What would be concerning if no Russian would want (secretly?) regime change. Yet many opt to leave... perhaps the ghost of Stalin is too frightening. — ssu

I guess if Biden wanted stability in the region, he would try to help Russia save face right now, instead of humiliating the fuck out of Putin? Maybe that's not even in the cards, though.

Putin had a somewhat good run for Russia. — ssu

True. I think he was pretty well respected after Syria. How things change.

:up: Cool find

By the way, going by ...

Russian Society and Foreign Policy: Mass and Elite Orientations After Crimea (Mar 14, 2019)

... the general Russian population isn't particularly keen on the outward aggressions nor feels particularly threatened by other countries.
Hard to tell, but does make sense (to me anyway).

... the general Russian population isn't particularly keen on the outward aggressions nor feels particularly threatened by other countries. — jorndoe

I can totally believe that. But that's the official line: that foreign countries (the US) are out to get Russia. Many of the Russians that I've met have totally sound and realistic views about the state of their nation. If the US is polarized with democrats and Trump fans, Russia is even more divided with those that believe in Putin and those who are against the regime.

Yet as there isn't a democracy, just how much there is opposition is hard to know. Yet a quarter of a million people leaving the country does tell something.

Well, actually I think that's the problem, we have no way to interpret it other than establishing it happens. My gut feeling is pretty optimistic this has an effect on the war effort in Ukraine but it's just a vague sense and too many other variables swirling about to trust it.

That the Russian invasion of Ukraine is only Western propaganda? Sure. — ssu

What are you talking about?

The issue under discussion was how Ukraine would be victorious, or Russia not-victorious, through military means, such as the collapse of the Russian state.

And I was asking for a citation from this thread or an actual argument.

I know people state that Russia will collapse or that Ukraine will "be victorious", what I'm asking for is how?

The closest I've seen to an actual argument is that low morale will simply lead to the complete dissolution of the Russian armed forces. An argument with zero supporting evidence except anecdotal that some Russians aren't happy (which is not surprising).

No. I asked for a geopolitical account by which he might be understood as a rational actor.
— apokrisis

Why would you be asking me for such an account, what makes you think I have one? — Isaac

I'll give it a shot.

The West insists the war is a "mistake" or "miscalculation" as basically Westerners don't approve. I think this sentiment is more-or-less just the emotional praxis of cancel culture applied to Russia and with zero context.

The war is presented as something happening totally out of the blue and unprovoked.

Obviously it's not out of the blue and has been going on since 2014 and teasing Ukraine joining NATO and therefore moving NATO weapon systems into Ukraine, and in the meantime arming and training Ukraine, is obviously a provocation. Of course, one can argue that these conditions do not satisfy a just war hypothesis along US' standard of invading Iraq (or then argue both aren't a just war), but, putting the moral evaluation aside, the context is important to actually understanding the situation.

For, after the civil war broke out there was 2 agreements (agreed by all sides) to end the fighting, the Minsk accords:

The Minsk agreements were a series of international agreements which sought to end the Donbas war fought between armed Russian-backed separatist groups and Armed Forces of Ukraine, with Russian regular forces playing a central part.[1] The first, known as the Minsk Protocol, was drafted in 2014 by the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, consisting of Ukraine, Russia, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),[2][3][4] with mediation by the leaders of France and Germany in the so-called Normandy Format. After extensive talks in Minsk, Belarus, the agreement was signed on 5 September 2014 by representatives of the Trilateral Contact Group and, without recognition of their status, by the then-leaders of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR). This agreement followed multiple previous attempts to stop the fighting in the region and aimed to implement an immediate ceasefire.

A map of the buffer zone established by the Minsk Protocol follow-up memorandum
The agreement failed to stop fighting,[5] and was thus followed with a revised and updated agreement, Minsk II, which was signed on 12 February 2015.[6] — Minsk agreements

Azov sympathisers like to say these agreements aren't "fair", well then Ukraine didn't need to sign them.

Again, regardless of the moral status these agreements obviously failed.

Getting into the geopolitics, the context of the war going on since 2014 (and ethnic Russians dying in it) and Russia signing agreements that would create a ceasefire (and mainly Azov and co. continuing the fighting), doesn't matter for Western media but it does matter to other geopolitical actors that Russia deals with.

The war is not out of the blue, and Russia has essentially since 2015 to make their case to their friends and allies that a larger war is inevitable. Simply because the West just ignored this issue, does not mean Russia did and literally 7 years of being able to point to Russia signing the Minsk agreements and Ukraine and the West not implementing them can go a long way to explain when the sanctions came down, essentially no country outside the West joined in, and the West was all Pikachu face all of a sudden.

Likewise, cutting the water to Crimea was a real headache for the Russians, with Crimean agriculture about to be seriously damaged (without fresh water, not only is agriculture more difficult, but salt water seeps in from the sea, from what I've read). And we can't forget the Nazi's, who nearly any Russian, from Putin to the lowliest peasant, is going to be angry about. From the Russian perspective "D-day" wasn't the cathartic moment that defeated the Nazi's, but 20 000 000 dead Russians, and it wasn't so cathartic. So it does not only stir hatred for Nazi's, but also hatred for the West which Russia views as ungrateful for their sacrifice in dealing with Hitler's war machine (an actual existential war with a genocidal maniac, not just rhetoric).

Now, simply because there's nearly a decade to prepare militarily, economically and diplomatically for the war, doesn't mean it's a good idea, but the context that it's not some random act out of the blue, obviously prepared diplomatically in direct and indirect ways, may indicate there is a thought out geopolitical plan, in addition to things like meeting with Xi before the war was launched.

We don't know what conversations between Putin and Xi are like, but we can make an educated guess.

From the Chinese perspective, US is constantly talking about a pivot to Asia (aka. China) and constantly talking about China as the rival super power and so on. The war in Ukraine essentially opens a second front with the US, they now are "pivoting" back to the Europe.

From the Russian perspective, they are constantly sanctioned and threatened with more sanctions, so economic relations aren't friendly and all economic ties with the West are a double edged sword, as easily a benefit as painful leverage (for the exact same reasons as the West is suddenly lamenting it's economic ties).

Unlike in Soviet times, there is now alternative sources for advanced technology. We're also at the end of Moores law for a single processing core, so advanced technology does not improve as it once did in any case.

What this means is not only is there no strong technology dependence relations, but China and India now compete with the West as technology suppliers. You can say Western technology is still "better" but China and India are trying very hard to catchup. One thing that would allow them a competitive edge across the board: cheaper access to energy.

So, let's say Putin determines that the West's failure to deal with Ukraine and make them implement Minsk and the constant propaganda and sanctions and threat of sanctions, all means that the West just aren't good partners, just a source of constant headaches, and China and India can provide everything the West provides in terms of components and technicians to run a commodity based economy of things both China and India really need (being the world's factory).

Now, I have zero problem accepting that the preferred outcome of the war in Ukraine would have been a negotiated peace in the first week of the war with Ukraine, every day since, and even now. However, the levels of preparation for both the war (taking over the south in less than a week) and also economic sanctions (Ruble didn't collapse, infrastructure didn't stop working) tells me at least that the possibility of a long war and total sanctions was thought through and accepted as a second best scenario.

Why would this be? Well, if Putin's perspective is either the West are good partners or then not-partners, he would be in the position of being unable to implement this policy himself. If Putin just randomly one day kicked out all Western corporations from Russia, no one in Russia would understand the move and he's gone insane and all that.

However, if the West implements sanctions that forces Western corporations to leave Russia ... that's not Putin's doing, Chinese and Indian corporations come in and are super happy. Russia is still a sizeable market ... so imagine doing your best to compete, with lower prices and marketing and bribes and stuff, struggling for market share and ROI, and then your competitors just up and leave. It's a pretty great feeling.

So, geopolitically, the value Russia is providing China and India as an outcome of this war, is not really questionable. In return, India and China purchase the energy and commodities and don't sanction Russia.

Of course, that's not really a payment to do the war, just conditions that allow the war to happen.

So what is Russia getting from the war other than just kicking out unreliable partners (from it's point of view)?

Militarily speaking, the Azov sea is a traditionally very weak spot for Russia and the 2000 km border with Ukraine means Russia can be invaded on a massive front just like it did to Ukraine, goes both ways. How much do these things matter in a nuclear age I honestly don't know, both in terms of the real truth and what the Kremlin actually thinks about these conventional military considerations.

So, even ignoring any real military gains, apparently there's giant gas fields right under the Donbas and around Crimea.

I'll stop the analysis here for now, as I need to go to a meeting, but if a Schism with the West and taking these gas fields are a primary motivating factor, with protecting ethnic Russians (whether genuine concern for Putin or not) easy pretext for the war, then one is left to wonder who is baiting who.

Did the US bait Russia into this "mistake" or did Russia bait the US into massive sanctions and refusing reasonable peace deals to take these gas fields and create Russia-India-China alignment? For, the US' analysis was that this would be Russia's "Afghanistan" and so weaken Russia in conventional military terms, which is certainly true in terms of using up Soviet stockpiles. However, if the Soviet stockpiles had a shelf life anyways ... and short term conventional weakness doesn't mean much when you have 6000 nuclear weapons, and therefore the gas fields, water to Crimea, and creating an alternative global financial system is "worth it".

a quarter of a million people leaving the country does tell something. — ssu

It used to be called "voting with one's feet", in the good old days of the USSR. They all tell the same story: not interested in committing war crimes, thank you very much. I thought they would say they are saving their skin, but it seems they primarily don't want to take part in what they rightly see as a crime.

It used to be called "voting with one's feet", in the good old days of the USSR. — Olivier5

Again, any evidence this has a chance to stop the war? Will all these people be signing up to fight to Ukraine?

How many will just return to Russia after they get their first energy bill?

Propaganda victories can be short lived (for example if Ukrainian gains are stopped and reversed the recent euphoria will be a distant memory) ... and obviously no amount of propaganda produces victory, although it is pleasant to hear.

My gut feeling is pretty optimistic this has an effect on the war effort in Ukraine but it's just a vague sense and too many other variables swirling about to trust it. — Benkei

We can just look at Venezuela, Belarus, Iran and Russia itself and notice that widespread dissatisfaction and protests don't topple totalitarian regimes. It's only in functioning democracies were large scale protests can make the administrations to resign.

But I agree, it's at least positive what is happening in Russia.

This also reads like fiction.

I really think people here have a tendency to extrapolate all sorts of stories from a minimum of facts.

We have seen an irrational Putin. Which is a variation on the theme whenever leftists proclaim "but why do poor people vote against their interests? whine whine". It's elitist and almost always misplaced. Putin is not an idiot, he's not irrational. He simply thinks other things are important than most "Westerners" fed on a steady diet of neoliberal economic policy, white saviour complex while being blind to the financial and cultural oppression of other countries and sometimes outright wars (based on lies). He doesn't care about the legal order so the whole "it's an illegal war" is not a consideration at all. We know this because Russians bomb the shit out of civilians in every war and those rules are older than the UN charter.

Then there's the "Putin is a mastermind" kind of exposition you just wrote. We see coping and market mechanism developing alternative financial systems, we see increased trade between Russia and countries that didn't join sanctions. These are reactions to circumstances and I don't believe for a second these steps and consequences can be predicted by any type of accuracy because you cannot accurately predict the shape and form of sanctions, the level or type of support by the West and even your own allies. etc.

Then there's the "imperial" Putin because he referenced tsaristic Russia a couple of times (and boy, what a lot of books that invited). I'm sure lizards dream of being dragons too. That doesn't automatically mean they actually try to breathe fire.

I still believe the simplest explanation is NATO expansion or the threat thereof. The BBC in 2008 on Georgia:

President Saakashvili has made membership of Nato one of his main goals - and Nato agreed in April 2008 that Georgia would become a member of the alliance at some unspecified date in the future. — BBC

I think the similarities in 2008, 2014 and now in 2022 are obvious. It's the simplest explanation for Putin's actions. A basic realpolitik interpretation of the geopolitical situation where Russia considers NATO an existential threat. The knee-jerk reply that "NATO is a defensive alliance" is neither here nor there - it's not about what we believe, it's what Putin believes that drives his decisions.

The issue under discussion was how Ukraine would be victorious, or Russia not-victorious, through military means, such as the collapse of the Russian state. — boethius

Uh, by continuing to do what it has done now. :smirk:

An argument with zero supporting evidence except anecdotal that some Russians aren't happy — boethius

Yes, we have heard your argument that everything is just anecdotal. The quarter million leaving Russia are just anecdotal also. :snicker:

For, the US' analysis was that this would be Russia's "Afghanistan" and so weaken Russia in conventional military terms, which is certainly true in terms of using up Soviet stockpiles. — boethius

Actually the war has lweakened Russia far more than the war in Afghanistan did the Soviet Union. That Russia is using Soviet stockpiles is already quite telling. Meaning that the modern stock has already gone or very limited.

(T-62 tanks, which were first introduced in 1961 to the Soviet arsenal. Production stopped in 1975.)

Again, any evidence this has a chance to stop the war? Will all these people be signing up to fight to Ukraine? — boethius

Again, it is not meant to stop anything. Boys don't want to be criminals, kudos to them. If you want to commit war crimes instead of just advocating them on TPF, go right ahead and enlist. But that too won't stop anything.

This also reads like fiction.

I really think people here have a tendency to extrapolate all sorts of stories from a minimum of facts. — Benkei

To be fair to @boethius, the question he was answering was a request for...

a geopolitical account by which [Putin] might be understood as a rational actor.

...not necessarily a wholesale agreement with such an assessment. The point is to show how it's a perfectly plausible theory, and it does indeed has many plausible aspects.

One bit of rhetoric that seems to linger even in critiques is this idea that things like sensible long-term strategies, plans B (or C, or D), feints, bluffs, preparations etc require some kind of strategic mastermind. They don't. They're all quite normal tools in any governments tool-box. It would be a surprise to find them absent from Russian planning, it's not remotely a surprise to find them there.

Putin can be a mediocre autocrat and still have more than one reserve plan, he can be clouded by ambition and still think strategically a few years ahead, these aren't difficult tasks.

It's part of the Western propaganda to paint a prepared Russia as being implausible so as to maintain the 'victory is just around the corner' spin we hear so many here obediently regurgitating. To further that end, this narrative had been spread that anyone suggesting Russia is prepared must think Putin is a genius (and therefore must be a Putin supporter!). It doesn't take a genius to adequately prepare for war. It takes a mid-level bureaucrat with a modicum of facilities at his disposal.

by continuing to do what it has done now — ssu

...and then?

Ukraine continues to win back territory as it has been doing, rebutting Russian advances as it has been. Go on with your story...What does Russia do next in your version of 'How Ukraine Wins'?

Putin can be a mediocre autocrat and still have more than one reserve plan, he can be clouded by ambition and still think strategically a few years ahead, these aren't difficult tasks. — Isaac

I've been meaning to ask you as an actual professional of these things what would need to be proven for a judge to consider an actor "irrational". Maybe people would propose some other standard, but I think it's an interesting reference point regardless.

Your summary above is spot on: you need a lot more than some mistakes to consider someone irrational. And ... it's one of those "call me in 300 years" to even really be sure what was a mistake or not. Russia totally collapse with this a contributing factor as @ssu says may happen; sure, big mistake, no dissenting opinion from me on that one ... but people pretend like that has already happened somehow.

I've been meaning to ask you as an actual professional of these things what would need to be proven for a judge to consider an actor "irrational". — boethius

It's not often used that way, but in terms of 'capacity' it's largely to do with the retention and repetition of relevant data rather then the outcomes or methods. If someone can be shown to repeatedly fail to recall, or make use of, information that is clearly consequential to the outcome of a decision, then they may be said to lack the capacity to make that decision rationally. They can get it 'wrong' as often as they like, it doesn't really enter into the legal framework.

Mistakes are, as you say, very difficult to judge. This is especially true of an autocrat like Putin. He's not the state, he's a person, which means he'll have his own agenda which may or may not have anything to do with the perpetuation of the Russian state.

They all tell the same story: not interested in committing war crimes, thank you very much. I thought they would say they are saving their skin, but it seems they primarily don't want to take part in what they rightly see as a crime. — Olivier5

Wow. According to my back of the envelope calculations; with a 1% margin of error, to 99% confidence you'd need a sample of 15556 to be able to make such a claim of 250,000 people. You have been busy haven't you!

So, when people speak of war crimes, you pull out your calculator to estimate a margin of error? Have some decency.

Of course I wouldn't dream of doing any actual factual analysis about war crimes before the most important matters are dealt with. I'd get straight on to social media without delay and make sure everyone knew just how very much I thought war crimes were bad...

...then I'd get the calculator out...

Talking of calculators:
"Nearly 100,000 Russian citizens have crossed into Kazakhstan alone since last week, the country’s interior ministry said on 27 September."
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/putin-mobilisation-russians-flee-across-borders-kazakhstan/

Estimates seem to be very variable as to how many Russians are leaving. Has anyone done any sums yet?

Has anyone done any sums yet? — unenlightened

The place will be empty by next Thursday. All 145 million of them citing the fact that they suddenly realised that killing innocent people is bad. Most said they had no idea until they read some earnest Westerners clarifying the matter for them on Twitter.

Estimates seem to be very variable as to how many Russians are leaving. Has anyone done any sums yet? — unenlightened

First of all, one should look at net flows. People come also back to Russia.

Here's of statistics of Russian citizens entering Finland (yellow) and leaving (white):

As for Finland (and the EU) Russians need visas, the volumes of people to coming to Finland is small. Yet it's the only Western border open for them (perhaps Norway might be up North). Kazakhstan doesn't have visa requirements and there is a large ethnic Russian population in the country.

From the Border Guards site of the following days of Russian citizens (link here:

Date___Incoming_Outgoing___Net inflow
26.9.___ 7 743_ 3 662_ 4081
25.9.___ 8 314_ 5 068_ 3246
24.9.___ 8 582_ 4 199 _ 4383
23.9.___ 7 667_ 3 545_ 4122

Hence several thousand coming in every day to Finland. And a lot of new cars. So these aren't poor people leaving Russia, but basically people the Russian economy would need. To put this into perspective, last year in Finland there were about 70 000 people that came from the former Soviet states, majority naturally Russians. Of course many go onwards to other Western countries.

Here's the stats by Frontex:


Georgia and Kazakhstan likely have far more. The stats may have difficulties to keep up.

Seems that it was an explosion that caused the gasleaks in the Nordstream gas pipeline:

Swedish geological stations notice an explosion: See here (in Swedish)

Reuters picked on it:

STOCKHOLM, Sept 27 (Reuters) - A Swedish seismologist said on Tuesday he was certain the seismic activity detected at the site of the Nord Stream pipeline gas leaks in the Baltic Sea was caused by explosions and not earthquakes nor landslides.

Russia has declared it cannot repair the leaks because of the sanctions. So a bit of hybrid warfare?

Timothy Snyder's Yale course The Making of Modern Ukraine (ongoing)

Ukraine must have existed as a society and polity on 23 February 2022, else Ukrainians would not have collectively resisted Russian invasion the next day. What does it mean for a nation to exist? Is this a matter of structures, actions, or both? Why has the existence of Ukraine occasioned such controversy? In what ways are Polish, Russian, and Jewish self-understanding dependent upon experiences in Ukraine? Just how and when did a modern Ukrainian nation emerge? For that matter, how does any modern nation emerge? Why some and not others? Can nations be chosen, and can choices be decisive? If so, whose, and how? Ukraine was the country most touched by Soviet and Nazi terror: what can we learn about those systems, then, from Ukraine? Is the post-colonial, multilingual Ukrainian nation a holdover from the past, or does it hold some promise for the future?

I haven't listened to it, but will give it a try when I have time.

1 Ukrainian Questions Posed by Russian Invasion
2 The Genesis of Nations
3 Geography and Ancient History
4 Before Europe
5 Vikings, Slavers, Lawgivers: The Kyiv State
6 The Grand Duchy of Lithuania

Georgia and Kazakhstan likely have far more. — ssu

Kazakhstan will guarantee the safety of Russians fleeing their country as Russia moves to conscript hundreds of thousands of army reserves to fight in Ukraine, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has said.

“A lot of people from Russia have come here over the last few days,” Tokayev said in a speech on Tuesday.

“Most of them are forced to leave because of the hopeless situation. We must take care of them and ensure their safety.”

I'm skeptical of the NYT and the like. — Manuel

Not sure what you consider to be "the like" of NYT. It has few peers, in my opinion. (That is, if you are after reporting and analysis. I generally avoid opinion columns.)

I am always wary of people in the West (don't necessarily mean you, Manuel) who proudly declare that they don't get their information from mainstream media (spoken with a sneering contempt). You can rightly criticize mainstream media for a lot of things, but what are the alternatives? More often than not, it is trash like conspiracy blogs, misinformation enterprises like RT, Infowars (or thegrayzone), partisan media that cares more about ideology than accuracy and depth, and generally anything that tells you what you want to hear.

NYT, Guardian (which still has an active live stream for the war news), Washington Post all do professional reporting and analysis. BBC is OK for news updates (their Russian studio does good coverage of the war, but of course you need to know Russian). NPR, like much of US media, has scant international coverage. The most complete and timely news can be found in independent Russian and Ukrainian media.

Kazakhstan will guarantee the safety of Russians fleeing their country as Russia moves to conscript hundreds of thousands of army reserves to fight in Ukraine, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has said. — Olivier5

And this is very interesting.

Has Russia lost Kazakhstan?

Russia has declared it cannot repair the leaks because of the sanctions. So a bit of hybrid warfare? — ssu

Gasprom just issued an ultimatum to Ukraine's gas operator Naftogas. The likely outcome of this is that unless Ukraine consents to deliver Russian gas to Europe at no charge, this pipeline will be cut off as well, reducing the current amount of Russian gas flow to Europe by half.

Has Russia lost Kazakhstan? — ssu

More precisely, Putin has apparently lost Tokaïev, Kazakhstan strong man.

Gasprom just issued an ultimatum to Ukraine's gas operator Naftogas. The likely outcome of this is that unless Ukraine consents to deliver Russian gas to Europe at no charge, this pipeline will be cut off as well, reducing the current amount of Russian gas flow to Europe by half. — SophistiCat

This is the interesting fact: gas to Europe has flowed through Ukraine by the Brotherhood / Soyuz pipelines. Yeah, all out conventional war going on...but don't that let hinder gas trade.

I think here Putin made an error by cutting the gas (or making threats to cut it) far too earlier in the summer. Yes, it's a natural response to counter with something when the West makes all kinds of embargoes against you. But now West Europe has had time to replenish it's stocks, to look for new resources and above all, get it's people informed that the winter might be filled with electricity rationing and even blackouts. Without doing so, without responding in any way until now, I do assume that Western politicians and especially Germany could have been gotten caught with their pants down.

Germany's Olaf Scholz obtaining a LNG deal with the UAE few days ago.(I bet he's as relieved as he looks in this picture):


Imagine if the question where to get gas now, when Russia is out, would have been asked only so late and people in Berlin would start looking at the World map today?