And if this inference is not justified, then there ought to be a proposition that is
just as certain, and deals with the process of this calculation, but isn't itself mathematical. I am
thinking of such a proposition as: "The multiplication '12x12', when carried out by people who
know how to calculate, will in the great majority of cases give the result '144'." Nobody will contest
this proposition, and naturally it is not a mathematical one. But has it got the certainty of the
mathematical proposition?

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of
incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your
dispute can turn."

656. And one can not say that of the propositions that I am called L.W. Nor of the proposition that
such-and-such people have calculated such-and-such a problem correctly.

"

In other words, "necessarily true propositions" are either in fact only contingently true, else they refer to those which are held true by convention, but whose necessary truth is nevertheless subject to revision whenever the convention changes.

Similar considerations led Quine to publish his rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction a couple of years later in "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism".

Yes, very great info coming from you. I actually downloaded a pdf of Anothny Kenny's book. I had completely misconstrued the concept. I normally stray away from linguists because of the ambiguity with which they operate. Banno actully gave me a clear description that dismissed my confusion. Thanks for your explication, it's excellent.

Yes, I see your point, but facts are not propositions, and this is what gives so many people the problem in understanding what supports the hinge propositions. Is it facts (objective reality), or attitude (subjective disposition) which supports hinges? People seem to be hesitant to consider that both are required, because it leads into dualism and a conception of reality which is far to complex for a simple mind to understand. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's actuall a strange phenomenon here in this. Even though you are correct, technically speaking, the hinge proposition is actually accepted by the individual as having true premises. Or, humans couldn't use those propositions to inform action. This is true both in terms of formal propositional logic, as well as cognitive operation. I'm doing some writing now expanding on this topic. If I come up with anything of serious value, I'll show it to you.

So stick with what Siegel tells you Garrett, as a fair enough representation, and don't get drawn into the ambiguity of Wittgenstein. Allowing ambiguity (which is the only way to support the idea of a proposition without a truth value) to be a first principle of knowledge, is simply wrong, for obvious reasons. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it is logically not possible. You can see this clearly in truth tables:

p > q
p
---------
q

p q p / > / q / p // q
t t t t t t t
f t f f t f t
t f t t f t f
f f f f f f f

It's not a concept that makes sense. Every proposition has truth values associated with its premises. This messaging application is messing up my table.

Wittgenstein's notion of "hinge proposition" is really useless. All propositions are "hinges"; "hinge" describes the use of a proposition. Some propositions just have a bigger weight hanging on them than others do. As time passes, and they hang around for a while, more and more stuff gets hung on them. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hinge describes implicit presupposition. If one can call this is a use, it is a different use than rational belief.Duncan Pritchard suggests that hinge commitment is a more appropriate way to understand what Wittgenstein is getting at than hinge proposition.

https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/64250343/OnHingeEpistemology.pdf?1598171534=&response-content-disposition=attachment%3B+filename%3DON_HINGE_EPISTEMOLOGY.pdf&Expires=1644692999&Signature=GuP306rI9Aba0nTuE1~Z-UY92YpEAQbZUnpsDNSuKd-tppGY7G9oShqkfIOz2L3m2dyuBWO3A6T71tWpVY4DD0w7smC-03k2xD4Y2nL2l8ln3xPMHlBtzABGSLFOiGNXOSwOei60hA4uHz19nGuVDUyaQRW9hoBpVOeKLPiiwftEEcGweBVd~2DrYV5Cg3nAuM6xpXrExXlBf6t9g4Gjss231M-712-cMznhGKl5udfYAMSAZYdufzDl~KepH2UjHWsLD18etT0M9iVSouvciPigVPWRPxyhRCWXWoSeaQeBcpS256iguBiy-rSJuxhEqPl-zTP2C5jQbOh47QeEHA__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA


I think a comparison with Heidegger’s notion of a frame of interpretation may be instructive here. Heidegger defines propositional logic and statement of belief in terms the ‘as’ structure of seeing something as something.

“...in interpretatively addressing something as something, one addresses the thing encountered against the background of a more or less explicit acquaintance with it: as a tool as suitable for this or that, etc. These 'as what', in light of which one interprets the surrounding world as well as the concern that is immersed in it, are not usually newly discovered by Dasein. As being-together-with-others, Dasein grows up in and into this fixed interpretedness. The interpretative undertaking has a firm fore-conception. At the same time, it fixes the point of view from which those things that fall within the fore-conception are, as it were, targeted. The possible lines of 'sight' remain within circumscribed limits. Interpretation has its fore-sight. The world with which we are concerned and being-in itself are both interpreted within the parameters of a particular framework of intelligibility.”
(Heidegger, Concept of Time)

I think a comparison with Heidegger’s notion of a frame of interpretation may be instructive here. Heidegger defines propositional logic and statement of belief in terms the ‘as’ structure of seeing something as something. — Joshs

Searle develops a not dissimilar account based on speech act theory. It goes along the lines of there being sentences of the form "A counts as x in F", that set a role for A in the activity F; so putting the ball through the goal counts as scoring in soccer; that piece of paper counts as $10 in the economy, and so on. These are hinge propositions in that one cannot play soccer or pay for a book unless one takes these propositions as true.

Wittgenstein says a bit about interpretation in PI which would be at odds with it's use in this context. Interpretation is saying the same thing in different words: "2", "Two" and "deuce". Interpretation already assumes language use; one interprets one piece of language with another. Wittgenstein is getting behind that, and so in a way "interpretation" is inadequate to the task.

Again, hinge propositions might well be thought of as forming the join between our language games and the things that make up our world.

Even though you are correct, technically speaking, the hinge proposition is actually accepted by the individual as having true premises. Or, humans couldn't use those propositions to inform action. — Garrett Travers

I think that action is generally based in probability rather than in truth. We usually act when we believe that there is a probability for success, not when we believe that it is true that we will have success. So it is not true premises (what is) which inform action, it is understanding the relations between means and ends (this action ought to produce the desired result) which informs action.

Hinge describes implicit presupposition. If one can call this is a use, it is a different use than rational belief.Duncan Pritchard suggests that hinge commitment is a more appropriate way to understand what Wittgenstein is getting at than hinge proposition. — Joshs

If you go in this direction, then the hinge says something about the attitude of the subject rather than saying something about the world (something objective). Therefore it could not be a basic presupposition or proposition forming a foundation for knowledge about the world, objective knowledge. It would be a type of psychological principle only. So take Sime's example:

340. We know, with the same certainty with which we believe any mathematical proposition, how
the letters A and B are pronounced, what the colour of human blood is called, that other human
beings have blood and call it "blood". — sime

The 'hinge proposition', as an objective fact about the world, would be "human beings have blood". The "hinge commitment" would be 'I have faith that my belief that human beings have blood is true'. The latter is not what Wittgenstein is saying, because attitudes, even strong ones like faith can be doubted, whereas Wittgenstein is talking about something we cannot doubt. Therefore it is the former, something we believe to be an objective fact about the world, not a subjective attitude toward a proposition, like a commitment.

Go back a few steps.

PI §2

Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right: the language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass him the stones and to do so in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they make use of a language consisting of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “beam”. A calls them out; B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. —– Conceive of this as a complete primitive language.

What would be the hinge propositions here?

"Here is a bock"
"Here is a slab"
"Here is a beam"

Compare:
"Here is a hand!"

These form the implicit link between the language game and the bits and pieces around the building site.

The key to understanding Wittgenstein is to forget about meaning and look instead to use. The meaning of the command "Block!" in the language game is found in the assistant bringing a block. That game can only occur if "Here is a block" is indubitable.

That game can only occur if "Here is a block" is indubitable. — Banno

Does what it means to bring a block also indubitable?

If you go in this direction, then the hinge says something about the attitude of the subject rather than saying something about the world (something objective). Therefore it could not be a basic presupposition or proposition forming a foundation for knowledge about the world, objective knowledge. It would be a type of psychological principle only. — Metaphysician Undercover

Unless you hold with Heidegger and Wittgenstein that any such separation between subjective attitude and objectivity is incoherent. It is the hinge that makes the world objectively intelligible in the first place.

The 'hinge proposition', as an objective fact about the world, would be "human beings have blood". The "hinge commitment" would be 'I have faith that my belief that human beings have blood is true'. The latter is not what Wittgenstein is saying, because attitudes, even strong ones like faith can be doubted, whereas Wittgenstein is talking about something we cannot doubt. Therefore it is the former, something we believe to be an objective fact about the world, not a subjective attitude toward a proposition, like a commitment. — Metaphysician Undercover

“One’s hinge certainty, in normal circumstances, that one has hands would not be the least bit affected by the recognition that one has no rational basis for the truth of this proposition. This reflects the fact that, for Wittgenstein, such commitments are not rooted in ratiocination at all. Indeed, this is manifest in how we acquire our hinges. We are not explicitly taught them, but rather ‘swallow them down’ (OC, §143) with everything that we are explicitly taught, as part of the worldview that is thereby acquired. No-one teaches you that you have hands, for example; you are rather taught to do things with your hands, which presupposes their existence.”

despite Banno's cherry picking to make Wittgenstein appear to be intelligible, Banno doesn't even seem to understand what it means to have a changing proposition. — Metaphysician Undercover

How could a proposition which changes over time (therefore necessarily ambiguous) have a truth value? — Metaphysician Undercover

“On the one hand, hinge commitments are completely unresponsive to rational considerations, in the sense that they are commitments that we would retain, and be no less certain of, even if we became aware of the fact that we have no rational basis for their truth. In
particular, our continued certainty in them would be manifest in our actions, so that even if we might claim to doubt them, this ‘doubt’ would be in an important sense fake. On the other hand, however, hinge commitments clearly can change over time, and change in ways that seem to be at least superficially rational. Indeed, the very same proposition can be at one time a hinge commitment and another time an ordinary belief, where this change seems to involve a rational response to changed circumstances.”

No.

So:

The meaning of the command "Block!" in the language game is found in the assistant bringing a block. — Banno

but it is not indubitable that this is what it means? How can the game be played, how can they work, if the command is in doubt?

how can they work, if the command is in doubt? — Fooloso4

Doubt a command? Commands to not have truth value. IF the assistant brought a slab, then they have made an error. IF the builder asked for a slab when they wanted a block, they have made an error.

IF the assistant did something else with the block rather than bring it to the builder then he would have made a error as well.

Have you a point here? Or is this just idle chat?

If the game only occurs if block is indubitable it is equally true that it only works if bringing it is indubitable.

It is not only:

the implicit link between the language game and the bits and pieces around the building site. — Banno

but the link between the language game and the activity. It is not just the objects but the activity that is at issue.

We might ask: "what are we to do with Moore's 'here is a hand'".

If the game only occurs if block is indubitable — Fooloso4

That's not a sentence. And even if we make it a sentence: 'If the game only occurs if "this is a block" is indubitable it is equally true that it only works if bringing it is indubitable', your conclusion doesn't follow.

Try harder.

Having a bad day?

You are right, the half of a sentence you quoted is not a sentence, although, as you quoted:

For this purpose they make use of a language consisting of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “beam”. A calls them out; B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. —– Conceive of this as a complete primitive language.

If this is a complete language then "block" is a sentence in that language.

... your conclusion doesn't follow. — Banno

B must have no doubt about not only what a block is but what he must do with it. How could the game be played otherwise?

You appear to be, most adamantly and at superfluous length, agreeing with me.

I pointed out that what he was to do with the block is also indubitable. You disagreed.

I agree with you that there is a difference between the builder's language and Moore's claim. That difference is not made clear by "Here is a block".

But if you regard this as being adamant an superfluous, I'll leave it there.

But if you regard this as being adamant an superfluous, I'll leave it there. — Fooloso4

Might be better if you did.

For the assistant to be mistaken in bringing a block when commanded "Slab!", This must be a block; This must be a slab. The error is as dependent on the hinge propositions as is the correct use.

I supect you have an interesting point, but have failed to articulate it.

But further, the point you might be making is not helpful in the context of this thread.

My understanding of a hinge is that something must revolve around it. In this case it is not enough simply to correctly identify a block but to do the correct thing with it. The assistant will be mistaken if he picks up a block and does something other than bring it to the builder. If I am new on the job "here is a block" does not function as a hinge proposition in the builder's game if I don't know what to do with that information.

Whether Moore's "here is a hand" is a hinge depends on what hangs from or turns around it, with what we do with that the statement. We may not doubt it, but simply identifying or naming myriad things does not make them hinges.

k but to do the correct thing with it. — Fooloso4

Sure. Note that "doing the correct thing" with a block rests on the hinge proposition "This is a block".

Again, the assistant can't even get it wrong unless "this is a block" is true. Compare Wittgenstein's comments on skepticism.

Now given that, where does your argument lead?

Note that "doing the correct thing" with a block rests on the hinge proposition "This is a block". — Banno

This is where we differ. I am not denying the indubitability of what a block is. I am arguing that not doubting what a block is is not sufficient for doing the correct thing.

You have not explained this:

How can the game be played, how can they work, if the command is in doubt? — Fooloso4

Doubt here means not being certain what the command is. Note: As Wittgenstein says:

B brings the stone which he haslearnt to bring at such-and-such a call.

Bring the stone is something he had to learn, just as he had to learn "this is a stone". He cannot doubt what a stone is or doubt what to do with it.

This is where we differ. I am not denying the indubitability of what a block is. I am arguing that not doubting what a block is is not sufficient for doing the correct thing. — Fooloso4

No, it is requisite to perform the action. Nothing to do with sufficiency.

Unless you hold with Heidegger and Wittgenstein that any such separation between subjective attitude and objectivity is incoherent. It is the hinge that makes the world objectively intelligible in the first place. — Joshs

Let me state the problem using other words then. If you proceed in this direction, you have no "truth" as correspondence, because you've denied that there's a separation between the thing, and what corresponds with the thing by denying the separation between subjective (of the subject), and objective (of the object). Then we have no "knowledge" in the traditional sense because there is no separation between truth and justification. We'd have to say that if it is justified then it is true, because any other form of truth (correspondence with the object) has been excluded. But this is contrary to experience. We know from experience that what is justified sometime still turns out to be false. That's why we uphold a difference between justified and true.

“One’s hinge certainty, in normal circumstances, that one has hands would not be the least bit affected by the recognition that one has no rational basis for the truth of this proposition. This reflects the fact that, for Wittgenstein, such commitments are not rooted in ratiocination at all. Indeed, this is manifest in how we acquire our hinges. We are not explicitly taught them, but rather ‘swallow them down’ (OC, §143) with everything that we are explicitly taught, as part of the worldview that is thereby acquired. No-one teaches you that you have hands, for example; you are rather taught to do things with your hands, which presupposes their existence.” — Joshs

This is exactly why the so-called hinges are the most dubious of all propositions. We simply pick them up, acquire them through some sort of animalistic habituation without any type of ratiocination. Therefore they are the least reliable, and ought to be the first to be doubted. And, in philosophy, through methods like Platonic dialectics we learn the process for doubting them. That's why Wittgenstein is simply wrong when he suggests that it is for some (unexplainable) reason, unreasonable to doubt the hinges.

Because the hinges may be archaic remnants, left over from some ancient traditions, which are maintained in common language for simplicity sake only, they are the propositions most in need of the skeptic's doubt. Consider phrases like "the sun rises in the morning, and sets in the evening". We know that it's not true that the sun literally rises, it stays put, relatively, while the earth spins. This demonstrates how simple statements which we acquire, and use ("swallow them down"), may be very misleading. They can appear to correspond precisely with our observed world, they are also simple and very useful, yet sometimes they are actually false. That's why they are actually in need of the skeptic's.

“On the one hand, hinge commitments are completely unresponsive to rational considerations, in the sense that they are commitments that we would retain, and be no less certain of, even if we became aware of the fact that we have no rational basis for their truth. In
particular, our continued certainty in them would be manifest in our actions, so that even if we might claim to doubt them, this ‘doubt’ would be in an important sense fake. On the other hand, however, hinge commitments clearly can change over time, and change in ways that seem to be at least superficially rational. Indeed, the very same proposition can be at one time a hinge commitment and another time an ordinary belief, where this change seems to involve a rational response to changed circumstances.” — Joshs

I don't agree with this, and that's why I think Wittgenstein is wrong. Plato, throughout his dialogues demonstrated how Socrates doubted such commitments. And it wasn't just moral commitments which were doubted, but he doubted commitments throughout the entire sphere of knowledge, including technical practice, science, mathematics, law, and even the meaning of "knowledge" itself. To doubt the meaning of a word, like "love", "virtue", "just", or "knowledge", is to doubt how one's society uses that word, and therefore the hinge commitments which support that usage.