Poland Is ‘Next’ After Russia Wins Ukraine War, Putin Ally Says (Aleksey Zhuravlyov)
— Carley Welch · The Messenger · Jan 14, 2024 — jorndoe
Why Ukraine is dangerous for its inhabitants
The existence of Ukraine is mortally dangerous for Ukrainians. And I don’t mean only the current state, Bandera’s political regime. I'm talking about any, absolutely any Ukraine.
Why?
The presence of an independent state on historical Russian territories will now be a constant reason for the resumption of hostilities. Late. No matter who is at the helm of the cancerous growth under the name of Ukraine, this will not add legitimacy to his rule and the legal viability of the “country” itself. And, therefore, the likelihood of a new fight will persist indefinitely. Almost always. Moreover, there is a 100% probability of a new conflict, no matter what security papers the West signs with the puppet Kyiv regime. Neither Ukraine’s association with the EU, nor even the entry of this artificial country into NATO will prevent it. This could happen in ten or fifty years.
That is why the existence of Ukraine is fatal for Ukrainians. They are practical people at the end of the day. No matter how they now wish the Russians to die. No matter how much they hate the Russian leadership. No matter how much they strive to join the mythical European Union and NATO. Choosing between eternal war and inevitable death and life, the vast majority of Ukrainians (well, perhaps with the exception of a minimal number of frostbitten nationalists) will ultimately choose life. They will understand that life in a large common state, which they do not like very much now, is better than death. Their deaths and the deaths of their loved ones. And the sooner Ukrainians realize this, the better. — Dmitry Medvedev · Jan 17, 2024
Today’s actions by Zelensky once again prove that our president is right about launching a special military operation. Ukraine is a puppet of forces that want to destroy Russia and take away its historical lands. — Roman Starovoyt
There is nothing to comment on because Ukrainians are Russians. — Dmitry Medvedev
Russia continues to weaponize its position on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to propagate several long-standing Russian information operations.
Russian officials and information space actors are attempting to further rhetorically justify Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by misrepresenting a decree that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed on January 22 concerning discrimination against ethnic Ukrainians in Russia. Zelensky’s decree does not establish any territorial demands upon Russia, as select Russian ultranationalists falsely claimed.
Russians and Ukrainians will live exactly like brothers and good neighbors — Sergey Lavrov
They will understand that life in a large common state, which they do not like very much now, is better than death. Their deaths and the deaths of their loved ones. And the sooner Ukrainians realize this, the better. — Dmitry Medvedev · Jan 17, 2024
And there have been attempts at peace after that, now Zelensky is trying to have them in Switzerland. Back then it was all about the denazification of Ukraine, which it isn't anymore (so clearly).The peace talks in March/April 2022 which were blocked by the West. — Tzeentch
Dude, what you actually claimed is the following:
The peace deal was all but finished when Boris Johnson flew in to announce Ukraine would not be signing any deals with the Russians. — Tzeentch
"
To such rhetoric manipulation of yours and your sidekicks I commented:
Russia and Ukraine can agree on whatever ceasefire proposal, but if this proposal requires security guarantees from foreign guarantors, and foreign guarantors are not willing to provide them, then there won’t be a deal. — neomac
Concerning the Istanbul Communiqué, two points remain predictably uneasy to settle: the territorial claims over Donbas and Crimea, the security guarantees. Concerning the security guarantees, either they exclude Russia so they become a version of NATO which Russia couldn’t possibly like if that’s Putin’s issue, or they include Russia (the aggressor) which can at the very least sabotage any effort of Ukrainian Westernisation (as much as it happens with resolutions that go against Russian interest in the UN) while being spared economic and diplomatic sanctions. — neomac — neomac
The idea that Russia was open for something else as "peace" than all it's objectives accepted: puppet regime, eastern Ukraine with land corridor to Crimea and perhaps also Odessa is questionable. — ssu
That's a big "if" when Putin hadn't accepted the terms. — ssu
To my mind, this is my personal view, Putin within one week of the start of his aggression on 24th February very quickly understood he had made a mistake, and tried to do everything possible to conclude an agreement with Ukraine.
It was his personal decision to accept the text of the Istanbul communiqué. — Oleksandr Chalyi
↪Tzeentch Do you have a link? But seriously, what were Russia's terms then. That's a big "if" when Putin hadn't accepted the terms. — ssu
:smile: Did you listen to for instance what doctor Greame P. Herd said? Thorough explanation of the imperial aspects of Russia and it's policies.Oleksandr Chalyi Interview / Panel (Former Ukrainian ambassador and diplomat, partook in the March/April negotiations) — Tzeentch
But the first link doesn't give this kind of "smoking gun" argument: — ssu
The West, especially the US, wouldn't have at all liked the idea. Hence Ukraine would have become a pariah state thanks to it's strange obsession of having a nuclear deterrent. — ssu
US didn't want Ukraine to have nukes either and an additional proliferation concern so trying to keep the nukes would have resulted, at best, in international pariah status even if we imagine there wasn't the above problems. — boethius
Again this pro-Russian dude is forgetting EVERYTHING ELSE the people he cites are saying: security guarantees from the West and Bucha. — neomac
This is war. It is combat. It is bloody, it is ugly, and it's gonna be messy, and innocent civilians are going to be hurt. going forward. — Biden White House
Nah, I think Chalyi is still an Ukrainian diplomat. Hence he likely suppports his own country. That moment past, we are in a new moment. That came quite clearly from the debate. Only those who want to portray everything being about the US (with nobody else having effect on these issues) will replay this. as they take any kind of own decision making capability away from the Ukrainians in their own country.Probably because he will have to fear for his life is he says too much (notice that Arestovych is also afraid to talk about who did it). — Tzeentch
Actually, that will come.If you're expecting definitive evidence, obviously that is never coming. — Tzeentch
The Iraqi case is a slam dunk nowdays, thanks actually Trump himself. And in Vietnam the US was already engaged prior to the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Besides, Great Powers simply act this way, after all, to Soviet (and Putinist history), Finland started the Winter War in 1939 with an artillery attack on Soviet Union.For example, in an official capacity the US probably still maintains it didn't base its wars in Vietnam and Iraq on construed evidence, but everybody with a brain knows that they did. — Tzeentch
And the simple fact is that the negotiations didn't go further. The war continued. And now Putin is quite hopeful that he will win. This is just speculation as we didn't go that extra mile. — ssu
So I guess on this issue we agree then.I literally stated:
US didn't want Ukraine to have nukes either and an additional proliferation concern so trying to keep the nukes would have resulted, at best, in international pariah status even if we imagine there wasn't the above problems. — boethius
And there's the possibility that this war would have started earlier and without the West so eager to give aid to Ukraine.Even if Ukrainian leaders wanted to keep the nukes and didn't believe in non-proliferation as a moral imperative, they were faced with a long list of practical problems and risks of keeping the nukes as well as developing new ones, and then (turns out we both agree) the best case scenario would be pariah status as both the US and Russia would be agreed on the policy.
So, it is was not a matter of "political will". — boethius
History will tell us, but again, we simply don't know what Putin would have accepted. Yet that strategic strike on Kyiv failed and the few days war got quite longer.We have various neutral sources stating that the negotiations were blocked by the West. So the evidence is out there. Whether you find it convicing is up to you.
To me it's cut and dry, and there is little doubt in my mind. — Tzeentch
:DEveryone, grab a piece, first come first serve! — László Toroczkai (paraphrased)
Again this pro-Russian dude is forgetting EVERYTHING ELSE the people he cites are saying: security guarantees from the West and Bucha. — neomac
"Security guarantees" have been discussed for dozens of pages.
The fact that no contract is ever actually "guaranteed" as some sort of ontological status is not a reason to not enter into contracts. — boethius
The word "guarantee" is meaningful only in the sense of being another word for promise, but it is not meaningful in the sense of some necessity a promise will be fulfilled. A guarantee in this context is simply a promise and like any other promise they are not necessarily kept. The word is purely ornamental in agreements between states. — boethius
Where guarantee in a contract is not ornamental is in agreements between parties subordinate to state power (or some analogue). There is first the other meaning of guarantee as in a warranty, which has to do with additional promises of maintenance or replacement if something breaks. In terms of simply embellishing promises, at issue here, again guarantee does not mean promises are somehow necessarily kept if they are "guaranteed" but a judge would take such wording into account in determining liability. You are arguably less liable for breaking a simple promise compared to a "super duper promise" that includes the word guarantee. — boethius
This should be common sense.
That any given company may go bankrupt and have zero assets and be unable to make good on any promises whatever is not a reason to not enter into agreements with said company.
We enter into agreements because it changes probable outcomes.
The reason to enter into a peace agreement is not that someone that elevates promises to some ontological necessary status, but because probably the outcome of a peace agreement is preferable to further fighting. — boethius
The main reason for Ukraine to enter a peace agreement, especially before the war or then in the beginning are:
1. Ukraine cannot prevail militarily over Russia even with Western support (that the West is likely willing to provide; so not nuclear weapons, for example).
2. A long war maybe of some harm to Russia but will be absolutely devastating to Ukraine, and not serve the interest of Ukrainians.
3. The West's promises are not "guaranteed" either, if we're talking about some ontological necessary status to the promise, therefore the ability to sustain a long war, even if desired, is cannot be counted on.
4. Russia has pressures to maintain a peace if Ukraine commits to neutrality and repudiates seeking NATO membership and cooperation. One such pressure is the diplomatic cost of breaking a promise, but there would be bother international and domestic pressures that would impose costs on Russia to reinvade.
If one evaluates all 4 points as likely true, then the choice to negotiate a peace agreement is extremely well supported.
However, points 1 through 4, each in itself, would be sufficient reason to accept most kinds of peace deals. The likelihood of each point would inform what would be reasonable to accept. — boethius
As for Bucha:
This is war. It is combat. It is bloody, it is ugly, and it's gonna be messy, and innocent civilians are going to be hurt. going forward. — Biden White House
The choice to continue the war is the choice of continuing a bloody, ugly and messy process where innocent civilians are going to be hurt.
Being upset that has happened already is not sufficient reason to continue the war, thus causing more of the same.
X implies Y, I don't like Y, therefore I will insist on X ... is not a valid argument form. — boethius
To me that’s just a straw man argument: first, you didn’t provide evidence that relevant Ukrainian, Russian, American politicians take “ ‘guaranteed’ as some sort of ontological status” whereby promises are necessarily kept as a reason to enter or not enter into contracts. — neomac
Besides you even contradict yourself because after insisting that “guaranteed” is ornamental because it doesn’t mean that promises are somehow necessarily kept if they are "guaranteed" and this would hold for contracts between states and work contracts between individuals, later you deny that the term “guaranteed” is ornamental “between parties subordinate to state power” even though that still doesn’t mean that promises are somehow necessarily kept. — neomac
I would question all your four points — neomac
That’s irrelevant wrt the point I was making. The argument I was making is that people Tzeench cites mention that Zelensky’s attitude toward negotiations changed after Bucha, so claiming that the peace deal was all but finished but the West blocked it, is twice manipulative: — neomac
4. Russia has pressures to maintain a peace if Ukraine commits to neutrality and repudiates seeking NATO membership and cooperation. One such pressure is the diplomatic cost of breaking a promise, but there would be bother international and domestic pressures that would impose costs on Russia to reinvade. — boethius
Switzerland and Sweden have a tradition of neutrality, or at least had. Moldova has a constitutional neutrality clause, though sort of impaired by Transnistria. The Baltics have their own stories (2023Jul8).
Similar to what's come up before (2022Mar13, 2022Jul21, 2022Oct8, 2022Nov9), suppose that Ukraine had ... ▸ declared neutrality with respect to international military alliance memberships, formally on paper / constitutionally (2022Mar8, 2022Mar9, 2022Mar11); ▸ retained right to self-defense, e.g. from invaders (shouldn't be controversial), including foreign training and/or weaponry as the case may be; ▸ explicitly stated that others respect sovereignty, self-determination, freedom to seek own path (shouldn't be controversial); ▸ actively pursued EU membership, and perhaps sought other such cooperation ... Something along those lines.
The question is what might we then have expected from the Kremlin. Seems like they covered their bases, but what might have transpired then? — Sep 26, 2023
Ukraine did want to be neutral. But as all of the East European countries starting from the Baltics, sooner or later they understood what Russia's plans would be... when it got it's act together. The Baltic states being tiny countries understood this from day one. Hence their objective to join NATO. — ssu
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