As I've been arguing for a while now, the US objective is to provoke a large-scale conflict between Europe and Russia.

The latest step in this process is the basing of F-16s in Poland and Romania, which makes the bases in these countries legitimate military targets.

This is of course what the US is hoping to provoke - a Russian attack on NATO soil, after which it can invoke NATO Art. 5 and forcefully drag Europe into the conflict.

As I've been arguing for a while now, the US objective is to provoke a large-scale conflict between Europe and Russia.

The latest step in this process is the basing of F-16s in Poland and Romania, which makes the bases in these countries legitimate military targets.

This is of course what the US is hoping to provoke - a Russian attack on NATO soil, after which it can invoke NATO Art. 5 and forcefully drag Europe into the conflict. — Tzeentch

That the bases are legitimate military targets doesn't mean Russia will strike them.

Russia clearly wants to avoid a war with NATO (otherwise they could have easily started on or then made sure "accidents" happen such as actual Russian missile "misses" that hit Poland), as Russia would have a lot to lose in a war with all of NATO even if it didn't go nuclear (and obviously Russia has also been avoiding nuclear war as they can start one of those any time).

It's simply not strategically sensible for Russia to get into a war with NATO as the US is still far away and very protected; taking a bunch of Europe "down too" isn't such a good participation trophy.

While that is certainly true, if the US manages to slowly expand the state of war that already exists, it is a matter of time before Art. 5 can be claimed.

↪boethius While that is certainly true, if the US manages to slowly expand the state of war that already exists, it is a matter of time before Art. 5 can be claimed. — Tzeentch

Well I agree that the US wants more escalation and triggering some messy bigger Eastern European war with Russia if Ukraine front line completely collapses I think would be their preference.

I'm just not sure how motivated Poland is to get into an actual war with Russia.

My reading of the Poles is that they very much like Russia and Ukraine fighting, but that's mainly because they don't like either Russians nor Ukrainians, and they view Ukrainians as corrupt and stupid to get into a war.

It's only in Western Europe and the US (and Finland apparently) that the entire reality can just be denied, but I don't think that's the position of the Poles.

Then there's the problem of Nuclear weapons.

I think you're completely correct that the US power brokers would love nothing more than a bigger conventional war in Eastern Europe with French and English troops streaming to the Polish front, with the US raining down conventional missiles and picking apart Russian air defence.

US can hang back on their Island, commit mostly standoff munitions and not real any troops and Europe has to deal with it. Of course, the West wouldn't defeat Russia, as there's too much strategic depth, but it would be devastating economically for both Russia and Europe (and Uncle Sam likey-like).

However, it seems to me the first thing that would happen is the Russians will immediately respond with Nuclear weapons and we'd enter a cycle of nuclear escalation management where conventional fighting essentially stops.

In my opinion, war has a tendency impose conditions on its participants. Especially when one of the most powerful nations on the planet, the United States, is pushing for it.

Furthermore, the Europeans seem utterly politically clueless, so I highly doubt Europe as a block will be able to push back on the United States' desire for chaos.

There's virtually zero risk of blowback for the Americans, as long as they can mislead the Europeans into doing the dirty work for them (in effect keeping the US out of the (nuclear) crosshairs).

What all of this tells us is that the Americans will push for chaos in Europe, because they have no reason not to. The Russians will at some point likely feel forced to react by striking NATO bases, and that will provide fuel for further escalation.

I see no reason why this should change, unless the US comes under serious threat. Until then it can simply keep pushing forward its pawns as it pleases. The only thing it needs to avoid is a general nuclear war.


PS: As I wrote this post, news hit about the Russians carrying out missile drills off the coast of Cuba. This is a clear signal that they are trying to change the situation in which there is no risk for the United States.

↪boethius In my opinion, war has a tendency to start imposing conditions on its participants. Especially when one of the most powerful nations on the planet, the United States, is pushing for it. — Tzeentch

Agreed, no qualms from me here.

Furthermore, the Europeans seem utterly politically clueless, so I highly doubt Europe as a block will be able to push back on the United States' desire for chaos. — Tzeentch

This is why I focus on Poland. To expand the war you need willing front line participants and the only real candidate for that would be Poland. My understanding of the Poles is that they view themselves as clever enough to have Ukrainians (who they don't like) fight Russians (who they don't like) while also being clever enough to not fight Russians themselves and destroy their country for US interests as the Ukrainians are doing.

Maybe a Pole would contradict me, but my understanding is that Poles view Ukrainians as useful idiots, and they don't view the war as something they want to start fighting on their own territory.

The Baltics don't really matter as they don't actually threaten Russia, they are simply too small so if shit going to start on NATO territory it has to be Poland, and the Poles would have to be willing participants to both let the escalation happen as well as trigger Article 5.

You would think the Poles of all people would understand the potential cost of playing games with the Russians, though when I look at their behavior I am not sure.

Haven't they, just like the Romanians, mentioned Art. 5 when supposed missile debris landed in their borders?

Now both of these countries are planning to base Ukrainian F-16s within their borders, which makes them legitimate targets. This would in effect make them direct participants in the war.

If they had no intention of getting directly involved, the US seems to have been successful in dragging them ever closer.

The thing I am increasingly worried about, is for the US to do something extreme - something that will create a crisis that takes all these nations that have positioned themselves close to the precipice and plunges them in.

↪boethius You would think the Poles of all people would understand the potential cost of playing games with the Russians, though when I look at their behavior I am not sure. — Tzeentch

I think they are, that's my argument here.

Haven't they, just like the Romanians, mentioned Art. 5 when supposed missile debris landed in their borders? — Tzeentch

Well they still want to deter the Russians from actually attacking them. Them mentioning Art. 5 does not really indicate they want to escalate and get into a war with the Russians, but more they want to deter both the Russians (and everyone else) "starting shit" due to Art. 5.

Now both of these countries are planning to base Ukrainian F-16s within their borders, which makes them legitimate targets. This would in effect make them direct participants in the war. — Tzeentch

This is obviously a dangerous move, but the delay after delay after delay on the F16s would indicate what these NATO parties are actually trying to do is maintain the status quo, not escalate.

The armour repair facilities are legitimate targets too but Russia doesn't strike those. Why? Because they don't need to, so the F16s as "scary" as they sound can easily be introduced in theatre as more of the same: not worth striking outside Ukraine.

If the F16 do longer represent a real threat (as there is no longer any ground forces of significance to support), one could bet the Russians then wouldn't escalate the matter further.

There's also American influence to consider. The White House is desperate to prop up Ukraine until the election as no one likes a "loser" and all the false promises being clearly demonstrated to be false promises.

Therefore, dangling the prospect of F16s to the Ukrainians is critical in motivating them to keep fighting in hopes this "wonder weapon" changes things, and then if things get too bad may actually be necessary to introduce the F16s to try to stabilize the situation.

Poland may not want F16s on its territory but US officials may both pressure to do it anyways while assuring them they have some way of avoiding escalation (the F16s won't do much, the Ukrainians are functionally defeated already).

If they had no intention of getting directly involved, the US seems to have been successful in dragging them ever closer. — Tzeentch

As mentioned above, obviously US has a lot of influence over what Poland does.

Furthermore, as with Macron, countries still want to threaten to do things as "deterrence" and for "me feel strong" vibes. Behind the scenes things could be very far from any actual escalation.

The thing I am increasingly worried about, is for the US to do something extreme - something that will create a crisis that takes all these nations that have positioned themselves close to the precipice and plunges them in. — Tzeentch

This is certainly something to worry about, but it's possible they already did it.

Blowing up Nord Stream was pretty extreme. If the concert terrorist attack was Whitehouse / CIA, that was pretty extreme too. Likewise plenty other attacks inside Russia, on the bridge, oil refineries etc. seem only possible with CIA and their lapdogs in SAS.

Sanctions was an extreme option too (at least in US policy makers perception as they kept calling it the "Nuclear Option" on their onscreen mutual masterbation sessions).

So lot's of extreme things have happened already.

The problem with escalating to a bigger regional conflict is that there are few ways to do that without front line country participants.

Anything you do to escalate inside Ukraine just results in Russia striking Ukraine harder.

If you did exceed what the Russians are willing to tolerate, then Russia has the option of simply escalating to nuclear weapons inside Ukraine.

The problem in this scenario is that (precisely because Ukraine isn't in NATO and it makes no sense to fight a war simply based on the wish to be in NATO) there's simply no logic in retaliating against Russia with nuclear weapons.

For example, Russia nukes a Ukrainian base, so US nukes a Russian base ... well this will just result in Russia nuking an European NATO base.

Ok, now US has to respond to that, but the Russian response to another nuke will be something like nuking every single NATO base in Europe and then saying the next step is generalized strategic launch if they see even one more missile in the air.

Well what do you do then? This threat will for sure be credible at this stage of escalation.

Obviously you back down. So since this is the result the whole process makes no sense.

Therefore, to avoid a nuclear game you can't win, you respond to Russia nuclear strike in Ukraine with conventional weapons.

However, Russia can just keep nuking Ukraine.

That is the key problem here.

Responding to a Russian nuke with conventional weapons in Ukraine to avoid European bases being hit with nuclear weapons (the likely response to actually nuking a Russian base), simply results in Russia nuking Ukraine into submission and winning that way.

Therefore, escalating within Ukraine to a bigger war can certainly work, but just results in a bigger war in Ukraine involving Russia nuking Ukraine. That is the rational response for Russia in response to anything conventional that does anger them enough or then actually threatens them enough with military defeat.

So, the only other way to broaden the conflict is to get another front line country involved.

The only candidate is Poland as far as I can see.

There's not only the issue of getting the poles involved (as they need to go through several rounds of escalation and need to formally invite NATO to the party), and at some point even corrupt politicians with binders full of compromat may not be willing to start a war on their own territory (only Ukrainians are corrupt enough to do that).

Then there's the problem of Belarus and that Poland doesn't actually border Russia. There's way to manage that problem but it's still an annoying obstacle to escalating WWIII.

Conclusion, although I agree that the White House wants a bigger war (make a bigger problem that kills a lot more people to solve your current problems that are currently killing less people, is the Neocon religion), there are real obstacles to achieving that.

Now, do I share your concern that "life finds a way" and it turns out the frogs are gay, or however that was supposed to work, yes I do, but my difference with your position is that I'm of the opinion that the obstacles are too great and so I'm predicting this escalation won't happen. Could happen. A lot of powerful people want it to happen. Definitely black swans go for cheap nowadays. But still, seems too tall a task even for the rambunctious and wily blackest of black-ops agents at the CIA to pull off.

Sometimes there's just a war too far.

Sometimes there's just a war too far. — boethius

Lets hope so.

The way I am reading Washington's behavior is that they are "shaping the battlefield" - the current Ukraine crisis isn't the grand finale. It was a tool to decouple Russia from Europe, remilitarize the region, and sow adversarial sentiment.

This creates fertile soil for conflict in the future.

With how dim-witted the Europeans are, I sense that we are one crisis away from war. Is it within the United States' power to initiate or even stage such a crisis when it suits its agenda? I believe so.

This creates fertile soil for conflict in the future. — Tzeentch

This is certainly true, but I think for now the US has as much as it can handle.

There's also Biden's cognitive decline, could he handle an actual crisis? Not just sending weapons to Ukraine and talking a big (but extremely slow) game?

Just doesn't seem doable. To handle a nuclear escalation cycle you need a leader pretty quick on the draw (for a lot of reasons).

Me feeling considering everything, for what it's worth, is that the US has achieved exactly what it set out to achieve with the Ukraine war:

It was a tool to decouple Russia from Europe, remilitarize the region, and sow adversarial sentiment. — Tzeentch

How the US establishment then handles the fact it can't win the war that achieved so much profits already, is to just let if fester, then just walk away one day, start a new war somewhere else, we just "move on" and anyone who's like "what the fuck did we just do in [insert last country to be destroyed]" is a ridiculous anachronistic busybody, a dinosaur from a bygone age, and polite society does not pay attention to such folk and their vapid noises.

What I think is driving US foreign policy in Ukraine is the following:

1. Russia and Europe are in prime position to benefit from a war between the US and China.

2. Russia and Europe will both fill a critical role for China in said war, since China will need markets it can reach over land when its sea routes are blocked. Note that conflict in Iran and Eastern Europe would seal Europe off from China entirely.

3. European populism threatens to slip Europe from Washington's grasp, turning it from a vassal into a potential rival. (In terms of potential, Europe even surpasses the US and China)


So, being the United States, what do you do?

NATO will be useless in a conflict with China, especially if the Europeans start thinking for themselves.

You look for a way to leave NATO while simultaneously getting your two rivals (Europe and Russia) to fight each other.


A hypothetical scenario (not necessarily the most likely, but just to show how easily one can imagine this escalating):

Trump becomes president, and leaves NATO. With the US ditching Europe, European war paranoia will spike - keep in mind the Ukraine war may still be going on. This creates opportunities for trickery. A false flag attack on a base or ship, an assassination of some high-profile political figure, etc.

Wars have been started over less, and it wouldn't be the first time the US fabricates a casus belli.

Of course the US doesn't intend to be involved in this conflict at all. It will be its parting gift to Europe.

1. Russia and Europe are in prime position to benefit from a war between the US and China. — Tzeentch

This is true, but Europe and Russia would also anyways benefit from mutual peace.

And if there was no US-China war then Europe, Russia and China would benefit from the peace.

So either way US relative power would decrease.

With the war that doesn't happen but also Europe becomes a vassal province so Europes power is simply absorbed fully into American power.

So even if Russia benefits from the war (something US planners would certainly have thought possible considering their own RAND analysis told them that) and also there is no war with China, having a China-Russia power block and then a US block with Europe as a side kick is a much better prospect to manage US power decline than simply letting the world get on more-or-less peacefully.

Without the war, the Euro could have just quietly overtaken the USD and that would be that.

So you also get the benefits of your point 3:

3. European populism threatens to slip Europe from Washington's grasp, turning it from a vassal into a potential rival. (In terms of potential, Europe even surpasses the US and China) — Tzeentch

Even without a war with China.

The US strategy may not be to get into a war with China, just containment and slowing China down as much as possible while the US consolidates imperial domination where it can.

The current process can be as easily interpreted as US, Russia and China working out the lines on the "spheres of influence" map as it can be an actual conflict between them.

Eternal foes usually become your frenemies, as you must inevitably learn to live together.

There is no available strategy for the US to go out and, through conflict, actually dominate either Russia or China.

There does, however, exist a strategy for the US to go out and, through conflict, dominate Europe.

Now, it could be the US is trying to do something it can't actually do and this second strategy is a byproduct.

Or, it could be the US is trying to do what it can actually do.

This is true, but Europe and Russia would also anyways benefit from mutual peace. — boethius

Indeed. And Russia understands this, which is why they are trying to get a diplomatic solution to the crisis. The problem is, Europe does not.

Europe's naivety is the real risk factor here. Zero geopolitical awareness makes them irrational and a willing pawn.

And if there was no US-China war then Europe, Russia and China would benefit from the peace. — boethius

The US strategy may not be to get into a war with China, just containment and slowing China down as much as possible while the US consolidates imperial domination where it can. — boethius

Personally, I don't think the eventual war can be avoided, because the US has pressed itself right against China's doorstep where it poses an existential threat by threatening to cut off all Chinese sea trade. (Quite comparable to the situation it created vis-á-vis Russia)

So basically it has created a completely unacceptable situation for the Chinese, and any attempt by the Chinese to resolve it will result in war.

And I think you're right that if there is no war, China would surpass the United States naturally.

This is why I disagree with your view that we may be looking at the multipoles working out their new respective spheres of influence in a somewhat civilized fashion. The United States doesn't show any signs that it will respect a sphere of influence of the challenging powers.

The status quo favors the challenging powers, which is all the more reason for the former hegemon to seek to bring things to a head before it is surpassed.

Indeed. And Russia understands this, which is why they are trying to get a diplomatic solution to the crisis. The problem is, Europe does not.

Europe's naivety is the real risk factor here. Zero geopolitical awareness makes them irrational and a willing pawn. — Tzeentch

Well, real risk to Europeans that's for sure.

It's unfortunate to see, being European myself, and will likely result in the right wing making things even worse. To summarize the process, the "centre" neo-liberals do corruption to benefit the US Empire (and themselves personally) whereas the right wing want to do corruption to benefit the local rich in their countries, resulting in a double dose of state asset pilfering and other foul deeds.

Personally, I don't think the eventual war can be avoided, because the US has pressed itself right against China's doorstep where it poses an existential threat by threatening to cut off all Chinese sea trade. (Quite comparable to the situation it created vis-á-vis Russia) — Tzeentch

The problem with the US-China war is there seems to me no way for the US to win. There's also far more costs in a war with China than with Russia due to the global supply chains.

And, of note, the US has not blockaded or otherwise physically interfered with Russia's ability to trade, so that they'd be willing to cross that line with China seems far fetched to me. It's not just the US that depends on Chinese goods but most of the world so that itself does not seem manageable.

Then there's maintaining the blockade itself. China will be "the victim" of this clear act of war and would sink US vessels and down US planes. Even if somehow has a strong advantage to start, China has enormous industrial capacity to build more drones, more missiles, and figure things out.

I just don't see how the US could maintain such a blockade of any extended period of time.

Invading Chinese mainland obviously isn't possible, and the only other option would be to nuke China. China also has nuclear weapons.

So I just don't see a viable endgame for the US to go to war with China.

Now, certainly situation is tense and there could be "events" as tensions rise, essentially border skirmishes of one sort or another, but I don't see either side having any rational to start some sort of actual war which would quickly transition to simply the US blockading China, which seems to me the only conventional "war" move on the table.

So basically it has created a completely unacceptable situation for the Chinese, and any attempt by the Chinese to resolve it will result in war. — Tzeentch

They're obviously accepting it so far.

They don't like it, obviously, but the Chinese have been clearly playing the long game of economics since decades. The "remote Islands game" has no actual strategic impact and is purely symbolic; no one is actually obstructing any shipping from these various islands.

The big issue is of course Taiwan but the Chinese have clearly been able to live with that for many decades and with enough economic ascendency and with the decline of the US Empire it should be possible to simply re-absorb Taiwan eventually.

In other words, the current dynamic favours China as the US is decreasing in relative power as the Chinese increase their own. So why start a war to formally control Taiwan when that's not a critical strategic issue? Taiwan does remain an island at the end of the day that does not threaten mainland China (in comparison to Ukraine that has a 2000 km border with Russia).

An alternative model for the Us-China conflict is the US-Iran conflict. Many powerful people in the US, really, really, really wanted to go to war with Iran, but it's simply not practical to do.

And, of note, the US has not blockaded or otherwise physically interfered with Russia's ability to trade, so that they'd be willing to cross that line with China seems far fetched to me. — boethius

Truly?

I'm convinced the second conflict breaks out, all of China's sea trade will be cut off and that this is their main strategic challenge. This threat is what prompted them to launch the Belt & Road Initiative - to create overland alternatives to US-dominated sea lanes.

The threat is strategic in nature. That is to say, during peace-time all is well, but during war all of these trump cards would be played. And if you're China or Russia, and you see the US quietly collecting trump cards against you, they perceive that as a threat. It's essentially a knife aimed at their throat.

When the conflict finally happens it will be framed in such a way that China is the bad guy, and 'the West' will unquestioningly accept the American narrative as truth, as we saw in the Ukraine crisis.

I just don't see how the US could maintain such a blockade of any extended period of time. — boethius

Note that cutting off sea trade is different from a total blockade. The US and its Pacific allies don't need a total blockade, because they control several rings of islands and straits that would make it extremely easy to monitor and target Chinese sea traffic.

Crippling Chinese trade would be a walk in the park for the US. The Chinese know this, and it's also the reason why the Chinese are very careful to avoid armed conflict.

Personally, I think the US is gearing up to create a situation like this before the Chinese fully surpass the US. The problem for the US is that its pivot to Asia is taking time, due to unfinished business in Europe and the Middle-East. However, this is also looking a lot like "shaping the battlefield" - ensuring all pieces are in place before the grand finale starts.

Note that if there is chaos in Eastern Europe and Iran, China would be effectively cut off from Europe, the Middle-East and Africa over land.

These things aren't coincidental.

Many powerful people in the US, really, really, really wanted to go to war with Iran, but it's simply not practical to do. — boethius

There are many speculations about Raisi's death having been an assassination. If that's the case, it follows a familiar pattern of the US sowing chaos in the Middle-East.

Iran just so happens to be a crucial link in Chinese overland access to the rest of the world.

The New York Times got hold of some documents, did some interviews ...

Ukraine-Russia Peace Is as Elusive as Ever. But in 2022 They Were Talking.
^{— Anton Troianovski, Adam Entous, Michael Schwirtz, Andrew E Kramer, Julian E Barnes, Maria Varenikova, Gray Beltran, Rumsey Taylor · New York Times · Jun 15, 2024}
The sticking points that kept Russia and Ukraine apart
^{— Anton Troianovski, Michael Schwirtz · New York Times via Japan Times · Jun 16, 2024}

NYT publishes alleged draft of failed Russia-Ukraine peace deal (note, this is Russian state media)
^{— RT · Jun 15, 2024}
From security guarantees to territorial control, these differences led to failure of Ukraine-Russia peace talks
^{— Firstpost · Jun 16, 2024}

Someone summarized ...

• Russia withdrew previous objections to Ukraine's full membership of EU
• Ukraine proposed never to join NATO
• Russia wanted Ukraine to make Russian an official language
• Russia wanted Ukraine and all other signatories of treaties to lift 2014+ sanctions and publicly call on others to follow suit
• Ukraine was to give up Donbas and recognize Crimea as part of Russia
• Ukraine did not recognize Russian sovereignty over occupied territory (independence being a separate topic)
• Russia's ceasefire proposal stated that Ukraine withdraw all troops
• Ukraine wanted allies to be bound by a treaty to intervene if attacked again
• For Ukrainians, binding security guarantees were the basis of a potential peace agreement signed by several countries
• The Kremlin required Russia to be among guarantor states, all of who must approve response in case of attack on Ukraine
• Ukraine to be permanently neutral (with limited militarization)

More recently ...

Ukraine Peace Summit: Putin demands more Ukrainian land to end war; Kyiv rejects 'ultimatum'
^{— WION · Jun 15, 2024 · 5m:26s}

Ukraine conference joint communiqué: full text
^{— Thomas Escritt · Reuters · Jun 15, 2024}
80 Countries Back Ukraine's 'Territorial Integrity' At Swiss Peace Summit
^{— RFE/RL · Jun 16, 2024}
Ukraine summit strives for consensus, way forward uncertain
^{— Dave Graham, Sabine Siebold, Steve Holland, Thomas Escritt, Dan Peleschuk, Alvise Armellini, Matthias Williams, Mark Potter, Hugh Lawson · Reuters · Jun 16, 2024}
Swiss summit backs Ukraine’s ‘territorial integrity’, calls for peace talks with Russia
^{— France 24 · Jun 16, 2024 · 6m:59s}

Not really much new.

Ukraine was to give up Donbas and recognize Crimea as part of Russia — jorndoe

Isn't this a non-starter from Ukraine's perspective, esp. in 2022?

, apparently so; well, the Ukrainians agreed to remove whatever about Crimea from the deal, i.e. no mention thereof.
Seemed like they focussed more on peace guarantees (future).
I think they also differentiate Donbas becoming part of Russia and an entirely independent Donbas.

Should Ukraine go for that deal now?

, well, that's up for debate.

If you're asking my own opinion, then I tend to start out simpler. The Kremlin rolling in and grabbing what they see fit isn't acceptable. EOS. Extending and imposing the regress of Putin's Russia onto another country makes it worse, both for Ukraine and others.

But it's up to the Ukrainians. Ukraine isn't a kindergarten.

As per Natalka (Jun 15, 2024), Kremlin-associated bots sent out 120,000 posts with fake quotes.

Also reported by Agentstvo (Jun 15, 2024).

Hard to tell what the impact is, but there's more where that came from.

When women are held for days and raped, when you start to rape little boys and men, when you see a series of genital mutilations, when you hear women testify about Russian soldiers equipped with Viagra, it's clearly a military strategy. — Pramila Patten (UN) · Sexual violence in the Russian invasion of Ukraine · Wikipedia

War does things to people. Hopefully The Hague also does something.

Russia says Finland's NATO accession is dangerous historic mistake (— Andrew Osborn, Jake Cordell, Mark Heinrich · Reuters · Apr 4, 2023)

encroachment on our security and on Russia's national interests — Peskov

Finland joins NATO in historic shift, Russia threatens 'counter-measures' (— Anne Kauranen, Andrew Gray, Tom Little, Essi Lehto, Kate Abnett, Jan Strupczewski, Sabine Siebold, Angus MacSwan, Mark Heinrich, Patricia Zengerle, Nick Macfie, Richard Chang, Rosalba O'Brien · Reuters · Apr 4, 2023)

Finland: Almost all the ground forces in Russia's immediate area are now in Ukraine (— Mika Mäkeläinen, Eva Sarlin, Päivi Koskinen · Yle · Jun 19, 2024)

Security, though?

War does things to people. Hopefully The Hague also does something. — jorndoe

I think it starts form when you treat your own soldiers as cannon fodder, expendable, that has a psychological effect on them as they know (and naturally do notice) that they are viewed as so. When you cannot oppose this, but you can do whatever towards the enemy and the civilian population, you can then take out your frustrations on these.

It's actually surprising how the Russian army has now when mobilized turned in many ways into the Red Army of WW2.

Yet if are reminded that you can be court-martialed for killing, torturing or raping civilians, then that limits these kinds of actions.

Seems like plain hostile acts:

Unprecedented GPS jamming attack affects 1600 aircraft over Europe
^{— Jeremy Hsu · New Scientist · Mar 29, 2024}
GPS jamming traced to Russia after flights over Europe suspended
^{— Jeremy Hsu · New Scientist · May 1, 2024}
Innovation: Recent GPS jamming in regions of geopolitical conflict
^{— Dong L Wu · GPS World · May 24, 2024}
Newest NATO Member Sweden Says Russia Disrupting Its Satellite Networks
^{— Hugo Miller, Jonas Ekblom, Greg Sullivan, Alessandro Speciale · Bloomberg · Jun 20, 2024}
Nordic satellites targeted by Russia after Sweden’s NATO accession
^{— Ryan Daws · Telecoms Tech News · Jun 21, 2024}

According to Hugo Miller, the Kremlin is testing the EU and NATO.

What (if any) would an appropriate response be?


As an aside, as long as Hungary has ongoing deals with Rosatom (Paks II) they aren't likely to accept nuclear energy sanctions against Russia. I suppose that is to be expected. Would it be (too) awkward for them to participate in other sanctions?

Teenager jailed for helping spread whatever critique of Putin:
Turbin Arseny (— Memorial · Jun 20, 2024)
Not normal.

The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Shoigu and Gerasimov (Jun 25, 2024) for civilian harm and crimes against humanity.
It's unlikely that there will be a trial in the foreseeable future.

The European Court of Human Rights concluded the CASE OF UKRAINE v. RUSSIA (RE CRIMEA) (Jun 25, 2024) listing whatever Russian offenses/crimes from before they were expelled from the Council of Europe (Mar 16, 2022).
The legalities cover Feb 27, 2014 through Mar 16, 2022.

The regress of Putin's Russia has been evident for some time.

There goes Chersonesus (not Kherson), according to Evelina Kravchenko.

'Cultural Expropriation': Russia Steps Up Seizures Of Artifacts In Occupied Ukraine
^{— Nikolai Berg, Robert Coalson · RFE/RL · Oct 28, 2023}
Russians destroyed the ancient site of Chersonesus and erected a new building in its place
^{— Odessa Journal · Jun 27, 2024}

According to UNESCO, it's part of wider ruinage, whether accidental due to the war or intentional efforts (land grab, Russification, re-enculturation, old playbook). ^{(2001, 2015, 2022Oct21, 2022Nov8, 2023Aug9)}

Hélène Blanc (en) opines:

ENTRETIEN. Guerre en Ukraine : "Vladimir ne négocie jamais, sa proposition est un cessez-le-feu Potemkine" (en)
^{— Martin Planques · La Dépêche · Jun 14, 2024}

Your mileage may vary, though some of her claims have come up in the thread before, consistent with observations.

As usual, they say what they want others to hear, irrespective of whatever else.

Russian embassies overflowing with requests to relocate to country — MFA
^{— TASS · Jun 27, 2024}

Our embassies, our consulates are literally flooded with requests for either visas, residence permits or assistance in resettlement in order to preserve themselves as representatives and bearers of traditional values. But we should also look from another angle. A huge number of people, who are under the oppression of liberal democracies, are trying to resist this. I would also like to say that when we talk about strangers - it's not about borders, it's not about the names of states or regimes <...>. Strangers are not those who differ from us, but those who aggressively impose their ideology, wanting to destroy our ideas of true values. — Zakharova

Dear followers, have you noticed any floods of people wishing to move to Russia from the "oppression of liberal democracies?"
^{— Gerashchenko · Jun 28, 2024}

A most egregious abuse of grammar. Requests cannot ''literally'' flood ...unless they are somehow presented in liquid form. :chin:

:)
I was kind of wondering if they counted people in occupied territories.

···

The invasion more or less slammed the brakes on Ukraine's efforts. Lawless and Soboliev (known from the 2014 commotion in Ukraine):

Takeaways from AP’s report on Ukraine’s battle to defend its democracy in wartime
^{— Jill Lawless · AP · Jun 28, 2024}

Organized efforts:

The role of psychological warfare in the battle for Ukraine
^{— Zara Abrams · APA · Jun 1, 2022}
Putin and the Third Rome
^{— Niels Drost, Beatrice de Graaf · Brill · Dec 12, 2022}
Inside Putin's push to rewrite Russian history in favor of his war in Ukraine
^{— Yuliya Talmazan, Artem Grudinin · NBC · Sep 3, 2023}
From playgrounds to parade grounds: Russian schools are becoming increasingly militarized
^{— Tim Lister, Katharina Krebs · CNN · Sep 25, 2023}

To what end? (remains a pertinent question)