Yeah, not actually.

We already saw this didn't happen in the case of the Soviet Union collapsing. Or with the sad case of the Iraqi scientists building Saddam's bomb.

Those people will be on the kill list of many intelligence services.

And that's why knowledge of nuclear technology, which is now basically ancient tech, hasn't proliferated: if anyone is so stupid to try to sell services to terrorists, that's a guarantee you will get on the CIA/Mossad hit list. And actually, those people (with the tech knowledge) know this. — ssu

The key difference is that the number of nukes and people behind them is much higher by the collapse of Russia than anyone else. It's by a large magnitude different. And a collapse of modern Russia would be different from the Soviet collapse seen as Russia would be fractured into more states than before and each state would set its own agendas rather than deal with a larger main state as was the case after the Soviet collapse.

My point is that it only takes one scientist and one nuke to get into the hands of terrorists and seeing as how much of the Russian army is infected by right-wing extremists and downright nazis, what would happen if neo nazi terrorists get hold of a nuke? Most people think of Islamic terrorism when mentioning terrorists, but that's probably not what the outcome would be with nukes from Russia. Neo nazis and right-wing extremists are a much more probable group to weaponize themselves with nukes. And seen how the governments of the world slowly move towards such extremism, like in Italy, it's a major threat to the world if that would happen.

, if Russia was to explode like that, then a good deal of conflict would ensue, at least in the current environment. :/
Don't know if China or NATO would do something, but I imagine so.
Preferably, Putin's Russia would simmer down on the warring, and focus on building instead, in my opinion anyway.

The key difference is that the number of nukes and people behind them is much higher by the collapse of Russia than anyone else. It's by a large magnitude different. And a collapse of modern Russia would be different from the Soviet collapse seen as Russia would be fractured into more states than before and each state would set its own agendas rather than deal with a larger main state as was the case after the Soviet collapse. — Christoffer

Actually, the Soviet collapse was far more dangerous as:

a) there were A LOT MORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS then than now in Russian arsenal

b) several countries, from Ukraine to Kazakhstan got nukes. Their capability, not Russia's, was the serious question during that time.

c) Unlike in the situation of Soviet Union, the Russia autonomies wouldn't become immediately independent. The last thing Moscow would do would be leaving it's nukes unattended in a secessionist part of the country.

d) as there is already a history of this, people can anticipate these issues far more better.

And lastly, Russia actually is in far better shape than the Soviet Union was when it collapsed. There aren't any bread lines in Moscow. Then there were, even in Moscow and Leningrad. I've seen them myself and how horrified Muscovites were when even bread was in shortage. (I visited the place when in the last year before it dissolved.)

Aww, that's lovely. Shame not every refugee is equally as 'Ukrainian' as this pretty young Arian TV bait you've dredged up for the virtue-hungry masses.



Still, I'm sure all that will change on Ukraine's path to Western enlightenment...

20 Years of Immigrant Abuses

...oh.

https://jacobin.com/2022/10/ukraine-war-letter-diplomacy-progressive-congress-caucus-foreign-policy/

Latest step in our descent into absolute fucking lunacy. Well done everyone.

Latest step in our descent into absolute fucking lunacy. Well done everyone. — Isaac

We're not content with merely heading towards annihilation, we are racing to it, with enthusiasm!

https://news.antiwar.com/2022/10/26/us-accelerates-plan-to-deploy-upgraded-nukes-to-europe/

IEA's World Energy Outlook 2022 is out. A large part of it is about the outlook for clean energy and CO2 reduction. In that context the report notes that the energy crisis precipitated by the war in Ukraine will in the longer term hasten the transition to clean energy (although in the short term there has been some backsliding in Europe as it tries to compensate for energy shortages).

Russia's fossil fuel exports will decline, both in absolute and in relative terms. Russia used to export 75% of its gas and 55% of its oil to Europe. Asia will not make up for the loss of the highly lucrative European market. Russia's share in oil and gas exports will fall by half by 2030, and it will lose 1 trillion dollars in revenue.

Good to know the 10,000 dead didn't die for nothing. Take that Russia! Perhaps we throw some Lithuanians at them next, see if we can't put a dent in their precious metals exports too. Fingers crossed we don't annihilate civilisation in nuclear holocaust first, but hey, can't make an omelette without breaking eggs...

Shame not every refugee is equally as 'Ukrainian' — Isaac

You mean that Ukrainians preferring to save their lives over the Africans' are morally on the same level than Russians bombing their "brother" Ukrainians and Africans?

20 Years of Immigrant Abuses — Isaac

That's the West. And also that's the West: Human Rights Watch (HRW) is an international non-governmental organization, headquartered in New York City (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_Rights_Watch).

That's the West. And also that's the West: Human Rights Watch (HRW) is an international non-governmental organization, headquartered in New York City (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_Rights_Watch). — neomac

https://humanrightshouse.org/human-rights-houses/moscow/

https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2022/press-release/

I'm struggling to think of anything more dumbfoundingly bigoted than thinking the fight for human rights is a 'Western thing'.

if Russia was to explode like that, then a good deal of conflict would ensue, at least in the current environment. :/
Don't know if China or NATO would do something, but I imagine so. — jorndoe

If Russia explodes, I would think China could try and take a good chunk if Siberia.

, the US ain't the center of the world; this, on the other hand, is in need of being addressed by Kyiv (assuming they'll be alive to do so); Ukraine would be subject to transparency and standards to join the EU, for example.

Anyway, I'm wondering how many (varying) avenues for diplomacy are possible.
The UN, US, EU, China, London, ..., try to initiate/establish something?
Something more direct between Moscow/Putin and Kyiv/Zelenskyy?
A different way to go about it?

Earlier in the thread, some folks argued against the US and London being involved; there are still other possibilities, though.
(Maybe one of us should call up Moscow/Kyiv? :smile:)
Talks/negotiations are kind of needed, at the very least desirable, yes?

Anders Åslund's suggestion came up earlier, others have been aired, it just seems like that ship has sailed long ago; the Kremlin (and Putin) appears to be on a wretched warpath.

Still, I'm sure all that will change on Ukraine's path to Western enlightenment...

20 Years of Immigrant Abuses — Isaac

'The East' doesn't treat refugees any better than 'the West'.

Are you really saying that Poland, the Baltic states, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, the Czech republic all joined NATO in order to benefit from humanitarian assistance? — Olivier5

No.

Again, for the third time, what kind of statements and actions would demonstrate to you an “imperialistic bent”? — neomac

Whatever it is that’s convinced you of it prior to the NATO summit. I’m not interested in surmise and gut feelings.

But nobody underestimated the “imperialistic bent” of Russia, — neomac

Prior to 2008? Who?

If Russia stays within its borders and recognizes that Austria, Singapore, Japan and Israel all developed huge economies with no resources and in small territories, they, with a vast territory and vast resources, could do enormous things for their people. Then there is no security problem. — neomac

Which they did…

According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, ``We should not be shy in saying that NATO expansion will help a democratic Russia and hurt an imperialistic Russia.'' — neomac

That’s nice. That’s not Russia’s attitude.

`Fear of a new wave of Russian imperialism . . . should not be seen as the driving force behind NATO enlargement,'' says Mr. Talbott. — neomac

Right…

It does seem to me that whatever residual imperialistic tendencies, which, indeed, can be a problem, can best be contained by methods other than adding members to NATO. — neomac

Right…

Still not seeing anything that demonstrates imperialist ambitions, beyond speculation about the possibility of it in the 1997, before Putin came to power. The article seems pretty slanted— with no evidence whatsoever given to justify it beyond “it’s happened in the past”.

Regardless, I asked about the threat of imperialism prior to the NATO summit because the claim was that NATO expansion was due to the threat of Putin’s imperialist ambitions. No one was claiming that prior to the summit, as you’ve now demonstrated by failing to produce anything that shows it.

There was no imperialist threat. As Mearsheimer notes — who isn’t an “average dude” but who, unlike you and I, has studied this for decades and is considered a foremost expert on it— this claim is an invention, started especially after 2014. It’s useful as a deflection of what actually transpired. A nice story to tell now— but ultimately untrue.

Arguments based upon authority are the weakest kind.

Since you have no independent view of the matter, what would Mearsheimer accept as evidence of intent?

That is a very interesting development. While being pissed off by the U.S. could be a powerful motive, I wonder how much the rise of the Salafist parties played a part in these troops resisting the Taliban. That struggle played a major part in the Chechen wars.

If this group went full Merc, that sort of thing won't matter. Pretty nihilistic, after all that has happened.

Ukraine would be subject to transparency and standards to join the EU, for example. — jorndoe

How's that going...?

Greece: Pushbacks and violence against refugees and migrants are de facto border policy

Croatia: Damning new report slams systematic police abuses at country’s borders

Slovakia: Hate crime against refugees and migrants widespread but unreported

Refugees crossing Channel tell of beatings by French police

... You know, had I not just been so thoroughly educated here on this thread about the true enlightenment values of the West, I might have been confused into thinking these countries were encouraged to join so that they could provide the richer states with a source of cheap labour, rather than to help them improve their benighted Eastern attitudes... but that would be crazy, right?

it just seems like that ship has sailed long ago; the Kremlin (and Putin) appears to be on a wretched warpath. — jorndoe

Did you read about the recent shitshow in the US? The ship didn't 'sail'. It was burnt down, smashed and then sunk - without any assistance from the Kremlin.

It's exactly the kind of warmongering rhetoric we see repeated here that's preventing progressive politicians from even talking about peace-talks. All we can hope for is something through one of the back-channels, something away from the baying blood-lust of the social medal frenzy. Maybe there are a few diplomats still working on both sides who aren't either kleptocrats or more concerned about their Twitter profile than avoiding war. I think we have to hope that there's someone in the Russian cabinet and someone in either Ukraine, or one of the NATO governments, who are prepared to risk their necks speaking to each other against the wills of their respective leaders.

Arguments based upon authority are the weakest kind. — Paine

You're right, of course, but to back up @Mikie I did also have 'a bit of think about it' from my armchair and reached the same conclusion.

I'm struggling to think of anything more dumbfoundingly bigoted than thinking the fight for human rights is a 'Western thing'. — Isaac

A 'Western thing' more than in authoritarian regimes like Russian, Chinese, Iranian which are antagonizing the West (indeed https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memorial_(society)#Persecution). Keep struggling and playing dumb.

Anyway, I'm wondering how many (varying) avenues for diplomacy are possible. — jorndoe

If "diplomacy" means a cease fire on the lines now, that would be most beneficial to Russia's war aims. Putin could justifiably say his war has been victorious and once he has refurbished his war material in a few years, he could start the war again and finish the nazis once and for all.

If "diplomacy" means Russia withdrawing from the territories that it has occupied, that isn't going to happen as they are now part of Holy Mother Russia.

Either one side has to be defeated on the battlefield or the war isn't going nowhere (for a long time) and then "diplomacy" can take hold.

A 'Western thing' more than in authoritarian regimes like Russian, Chinese, Iranian which are antagonizing the West. — neomac

But for some people here the only issue is to criticize the West and about the situation in Russia, China or Iran, they don't simply care.

Are you really saying that Poland, the Baltic states, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, the Czech republic all joined NATO in order to benefit from humanitarian assistance?
— Olivier5

No. — Mikie

Do you have the slightest idea why Poland, the Baltic states, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and the Czech republic all joined NATO, then?

Do you have the slightest idea why Poland, the Baltic states, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and the Czech republic all joined NATO, then? — Olivier5

Do you have the slightest idea why Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan joined the Collective Security Treaty Organization?

Do you have the slightest idea why Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan joined the Collective Security Treaty Organization? — Isaac

Because they sought some amount of protection against possible aggressions, I suppose. It's not clear that Russia is in a position to deliver any security in this space though, as seen now by the currents wars between Azerbadian and Armenia and between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Whatever it is that’s convinced you of it prior to the NATO summit. I’m not interested in surmise and gut feelings. — Mikie

To that I already answered: “That’s why Russia and Putin were under NATO’s radar. By the end of 2008 Putin was already on the path of centralising power (e.g. by fighting oligarchs since hist first presidency term) while signalling his geopolitical ambitions in his war against Chechnya and Georgia”.
Then you asked me for evidences about Georgia prior to the Summit and I gave you the link to wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Georgian_War#Russian_interests_and_involvement (which case BTW presents -similarities to what Putin is doing now in Ukraine)
Overall, Putin showed a much more assertive politics and foreign politics compared to Yeltsin, as nobody could fail to notice [1]

Regardless, I asked about the threat of imperialism prior to the NATO summit because the claim was that NATO expansion was due to the threat of Putin’s imperialist ambitions. — Mikie

I feel compelled to prove my claims and my objections not whatever you feel the need to be convinced about. And if you lack a deeper understanding of geopolitics (including Mearsheimer’s views) than what you are showing with such objections, that’s all your problem not mine.
For example the claim that “NATO expansion was due to the threat of Putin’s imperialist ambitions” is conceptually myopic: however it was presented by American administrations in public, the big concern about Russian (not Putin’s!) imperialist bent was present since the collapse of Soviet Union (so prior to Putin’s presidency). This threat perception was felt by everybody in that debate, and especially by Eastern European countries. The attitude toward this threat was not to deny it but to decide how to address it either by expansion of NATO (as a defensive alliance) primarily and/or by using the EU market and institutional integrations.
If your argument was geopolitically compelling, it would be even more easy for you to question the evidence of Yeltsin’s “imperialist bent” compared to Putin’s given that NATO expanded over 3 ex-Warsaw Pact states during the Yeltsin’s presidency, and there were discussions to integrate ex-Soviet Union republics. Russia was at its weakest point after the Soviet Union collapse, what was the threat then?
Besides your arguments can be retorted against you. What were the evidence to support the perceived threat from NATO expansion by Putin prior 2014? And now that “the West is trying to destroy Russia”? Also Putin and Putin’s administration sent ambiguous messages about Nato expansion, after all [2]
Your reasoning is conceptually flawed for the following reasons:

• Geopolitical strategising is of course speculative (BTW also for reasons explained even by Mearsheimer’s) so "speculative" is not an objection to my arguments
• It concerns threat perceptions by countries from other countries, not by specific administrations independently from geopolitical context (if not even a geopolitical theory) and historical trends. And neither you nor Mearsheimer are the ones to assess such threats but political decision makers and their advisors.
• The more mistrust there is between countries the greater is the sensitivity toward threats (so response can be over-proportionate), and the need to anticipate them (that’s the case for ex-Soviet Republics)

As Mearsheimer notes — who isn’t an “average dude” but who, unlike you and I, has studied this for decades and is considered a foremost expert on it— this claim is an invention, started especially after 2014. — Mikie

If you have your argument from authority, I have mine: for the third time, read Brzezinski who wasn’t just an academic (from Harvard) but also an actual United States National Security Advisor. Not to mention that I find Mearsheimer's views inconsistent wrt his own assumptions.

[1]
Russian President Vladimir Putin has just said that his country is working on the development of new nuclear weapons, claiming that they'll be so advanced, no other nuclear power will be able to match them. Besides sparking speculation by saying that Russia needs the weapons to deal with future security threats - President Putin was particularly vague about what these threats might be - the news has also raised fears that we could be about to see a renaissance of the old nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. https://www.nci.org/06nci/10/RNW%20Putin%20nuclear%20posturing.htm (18-11-2004)

“Join Nato and we'll target missiles at Kiev, Putin warns Ukraine” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/12/russia.ukraine

“Defying the United States, Russia agreed in July to sell $1 billion in combat aircraft to Venezuela. The deal marks the latest in a series of Russian arms sales to a state that has increasingly clashed with Washington over different ideological approaches to Latin America and the developing world.”
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_09/VenRussia

NATO members say they share the goal of bringing the adapted accord into effect as soon as possible, but had maintained collectively that they would not ratify the agreement until Russia fulfilled commitments to withdraw military forces from Georgia and Moldova. Russia made those pledges in conjunction with the adapted treaty’s completion, and many NATO governments saw them as prerequisites for concluding the adapted treaty. (See ACT, November 1999. ) Notwithstanding the lingering presence of Russian forces in Moldova and Georgia, NATO recently suggested that some of its members might soon begin their ratification processes on the adapted treaty. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008-01/russia-suspends-cfe-treaty-implementation

At Munich security conference in 2007: President Putin continued in a similar vein for some time. "The United States has overstepped its borders in all spheres - economic, political and humanitarian, and has imposed itself on other states," he said. It was a formula that, he said, had led to disaster: "Local and regional wars did not get fewer, the number of people who died did not get less but increased. We see no kind of restraint - a hyper-inflated use of force.” The US has gone "from one conflict to another without achieving a fully-fledged solution to any of them", Mr Putin said.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6350847.stm (10 February 2007)

the Kremlin has neither forged an EU entente against America nor widened its “partnership for peace” with Washington. Instead, it has demanded concessions for the accession of former Soviet bloc nations into the European Union, sniped at the West for NATO expansion, conducted a mammoth nuclear exercise, announced the successful development of a new ICBM to defeat America’s National Missile Defense, and vigorously sought to carve out “imperial” spheres of influence in Moldova, Georgia, and the CIS.5 All these give solid reasons to think that an “integrationist” interpretation of Putin’s international strategy is one-sided and does not grasp the continuity of Russian strategic thinking. While unveiling Putin’s strong desire for inclusion in the international community and selective engagement with the West, this approach fails to capture the aspects of great power thinking which guided his strategy from the very beginning. In his “manifesto”, Putin mentioned about derzhavnosti as one of Russian traditional values on which has to be based Russia’s revival in the 21st century. Therefore, for Putin, Russia can revive and successfully develop only as a great power recognized and respected in the world. In this regard Putin warned the possible opponents to this idea in international community that it is too early to bury Russia as a great power.
https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/767/76701018.pdf (January 2006)


[2]
02.01.2005 Interview with Sergej Lavrov (Foreign minister of Russia) by the German business newspaper Handelsblatt:

Question: Does the right to sovereignty also mean for Georgia and Ukraine, for example, that Russia would have nothing against their accession to the EU and NATO?

Lavrov: That is their choice. We respect the right of every state - including our neighbors - to choose its own partners, to decide for itself which organization to join. We assume that they will consider for themselves how they develop their politics and economy and which partners and allies they rely on.

https://amp2.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/handelsblatt-interview-mit-aussenminister-lawrow-russland-oeffnet-ukraine-den-weg-in-die-nato/2460820.html



During his November 2001 visit to the United States, Putin struck a realistic but cooperative tone:

• We differ in the ways and means we perceive that are suitable for reaching the same objective . . . [But] one can rest assured that whatever final solution is found, it will not threaten . . . the interests of both our countries and of the world.

In an interview that month, Putin declared,

• Russia acknowledges the role of NATO in the world of today, Russia is prepared to expand its cooperation with this organization. And if we change the quality of the relationship, if we change the format of the relationship between Russia and NATO, then I think NATO enlargement will cease to be an issue—will no longer be a relevant issue.

Putin even maintained the same attitude when it was a question of Ukraine someday entering the Atlantic Alliance. In May 2002, when asked for his views on the future of Ukraine’s relations with NATO, Putin dispassionately replied,

• I am absolutely convinced that Ukraine will not shy away from the processes of expanding interaction with NATO and the Western allies as a whole. Ukraine has its own relations with NATO; there is the Ukraine-NATO Council. At the end of the day, the decision is to be taken by NATO and Ukraine. It is a matter for those two partners.

A decade later, under President Medvedev, Russia and NATO were cooperating once again. At the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon, Medvedev declared,

• The period of distance in our relations and claims against each other is over now. We view the future with optimism and will work on developing relations between Russia and NATO in all areas . . . [as they progress toward] a full-fledged partnership.

From the end of the Cold War until Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, NATO in Europe was drawing down resources and forces, not building them up. Even while expanding membership, NATO’s military capacity in Europe was much greater in the 1990s than in the 2000s. During this same period, Putin was spending significant resources to modernize and expand Russia’s conventional forces deployed in Europe. The balance of power between NATO and Russia was shifting in favor of Moscow.
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/what-putin-fears-most/

Because they sought some amount of protection against possible aggressions, I suppose. — Olivier5

From whom?

What were the evidence to support the perceived threat from NATO expansion by Putin prior 2014? — neomac

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/04/nato.russia

The pair have already outlined a potential deal to avert a crisis over Washington's planned missile defence system in Europe, involving a string of safeguards to ensure it could not be used against Russia.
Bush has insisted the system is a shield against a potential Iranian missile attack on Europe or the US, but Moscow sees it as an attempt to blunt Russia's nuclear deterrent.

In other words
- No evidence stronger than Russian development of new nuclear weapons in 2004 and Russia suspension of CFE Treaty in 2007
- Putin's speculations about threat perception from the US despite Bush administration assurances

Then you asked me for evidences about Georgia ... which case BTW presents -similarities to what Putin is doing now in Ukraine — neomac

You mean the war in which;

1) European and US envoys were dispatched to negotiate peace within just three days of fighting.
2) The President of France negotiated a ceasefire
3) Russia and a number of other countries recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as separate republics

...which tentatively ended the war.

The exact solutions currently being vociferously rejected with regards to Ukraine.

Oh, and do you even reslise how absurd it is to include Chechnya in your list of evidences of imperialist expansion?

Because they sought some amount of protection against possible aggressions, I suppose.
— Olivier5

From whom? — Isaac

Various folks. To Tajikistan for instance, the greatest threat (since the civil war) is seen as a possible Islamist contagion from Afghanistan. Armenia fears Turkey and Azerbadian. Etc They are not overly concerned that the EU or US will invade them, if that's what you're asking.