Side-effects of the war ...

2 intensifying border wars show Putin is losing sway in his neighborhood while Russia struggles in Ukraine (businessinsider; Oct 24, 2022) ... via yahoo, msn

More bombing isn't really the best. Forget Ukraine, it's markedly more costly than keeping those various borders from erupting. :)

Russian leaders, including Vladimir Putin, inherited this colonialist mindset, seeing Central Asia (and Ukraine) as part of the Russia sphere. The former Soviet states of Central Asia were also accustomed to Moscow being the big stick in the region. — Michael Peck

Ups and downs in support for Ukraine ...

since the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia, the Obama, Trump and Biden administrations have all, to some degree, delayed or balked at sending lethal aid to Ukraine — Mark Gollom · CBC News · Mar 5, 2022

The 2022 invasion changed things.

Great, Russia kicks off a nuclear exercise Oct 26 ("Grom"), and NATO is currently running one, Oct 17-30 ("Steadfast Noon").

Russia has notified the U.S. its annual nuclear exercise has begun, U.S. officials say (CBS News; Oct 25, 2022)

A bit of coinciding war + ☢ games + ☢ rattling.

The benefits of NATO membership include more than just security benefits and collective defense but also disaster relief, humanitarian aid, and scientific collaboration through the NATO Science for Peace and Security Program. — Mikie

Are you really saying that Poland, the Baltic states, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, the Czech republic all joined NATO in order to benefit from humanitarian assistance?

01.22 EDT
Oleksandra Matviichuk has a point she wants to make. The Ukrainian lawyer heads the Centre for Civil Liberties, a human rights organisation that this month jointly won the Nobel peace prize. And she wants to use her platform to call for international action against Russian human rights violations now.

The body she heads has patiently documented more than 21,000 examples of war crimes committed by occupying Russian forces since 2014, including many from after the invasion in February. But, speaking quietly and with controlled emotion, she complains: “I haven’t any legal instrument to stop the Russian atrocities” – no immediate way of bringing perpetrators to court.

The criminality appears vast when listed. “After the large-scale invasion, we every day documented different kinds of war crimes, like intentional shelling of residential buildings, churches, hospitals, schools, the shelling of evacuation corridors,” Matviichuk says. “We received requests for help from people in the occupied territories because they were abducted, tortured; we recorded sexual violence, extrajudicial killings.”

Staff from the Centre for Civil Liberties were among those who travelled through Irpin, Bucha and towns and villages north-west of Kyiv after Russia abandoned its attempt to seize the city in March. “I will remind you,” she says, that bodies were found lying uncollected in the streets, or dumped in mass graves. “And what was Putin’s response? He provided medals to the army unit that was staying in Bucha.”

Russia, as governed now, shows a “genocidal character,” she argues.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2022/oct/26/russia-ukraine-war-live-news-russian-forces-battle-kherson-kyiv

If there were both statements and actions that demonstrate it. There were neither before the 2008 summit — Mikie

Again, for the third time, what kind of statements and actions would demonstrate to you an “imperialistic bent”? Statements should be like "Me, Mr. Emperor Putin feel imperialistic bent" and actions should be like


???

Ah, so that's what everyone was secretly thinking, but it was never stated explicitly. And the evidence that would lend them to secretly believe this was what, exactly? — Mikie

Anyway -- you admit it was never stated as a reason. That's a good start, I suppose. — Mikie

Geopolitical strategizing requires anticipating events in medium-long term based on a deep understanding about history, society (people and their leading elites) and geography, not on arbitrarily recent chronology of news and public speeches accessible to any avg dude, like you and me. And it's done behind doors for obvious reasons and without consulting any avg dude, like you and me. They didn’t even consult Mearsheimer, go figure!
The debate over NATO expansion behind doors was complex and nuanced, with a blend of more hawkish and more dovish attitudes toward Russia. But nobody underestimated the “imperialistic bent” of Russia, nor conflated real geopolitical strategizing (affecting the deep state) with current presidents’ preferred posture and official propaganda.

Relatedly, it is important to note that NATO expansion before February 2014 was not aimed at containing Russia. Given the sad state of Russian military power, Moscow was in no position to pursue revanchist policies in eastern Europe. Tellingly, former U.S. ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul notes that Putin’s seizure of the Crimea was not planned before the crisis broke out in 2014; it was an impulsive move in response to the coup that overthrew Ukraine’s pro-Russian leader. In short NATO enlargement was not intended to contain a Russian threat but was instead part of a broader policy to spread the liberal international order into eastern Europe and make the entire continent look like western Europe.

It was only when the Ukraine crisis broke out in February 2014 that the United States and its allies suddenly began describing Putin as a dangerous leader with imperial ambitions and Russia as a serious military threat that had to be contained. What caused this shift? This new rhetoric was designed to serve one essential purpose: to enable the West to blame Putin for the outbreak of trouble in Ukraine. And now that the crisis has turned into a full-scale war, it is imperative to make sure he alone is blamed for this disastrous turn of events. This blame game explains why Putin is now widely portrayed as an imperialist here in the West, even though there is hardly any evidence to support that perspective.


That's exactly right. — Mikie

That’s why you should put aside Mearsheimer for a while, take a deep breath, and start reading Brzeziński.

Feel free to cite any sources at or before the 2008 summit that support your other claim. — Mikie

From:

THE DEBATE ON NATO ENLARGEMENT
======================================================================= HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS 
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 7, 9, 22, 28, 30 AND NOVEMBER 5, 1997
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations


Comments about the Russian “imperialist bent” were of the following kind:

Russia has also been an imperialist country that, for 400 years of its history, acquired territories, expanding from the region around Moscow to the shores of the Pacific, into the Middle East, to the gates of India, and into the center of Europe. It did not get there by plebiscite. It got there by armies. To the Russian leaderships over the centuries, these old borders have become identified with the nature of the state.
So I believe that one of the major challenges we face with Russia is whether it can accept the borders in which it now finds itself. On the one hand, St. Petersburg is closer to New York than it is to Vladivostok, and Vladivostok is closer to Seattle than it is to Moscow, so they should not feel claustrophobic. But they do. This idea of organizing again the old commonwealth of independent states is one of the driving forces of their diplomacy. If Russia stays within its borders and recognizes that Austria, Singapore, Japan and Israel all developed huge economies with no resources and in small territories, they, with a vast territory and vast resources, could do enormous things for their people. Then there is no security problem.

[…]

According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, ``We should not be shy in saying that NATO expansion will help a democratic Russia and hurt an imperialistic Russia.''

[…]

Dr. Kissinger. One slightly heretical point on the Russian situation. We have a tendency to present the issue entirely in terms of Russian domestic politics. I could see Russia making progress toward democracy and becoming extremely nationalistic, because that could become a way of rallying the people. We also have to keep an eye on their propensity toward a kind of imperialist nationalism, which, if you look at the debates in the Russian parliament, is certainly present.

[…]

Advocates of NATO transformation make a better case for the Alliance to disband than expand. NATO's job is not to replace the U.N. as the world's peacekeeper, nor is it to build democracy and pan- European harmony or promote better relations with Russia. NATO has proven the most successful military alliance in history precisely because it has rejected utopian temptations to remake the world.
Rather, NATO's mission today must be the same clear-cut and limited mission it undertook at its inception: to protect the territorial integrity of its members, defend them from external aggression, and prevent the hegemony of any one state in Europe.
The state that sought hegemony during the latter half of this century was Russia. The state most likely to seek hegemony in the beginning of the next century is also Russia . A central strategic rationale for expanding NATO must be to hedge against the possible return of a nationalist or imperialist Russia, with 20,000 nuclear missiles and ambitions of restoring its lost empire. NATO enlargement, as Henry Kissinger argues, must be undertaken to ``encourage Russian leaders to interrupt the fateful rhythm of Russian history . . . and discourage Russia's historical policy of creating a security belt of important and, if possible, politically dependent states around its borders.''
Unfortunately, the Clinton administration [/b] does not see this as a legitimate strategic rationale for expansion. ``Fear of a new wave of Russian imperialism . . . should not be seen as the driving force behind NATO enlargement,'' says Mr. Talbott.
Not surprisingly, those states seeking NATO membership seem to understand NATO's purpose better than the Alliance leader. Lithuania's former president, Vytautas Landsbergis, put it bluntly: ``We are an endangered country. We seek protection.'' Poland, which spent much of its history under one form or another of Russian occupation, makes clear it seeks NATO membership as a guarantee of its territorial integrity. And when Czech President Vaclav Havel warned of ``another Munich,'' he was calling on us not to leave Central Europe once again at the mercy of any great power, as Neville Chamberlain did in 1938.
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and other potential candidate states don't need NATO to establish democracy. They need NATO to protect the democracies they have already established from external aggression.
Sadly, Mr. Havel's admonishments not to appease ``chauvinistic, Great Russian, crypto-Communist and crypto-totalitarian forces'' have been largely ignored by the Clinton administration. Quite the opposite, the administration has turned NATO expansion into an exercise in the appeasement of Russia.

[…]


Regarding Mr. Simes' comments, I would simply clarify my own position. My position is not that we should accommodate Russia. Far from it. It does seem to me that whatever residual imperialistic tendencies, which, indeed, can be a problem, can best be contained by methods other than adding members to NATO. I can think of no lever more effective, no political lever, than the threat that if Russian behavior does not meet certain standards, NATO will be enlarged, and enlarged very rapidly, and even further, and considerably further, than the current proposal envisages.

[…]

The Russian people do not see NATO as an enemy or a threat. They are mainly interested in the improvement of their desperately bad living conditions.
Unfortunately, the Russian political ruling class has not reconciled itself to the loss of its empire. The economic and political system has been changed, but the mentality of the people who are pursuing global designs for the Soviet super power all their lives cannot be changed overnight. Eduard Shevardnadze warned the American people that the Russian empire disintegrated but the imperialistic way of thinking still remains. Andrei Kozyrev also warned against the old guard which has a vested interest in presenting NATO as a threat and an enemy. ``Yielding to them,'' wrote Kozyrev in Newsweek, ``would play into the hands of the enemies of democracy.''
Both statesmen have inside knowledge of the Russian ruling elite. They certainly speak with authority. Moscow is opposed not to the enlargement of NATO but to the very existence of NATO because it rightly sees a defensive military alliance as a threat to its long-term ambitions to regain in the future a controlling influence over the former nation of the Soviet orbit.
As in the time of the Soviet Union, we have to expect that the continued enlargement of NATO will meet with threats and fierce opposition from Moscow. Once, however, the process is complete, any imperialistic dreams will become unrealistic and Russia may accept the present boundaries of its influence as final. Such a reconciliation with reality would prompt Moscow to concentrate its full attention and resources on internal recovery. A change of the present mind set would open a new chapter of friendly relations between Russia and her neighbors, who would no longer see Moscow as a threat. This new sense of security would be an historic turning point.
This is exactly what happened between Germany and Poland.


Comments about Ukraine were of the following kind :

If, for example, we are saying that this is not the end. The Baltic countries are welcome. Ukraine is welcome. What then would be the consequences within Russia?
I guess all of this leads me to one question, and maybe this is my way, as somebody who is trying to sort through these issues, of getting closer to what I think would be the right position for me to take as a Senator.
You said that if countries meet this democratic criteria, they are welcome. Would Russia be welcome? Maybe that is the question I should ask. If Russia meets the criteria, after all, all of us hope that they will build a democracy. I mean, it will be a very dreary world if they are not able to. This country is still critically important to the quality of our lives and our children's lives and our grandchildren's lives. If Russia meets this criteria, would they be welcome in NATO?
Secretary Albright. Senator, the simple answer to that is yes. We have said that if they meet the criteria, they are welcome. They have said that they do not wish to be a part of it.
[…]

My estimate here rests on the fact that including the Madrid 3, there are now 12 candidates for NATO membership. This total of 12 candidates can easily increase to 15 if Austria, Sweden, and Finland decide to apply. In fact, I see a 16th country, Ukraine, on the horizon.

[…]
The most important issue this prospect raises, however, is NATO's relationship to the countries to its east. Specifically, expansion to the borders of the former Soviet Union unavoidably raises the question of NATO's approach to that vanished empire's two most important successor states: Russia and Ukraine. The suspicions and multiple sources of conflict between them make the relationship between these two new and unstable countries, both with nuclear weapons on their territory, the most dangerous and potentially the most explosive on the planet today.
An expanded NATO must contribute what it can to promoting peaceful relations between them, while avoiding the appearance either of constructing an anti-Russian coalition or washing its hands of any concern for Ukrainian security.
There is no more difficult task for the United States and its European allies and none more urgent. To the extent that their accession to NATO provides an occasion for addressing that task seriously, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will have performed yet another service for the West.

[…]
Some may ask, if the aim is to promote stability, then why not admit Ukraine or the Balkan countries first, since they need stability even more than Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. The answer is that prospective new members need to have achieved a certain degree of political, economic and military maturity before they can become members. They need to be ``contributors to security'' not just ``consumers'' of it. Otherwise, NATO and the EU would simply become a collection of economic and political basket cases and both organizations would be unable to function effectively.
[…]
I am not by this question suggesting that you do not feel and believe we have a commitment to the Baltics, but I think there is a factual historical difference between Ukraine and the Baltics. For example, I think the immediate effect on the Russian psyche of admitting either the Baltics or Ukraine would be very similar. But in fact we never recognized that the Baltics, which were annexed by the Soviet Union, were legitimately part of the Soviet Union. We have never recognized that, and it seems to me that any further actions will take some time and may need some massaging. I am not smart enough to know exactly how to do it, but it seems to me as a matter of principle that it is very important to make a distinction between the Baltics, for example, and Ukraine.
[…]
That understanding will be advantageous even to the nations not invited, at least in the near future, to join the Alliance just as the presence of NATO members on the borders of Austria, Sweden, and Finland provided an essential security umbrella during the Cold War. Ukraine and the Baltic States will benefit in a similar manner from the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the Alliance. Although Ukraine is not at this point seeking membership in the Alliance as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are, all four states are united in the belief that NATO enlargement--even if limited to its current parameters--is advantageous to their security. As a matter of fact, as expansion of the Alliance has become increasingly likely, Russian treatment of Ukraine and the Baltic States has become more moderate and more flexible. Russian policymakers clearly appreciate that rocking the boat too much could accelerate NATO's expansion to Russia's frontier--something they are eager to avoid.


Russian National TV:
https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1584054018145685504

(Why doesn't the tweet link work?)

Which agreement or disagreement from the past can serve as a template for progress in the situation? That is not a rhetorical question. On the other hand, nothing discussed here has yet to approach it. — Paine

My 2 cents:

• As long as one must address the solution offered by Putin (his non-negotiable demands) to end this war without knowing what the existential threats for the Russians more specifically are, one is left with no other option than to accept or refuse it. If the existential threats for the Russians were stated in more specific terms (like the weapon system available to the Ukrainian army, the Black Sea fleet in Crimea, Russian minorities in Donbas and Crimea, etc.), one could try to propose other solutions which would take into account Russian concerns.
• In international politics, the most super-partes way one could and could have addressed this issue was by means of the UN: like UN supervised referendums (for stronger autonomy if not annexation) in Crimea and Donbas.

Side-effects of the war ...

2 intensifying border wars show Putin is losing sway in his neighborhood while Russia struggles in Ukraine (businessinsider; Oct 24, 2022) ... via yahoo, msn — jorndoe

This just shows what this war can be seen as a war that didn't happen then, but has happened now due to the breakup of the Soviet Empire. This is on the one hand extremely puzzling as this happens decades after the breakup of the Soviet Union. But as Putin has seen the breakup as this freak accident and has had these ambitions to make Russia great again, it was unavoidable I guess. But as Russia needs to pull out it's forces to be sent to the war in Ukraine, it's grasp is collapsing in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

So basically what Putin is doing is truly destroying not only his army in Ukraine, but also destroying Russia's regional power status it has enjoyed in the former Soviet republics (that have not joined NATO). Now the hollowness of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) can be seen as two member states are having border skirmishes with each other and one member, Armenia, is facing hostilities with Azerbaijan and Russia is not doing anything (or cannot do anything) about it. When members of a defensive alliance have hostilities between each other, then the organization is only a shell without any meaning.

(And this actually is forgotten about NATO: one of it's objectives is to keep it's members out of war between each other. In the case of Greece and Turkey, it has been rather successful.)

Which agreement or disagreement from the past can serve as a template for progress in the situation? That is not a rhetorical question. On the other hand, nothing discussed here has yet to approach it. — Paine

Many wars show how this war could end...badly for Russia.

A failure to make peace:

- The Korea war. Only an armstice exists. DMZ drawn where the fighting brought it to be.

- The Minsk memorandums, the present war prior to February 24th 2022.

Minsk I:

Ukraine and the Russian-backed separatists agreed a 12-point ceasefire deal in the Belarusian capital in September 2014.

Minsk II:

This agreement consisted of a package of measures, including a ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy weapons from the front line, release of prisoners of war, constitutional reform in Ukraine granting self-government to certain areas of Donbas and restoring control of the state border to the Ukrainian government. While fighting subsided following the agreement's signing, it never ended completely, and the agreement's provisions were never fully implemented.[7] The Normandy Format parties agreed that the Minsk II remains the basis for any future resolution to the conflict.

And now of course, these are totally meaningless as the puppet-states have been, as anticipated, annexed into Russia just like Crimea.


A peace after a humiliating loss for Russia:

- The Crimean war with the peace treaty signed in Paris.

Peace negotiations at the Congress of Paris resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Paris on 30 March 1856. In compliance with Article III, Russia restored to the Ottoman Empire the city and the citadel of Kars and "all other parts of the Ottoman territory of which the Russian troop were in possession". Russia returned the Southern Bessarabia to Moldavia. By Article IV, Britain, France, Sardinia and Ottoman Empire restored to Russia "the towns and ports of Sevastopol, Balaklava, Kamish, Eupatoria, Kerch, Jenikale, Kinburn as well as all other territories occupied by the allied troops". In conformity with Articles XI and XIII, the Tsar and the Sultan agreed not to establish any naval or military arsenal on the Black Sea coast. The Black Sea clauses weakened Russia, which no longer posed a naval threat to the Ottomans. The Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were nominally returned to the Ottoman Empire, and the Austrian Empire was forced to abandon its annexation and to end its occupation of them, but they in practice became independent. The Treaty of Paris admitted the Ottoman Empire to the Concert of Europe, and the great powers pledged to respect its independence and territorial integrity.

A peace after a humiliating loss for Russia number 2:

- The Russo-Japanese war and the Portsmouth peace treaty.

An immediate ceasefire, recognition of Japan's claims to Korea, and the evacuation of Russian forces from Manchuria. Russia also ceded its leases in southern Manchuria (containing Port Arthur and Talien) to Japan and turned over the South Manchuria Railway and its mining concessions to Japan. Russia was allowed to retain the Chinese Eastern Railway in northern Manchuria.

Plus Japan got the southern part of the Sakhalin Island, but Russia didn't have to pay reparations for Japan.

Okay, it looks like Russia has gone too far to jump start a Minsk III. The annexations also make an armistice line an unlikely option because Ukraine would view that as a de facto relinquishing of territory. Russia's destruction of civilian infrastructure deepens the motivation to keep the structure of sanctions after any kind of cease fire.

The idea of a U.N. referendum is interesting. It seems like that would require restoration of occupancy by refugees who headed west and the return of those deported east.

It's not looking good for Humpty Dumpty.

, the tweet shows fine in my browser.

I think Krasovsky took a bit of heat for that one, and Zakharova was a bit too trigger-happy with a "template" response. :)

In a since-deleted post, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova denounced what she called a “targeted information attack” against Krasovsky, calling the RT host a “fantastically talented” commentator of “obvious and truthful” information. — RT Host Suspended for Calls to ‘Drown, Burn’ Ukrainian Children (Oct 24, 2022)

"Close call m'am, ya' could'a gone down with'im." Makes you wonder how frequent bullshit responses are (from government officials at that).

Russian TV presenter says sorry but faces probe for call to drown Ukrainian children (Oct 24, 2022)

, fyi, direct link:

‘Accountability gap’: Nobel peace prize winner warns Russian war crimes going unpunished (Oct 26, 2022)

It looks more shit is coming:

https://news.usni.org/2022/10/18/accelerated-chinese-timeline-to-seize-taiwan-raises-questions-on-pentagon-priorities

https://www.npr.org/2022/10/19/1129652322/ukraine-us-midterm-elections

@jorndoe it depends on the browser: the twitter link still doesn't seem to work on my firefox.

, weird, I was just using Firefox as well, version 106.0.2 (64-bit), tweet is fine on my end.

weird indeed, I just upgraded my firefox version, and still the link doesn't work. :chin:

Russia's destruction of civilian infrastructure deepens the motivation to keep the structure of sanctions after any kind of cease fire. — Paine

Even if we see peace or cease-fire at some point, most of the west will probably not do business with Russia. The lesson has been learned: "never trust them, they will use a deal as hostile leverage".

Russia will be blocked until it has changed into a proper democratic state with low corruption. So basically, since that won't happen overnight, Russia will probably collapse in the long run and fracture into smaller nations that want to get out of the national bullshit while healing their relations with the west.

Most of modern society in developed nations as well as third world nations soon to be considered developed has been built around a globalized infrastructure of goods and tech. Cut off from that it's basically setting a nation back 50 years. So the choice for any nation is to either work peacefully with each other or risk ruining themselves and their people's ability to be on par with the rest of the world. That might work to some degree and in some nations better than others, but at a certain point, people won't accept it. Generally speaking, most people want to reach some basic liberal and human rights and if a nation blocks the people from that too much it will break the back of that government, either over time of political degradation or by the hands of the people.

Just look at Iran, if the people keep on pushing against that totalitarian bullshit, it will, at some point break into a takeover of power and could change Iran into a nation completely different from today (closer to how it was before the 1979 revolution). All it takes is a single event that makes people organize opposition.

What that would be like in Russia is unknown, maybe the police shoot someone who flees drafting, who knows, but I would not be surprised if there are oppositional groups in Russia figuring out how to stand up against Putin's regime and waiting for the perfect time to do so. It might be that they're waiting for Putin to be removed from power and in the following political turmoil they will push for change and take over. And what would happen if draftees were to organize not just to lay down arms but to turn around their weapons towards their own leaders? We've already seen things like soldiers killing their officers or groups of draftees organizing a laydown of arms as a massive group. If all the elite fighting forces are in Ukraine, then how many forces can be used to defend Putin and Kremlin if the people take up arms?

When I spoke about this in the earlier days of the war, I was heavily criticized for being naive, "to think that Russia would fall" was a preposterous idea. At this time I don't think anyone would argue against it being a possibility. People who didn't have insight into how bad the state of the military was in Russia before the war thought that Russia was an unstoppable freight train if they dared to wage war against someone, but they weren't, they were rather pathetic. And with the decline in almost everything that makes up modern Russian society, I don't see how the trajectory for Russia right now is anything but utter state collapse. I mean, Putin is also getting older, if he dies of anything in five years, that's not enough to rebuild the economy and what's been domestically destroyed by this war. So eventually, Putin will disappear and if Russia is in the same bad shape as it is now, that would definitely collapse the region, especially if someone takes over trying to "be Putin", people might just snap and initiate a revolution to remove the corruption at the top.

All of this is of course speculation, but not so much as it was a couple of months ago.

Russia conducts first nuclear weapons drill since Ukraine invasion

https://www.ft.com/content/e28b0aa8-0260-4249-9954-4e346ebda68a

The article is paywalled, but I'm sure folks know how to read this - or find the same info elsewhere. Not good.

Then use reuters: https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/russia-has-notified-us-about-planned-nuclear-drills-pentagon-2022-10-25/

Yes. Do be careful with the copyright issue, unless you took this for another site saying similar things.

Edit: Yep, much better.

The annexations also make an armistice line an unlikely option because Ukraine would view that as a de facto relinquishing of territory. Russia's destruction of civilian infrastructure deepens the motivation to keep the structure of sanctions after any kind of cease fire. — Paine

If you don't have an armstice, you can have a frozen conflict then. Basically that both sides lick their wounds and refurbish their materiel for an possible offensive, which then doesn't happen. Even if in this scenario people don't die and missiles don't fly (or fly very rarely), it will be extremely costly for both sides.

Here becomes the nuke option, even if unlikely, an option. The sinister option "Escalate to De-escalate".

Let's say that the Russians retreat from Kherson and make the Dniepr basically the front line and destroy all bridges. This means a river crossing has to be made, which pose a singular point of entry. There are just so many amphibious vehicles and the supply has to go over a bridge or ferry, so such entry points are needed. Now these points of entry could be destroyed and made extremely difficult to pass by using tactical nuclear weapons.

Of course this is unlikely and the obvious escalation would be to simply make an underground nuclear test. As those tests have been done nearly all the time during the Cold War, NATO wouldn't have to respond.

Or even on a lower level, have annual excersizes, were you launch some missiles capable of carrying nukes (as seems to be intended now).

Five Signs That Russia Is Preparing for All-Out War (Newsweek; Oct 26, 2022)

<sup>1. Economy on 'War Footing'
2. Bomb Shelters
3. Signage
4. Moscow Police
5. Emergency Evacuation Drills</sup>

Part of this, I'm sure, is rather to instill a sense of urgency in the population. No one is marching on Moscow, or has suggested so; it's the Ukrainians that are bomb targets here. Putin is trained as a spy (military, assassin, all that), which, I guess, is reflected in some of his moves.

The US has always maintained that there would be no American boots on the ground fighting in Ukraine, and to the best of our knowledge, that's still true. But what's the next best thing? US-trained elite foreign troops fighting in Ukraine! Only... they might be fighting for the other side this time.

Members of Afghanistan’s elite National Army Commando Corps, who were abandoned by the United States and Western allies when the country fell to the Taliban last year, say they are being contacted with offers to join the Russian military to fight in Ukraine. Multiple Afghan military and security sources say the U.S.-trained light infantry force, which fought alongside U.S. and other allied special forces for almost 20 years, could make the difference Russia needs on the Ukrainian battlefield.

Afghanistan’s 20,000 to 30,000 volunteer commandos were left behind when the United States ceded Afghanistan to the Taliban in August 2021 . Only a few hundred senior officers were evacuated when the republic collapsed. Thousands of soldiers escaped to regional neighbors as the Taliban hunted down and killed loyalists to the collapsed government. Many of the commandos who remain in Afghanistan are in hiding to avoid capture and execution.

The United States spent almost $90 billion building the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. Although the force as a whole was incompetent and handed the country over to the Taliban in a matter of weeks, the commandos were always held in high regard, having been schooled by U.S. Navy SEALs and the British Special Air Service...

Now, they are jobless and hopeless, many commandos still waiting for resettlement in the United States or Britain, making them easy targets for recruiters who understand the “band of brothers” mentality of highly skilled fighting men. This potentially makes them easy pickings for Russian recruiters, said Afghan security sources. A former senior Afghan security official, who requested anonymity, said their integration into the Russian military “would be a game-changer” on the Ukrainian battlefield, as Russian President Vladimir Putin struggles to recruit for his faltering war and is reportedly using the notorious mercenary Wagner Group to sign up prisoners. — Foreign Policy

The foresight and follow-through of US and British foreign military engagements never fails to disappoint...

Battlefield reports from whatever sources that scrolled by ...

Putin's Su-30 'Flanker' jet detects & shoots down Ukraine military aircraft | Max payload: 8,000 KG
^{— Hindustan Times; Oct 24, 2022}
Ukraine Situation Report: Russia’s Ka-52 Attack Helicopter Fleet Has Been Massacred
^{— The Drive; Oct 25, 2022}
Russian Assault Repelled as Repeated Attacks in Donetsk Fail: ISW
^{— Newsweek; Oct 26, 2022}
Russia dealt setbacks in Ukraine's Kherson, Bakhmut, and Luhansk, Kyiv and pro-Kremlin bloggers say
^{— The Week; Oct 26, 2022}
Russian Losses In Ukraine Soared To 480 In Just One Day, According To Kyiv
^{— HuffPost; Oct 26, 2022}

Difficult to verify, but seems coherent across.


^{↑ Source: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 25 (Critical Threats; Oct 25, 2022)}

Lines aren't moving much at the moment despite the destruction.
The Ukrainians are expected to make a further move on Kherson.
The Russians are expected to...well, bomb away.

Exactly what threat is NATO to Russia?
(And, what threat is Putin's Russia to Ukraine?)
To warrant the destruction?

This article has a bit of details:

The flimsiness of the claims led some diplomats and experts to suspect it was not intended to convince anyone but to send a message, but it is unclear what that message may be.
[...]
The Kyiv government has asked the IAEA to verify that no radioactive materials in Ukraine have gone missing, and the UN nuclear watchdog said it was preparing to send inspectors to two unidentified Ukrainian sites, both already subject to frequent inspections.
[...]
Perhaps significantly, the Russian allegation has prompted rare communication with the west, with Moscow’s armed forces chief of staff, Valery Gerasimov, speaking on Monday to his US counterpart, Mark Milley, for the first time since May. — Russia steps up Ukraine ‘dirty bomb’ claim in letter delivered to UN · The Guardian · Oct 25, 2022

Nuclear materials are identifiable.

Russia Calling for ‘Desatanization’ of Ukraine (Truth or Fiction? Oct 25, 2022)

Apparently so, however weird. By government officials, first deNazification, then deMilitarization, now deSatanization. :D What's up in Moscow anyway?

At this rate we can soon hear from Russian screens that it was USA and NATO that attacked Ukraine, not Russia. — Anton Gerashchenko (Oct 26, 2022)

Meanwhile, real life on the ground, translations via Katya Soldak, Polina Raskazova, google:

Ivan Fedorov / Melitopol / Mayor
The occupiers continue to hold the population of Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Luhansk and Donetsk regions hostage.
Yesterday, the Russians released a total of 94 people from the occupied parts of 4 regions of Ukraine to Zaporizhzhia. 33 of them are residents of Melitopol and the district.
At the same time, the weather conditions are getting worse every day.
The dirt road in the "gray" zone near the village of Kamianske, which is the next settlement after the enemy checkpoint in Vasylivka, is being washed away by the rains.
If people are not released now, it will be much more difficult for them to leave later. Rashisti understand this, but continue to release dozens instead of thousands.
#EvacuationfromOccupation — Telegram (Oct 26, 2022)

They'd have to flee a good way though, can't just get on West Jet to Lviv.

Russia will probably collapse in the long run and fracture into smaller nations that want to get out of the national bullshit while healing their relations with the west. — Christoffer

In this case the next foreseeable concern for US/NATO would be - as it was for Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union - the Russian nuclear arsenal (and even nuclear plants) remaining in the hands of ex-Russian sub-states (with all their unresolved border issues) and the Chinese hegemonic ambitions in est/central Asia. Likely even Turkish and Iranian, at least in central Asia.

In this case the next foreseeable concern for US/NATO would be - as it was for Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union - the Russian nuclear arsenal (and even nuclear plants) remaining in the hands of ex-Russian sub-states (with all their unresolved border issues) and the Chinese hegemonic ambitions in est/central Asia. Likely even Turkish and Iranian, at least in central Asia. — neomac

Yes, it would be a mess. But it can also be leveraged. The west could initiate trade agreements and transactions with such states as long as they give up their nukes. It might sound like a loss for them, but since their nation will likely be much smaller, their existence is much more fragile and the west would probably block them even more if they keep holding onto their nukes. So for them, their quality of life gets a massive bump if they give up nukes and that might be preferable. (Using "the west" as a broad term for nations opposing Russia in this conflict).

Of course, with tensions around their borders, they might lock into a Russian-based cold war for decades, slowly suffocating themselves with their finger on the button to eradicate their neighboring nation. It all depends on how stuck up their own ass they are.

The problem isn't really that there will be new nations with nukes, that can be resolved with diplomacy. The biggest problems are broken arrow scenarios in which nukes go missing in the turmoil after Russia collapses. Terrorist organizations could end up with tactical nukes or with knowledge make suitcase bombs out of old bombs. This could become one of the most dangerous terrorist situations in history.

It's actually viable for the UN to go into the new fractured Russia and seize control of the nukes before that gets out of hand. Nato and the UN would need to hastily initiate a plan to acquire all nukes, maybe even by force, in order to have the situation under control.

The problem isn't really that there will be new nations with nukes, that can be resolved with diplomacy. The biggest problems are broken arrow scenarios in which nukes go missing in the turmoil after Russia collapses. Terrorist organizations could end up with tactical nukes or with knowledge make suitcase bombs out of old bombs. This could become one of the most dangerous terrorist situations in history. — Christoffer

Sure, that too. About this I read a study of 2005 (https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/irrc_859_5.pdf) reporting:
There is great concern that terrorists could obtain nuclear or radiological weapons and
detonate them in a large city. The authors analyse the technical requirements for and obstacles to obtaining such weapons. What difficulties would have to be surmounted?
Could these problems be solved by a terrorist organization without direct support from a State possessing nuclear weapons? The authors conclude that nuclear weapons are most likely out of reach for terrorists. However, radiological weapons may well be used by terrorists in the future. The possible consequences of such an attack are discussed.

The authors conclude that nuclear weapons are most likely out of reach for terrorists. — neomac

The thing to remember is that if a state fails and collapses, most of the people with technical knowledge of nuclear weapons would also be subjects for terrorists to recruit into their organizations. If successful, they won't need state support.

The thing to remember is that if a state fails and collapses, most of the people with technical knowledge of nuclear weapons would also be subjects for terrorists to recruit into their organizations. If successful, they won't need state support. — Christoffer

:ok:

The thing to remember is that if a state fails and collapses, most of the people with technical knowledge of nuclear weapons would also be subjects for terrorists to recruit into their organizations. If successful, they won't need state support. — Christoffer

Yeah, not actually.

We already saw this didn't happen in the case of the Soviet Union collapsing. Or with the sad case of the Iraqi scientists building Saddam's bomb.

Those people will be on the kill list of many intelligence services.

And that's why knowledge of nuclear technology, which is now basically ancient tech, hasn't proliferated: if anyone is so stupid to try to sell services to terrorists, that's a guarantee you will get on the CIA/Mossad hit list. And actually, those people (with the tech knowledge) know this.