https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/22/germany-far-right-afd-leader-alice-weidel-eu-exit-campaign

Well, naturally our front was on the other side, yes. And likely the blue division was for a time stationed at the Leningrad front.

Yet Finland actually didn't push to the actual fortification line surrounding Leningrad from the north. Last thing Finland wanted to do is to bang it's head against against the Karelian fortified region and lose troops for basically nothing. And Finnish troops didn't try to contact the German forces south of Leningrad when the took Shlisselburg. Hence Leningrad wasn't totally besieged and you had at winter 'Road of Life'.



(PS. The film Sisu is politically correct: the baddies are evil Nazis from the Lapland War, who apparently use a post-WW2 era Soviet main battle tank.)

Poland Is ‘Next’ After Russia Wins Ukraine War, Putin Ally Says (Aleksey Zhuravlyov)
— Carley Welch · The Messenger · Jan 14, 2024 — jorndoe

If the Russians were really interested in conquest, why would they negotiate a peace in the opening stages of their invasion where they gave back occupied territory and WE were the ones to block the deal?

There's no way you can square that circle, and articles like these are warmongering in its purest form.

If the Russians were really interested in conquest, why would they negotiate a peace in the opening stages of their invasion where they gave back occupied territory and WE were the ones to block the deal? — Tzeentch

What are you referring to?

The peace talks in March/April 2022 which were blocked by the West.

The contents of that peace talk were already known to us via the accounts of, for example, Jeffrey Sachs and Naftali Bennett.

Now we have first-hand accounts from the people directly involved on the Ukrainian side, like former Ukrainian ambassador and diplomat Oleksandr Chalyi, which I discussed here.

It is also confirmed by Zelensky's former spokesperson Oleksiy Arestovych, who gave an interview recently where he called for a more realistic and less emotional approach to the conflict.

Another of Medvedev's rabble-rousing :fire: outbursts:

Why Ukraine is dangerous for its inhabitants

The existence of Ukraine is mortally dangerous for Ukrainians. And I don’t mean only the current state, Bandera’s political regime. I'm talking about any, absolutely any Ukraine.

Why?
The presence of an independent state on historical Russian territories will now be a constant reason for the resumption of hostilities. Late. No matter who is at the helm of the cancerous growth under the name of Ukraine, this will not add legitimacy to his rule and the legal viability of the “country” itself. And, therefore, the likelihood of a new fight will persist indefinitely. Almost always. Moreover, there is a 100% probability of a new conflict, no matter what security papers the West signs with the puppet Kyiv regime. Neither Ukraine’s association with the EU, nor even the entry of this artificial country into NATO will prevent it. This could happen in ten or fifty years.

That is why the existence of Ukraine is fatal for Ukrainians. They are practical people at the end of the day. No matter how they now wish the Russians to die. No matter how much they hate the Russian leadership. No matter how much they strive to join the mythical European Union and NATO. Choosing between eternal war and inevitable death and life, the vast majority of Ukrainians (well, perhaps with the exception of a minimal number of frostbitten nationalists) will ultimately choose life. They will understand that life in a large common state, which they do not like very much now, is better than death. Their deaths and the deaths of their loved ones. And the sooner Ukrainians realize this, the better. — Dmitry Medvedev · Jan 17, 2024

'A kind of trolling'. Why Zelenskyy needs decree on Ukrainian lands in Russia: Historian's view
^{— Danylo Kramarenko, Nataliia Direyeva · RBC · Jan 22, 2024}

:D There are certain...analogies to that decree signed by Zelenskyy; maybe that was part of Kyiv's thinking.

Ukraine-Russia war: Russian regions 'historically Ukrainian', Zelensky claims
^{— Tim Sigsworth · The Telegraph · Jan 22, 2024}

Today’s actions by Zelensky once again prove that our president is right about launching a special military operation. Ukraine is a puppet of forces that want to destroy Russia and take away its historical lands. — Roman Starovoyt

There is nothing to comment on because Ukrainians are Russians. — Dmitry Medvedev

Zelenskyy signs decree on Russian territories historically inhabited by Ukrainians
^{— Tetiana Lozovenko · Ukrainska Pravda · Jan 22, 2024}

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 22, 2024
^{— Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Karolina Hird, George Barros, Frederick W Kagan · ISW · Jan 22, 2024}

Russia continues to weaponize its position on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to propagate several long-standing Russian information operations.

Russian officials and information space actors are attempting to further rhetorically justify Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by misrepresenting a decree that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed on January 22 concerning discrimination against ethnic Ukrainians in Russia. Zelensky’s decree does not establish any territorial demands upon Russia, as select Russian ultranationalists falsely claimed.

Russians and Ukrainians will live exactly like brothers and good neighbors — Sergey Lavrov

"It's the Kremlin's way or the highway." Some interviews/writings/speeches out of the Kremlin circle carry their authoritarian undercurrent. They seem to think (implicitly) that it's up to them to decide how "their subjects" (down to individuals) should live (perhaps up to government in general, according to them). With their self-entitlement, they extend that to the Ukrainians. If NATO-phobia led to the invasion, then what difference would grabbing Crimea + Donbas make?

They will understand that life in a large common state, which they do not like very much now, is better than death. Their deaths and the deaths of their loved ones. And the sooner Ukrainians realize this, the better. — Dmitry Medvedev · Jan 17, 2024

The best argument in favor of slavery and imperialism. Those who do not accept this obvious truth are submissive idiots or coward exploiters. As Pro-Russians in this thread keep repeating. And the discours drammatically changes when the Palestinians are the aggressed and Israel is the aggressor. Palestianian resistence will win in the end, some day, no matter how much territory and lives they are losing for decades, no matter that they are led by an Islamist party (as totalitarian and brutal as nazis can be), no matter if they are idiots exploited by Iran and other powers hostile to the West.

The peace talks in March/April 2022 which were blocked by the West. — Tzeentch

And there have been attempts at peace after that, now Zelensky is trying to have them in Switzerland. Back then it was all about the denazification of Ukraine, which it isn't anymore (so clearly).

I think there's been ample moments when peace talks could have been taken, if both sides would be willing.

Whatever fig leaf you are clinging on, the fact is that negotiated settlements come usually into being a possibility when both sides see that they cannot win the war militarily. As the other option is unconditional peace, which means military victory for one.

Whatever fig leaf you are clinging on, [...] — ssu

The only ones clinging onto fig leaves are those who, understandably, have a hard time coming to terms with the fact that the West (read: the US and UK) rejected peace and chose prolonged war over the backs of the Ukrainians.

Dude, what you actually claimed is the following:

The peace deal was all but finished when Boris Johnson flew in to announce Ukraine would not be signing any deals with the Russians. — Tzeentch

"

To such rhetoric manipulation of yours and your sidekicks I commented:

Russia and Ukraine can agree on whatever ceasefire proposal, but if this proposal requires security guarantees from foreign guarantors, and foreign guarantors are not willing to provide them, then there won’t be a deal. — neomac


Concerning the Istanbul Communiqué, two points remain predictably uneasy to settle: the territorial claims over Donbas and Crimea, the security guarantees. Concerning the security guarantees, either they exclude Russia so they become a version of NATO which Russia couldn’t possibly like if that’s Putin’s issue, or they include Russia (the aggressor) which can at the very least sabotage any effort of Ukrainian Westernisation (as much as it happens with resolutions that go against Russian interest in the UN) while being spared economic and diplomatic sanctions. — neomac — neomac

The complaint from Tzeench is completely idiotic since this proposal from Ukraine and Russia was STILL TO BE DISCUSSED WITH PUTIN, and needed a third party contribution (the security guarantors). Ukraine could find whatever agreement with Russia without any security guarantees from third parties.

As @neomac shows, there were (and are) many hurdles for peace. The idea that Russia was open for something else as "peace" than all it's objectives accepted: puppet regime, eastern Ukraine with land corridor to Crimea and perhaps also Odessa is questionable.

It sounds like there was this wonderful peace just around the corner that everybody was taking, but then came the baddie Uncle Sam.

And if it would have been only about NATO membership (which also some portray this war to be about), just having those troops on the border would have and did de facto put away NATO membership. NATO would have never said it out loud because the treaty organization is open for everybody that qualifies, but Ukraine never would have joined. It wouldn't be just Hungary, it would be Germany opposing the idea. Hence the war was never only about NATO membership, which conveniently someone like Jeffrey Sachs forgets.

And this is now and there are proposals to have peace talks by Zelensky, but that hardly seems to matter for some...

The idea that Russia was open for something else as "peace" than all it's objectives accepted: puppet regime, eastern Ukraine with land corridor to Crimea and perhaps also Odessa is questionable. — ssu

I've linked you the Ukrainian former officials, one of whom was part of the Ukrainian delegation involved with the negotiations, telling us that the agreement as per the Istanbul communiqué was genuine, and to quote Chalyi, was a "very real compromise." Furthermore, the Ukrainians themselves confirm that NATO and Ukrainian neutrality was Russia's main concern.

You'll have to come to terms with the fact that this happened - Russia and Ukraine were ready for peace, but the US and the UK pushed for war.

And you can view the terms of the communiqué yourself, and see that it doesn't match up with your view.

Do you have a link? But seriously, what were Russia's terms then. That's a big "if" when Putin hadn't accepted the terms.

Oleksandr Chalyi Interview / Panel (Former Ukrainian ambassador and diplomat, partook in the March/April negotiations)

Arestovych Interview (Zelensky's former spokesperson)

________________________

That's a big "if" when Putin hadn't accepted the terms. — ssu

Chalyi said this about it:

To my mind, this is my personal view, Putin within one week of the start of his aggression on 24th February very quickly understood he had made a mistake, and tried to do everything possible to conclude an agreement with Ukraine.

It was his personal decision to accept the text of the Istanbul communiqué. — Oleksandr Chalyi

Ukrainians and Russians settled the points ("a protocol of intentions") for a negotiation between Zelensky and Putin, but these points involved necessary security guarantees from third parties, including the West. Ukraine can establish whatever agreement with Russia without any security guarantees from third parties. There is no proof that the West is preventing Ukraine from doing that.
Besides what the Ukrainian former officials (along with Bennett) mentioned is also how Zenesky's attitude toward negotiatons with Russia changed after Bucha .

from min 36

BTW, remember when the pro-Russian in this thread were rambling on how vital was Crimea for the Russian Black Sea Fleet ? And how obsessed they are about the Ukrainian land offensive failure ?

And yet...

It fired cruise missiles into Russia’s Black Sea fleet headquarters in Crimea’s Sevastopol in September, causing extensive damage and prompting Russia to relocate vessels to other ports including Feodosia and Novorossiysk.

The raids have proved so effective that they’ve helped Ukraine to break the Kremlin’s efforts to block its grain exports through the Black Sea after Moscow in July abandoned a deal brokered by the United Nations and Turkey that had ensured safe passage for ships. Ukraine shipped 10 million tons of commodities, mostly grains, through the passage since August.

https://finance.yahoo.com/news/putin-forced-relocate-ships-crimea-050013706.html

↪Tzeentch Do you have a link? But seriously, what were Russia's terms then. That's a big "if" when Putin hadn't accepted the terms. — ssu

Oleksandr Chalyi Interview / Panel (Former Ukrainian ambassador and diplomat, partook in the March/April negotiations) — Tzeentch

:smile: Did you listen to for instance what doctor Greame P. Herd said? Thorough explanation of the imperial aspects of Russia and it's policies.

But the first link doesn't give this kind of "smoking gun" argument: Chalyi simply states that the talks didn't go further. (It's btw a long discussion)

Chalyi does make some good points. Chalyi: Putin's actions was not only a crime, but a mistake. Putin came a victim of his own propaganda and, according to Chalyi, then understood this was a mistake. Here I can agree, Putin might really noticed that his swift quick capture of key objectives didn't go as they had gone as when he captured Crimea. Many have said this and the actual fighting on the ground tells this that what Russia had in mind was a quick lightning strike. But as @neomac has consistently said, there was no agreement on what kind of peace Putin would have accepted. Listening to Chalyi, it's evident that they hadn't come close to an actual peace or cease-fire arrangement.

Yet notice what Chalyi says about the present: it's a full scale war, for NATO a cold war. Chalyi believes that it's something there has to be some reapprochement, even if other matters, between the West and Russia. What he also admits (correctly in my view) that now Putin is willing to continue.

But the first link doesn't give this kind of "smoking gun" argument: — ssu

There was already a lot evidence for the blocked negotiations in March/April, and this is simply another piece to add to that pile.

Chalyi doesn't mention who blocked the negotiations, or why. Probably because he will have to fear for his life is he says too much (notice that Arestovych is also afraid to talk about who did it). But we have plenty of evidence who it might have been from the various other sources.

If you're expecting definitive evidence, obviously that is never coming. That's simply not how these types of things work. Biden isn't going to give us a statement admitting to the United States' many crimes. States always ensure they have "plausible deniability". However, as the list of contrary evidence grows, the plausibility of said deniability continues to shrink.

For example, in an official capacity the US probably still maintains it didn't base its wars in Vietnam and Iraq on construed evidence, but everybody with a brain knows that they did.

Ultimately it's up to you whether you continue to give these states the benefit of the doubt. I choose to go where the evidence points.

Again this pro-Russian dude is forgetting EVERYTHING ELSE the people he cites are saying: security guarantees from the West and Bucha. And that the Istanbul communiqué was just "a protocol of intentions" not a peace deal which was all but finished.

The West, especially the US, wouldn't have at all liked the idea. Hence Ukraine would have become a pariah state thanks to it's strange obsession of having a nuclear deterrent. — ssu

I literally stated:

US didn't want Ukraine to have nukes either and an additional proliferation concern so trying to keep the nukes would have resulted, at best, in international pariah status even if we imagine there wasn't the above problems. — boethius

After explaining all the military and intelligence problems of trying to keep and reverse engineer the nukes while developing a long term nuclear program.

Even if Ukrainian leaders wanted to keep the nukes and didn't believe in non-proliferation as a moral imperative, they were faced with a long list of practical problems and risks of keeping the nukes as well as developing new ones, and then (turns out we both agree) the best case scenario would be pariah status as both the US and Russia would be agreed on the policy.

So, it is was not a matter of "political will".

Again this pro-Russian dude is forgetting EVERYTHING ELSE the people he cites are saying: security guarantees from the West and Bucha. — neomac

"Security guarantees" have been discussed for dozens of pages.

The fact that no contract is ever actually "guaranteed" as some sort of ontological status is not a reason to not enter into contracts.

Agreements change probabilities of future outcomes. "Probably" if you sign a contract with an employer and show up for work and do the work you'll get paid as agreed, but there's no "guarantee" that will happen. The word "guarantee" is meaningful only in the sense of being another word for promise, but it is not meaningful in the sense of some necessity a promise will be fulfilled. A guarantee in this context is simply a promise and like any other promise they are not necessarily kept. The word is purely ornamental in agreements between states.

Where guarantee in a contract is not ornamental is in agreements between parties subordinate to state power (or some analogue). There is first the other meaning of guarantee as in a warranty, which has to do with additional promises of maintenance or replacement if something breaks. In terms of simply embellishing promises, at issue here, again guarantee does not mean promises are somehow necessarily kept if they are "guaranteed" but a judge would take such wording into account in determining liability. You are arguably less liable for breaking a simple promise compared to a "super duper promise" that includes the word guarantee.

This should be common sense.

That any given company may go bankrupt and have zero assets and be unable to make good on any promises whatever is not a reason to not enter into agreements with said company.

We enter into agreements because it changes probable outcomes.

The reason to enter into a peace agreement is not that someone that elevates promises to some ontological necessary status, but because probably the outcome of a peace agreement is preferable to further fighting.

The main reason for Ukraine to enter a peace agreement, especially before the war or then in the beginning are:

1. Ukraine cannot prevail militarily over Russia even with Western support (that the West is likely willing to provide; so not nuclear weapons, for example).

2. A long war maybe of some harm to Russia but will be absolutely devastating to Ukraine, and not serve the interest of Ukrainians.

3. The West's promises are not "guaranteed" either, if we're talking about some ontological necessary status to the promise, therefore the ability to sustain a long war, even if desired, is cannot be counted on.

4. Russia has pressures to maintain a peace if Ukraine commits to neutrality and repudiates seeking NATO membership and cooperation. One such pressure is the diplomatic cost of breaking a promise, but there would be bother international and domestic pressures that would impose costs on Russia to reinvade.

If one evaluates all 4 points as likely true, then the choice to negotiate a peace agreement is extremely well supported.

However, points 1 through 4, each in itself, would be sufficient reason to accept most kinds of peace deals. The likelihood of each point would inform what would be reasonable to accept.

As for Bucha:

This is war. It is combat. It is bloody, it is ugly, and it's gonna be messy, and innocent civilians are going to be hurt. going forward. — Biden White House

The choice to continue the war is the choice of continuing a bloody, ugly and messy process where innocent civilians are going to be hurt.

Being upset that has happened already is not sufficient reason to continue the war, thus causing more of the same.

X implies Y, I don't like Y, therefore I will insist on X ... is not a valid argument form.

Probably because he will have to fear for his life is he says too much (notice that Arestovych is also afraid to talk about who did it). — Tzeentch

Nah, I think Chalyi is still an Ukrainian diplomat. Hence he likely suppports his own country. That moment past, we are in a new moment. That came quite clearly from the debate. Only those who want to portray everything being about the US (with nobody else having effect on these issues) will replay this. as they take any kind of own decision making capability away from the Ukrainians in their own country.

If you're expecting definitive evidence, obviously that is never coming. — Tzeentch

Actually, that will come.

As we know about the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement and issues like that, these issues surely will be come out. And the simple fact is that the negotiations didn't go further. The war continued. And now Putin is quite hopeful that he will win. This is just speculation as we didn't go that extra mile.

For example, in an official capacity the US probably still maintains it didn't base its wars in Vietnam and Iraq on construed evidence, but everybody with a brain knows that they did. — Tzeentch

The Iraqi case is a slam dunk nowdays, thanks actually Trump himself. And in Vietnam the US was already engaged prior to the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Besides, Great Powers simply act this way, after all, to Soviet (and Putinist history), Finland started the Winter War in 1939 with an artillery attack on Soviet Union.

And the simple fact is that the negotiations didn't go further. The war continued. And now Putin is quite hopeful that he will win. This is just speculation as we didn't go that extra mile. — ssu

We have various neutral sources stating that the negotiations were blocked by the West. So the evidence is out there. Whether you find it convicing is up to you.

To me it's cut and dry, and there is little doubt in my mind.

I literally stated:

US didn't want Ukraine to have nukes either and an additional proliferation concern so trying to keep the nukes would have resulted, at best, in international pariah status even if we imagine there wasn't the above problems. — boethius

So I guess on this issue we agree then.

Even if Ukrainian leaders wanted to keep the nukes and didn't believe in non-proliferation as a moral imperative, they were faced with a long list of practical problems and risks of keeping the nukes as well as developing new ones, and then (turns out we both agree) the best case scenario would be pariah status as both the US and Russia would be agreed on the policy.

So, it is was not a matter of "political will". — boethius

And there's the possibility that this war would have started earlier and without the West so eager to give aid to Ukraine.

We have various neutral sources stating that the negotiations were blocked by the West. So the evidence is out there. Whether you find it convicing is up to you.

To me it's cut and dry, and there is little doubt in my mind. — Tzeentch

History will tell us, but again, we simply don't know what Putin would have accepted. Yet that strategic strike on Kyiv failed and the few days war got quite longer.

László Toroczkai: If Ukraine fails, we will claim Transcarpathia
^{— bt · Index · Jan 27, 2024}

Everyone, grab a piece, first come first serve! — László Toroczkai (paraphrased)

:D

When according the politician BlackRock has bought Ukraine, I wouldn't put much on this one. Only to note that anti-Westernism / anti-globalization and hostility towards the US has deep roots in the European far right (even if they love Trump, but he, of course, isn't one of those billionaires ripping of the poor people).

Again this pro-Russian dude is forgetting EVERYTHING ELSE the people he cites are saying: security guarantees from the West and Bucha. — neomac

"Security guarantees" have been discussed for dozens of pages.

The fact that no contract is ever actually "guaranteed" as some sort of ontological status is not a reason to not enter into contracts. — boethius

The word "guarantee" is meaningful only in the sense of being another word for promise, but it is not meaningful in the sense of some necessity a promise will be fulfilled. A guarantee in this context is simply a promise and like any other promise they are not necessarily kept. The word is purely ornamental in agreements between states. — boethius

To me that’s just a straw man argument: first, you didn’t provide evidence that relevant Ukrainian, Russian, American politicians take “ ‘guaranteed’ as some sort of ontological status” whereby promises are necessarily kept as a reason to enter or not enter into contracts. Second, the word “guaranteed” is not ornamental at all, since it labels a difference in the legal and functional design of the agreement: indeed, its legal meaning is to be contrasted to the “security assurances” that have been provided to Ukraine in the Budapest memorandum (as well as to other failed agreements like the Minsk agreements). So if Ukraine (and Russia too, for that matter) is looking for “security guarantees” that means Ukraine wants them to be something else than the “security assurances” provided in the Budapest memorandum (and Russia likely wants them to be something else than the Minsk agreements). And this legal and functional difference is what deserves to be discussed not the ontological status of “security guarantees” you are blabbering about. For that matter, even NATO article 5 or the contract of any employer are not “guaranteed” if that word is taken to express an ontological necessity.

Where guarantee in a contract is not ornamental is in agreements between parties subordinate to state power (or some analogue). There is first the other meaning of guarantee as in a warranty, which has to do with additional promises of maintenance or replacement if something breaks. In terms of simply embellishing promises, at issue here, again guarantee does not mean promises are somehow necessarily kept if they are "guaranteed" but a judge would take such wording into account in determining liability. You are arguably less liable for breaking a simple promise compared to a "super duper promise" that includes the word guarantee. — boethius

Besides you even contradict yourself because after insisting that “guaranteed” is ornamental because it doesn’t mean that promises are somehow necessarily kept if they are "guaranteed" and this would hold for contracts between states and work contracts between individuals, later you deny that the term “guaranteed” is ornamental “between parties subordinate to state power” even though that still doesn’t mean that promises are somehow necessarily kept.
And if “guarantee” can mean different things other than ontological necessity then “guarantee” can also mean whatever is taken by Ukrainians, Russians, and the West to decisively differentiate requested “security guarantees” from the Budapest memorandum “security assurances” and Minsk agreements. So if the label “guarantee” points to a decisive difference for all involved parties then it is not ornamental at all.

This should be common sense.

That any given company may go bankrupt and have zero assets and be unable to make good on any promises whatever is not a reason to not enter into agreements with said company.

We enter into agreements because it changes probable outcomes.

The reason to enter into a peace agreement is not that someone that elevates promises to some ontological necessary status, but because probably the outcome of a peace agreement is preferable to further fighting. — boethius

Formal agreements signal and codify commitments between contractors with implied reputational and material costs/hazards (as well as benefits and/or opportunities) and which can shape contractors’ expectations. To that extent, they can change the perceived likelihood of an outcome. So a plausible reason why the Instabul communiqué ("a protocol of intentions") was problematic is that the design of such security guarantees between Ukraine, Russia, and the West may not be convenient for all three parties AT THE SAME TIME due to their implied reputational and material costs/hazards (as well as benefits and/or opportunities). That is one relevant point that the “alleged” peace deal between Ukraine and Russia which “ was all but finished” intentionally or naively overlooks because even if there was an agreement between Ukraine and Russia but such agreement requirs a third party agreement (e.g. the West as security guarantor), the agreement can’t be considered as practically finalised if the third party doesn’t agree. That should be common sense!
It’s like me and my landlord agreeing that my bank will pay for my rents if I don’t pay. But what if my bank neither is nor will be committed to perform what our agreements established? And, in this case, what would be the point of protesting that my bank blocked the agreement between me and my landlord which was all but finished?! It would be a disingenuous or idiotic protest, yes?

The main reason for Ukraine to enter a peace agreement, especially before the war or then in the beginning are:

1. Ukraine cannot prevail militarily over Russia even with Western support (that the West is likely willing to provide; so not nuclear weapons, for example).

2. A long war maybe of some harm to Russia but will be absolutely devastating to Ukraine, and not serve the interest of Ukrainians.

3. The West's promises are not "guaranteed" either, if we're talking about some ontological necessary status to the promise, therefore the ability to sustain a long war, even if desired, is cannot be counted on.

4. Russia has pressures to maintain a peace if Ukraine commits to neutrality and repudiates seeking NATO membership and cooperation. One such pressure is the diplomatic cost of breaking a promise, but there would be bother international and domestic pressures that would impose costs on Russia to reinvade.

If one evaluates all 4 points as likely true, then the choice to negotiate a peace agreement is extremely well supported.

However, points 1 through 4, each in itself, would be sufficient reason to accept most kinds of peace deals. The likelihood of each point would inform what would be reasonable to accept. — boethius

I would question all your four points: point 1, it depends on the military objectives; point 2, it’s up to Ukrainians to decide what is convenient to them not to me or you; point 3, straw man argument; point 4, involved parties may consider also other reasons and means Russia (which has already turned to a wartime economy) can military and politically threaten the West and Ukraine to pursue hegemonic goals.
But, as far as I’m concerned, what your analysis is most evidently failing to take into account is that if the security guarantees concern Ukraine, Russia, and the West (or the US, if you prefer) then one has to take into account the INTERESTS OF THE WEST AND THE US in such security guarantees. If the interest of the West/US is to WESTERNIZE Ukraine (i.e. to take and keep it OUT OF Russian sphere of influence for political, security and economic reasons) AND the interest of Ukrainians is to be WESTERNIZED, then the Ukrainians must take into account Western conditions for such westernisation with all implied costs/hazards (as well benefits and opportunities), also for years to come. And without overlooking the circumstances of a profound mistrust due to past failed agreements, a declared defiant attitude by Russia against the Western-led world order, and all the current/incumbent international instabilities (also arguably linked to the Ukrainian war).

As for Bucha:

This is war. It is combat. It is bloody, it is ugly, and it's gonna be messy, and innocent civilians are going to be hurt. going forward. — Biden White House


The choice to continue the war is the choice of continuing a bloody, ugly and messy process where innocent civilians are going to be hurt.

Being upset that has happened already is not sufficient reason to continue the war, thus causing more of the same.

X implies Y, I don't like Y, therefore I will insist on X ... is not a valid argument form. — boethius

That’s irrelevant wrt the point I was making. The argument I was making is that people Tzeench cites mention that Zelensky’s attitude toward negotiations changed after Bucha, so claiming that the peace deal was all but finished but the West blocked it, is twice manipulative:
First, because the “blocking” may have to do with a problem of the security guarantees (actually also the status of Crimea could have been a problem, as one can also guess from Arestovych speech), so it’s matter of Zelensky’s political calculus, not of Zelensky’s knee-jerk subservience to a Western diktat.
Second, because Bucha may have also changed the Ukrainian sentiment about the war in some relevant sense no matter if you deem Zelensky’s choice as whimsical.
Besides, I’d also question the idea that Zelensky’s choice was as whimsical as you wish to depict it: indeed, Bucha may have reinforced the perception of the genocidal nature of Russia’s aggression and to the extent the memory of Holodomor and the Ukrainian patriotic sentiment is in Ukrainian bones (as much as it could be in Ukrainian leaders) that’s a big issue for any Ukrainian leader. So this may have very well introduced additional political costs to Zelensky’s choice of pursuing over-conciliatory negotiations with Russia.

Of course, it is still up for debate if Zelensky’s choices were based on political miscalculations. For now, my point is simply that no compelling evidence/argument has been provided to support the claim the West has blocked an agreement which was all but finished, or the claim that Zelensky’s choice was whimsically discounting the Ukrainian national interest (at least as perceived by the Ukrainians back then), or the claim that the word “guarantee” in “security guarantees“ is anything but “ornamental”.

To me that’s just a straw man argument: first, you didn’t provide evidence that relevant Ukrainian, Russian, American politicians take “ ‘guaranteed’ as some sort of ontological status” whereby promises are necessarily kept as a reason to enter or not enter into contracts. — neomac

They obviously don't.

American and Russian politicians are quite aware states can break their promises.

Ukrainian politicians as well. The story that one reason the peace agreement offered by Russia was not acceptable because the "security guarantees" couldn't actually be "guaranteed", that Russian "can't be trusted anyways", is not something the Ukrainian politicians and diplomats actually believe.

It is a piece of propaganda to appease the masses, and it works well on people such as yourself.

Besides you even contradict yourself because after insisting that “guaranteed” is ornamental because it doesn’t mean that promises are somehow necessarily kept if they are "guaranteed" and this would hold for contracts between states and work contracts between individuals, later you deny that the term “guaranteed” is ornamental “between parties subordinate to state power” even though that still doesn’t mean that promises are somehow necessarily kept. — neomac

You need to really work on your reading comprehension.

The word "guarantee" appearing in a contract subordinate to state power is still ornamental. It simply embellishes the promise as an ornament to said promise, and if you embellish a promise then a judge will take that into account in determining liability.

It is not substantive though because you already promised whatever it is; adding that you guarantee it is simply promising twice, leading to even more actions by the promised party that are reasonable to take assuming you promise (and therefore more damaging if you don't fulfill your "super duper promise").

The issues of substance in such a dispute are "what was promised?", "was the promised fulfilled or not", "if the promise wasn't fulfilled, what are the damages that caused?".

None of the substantive issues relate to a guarantee (because guarantees do not change the ontological status of anything of substance; whatever is actually guaranteed, say "the laws of physics" obviously there would never be a court case where you promise the laws of physics will hold and that doesn't happen".

Where the word "guarantee" becomes relevant is once the substantive issues are settled and the promise has indeed been made but has not been fulfilled and indeed it caused much strife and consternation and rescheduling (aka. damages), then the fact that ornaments were added to the substantive meaning of the promise to embellish said promise will come to bear on the extent of liability or punishment for said damages; as a judge can easily say that when you flex your promises by guaranteeing them, and then don't deliver, I pity the fool!

However, between states, precisely because everyone knows it was an ornament, there isn't really any difference between calling something "security guarantees" or then "security promises"; the diplomatic cost will be the same whatever you call it.

I would question all your four points — neomac

You can question all the points.

My explanation is to expound on the correct analytical framework in which to evaluate a proposed peace settlement. If "security guarantees" (as in promises) can never be "actually guaranteed" (as in an ontological status of necessity), then that begs the question of upon what basis would a peace agreement be reasonable to accept.

The 4 points I list are the main issues of consideration to evaluate sufficient reason to accept a peace deal.

Of course, regardless of the evaluations of likelihood of the 4 points, one can always propose a peace deal that is unacceptable. For example, "You must rape every baby as a condition for peace" is arguably, and I would both argue and agree, worth fighting to the death to avoid accepting.

Similarly, one can always propose values in which any given peace offer is unacceptable.

Rather, a better way to think of it is that evaluating the 4 points expands the area of acceptable peace terms.

If one believes all 4 points are very unlikely, then one should be willing to make equally little concessions for peace.

If one believes all 4 points are very likely, then, likewise, one should be willing to make equally graet many concessions for peace.

Obviously, to do it properly you'd need some matrixes representing all possible outcomes and their respective likelihoods and the changes of those likelihoods under all possible peace terms, and so forth until everything we could imagine ever happening is nicely represented in some way we that is almost, but not entirely, meaningless, and then calculate some eigenvalues and eigenvectors and then dabble in multi-variable integration over abstract higher dimensional spaces, and then before you know it bobs you're uncle: QED.

It would all be very mystifying and edify absolutely no-one, I'm sure you'd love it.

That’s irrelevant wrt the point I was making. The argument I was making is that people Tzeench cites mention that Zelensky’s attitude toward negotiations changed after Bucha, so claiming that the peace deal was all but finished but the West blocked it, is twice manipulative: — neomac

Literally no one is claiming that Ukraine was "about" to sign the peace deal and then Bucha happened and that changed Zelensky's mind. Even the Western media recounts that the peace deal was rejected on advice from the West, and in particular Boris Johnson. Furthermore, the Ukrainian lead negotiator literally went on national television and explained what the Russians wanted and the reason they rejected the deal, which was not Bucha, which we've already discuss.

The reason no one mentions Bucha much in any narrative is because there isn't must solid evidence ether Russians even did it. Plenty of factions in Ukraine did not want peace and had the means and opportunity to stage such an event. There are of course plenty of factions in Russia that don't want peace either and likewise would have motive and opportunity. The evidence available does not actually resolve the issue, so best to forget about it, especially as we've learned since that war is so messy and ugly and turns out civilians get hurt in wars all the time.

If the Ukrainian leadership wanted a peace deal (as they had some analytical framework analogous to what I propose above and the calculus was clearly in favour of peace) they would have worked out the deal.

Fact is they either considered the relevant points, in my framework or some comparable framework, and decided they really could "win" or then fight to a better negotiating position at acceptable costs.

However, any analysis by decision makers will also be weighted by what they have personally to gain, so the West's offer of providing hundreds of billions of dollars in the form of a slush fund may have also influenced analytical outcomes of influential people involved in the process. "Getting close" to a deal with the Russians is of course leverage to extract more mulla from the West.

That is another way, a more free and capitalist way, to approach things where profit is the main driver of incentives.

Oh look, another one :D

Romanian far-right leader lays claim on Ukrainian regions, Moldova
^{— Martin Fornusek · The Kyiv Independent · Jan 29, 2024}
Yasmina (Jan 28, 2024) of NAFO has unflattering words ...

, maybe Yasmina's word, "clown", is right. Anyway, so easy it is to lay claim to land.

Ukraine - Law 10288 (Amendments) (direct)
^{— EU's Venice Commission · Jan 22, 2024}
Ukrainian Parliament Amends Laws on National Minorities’ Rights
^{— Interfax-Ukraine · Kyiv Post · Dec 9, 2023}

The Kremlin sometimes take another approach to extend their authoritarian control (call it a variation of "neo-imperialism" or "neo-colonialism" or whatever), by setting up supposedly independent puppet regions, then accusing others of doing that (e.g. Medvedev, Starovoyt). Destabilization can be an action towards that, instability an excuse, immigration/deportation/etc a solidification. One advantage is deniability or distancing, though it doesn't always work well (e.g. Girkin). Nothing new I guess.

4. Russia has pressures to maintain a peace if Ukraine commits to neutrality and repudiates seeking NATO membership and cooperation. One such pressure is the diplomatic cost of breaking a promise, but there would be bother international and domestic pressures that would impose costs on Russia to reinvade. — boethius

Switzerland and Sweden have a tradition of neutrality, or at least had. Moldova has a constitutional neutrality clause, though sort of impaired by Transnistria. The Baltics have their own stories (2023Jul8).

Similar to what's come up before (2022Mar13, 2022Jul21, 2022Oct8, 2022Nov9), suppose that Ukraine had ... ▸ declared neutrality with respect to international military alliance memberships, formally on paper / constitutionally (2022Mar8, 2022Mar9, 2022Mar11); ▸ retained right to self-defense, e.g. from invaders (shouldn't be controversial), including foreign training and/or weaponry as the case may be; ▸ explicitly stated that others respect sovereignty, self-determination, freedom to seek own path (shouldn't be controversial); ▸ actively pursued EU membership, and perhaps sought other such cooperation ... Something along those lines.

The question is what might we then have expected from the Kremlin. Seems like they covered their bases, but what might have transpired then? — Sep 26, 2023

(↑ for an intact Ukraine)

With the Kremlin's swift sham referendums they kind of burned some bridges of their own, somewhat at least (if they care). There was a post-Soviet time when things were looking up, many wanted to cut military, create relationships with Russia(ns), trade, open offices in Moscow, what-have-you, but the emergence of Putinism gradually ended that, and now we're looking at a 2nd cold war.

Ukraine did want to be neutral. But as all of the East European countries starting from the Baltics, sooner or later they understood what Russia's plans would be... when it got it's act together. The Baltic states being tiny countries understood this from day one. Hence their objective to join NATO. — ssu

Yep.