You're right, and it's very disingenuous how our position is repeatedly framed as being 'pro-Russian', when in fact what we are asking is why we, (presumably) Western onlookers, should support Ukraine in some hope-fueled offensive strategy when it's clear Ukraine does not have the capability to go on the offensive.

It will only lose more if it doesn't seek a diplomatic solution, and I think the biggest obstacle to that course of action is the United States. More specifically, the egos of the neocons that have been cultivating this conflict since at least the early 2000's like Nuland. The whole Biden administration is extremely hawkish on Ukraine, going back decades, and it's no coincidence this conflict boiled over when Biden took office.

I'll say that by far the most influential book, 'eye-opening' if you will, I've read on the matter is Unrestricted Warfare (1999), written by two Chinese colonels. — Tzeentch

ok thanks, I'll have a look into it.

What's even worse is that early on I also put it to the "pro-Ukrainians" that if Ukrainian former lands is so important, why not send NATO boots on the ground to defend it? which was met with a combination of not-our-fight, can't escalate are you crazy, Russia has nukes! and but, but, but, but we're harming Russia for free!!!

And through all this Ukrainian cheerleading not a single moments reflection on the lives lost.

Not a single prediction ever comes true from Russian low morale will somehow cause total collapse of Russian lines, sanctions will destroy the Russian economy, Ukraine doesn't need heavy weapons when they have "saint Javelins", Ukraine doesn't need Western Heavy weapons, Western heavy weapons will be a game changer, but ok the next heavy weapon will be a game changer, Ukraine will "cut the land bridge", Russia has run out of missiles! Russia is running out of artillery! etc. etc. etc.

And yet not a single moments reflection of questioning source of these predictions and there relation to any discernable reality.

What's even worse is that early on I also put it to the "pro-Ukrainians" that if Ukrainian former lands is so important, why not send NATO boots on the ground to defend it? — boethius

I doubt many will want to swallow this pill, but this is the worst part, isn't it?

NATO has goaded Ukraine into picking a fight with the Russians. Ukrainian leaders probably were fed some ambiguous shit like "The US/NATO will support Ukraine in their fight against Russia!"

Now that push has come to shove, that support seems to be limited to sending arms, and not a single NATO country is willing to put boots on the ground in Ukraine.

To me, that implies incredible cynism on the part of NATO. Not that I want NATO to send troops to Ukraine and spark WWIII, but it dangled that promise of safety infront of the Ukrainians only to hang them out to dry.

Not that I want NATO to send troops to Ukraine and spark WWIII, but it dangled that promise of safety infront of the Ukrainians only to hang them out to dry. — Tzeentch

People like to forget, but the first things Ukraine was "fighting for" was "the right to join NATO" and a NATO no-fly zone.

it's very disingenuous how our position is repeatedly framed as being 'pro-Russian' — Tzeentch

Earlier I cited a pro-Russian Russian analyst claiming: The conception of our victory is clear: We still need the demilitarization of Ukraine (a radical reduction of its army), neutral status for Kiev (and a mechanism to control it) and the recognition of some form of territorial changes. (https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/counteroffensive-is-failing/). Now would it be perfectly fine with you for whatever reason to let Russia win according to that definition of Russian victory?

Would it be perfectly fine with you for whatever reason to let Russia win according to that definition of Russian victory? — neomac

This is mumbo jumbo to me.

"Denying the Russians victory" sounds like a quote from Dr. Strangelove's General Jack Ripper.

I would worry about ending this senseless waste of human life as soon as possible, and steer towards a stable peace. That often requires uncomfortable but necessary concessions from both sides.

He'd be wrong. It was an offensive. Not a counteroffensive, since there was no Russian offensive to counter; that had already ceased months prior. — Tzeentch

Uhm... I guess you don't call the invasion an offensive? It's the offense, what the Ukrainians are working to counter. :D In Putin's words, too.

It's just a buzzword now. It sounds flashy, and flashy sounding language might goad people into supporting senseless waste of human lives. — Tzeentch

Uhm... "counteroffensive" is a flashy-sounding buzzword...? :brow: Weird.

This is mumbo jumbo to me. — Tzeentch

Really? It's really quite easy to understand. :shrug:

Where do you get this stuff?

And not just for months, since the very beginning clear arguments have been presented of why it's simply unfeasible for Ukraine to attempt to remove Russia from its former territory by military means. — boethius

Hello Boethius, back on the job? Ah, the Great almighty Russian armed forces!

Well, what I remember was that the "clear arguments" were for the Ukrainian Nazis just to roll over and die. Because Ukrainians were Nazis, right? And that the whole war wasn't of Russia's choosing, but actually the fault of the US, we've heard that. Several cherished (and cherish) this view. And Before the attack it was that the US is making whimsical accusations that Russia will attack Ukraine, but that was I think before you (I don't remember).

But let's just look at the past comment just why and how unfeasible it has been to attempt to remove Russia from its "former territory" (Hint, Soviet or Imperial territory) by military means.

Some old quotes:

the Russian army and reserves are far larger and now on the defensive and have all the benefits Ukrainians had defending Kiev, and the Russian army can disable. the entire Ukrainian grid at will

as from many Russian's perspective, once the 4 Oblasts are officially part of Russia then they will be defending their country against a hostile invader.

Additionally, Russia has demonstrated it has highly motivated soldiers able to win in urban environments, so, as I already mentioned, the reservists can have a large impact simply supporting the professional forces.

Ukraine has sent fresh conscripts with little to no training into front line combat, but there's no reason to believe Russia will do the same.

Let winter pass and by the spring everyone will be so fed up with energy prices that peace with Russia will just be the normal, competent, level headed thing to do by politicians wanting to be reelected.

Russia has only committed 10% of it's standing army to Ukraine, and so can also rotate units in and out of the war as well as reinforce if it needs.

And for the last, the best from last year...

This narrative that the Russians have "stalled" makes zero sense. Had Russia failed to siege Kiev (the biggest single strategic objective), ok, then clearly a big stall, but it didn't fail. Reporters are essentially reporting Kiev is now under siege. It may not be completely surrounded, but if it can cover the Southern gap with artillery fire then it becomes significantly harder to resupply Kiev

If Ukrainian forces dig in to the front of a salient, Russian forces can just flank and pincer around it, and in flat open territory like this I do not see how Ukrainians could build and defend a line hundred or two hundred kilometres against armor maneuvers.

Obviously, Russia can eventually simply complete the encirclement of Ukraine by coming up from the south, but that will take time and preventing encirclement of Kiev meanwhile is their main strategy.

Once Kiev is encircled the military, social and political dynamic will completely change.

:blush:

I would worry about ending this senseless waste of human life as soon as possible, and steer towards a stable peace. That often requires uncomfortable but necessary concessions from both sides. — Tzeentch

So if Russia will require demilitarization of Ukraine (a radical reduction of its army), neutral status for Kiev (and a mechanism to control it) and the recognition of some form of territorial changes, to end this war with Ukraine, then Ukraine must make such "uncomfortable but necessary concessions" to end "this senseless waste of human life". Right?

Well, what I remember was that the "clear arguments" were for the Ukrainian Nazis just to roll over and die. Because Ukrainians were Nazis, right? — ssu

The clear arguments were that Ukraine has less man power, far less material in what you are now calling a material war, barely any airforce, needing to traverse 1000 km to supply the front whereas the front is next door to Russia pre-invasion.

The additional clear arguments is that NATO does not wage and is not prepared for the kind of war Ukraine is fighting, relying on a strategy that assumes gaining air supremacy (which makes sense if you are the US projecting power around the globe, but does not make sense if you are Ukraine defending against a lot of artillery without said NATO airforce).

But let's just look at the past comment just why and how unfeasible it has been to attempt to remove Russia from its "former territory" (Hint, Soviet or Imperial territory) by military means. — ssu

Exactly what one would expect looking at the numbers and looking at the disparity in forces is happening: Ukraine has suffered massive casualties, needs to conscript down to 16 years of age, and has not achieved anything militarily.

the Russian army and reserves are far larger and now on the defensive and have all the benefits Ukrainians had defending Kiev, and the Russian army can disable. the entire Ukrainian grid at will

This literally is what happened. The Russians have been disabling the Ukrainian grid at will.

as from many Russian's perspective, once the 4 Oblasts are officially part of Russia then they will be defending their country against a hostile invader

I'm pretty sure I didn't even say this, but I'm sure many Russias see the Donbass as ethnic Russians that have been re-integrated into Russia and with the annexation support Russia's defense of this legal Russian territory (legal as far as Russia is concerned).

But you take the trouble to get these quotes, why not just use the quote function so it's clear who is saying what and when and anyone can easily find the context.

I do that "work" as part of my new "job" later I guess.

Additionally, Russia has demonstrated it has highly motivated soldiers able to win in urban environments, so, as I already mentioned, the reservists can have a large impact simply supporting the professional forces.

This is exactly what the Wagner narrative turned out to be that these highly motivated professional mercenaries took Bahkmut because they are so good and professional, only these highly skilled professionals could oust the brave defenders. Of course, less professional soldiers manning the rear and quieter parts of the front are essential in supporting said mercenaries.

Ukraine has sent fresh conscripts with little to no training into front line combat, but there's no reason to believe Russia will do the same.

Ukraine has done exactly that, putting conscripts into Bahkmut with essentially no training, whereas Russia fought Bahkmut with only mercenaries which are not conscripts at all. The reservists Russia called up are, whether you want to call them conscripts or not, are already trained and have been training all throughout the Bahkmut ordeal.

Let winter pass and by the spring everyone will be so fed up with energy prices that peace with Russia will just be the normal, competent, level headed thing to do by politicians wanting to be reelected.

Again, I don't think I said this, but it is also what is happening, just not as early as this poster predicts. Take Poland for example, distancing from support to Ukraine, calling Ukraine ungrateful and a drowning man (pretty strong words) due to upcoming elections.

Russia has only committed 10% of it's standing army to Ukraine, and so can also rotate units in and out of the war as well as reinforce if it needs.

This is what Russia has been doing. Unless the West's own figures are wrong, the amount of troops Russia has committed to Ukraine at any given time has been remarkably low.

This narrative that the Russians have "stalled" makes zero sense. Had Russia failed to siege Kiev (the biggest single strategic objective), ok, then clearly a big stall, but it didn't fail. Reporters are essentially reporting Kiev is now under siege. It may not be completely surrounded, but if it can cover the Southern gap with artillery fire then it becomes significantly harder to resupply Kiev

This I probably said, but I'm pretty sure was when Russia was still advancing. The stall narrative basically came out in the first days of the offensive when clearly nothing was stalled. But we could go back and debate that sort of things retrospectively if you want.

Definitely I did predict Russia would continue the siege of Kiev but I also did mention they had other option such as pulling back and just keeping and defending what they already took in the Donbas.

Keep in mind that the paper (written before the war) analysing different scenarios of a Russian invasion concluded establishing a land bridge to Crimea was the maximum war aims achievable by Russias force disposition. I made it clear that maybe they will just do exactly what that paper said was the maximum they could do.

I also made clear that the purposes of laying siege to Kiev was both to tie up Ukrainian troops, as the Capital takes priority over everything else and can't fall, and also to apply pressure for a diplomatic resolution. So, all that analysis was entirely correct.

If Ukrainian forces dig in to the front of a salient, Russian forces can just flank and pincer around it, and in flat open territory like this I do not see how Ukrainians could build and defend a line hundred or two hundred kilometres against armor maneuvers.

This too I likely said, and definitely armour in this war has not been decisive outside the first days of the invasion.

However, that Russia can simply flank the Ukrainian lines remains completely true. The front is not what the Western media calls the front in the Donbas but the entire border.

There are large formations of Russian troops in Belarus for example, but simply moving large amounts of troops and equipment around the border with Ukraine to conduct an offensive anywhere is entirely possible.

So we'll see.

If you've been following my analysis as closely as you're citations of some of what I have said seems to indicate, you'd know that Russia's own military doctrine is that a modern war would have 3 phases: first a manoeuvre phase supported by advanced capabilities but this would get bogged down due to the small quantities of advanced capabilities, followed by an attritional phase where neither army can make significant advances but large quantities of men and material are being lost (due to things like drones, precise strikes etc.), and then a termination phase that will be won by the side that out-learned their opponent in the attritional phase.

That the war moved into a attritional phase is therefore not a surprise in that this is exactly what Russian doctrine calls for as well as this doctrine may simply reflect the truth of modern warfare (that a modern army needs advanced capabilities to compete but it's impossible to afford to fight a whole war with them, so there's this crazy mix and a high rate of attrition).

Obviously, Russia can eventually simply complete the encirclement of Ukraine by coming up from the south, but that will take time and preventing encirclement of Kiev meanwhile is their main strategy.

Once Kiev is encircled the military, social and political dynamic will completely change.

I definitely agree Ukraine managed to prevent complete encirclement and thus the dynamic didn't change and they had the determination to continue to fight.

As I said at the time, they fought to the point of maximum leverage to negotiate the best resolution to the war.

But please, explain how Ukraine leverage has increased since their breaking the siege of Kiev.

Also of note, the war is not over and Kiev can be sieged again at any time.

Likewise, Russia can still potentially invade right to the Dnieper.

If their doctrine is correct and they have indeed out-learned the Ukrainians then we may see the return to manoeuvre warfare and these strategies play out.

incidentally good news for the Kremlin — Sep 19, 2023

Russia says it sees growing friction between Ukraine and Poland, West
^{— Peter Graff · Reuters · Sep 22, 2023}

We see that there are frictions between Warsaw and Kyiv. We predict that these frictions will increase. As for Poland's weapons, being neighbours with Poland is not the most comfortable for our Belarusian comrades. The country is quite aggressive, does not shun subversive activity and interferes in internal affairs. But we and our Belarusian friends and allies are on alert against the background of potential threats that may come from Poland. — Pesky

I hadn't really expected the Kremlin to target Poland this way, whatever the tactic they're running with. Then again, insidious conspiracy theories come out of those people ← the top official at that.

if Ukrainian former lands is so important, why not send NATO boots on the ground to defend it? — boethius

That's not within NATO's mandate, is it? Others may not have such a charter, though. But, hey, maybe you're right, end the tiptoeing.

can't escalate are you crazy, Russia has nukes — boethius

... seems to often enough be put forth by those saying that Ukraine should capitulate.

That's not within NATO's mandate, is it? Others may not have such a charter, though. But, hey, maybe you're right, end the tiptoeing. — jorndoe

There is no tiptoeing, there's a very clear objective to weaken Europe, in particular the Euro, and give money to the defence contractors and start a new cold war so even more money flows to defence contractors: everyone pulling their weight and spending 2% of GDP, No Free Rides!!

... seems to often enough be put forth by those saying that Ukraine should capitulate. — jorndoe

The logic also goes the other way, that if it makes no sense for NATO to pick a fight with a nuclear armed opponent, neither does it make sense for Ukraine.

So if Russia will require demilitarization of Ukraine (a radical reduction of its army), neutral status for Kiev (and a mechanism to control it) and the recognition of some form of territorial changes, to end this war with Ukraine, then Ukraine must make such "uncomfortable but necessary concessions" to end "this senseless waste of human life". Right? — neomac

I get you're really desperate to frame me as being 'pro-Russian', but perhaps you can tone it down a little.

That often requires uncomfortable but necessary concessions from both sides. — Tzeentch

Note the keyword. I even underlined it for you.

, so you accuse others of sharing your own sentiment? Odd. :D Oh well.

There is no tiptoeing, there's a very clear objective to weaken Europe [...] — boethius

You changed the subject.

@neomac, in addition to Sergei Poletaev, Putin, Slutsky, Medvedev, Aksyonov, Zakharova, Gurulyov, Zhuravlyov, Zatulin, and some others, have spoken of demilitarization of Ukraine (not just a fifth thereof). Similarly, whoever has spoken of deNazification of Ukraine, change or control of Ukrainian government / Kyiv, and whoever has gone further. (Kremlin-approved officials.) Also Mordvichev.

If Putin's Russia were to assimilate a fifth of Ukraine, then their NATO-phobic argument would continue to apply to the remaining four-fifths of Ukraine just the same. If Putin's Russia was to assimilate all of Ukraine, then Putin's logic could equally be raised vice versa by Moldova Poland Romania Hungary Slovakia (Oct 13, 2022; Nov 26, 2022), and hence the EU. Open-ended, perpetual. — Sep 17, 2023

@Tzeentch, what does that...stuff suggest? (in terms of the future?)


^{• Full text: Putin’s declaration of war on Ukraine
• Russia’s Eliminationist Rhetoric Against Ukraine: A Collection}

Be more specific.

The clear arguments were that Ukraine has less man power, far less material in what you are now calling a material war, barely any airforce, needing to traverse 1000 km to supply the front whereas the front is next door to Russia pre-invasion. — boethius

You mean NATO assistance has to traverse 1000 km to supply the front in Ukraine or what? Well, it's their country so that isn't a big problem.

Otherwise yes, but note that with an inferior armed forces, with less equipment and not much of an air force has put Russia to entrench itself behind WW1 lines and isn't taking much anywhere the initiave.

The additional clear arguments is that NATO does not wage and is not prepared for the kind of war Ukraine is fighting, relying on a strategy that assumes gaining air supremacy (which makes sense if you are the US projecting power around the globe, but does not make sense if you are Ukraine defending against a lot of artillery without said NATO airforce). — boethius

Well, this is the kind of war Finland was preparing for. Not going for the brainfart of an idea of New-NATO new threats was in hindsight a very good choice. And seems like Poland is now preparing for something similar. Yes, NATO depends on air power and that is totally rational. However what has changed is the idea that a) conventional war in Europe is extremely unlikely so you don't prepare for one and b) wars aren't short and hence you do have to have those materiel and ammo stocks.

Ukraine has suffered massive casualties, needs to conscript down to 16 years of age, and has not achieved anything militarily. — boethius

Really? What's your reference to conscripting 16 years of age? I haven't heard this.

And isn't it an military achievement that Kyiv wasn't encircled, Kharkiv wasn't lost, territory has been taken back from Russia and a lot of Russian equipment has been destroyed too

The Russians have been disabling the Ukrainian grid at will. — boethius

And Ukrainians have been repairing that grid also at will:

(June 22nd 2023, Reuters)"The most extensive repair campaign in the history of energy facilities is currently under way in Ukraine," Energy Minister German Galushchenko was quoted as saying by his ministry on the Telegram messenger. "Power generation and distribution facilities are being restored, and work is under way to strengthen the power system's resilience to military challenges."

Ukraine has nearly doubled electricity tariffs for consumers since June 1 to find funds to prepare for winter, when energy consumption is typically at its highest. About 43% of Ukraine's energy infrastructure has been damaged in air strikes, state-owned power distributor Ukrenergo estimates. Some 70% of its substations have been attacked at least twice, it says.

I'm pretty sure I didn't even say this — boethius

You said it. :wink:

See . Other's are too quotes. I do sense a bias towards the Russians in your comments.

, it was following up on your chat with , that's the context, focus.

This literally is what happened. The Russians have been disabling the Ukrainian grid at will. — boethius

You said it. :wink: — ssu

I did not deny saying this and I pointed it out it's true.

Where I am unsure the citation is from me or someone else I say so.

And again, why not just use the citation function so it's clear who said what and when.

For example, when I stated:

Once Kiev is encircled the military, social and political dynamic will completely change. — boethius

First, this is in the context of responding to the comment:

It's also unclear why they wouldn't want to encircle Kiev as quickly as possible. You can hold most of the area around a city, and if supplies can still get through, your seige won't be effective. — Count Timothy von Icarus

My comment is explaining why Russian would want to encircle Kiev, because once the capital is encircled the dynamic changes.

And the first sentences of explaining that is:

They certainly do want to encircle Kiev as quickly as possible, but due to the political consequence of of that (leadership also stuck and suffering) preventing encirclement of Kiev is Ukraine's top priority.

Why gains in the south are extremely rapid and Kherson was taken without prolonged urban combat resistance, is because Ukraine clearly can't fight on all fronts. — boethius

In other words, encircling the capital would change the military, social and political dynamic (so one reason the Russians are trying to do it) and it also absorbs a lot of Ukrainian forces as their top priority is to prevent encirclement (precisely because that changes the military, social and political dynamic) which has the benefit for the Russians of gaining ground in the south.

In literally my next comment I clarify:

Definitely Ukrainians could keep fighting for a long time. — boethius

Precisely to clarify that Kiev may succeed in preventing encirclement, break the siege and rout the Russians with a surprise counter offensive, or even just be sieged for a long time.

I add further clarification in my next posts that:

Of course, deception is a large part of warfare, so the Ukrainians could be planning some brilliant move to rout the enemy that launches at any time. Likewise, stories of Russian moral collapse could be totally true or then riots start breaking out all over Russia at any moment. There's definitely risks on Russia's side and predictions of obviously possible things always have a chance to come true. However, what we can be certain of is that all the retired generals and retired intelligence directors that hammer this impending Ukraine victory home, base that on absolutely nothing. The real experts acknowledge they don't know the situation on the ground for Russia or Ukraine. — boethius

And when asked:

↪boethius are you averse to including evidence/sources with your posts? — Changeling

I respond:

I'm not averse to it, but the whole point of my post is that we don't really know what's going on. Western media continuously say one unsourced thing, so seems appropriate to say the alternative scenario. — boethius

In other words, the context makes it abundantly clear that I am engaged in analysis of different possibilities, including the Ukrainians completely routing the Russians in some brilliant surprise move.

However, I explain why I don't think that will happen:

So, that being said, the reasons to assume Ukraine is not going to bust out some brilliant move is that conscripts generally speaking, and especially conscripts that trained sometime in the distant past, are terrible at offensive maneuvers. Conscripts are effective at manning trenches and firing artillery mainly, and doing the logistics, cooking, repairing, medical evacs and nurse work etc. — boethius

I then go onto explain what would change that situation and be a game changer:

In terms of game changing weapons, it seems extremely likely to me that Migs from Poland would just get shot down and not do much (certainly can have a chance of doing some damage before being shot down; but the idea the skies would be safer for Ukrainian pilots than for Russian seems "untenable" to use the word that seems to currently describe that). The reason for the focus on the planes is likely for the simple reason that Ukraine does have the pilots and personnel to put some planes up in the sky.

The real game changing weapons would be a lot of armor. There's a reason that Nato assumed that the Soviet Union could just roll through Europe: a shit ton more armor than Nato had. Turns out that the US wildly overestimated the Soviet capabilities (because they hired a Nazi to run intelligence on the Soviets who realized grossly inflating Soviet capabilities would get him more resources and reason to hire his friends), but the basic principle that only a bunch of armor is actually effective against a bunch of armor at the end of the day is pretty accurate (planes and other things can help, but any large scale offensive or counter offensive maneuver needs a bunch of armor--which is why the conscript mobilization playbook also calls for an insane amount of anti-armor mines everywhere). — boethius

Which is exactly what everyone accepts a year later that Ukraine needs a lot of armour to do any offensive maneuovre.

I explained this March 10th, 2022, less than a month into the war right after explaining Ukraine contesting the skies is "untenable".

I could provide even more context to explain that my analysis at the time was completely accurate.

After all this military analysis of the different scenarios (not predictions), in my next comment I state:

Yes, definitely Putin could stop at any moment and says he's achieved whatever he set out to achieve. — boethius

In particular:

Key land captures to show for the blood spilled: land bridge to Crimea. — boethius

Which is what happened. If you believe the Russians they retreated from the siege of Kiev as a show of good faith in what they believed was preliminary agreement to end the war.

So, I fail to see how any of this analysis was anything other than spot on.

Really? What's your reference to conscripting 16 years of age? I haven't heard this. — ssu

The Cabinet of Ministers introduced military registration from the age of 16. This is stated in the message of the Ministry of Defense in the Telegram channel, Ukrainian News Agency reports.
The Ministry of Defense reported that the Cabinet of Ministers approved a new procedure for military registration, which in particular provides for military registration from the age of 16.

"Conscripts between the ages of 16 and 27 must register for military service," the message reads. — ukranews.com

Seems the confusion was caused by above statement, by referring to them as conscripts it would seem to mean they are conscripted, but I have not found explanation of why the age of registration was lowered.

So not actually conscripting 16 year old's, but just making the register. I did not find any clarity on if they can still leave Ukraine at 16 or not.

You mean NATO assistance has to traverse 1000 km to supply the front in Ukraine or what? Well, it's their country so that isn't a big problem.

Otherwise yes, but note that with an inferior armed forces, with less equipment and not much of an air force has put Russia to entrench itself behind WW1 lines and isn't taking much anywhere the initiave. — ssu

It is a big problem if you're logistics hubs can be hit by missiles, grid and rail disabled, and also that it just takes time to move things over this distance and maintain all the equipment and infrastructure needed to do so etc.

As for the initiative, we'll see what happens next.

If the Russian strategy of attrition is successful then Ukraine has indeed run out of anti-air missiles and Russia can get close enough to the front to use lot's of guide bombs and attack helicopters and Ukrainian supply chains and ammunition are under extreme strain and this will permit Russia to go on the initiative, also due to building up large formations not yet committed to battle.

If Ukraine's strategy is successful then none of that will happen and they will remove Russia from their former territory.

Well, this is the kind of war Finland was preparing for. Not going for the brainfart of an idea of New-NATO new threats was in hindsight a very good choice. And seems like Poland is now preparing for something similar. Yes, NATO depends on air power and that is totally rational. However what has changed is the idea that a) conventional war in Europe is extremely unlikely so you don't prepare for one and b) wars aren't short and hence you do have to have those materiel and ammo stocks. — ssu

In other words you agree that NATO was not and is not prepared for the kind of war Ukraine is fighting and so unable to supply Ukraine to fight said war it's not prepared for.

I do sense a bias towards the Russians in your comments. — ssu

I've explicitly stated multiple times that one of my purposes in the thread is to explain Russia's perspective as mutual understanding is required to negotiate peace.

The reason I don't equally represent the Ukrainian perspective is because we get that not only from other posters here such as yourself but the main stream media. We are inundated with the Ukrainian perspective.

Likewise, that Russia (having larger amounts of men and material) may simply win the war due to those advantages is another reason to negotiate peace, but I make clear many times that is not inevitable, maybe sanctions or low morale will cause some sort of collapse anytime (I just do not see any actual evidence for that nor historical precedent, but sure it's possible).

The reason to understand the opposing perspective is to first simply evaluate the situation.

We are told by the Ukrainian perspective that the Russians are all low morale and not motivated etc. Which is you believe then is one reason to seek a military solution as Russia is "weak". But is that true? It's perhaps wise to take into consideration Russia's arguments and reasoning (from government, media, ordinary people etc.), not just what Ukraine says about Russia, in making an evaluation of Russian determination.

Likewise, a sober analysis of force disposition and capabilities and recourses is also perhaps a wise thing to do in evaluating the project of defeating Russia in military terms.

If the conclusion of such an analysis looking at the different arguments and perspectives concludes Ukraine has little chance of achieving its objectives with military force, then there is little alternative to negotiation.

Lastly, in understanding the perspectives of the different sides it is maybe possible to negotiate. The only person you encounter who you can completely ignore what they say and what they believe is someone you can beat to death.

Otherwise, you have to deal with people you encounter and that requires some understanding them to some degree.

Precisely to clarify that Kiev may succeed in preventing encirclement, break the siege and rout the Russians with a surprise counter offensive, or even just be sieged for a long time.

This plus having people on the inside to facilitate their rapid takeover. What we know now is that part of Russia's strategy hinged heavily on the fact that government and defense officials would move to support their ousting of the current regime, either through direct support or through failing to mount a proper defense.

Russia's intelligence services had done a lot of work to "pave the way," for the invasion through bribes and persuasion campaigns. At least part of the reason they went in with such a small force relative to the population of Ukraine, and from so many different lines of attack, was because they were expecting for their advance to be facilitated in key areas. Then, the large number of axes of attack and their rapid progress would hopefully cause Ukrainians to see that the cause was hopeless.

But in many cases people took the bribes proffered to them and then reported the incidents to the Ukrainian intelligence services. Or they took the bribes and just didn't support the Russians when the time came.

It's just like Prigozhin's coup attempts. If he had picked up more military defectors, then more people would have likely joined him. People don't want to be on the losing side. Because Ukrainian resistance was effective in some areas, people who might have flipped didn't. Kherson is an area where they had significant "inside help."

And of course this has consequences for Russia. While Ukraine couldn't defend on a every front at once, neither could Russia effectively support it's large number of axes, resulting in very high equipment losses from infantry ambushes on supply lines and the TB2 becoming an absolute horror for the Russians until they regrouped and began focusing on having proper air defenses for advances.

IMO, one of the biggest problems for Russia's initial plan was the failure to properly suppress enemy air defenses. This not only messed up their air assault heavy campaign strategy, but was a massive propaganda and moral victory for Ukraine, the elite VDV being shot out of the sky in engagement after engagement without having any effect.

So if Russia will require demilitarization of Ukraine (a radical reduction of its army), neutral status for Kiev (and a mechanism to control it) and the recognition of some form of territorial changes, to end this war with Ukraine, then Ukraine must make such "uncomfortable but necessary concessions" to end "this senseless waste of human life". Right? — neomac


I get you're really desperate to frame me as being 'pro-Russian', but perhaps you can tone it down a little. — Tzeentch

Not as much desperate as you are to repeatedly frame your opponents as being addicted to "deadly drug" or “hopium” of Western propaganda. Besides there is nothing I’ve said to tone down, even a little. Indeed I still find the expression "pro-Russian" as a non-hyperbolic and most certainly accurate qualification of your views. The problem is not the words chosen it’s their meaning and implications. If I say: "Democracy is the worst form of Government except for all others", this would sound pro-democracy, wouldn’t it? Yes it would and rightly so. That is, it doesn't matter how badly you talk about Russia, but how badly you talk about it relative to their alternatives like NATO or the US, especially if it is matter to decide the political fate of the countries involved in this war and which will impact our present and future lives. You are pro-Russian as far as I’m concerned beyond any reasonable doubt and I don’t need your confirmation to that, I’m just soliciting you (and your sidekicks) to provide arguments to ground your moral and geopolitical positions as applied to this war instead of hiding behind your pointless sarcasm and framing your opponents as NATO cheerleaders. As far as I’ve read, you didn't bring arguments that the actual Russian propaganda supporting the war against Ukraine didn't make (so exactly zero of your arguments proves that you care about Ukrainian lives more than they themselves do), nor brought any arguments to support more likely effective policies of constraining Russian imperial ambitions alternative to what the Westerners are supporting because likely you do not see Russia as a geopolitical threat, certainly not as the US, since the US is the great Satan, right? So let me tone it up a little more: you are even more pro-Russian than certain pro-Russian Russian analysts, as I’ve pointed out earlier.

That often requires uncomfortable but necessary concessions from both sides. — Tzeentch


Note the keyword. I even underlined it for you. — Tzeentch

And then I'm the disingenuous one?! By underlining this twice pointless keyword which seemingly has a flavor of neutrality, in reality you are underlining how hypocritical and flawed your claims are. So, by all means, thanks a lot for underlining it for me.
As far as I can tell, everybody shared understanding here is that a negotiation “often requires uncomfortable but necessary concessions from both sides” in order to succeed and that negotiation is a plausible and welcomed way to end this war. So your dodgy answer is apparently nothing more than a platitude which nobody disagrees with. The rhetoric purpose of this platitude however is to hide all what is really controversial about your beliefs and therefore would be more pertinent to bring up in answering my question. What is controversial is under what conditions could and would be desirable this negotiation to happen, in particular concerning the Ukrainian negotiation power toward Russian claimed requirements (which I gave you an example of). This negotiation power could be weaker or stronger depending on a load of evolving circumstances, many of which might be hidden to us. However before, during and after the beginning of the war until now you and your sidekicks were fine with having Ukraine agree on Russian requirements by withdrawing the Western military support (which the Ukrainians have asked for and the Westerners were willing to provide according to Western national interest), without bothering with Ukrainian negotiation power and related circumstances to preserve self-determination, not surprisingly so because you even overlook Ukrainian agency at your convenience. The West should appease the Russians (their sense of security, their geopolitical projections, the Black Sea fleet, not bother them in their “back yard”, repay for the broken promise of “not one inch further East”, thwart the nuclear threat, etc.), so as your guru Mearsheimer suggests Ukraine should accept to remain under the influence of Russia. If this isn’t pro-Russian I don’t know what is.
Second, there are deeper flaws in your and your sidekicks’ views though. You and your sidekicks often accuse [1] your opponents of something like “not only is no theory of victory ever presented (for example how to deal with the lack of air power) but even simple questions such as how many lives lost would be worth the territory back if it was feasible likewise proponents of Ukraine policy can't answer” and something like “No actual sense to the project need be presented by Ukraine nor anyone else. Ukraine wants to fight!”. These arguments are grounded on alleged rational requirements (like a theory of victory or a victory assessment in terms of human life costs) or meant to discredit alleged Western excuses behind Ukrainian’s choices (like “Ukraine wants to fight”) for an exploitative and manipulative behaviour by the West at the expense of the Ukrainians. Both assumptions are not only questionable on their own merits (as I argued in the past on several occasions with little or no feedback) but can very easily be retorted against your own views in the same fashion. Indeed, you too do not have a “theory of peace” and instead pretend to rely on Ukrainian choice (all of a sudden Ukraine has regained its agency back like in “Ukraine found an agreement with Russia in April ’22!”) to determine “the uncomfortable but necessary concessions” the Ukrainians would freely choose ONLY AFTER the Western choice to not support them anyways. And this ALWAYS for exploitative and manipulative reasons, given your US-phobia or aversion to the “Great Satan” (just emulating your penchant for cheap discrediting expressions which you never felt like toning down), this would be a blow in the face of the American imperialism. Besides you too have nowhere presented how much loss of freedom, well being or security would be worth for the Ukrainians not to fight back the Russians.
Third, to me “being neutral” means that either you are indifferent to how the war evolves and to who is right or wrong in this war. Or it means that you place exactly equal responsibility on fighting parties and/or promote policies that maintain good economic/political relationships with both or with neither involved parties (assumed they would allow it). But you are not indifferent to how the war evolves and to who is right or wrong. Nor you and your sidekicks have ever given arguments supporting an equal attitude toward belligerents or involved third parties, indeed you put the greatest blame on the US and advocate opposition to the the current American leadership in this war while keeping totally silent about Russia. Now, given that you and your sidekicks can not claim impartiality by any means, as far as I am concerned what remains to be rationally investigated is your approach in picking sides. One of my core assumptions is that it would be more rational to start with the simple question “what do you prefer for you and people you really care about between living like an avg Westerner or an avg Russian, Chinese, Iranian?” instead of “what can you do to save the entire present and future humanity materially, psychologically and morally from war, starvation, diseases, exploitation, manipulation?”. And you know why “more rational”? Because I have no reasonable doubt that I and you too (or anybody else in this thread for that matter) have a clue on how to answer the first but absolutely no fucking clue about answering the second (I even doubt it makes sense). Whatever answer I give to that core question will guide my siding with the international circumstances (given my very limited but hopefully rational enough understanding of them) which would be more likely benign toward my preferences.



[1]

However, not only is no theory of victory ever presented (for example how to deal with the lack of air power) but even simple questions such as how many lives lost would be worth the territory back if it was feasible likewise proponents of Ukraine policy can't answer.
That it is simply Ukraine's choice is the answer and we must just take it for granted that Zelensky speaks for all Ukrainians. But who doesn't have a choice is Westerners supplying weapons. No actual sense to the project need be presented by Ukraine nor anyone else. Ukraine wants to fight! — boethius

neomac, in addition to Sergei Poletaev, Putin, Slutsky, Medvedev, Aksyonov, Zakharova, Gurulyov, Zhuravlyov, Zatulin, and some others, have spoken of demilitarization of Ukraine (not just a fifth thereof). Similarly, whoever has spoken of deNazification of Ukraine, change or control of Ukrainian government / Kyiv, and whoever has gone further. (Kremlin-approved officials.) Also Mordvichev. — jorndoe

Sure. In this case I was also interested in reporting the views of a sober pro-Russian Russian geopolitical analyst on the current situation (others in the same site maintain that nuclear bombing a NATO country like Poland would be the necessary evil to win this war, go figure).

In other words you agree that NATO was not and is not prepared for the kind of war Ukraine is fighting and so unable to supply Ukraine to fight said war it's not prepared for. — boethius

Which sounds kind of suprising given that NATO has been so rightly perceived as a growing unbearable threat against Russia at least since 2008, right?

I keep giving you chances to prove you can converse like an adult, and you keep disappointing me.

Which sounds kind of suprising given that NATO has been so rightly perceived as a growing unbearable threat against Russia at least since 2008, right? — neomac

NATO's planes and submarines and missiles and nuclear weapons are definitely a threat.

I personally have my doubts as to the effectiveness of the F-35 stealthiness, but it is still a dangerous aircraft and capable of many dangerous things.

The problem Ukraine has is that it has none of those things.

The problem the West has in supporting Ukraine fighting is that it simply doesn't have what Ukraine would need to have a chance.

Probably I wasn't enough clear. I was referring to the perceived security threat by Russians due to NATO meddling in Ukraine, the Russian backyard, with promises of having it joining NATO, CIA everywhere in Ukraine, American-led coup d'etat Euromaindan, the horror of the Soviet-era Trades Unions building burned in Odessa, neonazi everywhere in Ukraine with the complacency of the West, the genocide of Russians in Donbas under the blessing of NATO, "fuck the EU" by Nuland, the betrayed Minsk agreements, the US brining war everywhere (ex-Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Lybia, Iraq, Syria), the greedy American military industry all excited to shove into Ukraine all sorts of weaponry, the suffocating encirclement of Russia Lebensraum. So Russia was EVIDENTLY forced into a war for its own survival, right? Meanwhile Russia was building up its military arsenal, restoring violently its will against independence movements within its territory, expanding its military activism in the Middle East and Africa, building alliances with China and Iran (with authoritarian regimes with regional and world hegemonic ambitions competing with the US and plenty of grievances against the US), grunting everywhere and unequivocally about the unbearable American threat and broken promises, unplugging from the Internet, financing pro-Russian movements everywhere, annexing Crimea in 2014. The scenario pro-Russians (as you) typically describe is AS IF NATO was really consciously railroading into this war with arrogance despite Russia (a nuclear power led by an authoritarian leader full of grievances against NATO) was preparing for it for a good decade.
And yet "NATO was not and is not prepared for the kind of war Ukraine is fighting and so unable to supply Ukraine to fight said war it's not prepared for”. Moreover until the very last moment no Western country nor the Ukrainian president himself was believing that Russia would invade, except for the US, but it was too late to PREPARE. Not to mention the still ongoing weaponry supply in dribs and drabs when Ukraine is engaged in a full-out war for its own survival, right?
The point being, if NATO meddling in Ukraine was EVIDENTLY a growing unbearable security threat against Russia (as it is claimed by pro-Russians), before and after the occupation of Crimea, why on earth NATO members weren’t preparing for a war in Ukraine?
My answer is that there was NO EVIDENT UNBEARABLE security threat against Russia due to NATO meddling in Ukraine. Indeed it’s totally the opposite: it’s precisely because the threat of NATO meddling in Ukraine was EVIDENTLY WEAK and WEAKENING (the US military presence in Europe declining for decades, “Nato is brain dead”, Trump isolationism and destablization of the US democracy , the delay of Ukrainian membership, embarrassing American withdrawal from Afghanistan, European divisions between European countries, between Germany and the US especially about Russia, between European people and their political elites, the weak response of the West against Crimea grabbing, the growing tension with raising Chinese power, the islamist terrorism) while Putin’s successfully meddling in Western politics, successful crushing the Chechen independentist movements, Russian successful military adventurism in Georgia, in the Middle East , in Africa and in Ukraine, Putin’s domestic popularity AND Russian readiness for a war in Ukraine were EVIDENTLY GROWING that Putin took the Western EVIDENT lowest confidence in NATO, divisions and unreadiness to military confront Russia in Ukraine as a window of opportunity for Russia to boldly invade Ukraine. This is a rational strategy given Russian hegemonic ambitions: it is smarter to take the initiative to attack your enemies while they are weak and less threatening, instead of attacking them while they are strong and threatening (like immediately after the collapse of Soviet Union). But that also means that Russia was not compelled AT ALL to aggress Ukraine by an EVIDENT UNBEARABLE security threat from NATO against Russia, it was Putin’s deliberate choice to pursue hegemonic expansion at the expense of a decaying NATO. On the other side one might question now if the West and NATO are as weak as Putin thought they were. And if at the next round the West will be as unprepared to face the EVIDENT and now UNBEARABLE security threat from Russia against the West.