Now creating that deterrence will simply get some people to think that your war-hungry. Well, I'm not. — ssu

Something along those lines has come up before.

can all defense be narrated as offense, can all defensive measures be cast as threats? — Apr 8, 2024

A naïve attitude towards Putin's regressive Russia is, well, not particularly smart, or is a particularly kind of blindness, or whatever. Not going to repeat all evidence already posted. (Besides, you ignore requests to account for whatever observations with your theory.) — Jul 25, 2024

The only blind ones are you oompaloompas I keep wasting my time on. :lol: — Tzeentch

:shrug:

You have to have deterrence to keep the peace.

Now creating that deterrence will simply get some people to think that your war-hungry. Well, I'm not. — ssu

Like I said: I agree completely with you on the need for deterrence.

When I say Europe must get its head out of its ass I mean, among other things, that it must spend a minimal amount on maintaining their militaries.

There's no reason Europe shouldn't have a credible deterrent against Russia considering Europe's vastly larger GDP. We actually outspend Russia on defense by something like tenfold.


But, in geopolitics there is something called the security dilemma - you might be aware of this.

In a nutshell, a nation building their military, even as deterrence, can be seen as a threat to neighboring nations.

This is why I emphasize the foolishness of combining the build up of a deterrent (presumably to avoid war) with economic decoupling, refusal of diplomatic talks and maximalist war rhetoric, etc.

It's a guarantee that in today's context Russia views a European military build-up as a threat, and it will actually bring war closer, instead of deterring it.


That is the fine line Europeans are completely missing, and the geopolitical amateurism I spoke of.


The solution is extremely simple: combine the creation of a deterrent with de-escalating rhetoric and with dialogue with Russia.


What I have just laid out is in fact so obvious that I can only conclude that whoever is making these decisions on the side of the West (predominantly the United States) is not pursuing long-term peace and stability. I have made that point several times before, with detailed explanations as to why.

First of all, the globalized World won't profit from something far more devastating than a trade war. — ssu

It would do a number on the world economy of course, but absolute power and wealth matter very little in geopolitics. What matters is relative power and wealth.

Any great power would happily see global GDP shrink by 10% if it meant they would ascend to a dominant position in the world.

And your forgetting that the US has nothing like NATO in Far East. Don't you remember how SEATO simply collapsed? What are the goddam allies of the US? How close are South Korea and Japan to make some joint effort here? What are US allies there in the Pacific? Australia, and the UK! Not much of an alliance that AUKUS.

This is the peril when you have only nation-to-nation defense agreements, but not a treaty organization with collective defense. What countries would (or could) assist the US, if China went for Taiwan? The Japanese? How much? The South Koreans? They have to deal with North Korea. Likely Japan could give a few destroyers and subs, but likely it would hold it's resources back. And in truth the US is lousy in creating new workable alliances, because it doesn't want to. — ssu

That all of these nations will join in a coalition against China is all but a certainty.

They may not have mutual defense agreements, but their geopolitical goals naturally align in that they all want to contain China. South-Korea, Japan, the entire Anglosphere (the 'Five-Eyes' alliance), perhaps some other nations like Indonesia - they are all nations that exist in the periphery of the world island and therefore share a main strategic challenge. These are far more natural allies to the US than for example Europe is.

Taiwan is essentially the tripwire. If China manages to achieve reunification, it has definitively superceded the US as the dominant global power and every country in the Pacific region realizes the far-reaching consequences of that for themselves.

Look, Putin has all the time wanted to portray Western Europe as a threat Russia. — ssu

Well, haven't the Europeans parroted US-fed rhetoric about wanting to cripple Russia, enact regime change, and break it apart in multiple republics, etc., while simultaneously refusing any dialogue and maintaing a no-compromise position of Ukraine joining NATO?

Honestly, what did the Europeans expect?

It's quite clear from Russia's actions that even after the invasion they had good faith the Europeans would come to their senses and sit down for talks.

Yet, we now know that the Europeans were acting in bad faith as far back as the Minsk Accords.

And I actually agree with the Russians on this. While Europe is on Uncle Sam's leash they're a danger to themselves and others.

A modus vivendi was easily achievable. Even as far forward as March/April 2022 there was still a sensible deal that could have been made. Knowingly or unknowingly, we did everything in our power to make it impossible. Though in the case of the US, it is quite clear they knew exactly what they were doing.

Actually it is guided. Biden was all in favour of the "pivot" to Asia and his administration full of the "pivot people", just like Obama's. But he cannot and couldn't. That's the power of Atlanticism.

For Superpower USA, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the jewel in it's crown. But if American want to let their hubris go rampant and think their stature in the World doesn't need NATO or any allies (except Israel), I think they are mistaken. If the US really leaves NATO, then Europe will have to reorganize itself. But it's not something where the US wins.

Believe it or not, but I don't think that especially those Americans wanting to "make America great again" don't want the country to be the bigger Canada. Yeah, isolationism sounds great at first, but then when other countries really don't give a fuck, then comes the anger back when people find that isolationism is not a cure-all, just as Brexit wasn't for the Brits.

The simple fact is that the West is stronger together. Something that some people hate. — ssu

The fundamental power struggle of our time is going to take place in the Pacific.

The US cannot maintain its dominant position in both the Pacific and Europe, hence the need to pivot. But the US establishment realizes the consequences for its position in Europe, which is why it is currently trying to "shape the battlefield" and mitigate the damage done to US interests when it is forced to pivot away from Europe.

Europe in terms of its economic, intellectual and human potential is way too big for US to maintain its artificial status as suzerain. which is why Europe will simply break free from the US orbit once the US is forced to divert its attention elsewhere. It will be good for Europe in the long-term, because we will be able to pursue an independent geopolitical strategy that actually benefits us.

What the US or Europe want is hardly a factor in this. These are geopolitical realities - forces of nature, almost - that they cannot ignore (though admittedly, Europe has been a king at ignoring geopolitical realities).

If the US fails to pivot, it loses the Pacific. Once China breaks out of the island chains, the US no longer holds the trump card of being able to cut off China's sea trade, and it will be curtains for the peripheral nations as two thirds of the world island will be united under a Sino-Russian alliance.

One point that I don’t see stressed enough also by views critical toward Russia is the political hazard which Western countries are exposed to while dealing with hostile authoritarian regimes like in Putin’s Russia, and how this relates to security.

Security and deterrence are not just granted by military capacity and readiness, but also by efficient and consistent decision making about security-deterrence and hegemonic conflicts. What Western democracies and system of alliance have shown also during the current conflict is that authoritarian regimes have a comparative advantage over democracies in taking decisions about deterrence and security that are more efficient and consistent over time: indeed, Russia can count on a more hierarchical decision process (so no obstacles from the parliament or the judicial system), repression of political opposition and popular dissent (no obstacles from media and political representatives, INCLUDING those corrupted/infiltrated by the enemy), and consistently pursue strategic goals over decades (because the political leadership remains the same over decades). For democratic countries (including the US) is the opposite.
Exporting democracy, however poorly implemented or questionable in principle, still is/was not just matter of empowering foreign people in defending their rights against foreign authoritarian regimes for humanitarian purposes. It’s also about Western own political vulnerability AND SECURITY.

Something along those lines has come up before. — jorndoe

As many other things and issues. Over and over again in this thread.

In a nutshell, a nation building their military, even as deterrence, can be seen as a threat to neighboring nations. — Tzeentch

Really? Military build-up is what Russia was doing for decades (especially under Putin) while Europeans were doing the opposite for decades and did business with Russia. So you are saying that Europeans were wrong in ignoring the RUSSIAN THREAT coming back after the collapse of Soviet-Union, since doing business with Russia wasn’t a credible enough deterrent against Russia's hegemonic ambitions, right?

The logic of doing business and pursuing deterrence is what Russia, China and Iran COULD do in the pursuit of their regional hegemony when the West bet on globalization. Why they could and Europeans couldn't?
To me the main difference is that Russia, China and Iran are authoritarian regimes with revanchist aspirations, while European people are governed by democratic regimes focusing on economic issues more than on security issues. But that’s FAR from being all European political and economic elites' fault, indeed they were at least pursuing some form of economic and monetary integration, as a step toward greater political integration, however questionable. While the rest of the political debate was dominated by self-deprecating peace&love anti-EU anti-US populists and make our nation great again far-right nationalist/populist anti-EU, anti-US and anti-immigration (also financed by Russia). And they were far away from perceiving the Russian threat and support policies to boost deterrence AGAINST Russia.

Your pathetically naive assumption (not the only one) is that anti-EU and anti-US populism are best fit to do business with Russia AND build a credible deterrence against Russia, than the pro-EU and pro-US political elites.

The solution is extremely simple: combine the creation of a deterrent with de-escalating rhetoric and with dialogue with Russia. — Tzeentch

You mean like the Minsk accords? But then:

Yet, we now know that the Europeans were acting in bad faith as far back as the Minsk Accords. — Tzeentch

Damn Europeans can get anything right. Of course all Russia had to do to ensure somewhat cordial relations with the West was to not overtly escalate the conflict and keep it's bargaining chips in eastern Ukraine.

Luckily:

These are geopolitical realities - forces of nature, almost - that they cannot ignore (though admittedly, Europe has been a king at ignoring geopolitical realities). — Tzeentch

So there's no way Russia would blow up the status quo by doing something as silly as launching a full ground invasion of it's neighbor. That would keep the US attached to Europe, force Russia to deepen it's ties to China and ensure that every European politician who argued for deterrence and cooperation with Russia is instantly discredited.

I'm so glad we live in a world where the forces of nature obtain and not some bizarre and unpredictable place where domestic politics and even the mindset of individual powerful people can shape major world events.

So there's no way Russia would blow up the status quo by doing something as silly as launching a full ground invasion of it's neighbor. — Echarmion

Ukraine is more important to Russia than maintaining the status quo. That's exactly what they told us over the course of some fifteen years.

Striking such a sarcistic tone while losing sight of the most basic elements to this conflict is why I can't take you seriously.

Ukraine is more important to Russia than maintaining the status quo. That's exactly what they told us over the course of some fifteen years.

Striking such a sarcistic tone while losing sight of the most basic elements to this conflict is why I can't take you seriously. — Tzeentch

What I find bizarre is that you keep switching between different premises.

On the one hand, the geopolitical realities are supposed to be impersonal and irresistible forces. But when you have to explain why events don't conform to these forces, you suddenly invoke very personal and contingent reasons. European diplomats are incapable of even basic solutions. Unspecified actors are influenced by the US in unspecified ways. Europeans are "acting in bad faith" or are "ignoring realities".

Meanwhile while the russian side supposedly has an interest in working relations with Europe due to the inevitable US-China conflict, "Ukraine is more important". But this just seems to beg the question: How could it be more important than the "fundamental power struggle of our time"?

From my perspective you're building a complicated scaffold to prop up a theory which has a giant hole in the middle: namely that the invasion of Ukraine defies traditional "geopolitical reason", including the version championed by Mearsheimer.

namely that the invasion of Ukraine defies traditional "geopolitical reason" — Echarmion

It doesn't. Ukraine and especially Crimea are of great geopolitical and historical importance to Russia and always have been. They've fought several wars over them.

No realist should have been surprised that the Russians after over a decade of warnings chose to use force to secure what they believed to be their vital strategic interests.

In fact, Mearsheimer predicted it almost ten years in advance.

Russian imperialism allows us to predict Russia hegemonic ambitions in Ukraine centuries before Putin and Mearsheimer were even born.
And Mearsheimer based his predictions about Russia on history as well, not only on abstract security dilemmas (which are extrapolated from history anyways). Here:

Second, there is the danger of hypernationalism, the belief that other nations or nation states are both inferior and threatening and must therefore be dealt with harshly. Expressions of Russian and
Ukrainian nationalism have been largely benign since the Soviet collapse, and there have been few manifestations of communal hatred on either side. Nevertheless, the Russians and the Ukrainians neither like nor trust each other. The grim history that has passed between these two peoples provides explosive material that could ignite conflict between them.
Russia has dominated an unwilling and angry Ukraine for more than two centuries, and has attempted to crush Ukraine's sense of self-identity. Recent history witnessed the greatest horrors in this relationship: Stalins government murdered an astounding 12million Ukrainians during the 1930s. Though Stalin was a Georgian, and the Soviet Union was not a formally "Russian' government, Russia had predominant power within the Soviet Union, and much of the killing was done by Russians. Therefore, the Ukrainians are bound to lay heavy blame on the Russians for their vast suffering under
Bolshevism. Against this explosive psychological backdrop, small disputes could trigger an outbreak of hypernationalism on either side.
https://www.mearsheimer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Mearsheimer-Case-for-Ukrainian-Nuclear-Deterrent.pdf

And Putin himself made a historical point (however questionable) in rejecting Ukrainian as an independent nation to justify his war:
In essence, Ukraine's ruling circles decided to justify their country's independence through the denial of its past, however, except for border issues. They began to mythologize and rewrite history, edit out everything that united us, and refer to the period when Ukraine was part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as an occupation. The common tragedy of collectivization and famine of the early 1930s was portrayed as the genocide of the Ukrainian people.
https://www.prlib.ru/en/article-vladimir-putin-historical-unity-russians-and-ukrainians

What Mearsheimer did NOT predict is the window of OPPORTUNITY that Putin chose to aggress Ukraine.

It doesn't. Ukraine and especially Crimea are of great geopolitical and historical importance to Russia and always has been. They've fought several wars over them. — Tzeentch

That is not really the point though. The point is that Russia had no particular reason to invade in 2022.

No realist should have been surprised that the Russians after over a decade of warnings chose to use force to secure what they believed to be their vital strategic interests. — Tzeentch

And yet everyone was surprised. Easy to retroactively claim that it was all predictable, but no-one did predict it.

In fact, Mearsheimer predicted it almost ten years in advance — Tzeentch

He didn't. What he predicted was that Russia would use political, economic and military pressure to either force Ukraine back into it's orbit or "wreck" it. That is indeed what happened between 2014 and 2022.

These moves were already highly aggressive but, as Mearsheimer has argued, can still be put into a geopolitical framework, namely his offensive realism. Hence prior to 2022 you could still somewhat plausibly claim that Putin is a masterful geopolitical strategist.

The invasion in 2022 in contrast is a massive gamble with no clear political endgame. It's the kind of open-ended unpredictable warfare rational players avoid.

To use a historical example, after the Munich conference you could plausibly claim that Hitler was a master strategist, skillfully wringing the maximum out of his opponents for minimal cost. The subsequent annexation of the rest of Czechoslovakia was already a high risk gamble, but could still be justified as an acceptable risk. Once Hitler invaded Poland though it became clear that rather than a master strategist, he was actually a compulsive gambler.

Insisting that there was "no reason" and that Putin is some mad man is not a serious argument.

Insisting that there was "no reason" and that Putin is some mad man is not a serious argument. — Tzeentch

I did add the word "particular", as in nothing had dramatically changed for Russia's position in Ukraine.

Whether or not Putin is a mad man is immaterial to the argument that the decision defies conventional wisdom (even the unconventional conventional wisdom of Mearsheimer).

[...] nothing had dramatically changed for Russia's position in Ukraine. — Echarmion

This is another version of the "no reason" comment. The Russians clearly believed and told us otherwise, and the idea that a great power goes to war for "no reason" is just not a serious argument.

It's quite easy to see from the Russian point of view what was changing in Ukraine: Ukraine was in the process of being trained and armed by NATO to a point where Russia's standing army would no longer be able to intervene. During the initial invasion Ukrainian forces outnumbered the Russians (est. 200,000+ vs. 100,000 - 190,000 respectively).

Coupled with NATO rhetoric of incorporating Ukraine, it was clear from their point of view they were expecting NATO to create a fait accompli.

This is another version of the "no reason" comment. The Russians clearly believed and told us otherwise, and the idea that a great power goes to war for "no reason" is just not a serious argument. — Tzeentch

You're constantly arguing that European politicians are stupid and / or incompetent, but entertaining the possibility that the russian leadership made a stupid or incompetent decision is "not serious". Why not?

It's quite easy to see from the Russian point of view what was changing in Ukraine: Ukraine was in the process of being trained and armed by NATO to a point where Russia's standing army would no longer be able to intervene. During the initial invasion Ukrainian forces outnumbered the Russians (est. 200,000+ vs. 100,000 - 190,000 respectively).

Coupled with NATO rhetoric of incorporating Ukraine, it was clear from their point of view they were expecting NATO to create a fait accompli. — Tzeentch

What kind of fait accompli could NATO create?

It is entirely plausible that Russia saw the window for military intervention in Ukraine closing. That was the prelude for many a military adventure through history. But that alone doesn't explain the decision for a military escalation in the first place.

Prior to the invasion, plenty of people believed Russia would be using their military for another round of gunboat diplomacy, which was a reasonable assumption. Russia of course also had the option to offer to abandon the Donbas separatists in exchange for a commitment to a neutral Ukraine with some kind of economic deal thrown in. In view of the pivot to Asia, the latter choice seems especially appealing.

[...] entertaining the possibility that the russian leadership made a stupid or incompetent decision is "not serious". Why not? — Echarmion

You're both mischaracterizing your own position (you're arguing there was "no reason" to invade Ukraine - obviously not a serious argument) and mine (I never argued the Russian leadership was unable to make mistakes).

Cheap rhetorical tricks won't help you with being taken seriously here.

What kind of fait accompli could NATO create? — Echarmion

I already explained.

Russia of course also had the option to offer to abandon the Donbas separatists in exchange for a commitment to a neutral Ukraine with some kind of economic deal thrown in. — Echarmion

First-hand accounts from Merkel and Hollande tell us that NATO entered the Minsk Accords in bad faith, and used it to buy time to arm Ukraine. NATO was fully committed to flipping Ukraine.

The idea that if only the Russians stopped backing the separatists NATO would agree to Ukrainian neutrality is probably one of the most far-fetched things I've heard so far. I hesitate to say: not a serious argument.

You're both mischaracterizing your own position (you're arguing there was "no reason" to invade Ukraine - obviously not a serious argument) and mine (I never argued the Russian leadership was unable to make mistakes).

Cheap rhetorical tricks won't help you with being taken seriously here. — Tzeentch

I'm not arguing there was literally no reason.

First-hand accounts from Merkel and Hollande tell us that NATO entered the Minsk Accords in bad faith, and used it to buy time to arm Ukraine. NATO was fully committed to flipping Ukraine. — Tzeentch

Assuming this is true, how is this "bad faith"? The entire premise of your argument is that international relations are anarchic and guided by impersonal geopolitical forces. Are you now saying that Russia did not try to use the Minsk agreements to advance their goals? Doesn't Mearsheimer argue that nations will not sit back and wait but instead aggressively seek advantages?

The idea that if only the Russians stopped backing the separatists NATO would agree to Ukrainian neutrality is probably one of the most far-fetched things I've heard so far. I hesitate to say: not a serious argument. — Tzeentch

So on the one hand you're telling us that Europe's diplomats ought to scale back the rhetoric and couple deterrence with de-escalation. But also de-escalation is not even a serious argument because NATO will by default make unacceptable demands.

Assuming this is true, how is this "bad faith"? — Echarmion

You're asking me how it is bad faith to enter a peace agreement in order to double down on what caused the war in the first place?

Doesn't Mearsheimer argue that nations will not sit back and wait but instead aggressively seek advantages? — Echarmion

There's nothing within the realist framework that says cooperation cannot happen when it is rational to cooperate.

But also de-escalation is not even a serious argument because NATO will by default make unacceptable demands. — Echarmion

Again, you're just pulling this out of your ass. I never argued this.

I get the impression you are deliberately trying to waste my time with this nonsense. Let me know when you have something substantial to add to the discussion.

You're asking me how it is bad faith to enter a peace agreement in order to double down on what caused the war in the first place? — Tzeentch

No, I'm asking you what is bad faith about arming Ukraine in parallel to the Minsk agreements.

The agreements contain no clause to this effect, so you're asking NATO to unilaterally de-escalate. Did Russia unilateraly take steps to reduce the threat posed by the separatists?

There's nothing within the realist framework that says cooperation cannot happen when it is rational to cooperate. — Tzeentch

Great, I agree. So why was it impossible for Russia and NATO to cooperate in February 2022, and why would it have then been possible in April 2022 or now?

Edit: Or, in case you reject my framing of the question, if it was possible to cooperate in February 2022, why didn't Russia choose this path given the many advantages of cooperation with Europe.

The agreements contain no clause to this effect, so you're asking NATO to unilaterally de-escalate. — Echarmion

I'm not asking NATO anything.

NATO leaders admitted to signing a peace agreement not with the intention of maintaing peace, but with the intention to arm for war.

Your suggestion that Russia could withdraw support for the Donbas separatists and in turn NATO would agree to a neutral Ukraine is therefore laughable.

Great, I agree. So why was it impossible for Russia and NATO to cooperate in February 2022, and why would it have then been possible in April 2022 or now?

Edit: Or, in case you reject my framing of the question, if it was possible to cooperate in February 2022, why didn't Russia choose this path given the many advantages of cooperation with Europe. — Echarmion

This question has been answered a million times already. I'm not going to answer it again.

NATO leaders admitted to signing a peace agreement not with the intention of maintaing peace, but with the intention to arm for war. — Tzeentch

That's an entirely new claim you're making. Previously it was arming Ukraine, now it's "prepare for war".

You earlier stated you agree with the principle of deterrence. Why is this not covered by deterrence?

Your suggestion that Russia could withdraw support for the Donbas separatists and in turn NATO would agree to a neutral Ukraine is therefore laughable. — Tzeentch

"Therefore"? What exactly is the premise this is referring to? Because to me it reads like you saying that NATO was bent on war this entire time.

This question has been answered a million times already. I'm not going to answer it again. — Tzeentch

Ah yes, the classic kindergarten trick.

You earlier stated you agree with the principle of deterrence. Why is this not covered by deterrence? — Echarmion

Because deterrence is supposed to make war less likely, instead of provoke it.

Because to me it reads like you saying that NATO was bent on war this entire time. — Echarmion

Yep. That's something I've repeatedly argued in this thread: NATO, the US in particular, was purposefully seeking conflict in Ukraine from 2008 onward.

Ah yes, the classic kindergarten trick. — Echarmion

Just being selective with what I spend my time on.

If you think you're entitled to me regurgitating topics that have been covered here dozens of times, you are sadly mistaken.

Because deterrence is supposed to make war less likely, instead of provoke it. — Tzeentch

That's just rephrasing the claim. What distinguishes deterrence from aggressive armament?

Yep. That's something I've repeatedly argued in this thread: NATO, the US in particular, was purposefully seeking conflict in Ukraine from 2008 onward. — Tzeentch

Which just seems to strengthen my argument that Russia made a bad move by choosing to continually escalate in Ukraine.

As I have argued before, the different threads of your argument are contradictory. If the theory about the pivot to Asia is correct, then Russia's security interests demand cordial relations with Europe and it should seek to expand it's soft power, avoiding open conflict with Europe while positioning itself to take over from the US. In this scenario short-term control of Ukraine is a secondary concern, as Russia can wait out the US and then push it's advantage later once the US is embroiled with China.

But given the fact that Russian actions demonstrably run counter this strategy, you're reverting to an entirely different security environment where you ignore the pivot to Asia and argue as if Russia faces eventual destruction by a war-hungry NATO unless it preemptively creates a buffer.

You're constantly accusing Europe of ignoring the obvious signs on the wall yet Russia plays exactly to the US playbook and you have nothing to say about that?

If you think you're entitled to me regurgitating topics that have been covered here dozens of times, you are sadly mistaken. — Tzeentch

Oh I'm not entitled to anything. It's just interesting to see how you're strenuously avoiding to answer uncomfortable questions.

Which just seems to strengthen my argument that Russia made a bad move by choosing to continually escalate in Ukraine. — Echarmion

Of course not. The Russians believe NATO membership for Ukraine to be a threat to their vital strategic interests. They simply couldn't ignore it. That's what a red line means. They spent 15 years trying to avert this outcome.

You're constantly accusing Europe of ignoring the obvious signs on the wall yet Russia plays exactly to the US playbook and you have nothing to say about that? — Echarmion

This ties into the fact that Ukraine represents Russian key strategic interests, and therefore NATO seeking to flip NATO couldn't be ignored. But it's widely accepted that Putin expected Europe to be more amendable to peace, and thus miscalculated in that regard.

On the topic of the Europeans - their ability for geopolitics has simply atrophied since the end of the Cold War, and they are now basically Uncle Sam's poodles.

It's just interesting to see how you're strenuously avoiding to answer uncomfortable questions. — Echarmion

So far your questions have been little more than disingenuous, cheap attempts at "gotchas", which have achieved little other than betray your less-than-surface-level understanding of this conflict.

Of course not. The Russians believe NATO membership for Ukraine to be a threat to their vital strategic interests. They simply couldn't ignore it. That's what a red line means. They spent 15 years trying to avert this outcome. — Tzeentch

They spend 15 years trying to avoid it only to turn it into a virtual certainty by invading. What is the political endgame of Russia here?

At no point since 1990 was Ukraine closer to NATO than now. At any point prior to 2014, Ukraine would have looked at a process of several years before eventually joining. Between 2014 and 2022, it was absolutely impossible for Ukraine to join NATO. Russia has not only gained nothing in this regard, it made it's strategic situation strictly worse.

This ties into the fact that Ukraine represents Russian key strategic interests, and therefore NATO seeking to flip NATO couldn't be ignored. But it's widely accepted that Putin expected Europe to be more amendable to peace, and thus miscalculated in that regard. — Tzeentch

Why did Putin need Europe to be amenable to peace in the first place? NATO tanks weren't about to roll into Russia in 2014 or in 2022. Even if NATO "flipped" Ukraine, what does this matter to Russia if the US is going to pivot to Asia and this kills NATO? Literally all Russia has to do in this situation is not start a war. They did the opposite. Three times.

They spend 15 years trying to avoid it only to turn it into a virtual certainty by invading. — Echarmion

Because at that point they believed war to be unavoidable. I'm not sure what's so hard to understand about that.

NATO was clearly propping up Ukraine militarily with the intention of creating a fait accompli. Russia sought to stop them before that became a reality.

Why did Putin need Europe to be amenable to peace in the first place? — Echarmion

Because there's no way the US would have provoked this conflict unless the Europeans were willing participants. Putin probably banked on the Europeans pursuing a sensible strategy. They didn't.

Even if NATO "flipped" Ukraine, what does this matter to Russia if the US is going to pivot to Asia and this kills NATO? — Echarmion

As I said, the US is seeking to prepare its pivot to Asia by leaving long-lasting conflict as its parting gift to Europe.

Because at that point they believed war to be unavoidable. I'm not sure what's so hard to understand about that. — Tzeentch

It's hard to understand because it makes no sense. Why would war be unavoidable?

NATO was clearly propping up Ukraine militarily with the intention of creating a fait accompli. Russia sought to stop them before that became a reality. — Tzeentch

But Russia wouldn't face any immediate consequences from that. This is the classic encirclement argument and it's not more convincing now than it was in 1914.

Because there's no way the US would have provoked this conflict unless the Europeans were willing participants. Putin probably banked on the Europeans pursuing a sensible strategy. They didn't. — Tzeentch

Why didn't Russia pursue a sensible strategy? Europeans were clearly happy buying russian gas. They also softballed their reaction to Georgia, and then offered diplomacy. What exactly does Russia demand from the Europeans here?

As I said, the US is seeking to prepare its pivot to Asia by leaving long-lasting conflict as its parting gift to Europe. — Tzeentch

And Russia is playing right along. You still haven't answered why. "But Ukraine is so important" - yeah but why is it important now. Just wait until the US is gone, where is the problem?

Why would war be unavoidable? — Echarmion

Because NATO insisted on threatening what the Russians believed were their vital strategic interests.

Just wait until the US is gone, where is the problem? — Echarmion

Even when the US pivots, it doesn't mean the US 'is gone', and you're suggesting handing the US the biggest trump card it could hope for? Haha, what a 'sensible' strategy.

Because NATO insisted on threatening what the Russians believed were their vital strategic interests. — Tzeentch

That's not what inevitable means. Threatening a vital interest is just that. You can choose not to respond with a military escalation.

Even when the US pivots, it doesn't mean the US 'is gone', and you're suggesting handing the US the biggest trump card it could hope for? Haha. — Tzeentch

Like handing the US a war that according to you they desperately wanted? Yeah what could possibly be better.

Like handing the US a war that according to you they desperately wanted? — Echarmion

The war in Ukraine is just the appetizer - not the actual goal. War between Europe and Russia is the American dream scenario here, and the conduct of Russia in this war so far clearly shows they are trying to avoid giving the suicidal Europeans enough reason to fall for Washington's warmongering.