, Crimea¹ then² ...
Do you suppose that the Kremlin would hand (what they now (formally) consider³) a piece of Russia over to Kyiv? Perhaps insist on a new Kharkiv Pact⁴?
Didn't Mearsheimer (and Drennan⁵ by the way) argue that Crimea remains a critical geo-political-power-military asset to Russia?
Whatever the case, something here doesn't quite add up.
And what then of their deNazification irredentist genocide⁶⁷ revanchist rhetoric (again)? For show? Propaganda?
Either way, land grab remains what they're enacting⁸⁹ (factual, non-theoretical/hypothetical).
More things that telling a coherent story would have to account for, well, unless you think there are sort of random acts involved, maybe.

Do you believe the reporting that Russia has suffered around 60,000 KIA?

Do you suppose that the Kremlin would hand (what they now (formally) consider³) a piece of Russia over to Kyiv? — jorndoe

Now?

No, not anymore. At the onset of the invasion there was still a modicum of trust which formed the basis upon which Russia could agree to a neutral Ukraine holding strategically important territory as it had since the end of the Cold War.

After the West showed its unwillingness to negotiate and kept doubling down on "strategically defeating" Russia, etc. what little trust there was, was gone.

But the fact that even the status of Crimea was negotiable shows that the Russians weren't primarily interested in territory when they invaded, that was my point. Even now the Russians point towards the Istanbul Communiqué as a starting point for negotiations, though it is unlikely they will return Crimea and the oblasts they now occupy.

And what then of their deNazification irredentist genocide⁶⁷ revanchist rhetoric (again)? — jorndoe

Ukraine has had a long-standing problem with ultranationalism, and that problem has only increased since the start of the war. The Russians view that as a threat to their interests and to long-term peace and stability. This is why they talk about 'denazification'. They mean ultranationalist militias like the Azov Batallion.

The Kremlin hasn't really been revanchist in its attitude, though. If anything it's the West that has been looking to 'punish' Russia.

So apparently, the Ukrainian attack into Kursk Oblast was not just a larger cross border raid. Ukrainian troops are apparently still fighting in Russia.

It's possible they're opportunistically exploiting a situation of course and planning to retreat as soon as opposition is stiffening. Too early to tell really.

If this is a sustained operation it's notable in that it would be Ukraine widening the front, which so far they've tried to avoid. A change of strategy?

↪boethius Do you believe the reporting that Russia has suffered around 60,000 KIA? — RogueAI

Exact KIA and casualty figures are hard to come by, but I'd have no problem believing Russia has suffered 60 000 KIA. Seems reasonable.

If your point is that Russia has suffered losses, that is clearly true.

As I've just recently mentioned, my main concern is Ukrainian wellbeing and lives.

I find it highly debatable that the war is harming Russia geopolitically in relative power terms, certainly vis-a-vis Ukraine but also with respect to the US and NATO. For example, the war has done significant harm to the European economy, which may turn out to be bad for NATO, whereas Russia has been able to continue to export commodities and arms and the global uncertainty the war brings may turn out to be good for commodity and arms export.

This has already been discussed at some length multiple times, and the main argument that seems to arise to demonstrate the war is weakening Russia is that it is in fact China the greatest beneficiary of the war and the Russia-China led block has gained significantly as a whole but Russia is a junior partner in that "close friendship". This seems a pretty weak argument to me for many reasons.

However, I'm not so interested in the relative power jostling for power between the US, Russia and China, but more concerned about whether it makes sense for Ukrainians to sacrifice to reduce slightly Russian relative power, even if the were true. If we agree it does not make sense for Ukrainians to sacrifice themselves for US relative power over Russia ... or Chinese relative power over the US and Russia?! (which is what the "real winner is China and Russia is the junior partner" argument seems to imply) then it's of course also interesting to try to evaluate whether Russia is even being harmed in relative power terms. It's a complicated military, economic, political and cultural issue to try to get to the bottom of, necessitating developing a lot of potential scenarios to parse out the benefits and costs of the war to Russia and other relevant parties.

So apparently, the Ukrainian attack into Kursk Oblast was not just a larger cross border raid. Ukrainian troops are apparently still fighting in Russia.

It's possible they're opportunistically exploiting a situation of course and planning to retreat as soon as opposition is stiffening. Too early to tell really.

If this is a sustained operation it's notable in that it would be Ukraine widening the front, which so far they've tried to avoid. A change of strategy? — Echarmion

The strategy is the same of creating a "success story" for the Western media.

This stunt replaces the crossing the Dnieper stunt.

Ukraine has military problems, obviously, but its biggest short term problem is financial. If the money runs out then the whole things collapses overnight.

To solve this financial problem, Ukraine needs the Western media to present things in a positive light and forestall any realistic appraisal of Ukrainian military capabilities relative the Russians.

As soon as the Western media concludes that Ukraine is for sure definitely losing, and the losses so far have been overwhelming terrible and difficult to justify, and also the whole thing makes zero sense, there's zero chance of a military reversal and more fighting just means more death and suffering (mainly for the Ukrainians) for nothing, then the whole "this is just what we do (send arms and money to Ukraine)" current disposition of Western institutions will come under significant pressure.

Attitudes can change organically due to undisputed facts on the ground (Western media does have to maintain some minimum level of credibility) and also simply from orders from the top that it's time to pull the plug.

Zelensky needs to prevent both things from happening, which requires sending good news Westward, which required "successes" that may mean nothing strategically and be nonsensical in terms of resources, such as creating a bridgehead across the Dnieper, but are good enough for Western talking heads to keep patting on the back Western institutional mouth pieces and all is therefore as it should be.

This is the main reason, but an additional reason is that Zelensky is also criticized from the pro-more-war factions of Ukraine (aka. literal nazis for the most part) that believe the problem has been "playing by NATO's rules" and not hitting Russia proper hard enough. These people believe that attacking Russia north of the Donbas is a good idea, and they did so before seemingly by themselves with the media narrative that it's all real Russians leading the way to overthrow their own government, if you remember that episode.

In actual strategic terms, the problem with attacking Russia is that it has enormous strategic depth, a serious problem the greatest militaries of their time, such as the Grande Armée and the Wehrmacht, discovered to their dismay after hundreds of kilometres of offensive maneuvers, and so the idea the Ukrainians are going to get somewhere and accomplish something these previous far more powerful forces didn't, is dismissible offhand.

As you're certainly aware, the writing is on the wall, but for the benefit of any others that may have been following my analysis, we are now at the rapid disintegration phase of the war.

However, Russia still cannot conquer all of Ukraine due to logistics, manpower and it often simply not being a good idea to occupy people who really don't want to be occupied (i.e. the Ukrainian speaking regions).

Although small compared to Russia, Ukraine remains pretty big with significant strategic depth of its own, so even in this phase of the Ukrainian front lines disintegrating that does not directly entail defeat.

It could, Russia may have another go at the capital and regime change, but Russia could also just stop advancing at some point, such as after conquering the Donbas.

However, wherever Russia ultimately decides to go militarily will anyways take significant time in terms of planning and logistics.

In the meantime, Ukraine, in particular Zelensky, has other also problems.

As mentioned above, the shortest pathway to total collapse is running out of money. Ukraine just defaulted on their debts. Notably, no Western country stepped in to simply pickup the tab.

Then there's the ever present prospect of a coup.

The two issues are tightly linked. As I explained many moons ago, as long as Zelensky is the avatar that can summon vast sums of cash then other Ukrainian elites need him as the conduit to said cash, but as soon as the spice stops flowing they no longer need him.

Of course, if the West keeps pouring in hundreds of billions of dollars into Ukraine, then the status quo can be maintained, with the front lines moving steadily backward which (if properly managed) could take many more years to get to some sort conclusion, but how much cash the West is willing to spend on Ukraine is a pretty big unknown.

Simply because the Western media takes it for granted that we must send Ukraine as much cash as is needed, does not mean that it's an easy thing for policy makers to do; the cash can be spent on other things.

And that's the main issue that is currently being hashed out: will the West even finance the next phase of the war, which would be just slowly losing at great monetary expense (also expense of lives but Western policy makers don't care about those).

Zelensky's behaviour is becoming very erratic because there is no winning scenario and even in comparatively better scenarios he may still be assassinated. He knows the narrative could change overnight, plug could be pulled at anytime and even if the West continues to prop the show up, his successor could be anointed any minute of the day. You can always make a new avatar and tear down the old posters.

, maybe my wording should have been different/clearer (the links could help).

Do you suppose that the Kremlin would have handed (what they (formally) consider³) a piece of Russia over to Kyiv at that time², after 8 years of efforts¹? Perhaps insist on a new Kharkiv Pact⁴? Didn't Mearsheimer (and Drennan⁵ by the way) argue that Crimea remains a critical geo-political-power-military asset to Russia?
Whatever the case, something here doesn't quite add up.

Wouldn't such a supposition also be an admission of sham³? How might that fare (in Moscow, for one)?

This is why they talk about 'denazification'. They mean ultranationalist militias like the Azov Batallion. — Tzeentch

Hmm. Apologetics to make their (deNazification irredentist genocide⁶⁷ revanchist) stories fit your narrative? Dubious. Specious.

I bring up KIA because the Ukraine situation is becoming oddly similar to America's adventure in Vietnam. In both cases, you have a strong power taking on a weak country, with the weak country being supplied and funded by other strong powers. A proxy war, in other words. Eventually, the American public soured on Vietnam, and by the time we left, we'd lost just about 60,000 soldiers. At what point is the Russian public going to sour on Ukraine?

Do you suppose that the Kremlin would have handed (what they (formally) consider³) a piece of Russia over to Kyiv at that time², after 8 years of efforts¹? Perhaps insist on a new Kharkiv Pact⁴? Didn't Mearsheimer (and Drennan⁵ by the way) argue that Crimea remains a critical geo-political-power-military asset to Russia?
Whatever the case, something here doesn't quite add up.

If Ukraine is neutral, and the West shows a sincere interest in peace, I think the Russians could have possibly been persuaded to agree to some sort of special status for Crimea.

But that was back then. Today it is unthinkable they would give back Crimea and the landbridge that leads to it.

Apologetics to make their (deNazification irredentist genocide⁶⁷ revanchist) stories fit your narrative? — jorndoe

You can find plenty of information about Ukrainian ultranationalism online. It has been a problem since the time of Bandera. Furthermore, ultranationalists are a favorite when it comes to staging coups and waging proxy wars. From a Russian perspective they're a risk factor for similar trouble in the future.



You may make of this what you will, but it's clearly present in Ukraine and likely the war has only strengthened these elements.

My sense is that a total collapse is unlikely, unless the Russians dramatically shift their military operations to a more manoeuvre-style approach.

Probably they will stick to their slow & steady war of attrition, which leaves enough breathing room for the Ukrainians to stave off collapse.

Why would Russia be able to win a war of attrition with the EU and America bankrolling Ukraine? Does Russia think the West will tire of arming Ukraine? I can see staying in before the election in the hopes that Trump wins, but if the Dems win, is Russia willing to fight an attritional war for another four years and another 60,000 KIA?

The more apt question would be, how can Russia lose?

The Ukrainians don't need money. They need manpower, ammunition, tanks, etc.

Meanwhile, the horrible toll of the war has caused many in key demographics (military age men) to either be dead or flee the country, which compounds the crippling economic effects of the war.

At this point Ukraine is essentially a zombie that's kept alive solely by Western injections of funds.

It would be a mistake to believe foreign injections of capital can maintain a status quo. It's a short-term solution, but on the long run these injections damage the Ukrainian economy even further, which in turn will make it require more injections, etc. - a vicious cycle.

War is simply not the type of problem that one can throw money at in order to solve it.

Eventually, the American public soured on Vietnam, and by the time we left, we'd lost just about 60,000 soldiers. At what point is the Russian public going to sour on Ukraine? — RogueAI

I'm doubtful of the notion that public pressure could lead to a change. The political space to organise an opposition movement in Russia is highly constrained. This is compounded by the difficulty of opposing a "patriotic cause".

Concerning Vietnam, historian Max Hastings has argued that a highly critical press which was willing to point out every US failure was critical in shaping anti-war sentiment in the US. There was also not a singular commitment to Vietnam among the leading US politicians. So there was ample political space for the anti-war movement. I don't think this space exists in Russia today.

↪boethius My sense is that a total collapse is unlikely, unless the Russians dramatically shift their military operations to a more manoeuvre-style approach. — Tzeentch

Yes, the cause of total collapse would be financial.

People can accept fighting a losing war with horrendous losses ... as long as they're paid.

Likewise, the whole government, pensions etc. is floated by the west.

Hence the publicity stunts like crossing the Dniepre or this recent "invasion" of Russia. to make things "make sense" in the Western media.

Probably they will stick to their slow & steady war of attrition, which leaves enough breathing room for the Ukrainians to stave off collapse. — Tzeentch

Well, until they can't any longer.

Ukraine has a finite man power pool. At some point Ukraine will not have the reserves to throw in to arrest advances and then Russia can manoeuvre at low losses, open new fronts, even return to siege Kiev and the like.

Keeping the fight in the South maximizes the distance Ukraine needs to go to supply the front, so this is a big advantage in the attrition phase; that politically the South being now Russian territory and protecting the separatists one of the main reasons for the war is an additional reason.

However, at any moment Russia can launch an offensive on any other point of the border, including Belarus, where defences are less built up, as we've seen Ukraine just do. Of course, a big maneuver still has the problem of occupation and pacification, and the only war ending maneuver, presumably, is taking Kiev. So, maneuver to go where and do what is a critical question, but my intuition is that there does exist large manoeuvres North that do accomplish more than they cost. We'll see though.

↪boethius I bring up KIA because the Ukraine situation is becoming oddly similar to America's adventure in Vietnam. In both cases, you have a strong power taking on a weak country, with the weak country being supplied and funded by other strong powers. A proxy war, in other words. Eventually, the American public soured on Vietnam, and by the time we left, we'd lost just about 60,000 soldiers. At what point is the Russian public going to sour on Ukraine? — RogueAI

The difference is that Vietnam was thousands of kilometres away and so the reason for the war was an abstract domino theory. There was no practical security threat of North Vietnam to the US and also zero cultural affinity with South Vietnam to make fighting for them emotionally make sense.

In the case of this war, the Russians are fighting to protect Russian speaking separatists and it is obvious what security threat hostile forces in Ukraine would represent for Russia.

It's easy to make a case for the war from the Russian perspective, so you don't have anything remotely similar to the anti-war movement during Vietnam.

Another big difference is that the US was not winning the war in Vietnam; had the US been making steady progress the "we need to win" faction may have prevailed.

Then there's the question of resources that Vietnam didn't have anything of particular importance to the US, whereas Crimea, the Azov sea, the land bridge to Crimea, lot's of arable land and industrial capacity and new Russian citizens and so on, are all positive additions that make the war "profitable" in from a purely imperialistic lens, which I have no problem believing the Kremlin does put on those glasses to consider things, from time to time.

Ukrainian troops appear to have penetrated deep into Kursk Oblast. Some pictures suggest Ukrainian troops (though probably not large formations) have reached Ljubimovka, 30km from Kursk.

What is it all good for? Hard to say. Perhaps the plan is simply to cause as much dislocation as possible, in the hopes of drawing large formations from other parts of the front.

Its also possible that Ukraine received intelligence about a russian incursion into Sumy and this is a spoiling attack.

Some russian milbloggers are apparently warning that Ukraine might seek to open further fronts and even cut off the salient of Kursk Oblast. I'm not sure where Ukraine would have gotten the forces for such an operation though.

Herewith, a little talk about the possible aims of the Ukrainian Offensive. Seems to make some sense, what say ye?

The more apt question would be, how can Russia lose? — Tzeentch

Ukraine just invaded them.

So? The previous Ukrainian offensive was a costly failure, and that's probably what this offensive will turn out as well since it makes zero military sense.

Seems to make some sense, what say ye? — unenlightened

Ukraine's actions in Kursk make no military sense. It's Ukraine that is strapped for manpower, ammunition, etc. They cannot hold ground, their cities are being surrounded and they are losing villages almost daily. Opening another front when already overstretched seems completely counter-productive at least from a military standpoint.

Mearsheimer had the following to say about it:

I don't understand what the military objective is. In fact, if anything, what this is gonna do is detract from their effort in the eastern part of Ukraine to stimey the Russian steamroller, which is consistently moving forward every day and attriting the fighting units the Ukrainians have arrayed on that eastern front.

What the Ukrainians should be doing with those forces that they sent into Russia in the Kursk area, is those forces should have been sent to the frontlines in the eastern part of Ukraine to buttress the forces that are buckling underneath the Russian steamroller.

It makes no sense to attack into Kursk. What are they gonna gain from doing this? Are they gonna, you know, help win the war? Not at all. So this is a foolish, last-minute gamble from my perspective, on the part of the Ukrainians, to try and turn things around. — John J. Mearsheimer

Personally, the most plausible explanation I have heard so far comes from Alexander Mercouris who reported the possible target of this incursion is a nuclear weapons facility located in Kursk. The goal would be to capture or otherwise threaten this facility in order to gain some kind of leverage over the Russians that could be used in diplomatic negotiations for an end to the war, of which the Ukrainians currently have none.

This would explain why this incursion is hardly covered in western media. This last tidbit is actually quite significant, because if we were looking at some form of Ukrainian success, we would expect the entire western media to fawn over it in an attempt to score some propaganda victory. The fact that we don't see that makes for an unclear picture of what this is/was meant to achieve. Perhaps the West wasn't onboard with attacks on nuclear facilities, which is what Mercouris also hints at.

Seems to make some sense, what say ye?
— unenlightened

Ukraine's actions in Kursk make no military sense. — Tzeentch

Well I could make sense of what the professional military analyst I linked to was saying. Perhaps the Ukrainian military is stupid, and so is my analyst and so am I. But when your response AND Your quote of Mearsheimer begin with declarations of incomprehension, I rather tend to think that a strategic justification that seems to make sense to me would be worth actually considering and responding to.

Ukraine seems to have already mined a road to the South, and begun to fortify a couple of defensive lines one on the Eastern side of Sudzha, and one closer to the Ukraine border. and clearly this is not just a propaganda raid. They might be going for the nuclear plant, and I have seen several reports of them being already 20 k up the road in that direction, but there is another 30 k to go, and the logistics of holding the plant and the supply line territory would be formidable.

Russia said Wednesday that it strengthened security at the Kursk nuclear power plant amid Ukraine's assault in the region.

The Russian Guard Corps said it took additional measures to ensure the safety of the plant, including the deployment of additional units in the area. — yourlink

Well it is pretty clear that there are no significant combat troops in the area, only conscript units So I imagine if the plan is is to disable that plant and shut it down for a good while, they could probably do so. To hold it longer term might also be possible, but would be costly.

What makes a deal more sense is that the aim is to force the Russian to fight an offensive war on their own territory, and continue to attrit the Russians with a slow defensive retreat, as explained in the video above.

Herewith, a little talk about the possible aims of the Ukrainian Offensive. Seems to make some sense, what say ye? — unenlightened

I like this explanation because that plan requires only a relatively straightforward sequence of events. Ukraine takes a bunch of territory at relatively little cost, which it believes Russia will then be forced (for domestic political reasons) to recapture at relatively greater effort.

The idea of some grand offensive towards Kursk or to cut off a large chunk of russian territory seems fanciful given Ukraines past capabilities.

I don't understand what the military objective is. In fact, if anything, what this is gonna do is detract from their effort in the eastern part of Ukraine to stimey the Russian steamroller, which is consistently moving forward every day and attriting the fighting units the Ukrainians have arrayed on that eastern front.

What the Ukrainians should be doing with those forces that they sent into Russia in the Kursk area, is those forces should have been sent to the frontlines in the eastern part of Ukraine to buttress the forces that are buckling underneath the Russian steamroller.

It makes no sense to attack into Kursk. What are they gonna gain from doing this? Are they gonna, you know, help win the war? Not at all. So this is a foolish, last-minute gamble from my perspective, on the part of the Ukrainians, to try and turn things around. — John J. Mearsheimer

What I don't understand is how Mearsheimer can conclude this is a "foolish last minute gamble" when he also admits he doesn't actually know what the objective is.

Clearly this incursion is going to be crushed in time. The idea that it will keep the Russians busy when they're in need of rest is upside-down thinking; it's the Ukrainians who are overstretched, battered and in need of rest. Reportedly the Russians have several hundred thousand troops standing in reserve, so exhaustion is not a major factor.

If the previous years are anything to go by, the Russians were likely to continue their offensive actions throughout the winter anyway.

Ukraine's previous offensive was a failure from every military angle as well, but something that makes no military sense may still make political sense. The question is whether it will change anything for Ukraine and the answer is probably not.

Clearly this incursion is going to be crushed in time. — Tzeentch

Yes of course. Wagner are being recalled from Africa to do it! It might take them an hour or two...
You wonder why the Ukrainians ever bothered to resist at all. They must be crazy berserkers.

You wonder why the Ukrainians ever bothered to resist at all. They must be crazy berserkers. — unenlightened

That's what propaganda and war do to people, unfortunately. They become radical, irrational and emotionally driven.

In fact, if I were to be particularly cynical I would assume such a state of mind is actively encouraged by those who would see a nation fight to the bitter end.

The Ukrainians were ready for peace in March/April 2022. The West made peace impossible. So when one wonders why the Ukrainians can be bothered to resist - well, what other options did the West give them?

If Ukraine is neutral, and the West shows a sincere interest in peace, I think the Russians could have possibly been persuaded to agree to some sort of special status for Crimea.

But that was back then. Today it is unthinkable they would give back Crimea and the landbridge that leads to it. — Tzeentch

Possible, sure, maybe. Plausible, no. Would have handed the keys back to Kyiv, no, not likely.

DeNazification is their word, one they've been using consistently, and associates with the "Great Patriotic War". (Ukraine generally replaced "Great Patriotic War" with "Second World War" around 2015.) They've accused Ukraine of Nazi rule, and, they say, mean to deNazify Kyiv. Well...Mariupol first. You'll find attempts to justify its use in the thread. But, taking some liberties with your comment, you're right that their rhetoric is "alternate world" ridiculous, though it goes with their irredentist genocide⁶⁷ revanchist rhetoric. Other than that, apologetics (naïveté no good).

If Ukraine advances all the way to Moscow, all the Russians will disappear into the wilderness. That's what usually happens.

A slightly more balanced analysis: https://mickryan.substack.com/p/the-battle-of-kursk-2024

And some obviously biased "latest news"...

The US has no legitimate security concerns in Ukraine.
You cannot invade the US from Ukraine.

If Russia went and built up forces hostile to the US in Mexico, obviously the US would respond to that. — boethius

Here your assumptions seem that “legitimate security concerns” for one state is only about being “invaded” by foreign countries, and that the only relevant comparison over security concerns is between the US and Russia. But I deeply disagree with both.
1. As I argued elsewhere, “legitimate” is an ambiguous expression: it can be used to express “accuracy” of one’s judgement about perceived risks in terms of security. In that sense also nazis, terrorists, mobsters have legitimate security concerns, because certainly there historical circumstances that potentially harm nazis, terrorists, mobsters more than other circumstances. In another sense, “legitimate” is about other people’s recognition or acknowledgement about somebody’s rights to commit certain actions within an international legal order. So nazis, terrorists, mobsters violating this legal order can not appeal to “legitimate” security concerns to justify their violations, no right of violating the international legal order can be acknowledged by those who are committed to preserve such international legal order. An unprovoked aggressive war (the one Russia inflicted on Ukraine) is not justifiable by security concerns in light of the legal world order Westerners support, a provoked defensive war (the one by which Ukraine resists Russia) is. “Provoked” is not about hypothetical scenarios but actual offensive acts like actual territorial sovereignty violations (as in Russian actual territorial occupation of Ukraine).
I don’t mind you using the expression “legitimate security concerns” once the distinction of the 2 meanings is clearly stated and acknowledged because we should neither conflate the 2 meanings nor assume that one implies the other. Indeed, one can successfully claim that Russia has legitimate security concerns in the first sense, and yet deny the second after the invasion of Ukraine.
2. “invasions” are not the only object of State’s security concerns, destruction of its infrastructures, commercial routes, means of defence and sustenance, and strategic assets (like commodities and technology) can be considered a security threat. Also all factors that may socially destabilise a country beyond conventional wars: like support of terrorists, criminals, illegal immigration or independence movements within a state are security threats. So there are different forms of “security concern”: in previous posts, you yourself were talking about the possibility of putting offensive nuclear missiles in Ukraine as a security concern for Russia, and Tzeench was talking about the threat posed by NATO to the Black Sea fleet in Crimea, and the Black Sea fleet is used for power projection not just defense. Even if one wanted to circumscribe the usage of “security concern” to mere military capacity/equipments and operations, Russia has means and ways to hit the US militarily (see threats of nuclear escalation or “deploy conventional missiles within striking distance of the United States and its European allies”), so it’s not outlandish if the US wanted to increase deterrence against Russia for that reason only. But, at this point in history, I don’t think this the only reason or even the main one: the main reasons are more likely rooted in the security dilemmas for the US within a wider context of a multiplayer hegemonic competition, with China as the primary challenge. BTW something similar holds for Russia too: i.e. I don’t think Russia’s ambitions are primarily about defending itself from an hypothetical future invasion by the US or NATO from Ukraine, Russia’s ambitions are more maximalist, also declaredly so, they are seeking to establish a new world order in which they see themselves in some leading position, along with the US and China. Control over Ukraine contributes to increase Russia’s hegemonic status and power projection in Europe, in the mediterranean area and in the Middle East.
3. Talking about security threats from future invasions of Russia by the US/NATO from Ukraine which didn't join NATO yet what about about future invasions of Russia by the US/NATO from Finland joining NATO (apparently, Russia's border with NATO more than doubles with Finland as a member)? Isn't that a more imminent threat to Russia security? And yet Putin has even withdrawn forces from there instead of bolster them (https://kyivindependent.com/russia-has-moved-almost-all-forces-from-finlands-vicinity-to-ukraine-media-report/)
4. The pertinence of comparing only Russia’s vs the US’s “security concerns” is also questionable. As I argued, Russia is a security threat to Europe with or without the US. Russia’s hegemonic ambitions are a non-negligible security threat at the very least for all neighbouring countries and countries in geographic proximity, like East European countries (including Ukraine). And Russian DOUBLE aggression of Ukraine confirms that is the case MORE EVIDENTLY than an hypothetical future scenario wereNATO forces invade Russia. The US is at the centre of a system of strategic alliance with European countries and the idea of an alliance like NATO is to share responsibilities on security matters to benefit all allies (including the US). And the US would clearly have a greater burden if it wants to lead the alliance. So the US can NOT ignore Russia’s power projection in Europe, if the US wants to preserve its hegemony in Europe.

As for Ukraine, when you are a weaker nation beside a much stronger nation, your security is not served by forming military cooperation with another major power thousands of kilometres away that (precisely because you are of no relevance to their actual security) is not going to actually send any armies to come defend you if you get invaded due to becoming hostile to your more powerful neighbor.

For example, Mexico's security is not served by becoming a vassal to Russia to get a supply of arms to then lose a war to the United States. — boethius

The assumption is questionable for several reasons.
1. EU and NATO are an economic/military alliance between Ukraine and European states too, not just between Ukraine and the US. Indeed, as we are seeing now, the EU is pressed into taking greater responsibility than the US in Ukraine. I also argued that even a fully European military alliance e.g. between France, Germany, Poland, the UK and Finland that could include Ukraine could still be perceived as a security concern by Russia AS LONG AS Russia has no part in it, EVEN MORE SO due to the geographic proximity of all involved parties and historical precedents (the US never invaded Russia, Europeans did, Eastern Europeans’ primary security concern is Russian imperialism, and American imperialism is compelled to focus on the Pacific).
2. Weaker countries may very much prefer to strategically ally for their own security with a superpower far away than with the closest superpower if this ensures greater political and economic freedom (beside Europe, also in the Pacific we have evidence of this logic since many Asian countries prefer to ally with the US not with China). Besides you persist in arbitrarily assuming that all countries are or should be like peace-maximizers, but that’s a historically questionable belief and, in principle, arguably not on you to establish.
3. Your argument looks self-defeating, because you want to claim at the same time that the US can invade Russia from Ukraine if it wanted (so it’s a “legitimate” security concern for Russia for that reason), and yet that the US wouldn’t want to invade Russia from Ukraine “precisely because you [Ukraine] are of no relevance to their actual security”.
4. My understanding is that Russia’s strategic reasoning could have been something like: the US/NATO is getting to unpopular in Europe, as long as Europeans are dependant on Russian oil/gas esports they will not accept Ukraine into EU/NATO to not upset Russia (even more so if there are low-intensity conflicts due to territorial disputes), the mild opposition of EU toward the annexation of Crimea is further proof that they do not want to upset Russia, Americans are tired of the US engagement in world hegemony (see also the retirement from Afghanistan), and the US hegemony is now compelled primarily by the Chinese challenge, and troubled by domestic politics conflict (including Trump who is someone Putin can negotiate with) so it’s unlikely that the US would engage in an invasion of Russia from Ukraine given these historical trends. But then what’s the point of rushing into a full scale war against Ukraine to avert a possible American invasion of Russia from Ukraine, once Ukraine is in NATO?
Instead, Russia’s strategic reasoning was more like: the US/NATO is getting to unpopular in Europe, as long as Europeans are dependant on Russian oil/gas esports they will not accept Ukraine into EU/NATO to not upset Russia (even more so if there are low-intensity conflicts due to territorial disputes), the mild opposition of EU toward the annexation of Crimea is further proof that they do not want to upset Russia, Americans are tired of the US engagement in world hegemony (see also the retirement from Afghanistan), and the US hegemony is now compelled primarily by the Chinese challenge, and troubled by domestic politics conflict (including Trump who is someone Putin can negotiate with) so it’s unlikely that the US would engage in an invasion of Russia from Ukraine given these historical trends. But then what’s the point of not grabbing the OPPORTUNITY to subdue Ukraine and reclaim a superpower status (at this point not only in the eyes of the US but also of China) when the West and its leader are now too weak to oppose, Russia is at its historical peak after the collapse of Soviet Union, and the alibi of a war provoked by the Great Satan is already so popular in the West? What’s the point of not violating a Western-lead World Order supported by a declining West to achieve invaluable strategic benefits when the chances of getting punished for it by the West are at so low ?

A smaller state's security is served through a combination of defensive deterrence and diplomacy, without being a threat. Canada and Mexico coexist with the far more powerful United States because they don't threaten the US. — boethius

That’s a questionable assumption on three grounds.
1. Smaller states can also ALLY with other countries against the common enemy as the Greek city states did against the Persian empire. And one weak state might reasonably prefer to military ally with stronger and powerful countries than weaker countries.
2. Defensive moves (like Ukraine inside NATO, which is a defensive military alliance) can be perceived as hostile, despite NATO/Ukraine’s declared intentions. Russia was repeatedly assured that Ukraine inside NATO wasn’t about threatening Russia’s sovereignty, but it didn’t matter, since Russia didn’t agree anyways. Unfortunately mistrust runs on both direction: since Russia’s assurances over Ukrainian sovereignty have been actually violated by Russia repeatedly, while neither the West nor Ukraine have attacked Russia prior to Russia’s aggression of Ukraine. In any case, as long as Russia has no decision power over how Ukraine shapes its security strategy, Ukraine may raise security concerns to Russia, no matter if Ukraine joins NATO, or some other European military alliance, or it takes care for its own military security by itself (remember Mearsheimer’s argument for the Ukrainian nuclear deterrent?).
3. Russia wants Ukraine neutral, demilitarised, AND with a Russian Military Naval Base inside Ukraine, so what deterrence could Ukraine seriously achieve over Russia if these are Russian demands?

As I've explained numerous times, rights are insufficient to determine justification.

Russia has both a right and can actually justify preemptive military action against a smaller state: because it is likely to win.
A smaller state has the same right to preemptive military action but is much harder to form a justification if it is unlikely to win. — boethius

But I questioned numerous times this kind of arguments. And I’ll do it again.
1. Russia has been acknowledged no right to invade Ukraine to solve alleged “legitimate” security issues under international law (at least by the West). Russia security concerns were framed by Russia in terms of international law when Russia EXPRESSLY AND REPEATEDLY DEMANDED security guarantees (for you, “ornamental” and “with no meaning” or not expressing a “metaphysically necessity”, remember?) which it didn’t obtain, not when it aggressed Ukraine. And if it is not rights according to international law as acknowledged by parties in an international world order, then what rights are you talking about?
2. Binding the notion of “justification” to that of military victory and defeat, or war and peace is questionable. Afghans, Palestinians, Kurds are evidence that people won’t renounce to defend what they perceive to be their land and people against foreign oppression because of the disparity of military means and costs for fighting foreign oppression. One doesn’t need to empathise with them, but if one’s reasoning is FACT based, one can’t reasonably discount the historical and anthropological fact that the pursuit of self-determination by some people can be a major driving force factor in war that overrides the disparity of military means or losses. Nor can one discount the FACT that these wars can be foundational of people’s national identity, in that sense the material and spiritual price to pay for that, it’s ultimately THEIR OWN choice to make in a very personal sense. So I do not need to dismiss your points nor the idea that Ukrainians might have been in better conditions now if they preferred compromise or surrender as soon as possible, actually I find such points even more compelling for Ukrainians after the rather disappointing support Ukrainians got from the West. Yet your points may not be the most personally compelling reasons to Ukrainians. Ukrainians, similarly to many other people rebelling against foreign oppression, may be no peace-maximisers. Their recurrent historical conflicts with Russia supports my belief (as acknowledged also by Mearsheimer in the article you too cited). So Ukrainians too may pursue self-determination against Russian oppression, as much as a political status which grants them greater political-economic freedom through Westernisation. And in order to achieve that they may be ready to pay related (sunk) costs despite being intolerable to peace-maximisers.
3. Ukraine is not fighting alone but with the support of Western allies, so the outcome of their conflict with Russia depends also on the Western allies contribution during and after the war. Both Europeans and the US may be very much compelled to not let Russia win (each of them for their own strategic reasons) as much as they are compelled to not let their alliance be perceived as weaker than the anti-Western strategic alliance.
My conclusion is that no, “likely winning” for a stronger state against a weaker state is neither necessary nor sufficient for justifying aggressive or defensive wars.

That "Ukraine has a right to join NATO" is not a justification for trying to do so if the likely result is being invaded, losing large amount of territory, massive economic destruction, mass exodus less likely to return the the more the war drags on, and most importantly hundreds of thousands of maimed and dead Ukrainians. — boethius

I don’t find your claim fully intelligible since “trying to do so” semantically refers to an action, but in that contest it’s used as an anaphoric reference to "Ukraine has a right to join NATO" which is not an action. Anyways, let’s charitably assume that you are kind of putting in other words what you just said: i.e. “a smaller state has the same right to preemptive military action but is much harder to form a justification if it is unlikely to win” where “preemptive military action” refers to Ukraine joining NATO. I still find your argument misleading.
1. If one wants to reason according to international law, the right for Ukraine to join NATO depends EXCLUSIVELY on the conditions established by NATO and the approval of NATO members, so “being invaded, losing large amount of territory, massive economic destruction, mass exodus less likely to return the the more the war drags on, and most importantly hundreds of thousands of maimed and dead Ukrainians” don’t necessarily prevent Ukraine from satisfying the requirements of joining NATO, not exempt NATO members to recognise such a right to Ukraine, if Ukraine satisfies such requirements. Surely unresolved/persistent territorial conflicts are an hindrance to NATO accession taken into account in the accession requirements, but not territorial, demographic, infrastructural and economic losses, even when they are significative. The same goes with the Ukrainian right of self-defence against ACTUAL aggression (not hypothetical one): foreign violations of the Ukrainian territorial integrity put a legal burden on those states which acknowledged Ukrainian territorial sovereignty , including Russia. Therefore, talking about rights outside the international law or what has been acknowledged in terms of international order by relevant participants, if that’s what you are trying to do, looks rather unjustified to me.
2. If one wants to reason strategically over longer term objectives under evolving geopolitical conditions one can not discount NATIONAL interest as perceived by the concerned nation (Ukrainians and Russians, to begin with) nor discount how all other relevant players are reacting to such conflict. So defining necessary and sufficient conditions as a function of chances of winning or achieving peace as soon as possible (not even as long as possible?) based on current military capacity of the two direct belligerents, and independently from perceived national interest or other actors’ playing strategy, looks historically and strategically myopic to me.
At best, you may wish to persuade Ukrainians (not me) that it is not in their national interest to refuse to become Russian vassals. But I would be surprised if Ukrainians would find your arguments conclusive since their national identity is rooted in a historical opposition to Russian national identity and oppression. It would like to trying to convince them that the Ukrainian national interest is better served by being Russified.

If Ukraine's "rights" actually were sufficient justification, then the West would have all their militaries in Ukraine right now, but they don't because tying rights to justifications is a fallacy. What are the consequences of doing this or that also matter in forming a justification for actions. The West doesn't like the consequences of actually sending our armies to defend "Ukrainian rights" so we don't consider it justified on that account, and so we don't do it. — boethius

If all you are saying when distinguishing arguments from “rights” and justification is that one should not conflate legal reasoning with strategic reasoning over security matters, I can agree. But then the one conflating the two is you, when you talk about Russia’s legitimate security concerns about Ukraine joining NATO, or the “right to preemptive military action” if that refers to Russia’s aggression of Ukraine to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, or the genesis of this war as Western provocation. Here is why:
1. Russia may have security concerns about Ukraine joining NATO, but such fact doesn’t commit Westerners to appease Russia’s security concerns in violation of the international world order they support. Russia has no acknowledged right to have its buffer states. While acknowledging Ukrainian sovereignty commits Westerners and Russia (since Russia too acknowledged Ukrainian sovereignty) at least to refrain from pursuing unprovoked violations of Ukrainian sovereignty, or from supporting or approving unprovoked violations of Ukrainian sovereignty by foreign powers (where “unprovoked” refers to ACTUAL aggressions of one country against another, not hypothetical ones).
2. On the other side, Ukraine can justify its patriotic war against Russia, INDEPENDENTLY from legal rights to defend itself as acknowledged by others, as a function of heir perceived national interest and a multiplayer evolving geopolitical environment. So Ukraine doesn’t need to appeal to the acknowledged rights of joining NATO to justify its patriotic war against Russia, and to tolerate related costs beyond what you find acceptable. Appeal to rights to join NATO are the reason but the consequence of Ukrainian aspirations to self-determination from Russia’s oppression.
3. Concerning the genesis of this war, again it is not reasonable to justify Russia’s aggression of Ukraine according to acknowledged rights within the Western-led international order, since Russia wasn’t actually aggressed by Ukraine or the US or NATO, there is no internationally acknowledged right for preventive wars. If there was one, Russia wouldn’t need to aspire to change the Western-led world order. It is not even justified to frame Russia’s strategic choice as a function of some “provocation” by the West since all competing geopolitical players, Russia and the US included, may be security maximisers (as Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism claims) and any increase in deterrence by one country can be considered hostile or done at the expense of other countries’ security. The only counterbalance to maximalist objectives by great powers is the risk of overstretching, not the acknowledgement of rivals’ “legitimate” security concerns. In other words, there is no acknowledged legal or strategic burden on the West to appease Russia’s claims over Ukraine or tolerate Russia’s aggression of Ukraine. It’s preposterous for boxers to call out as a “provocation” a punch in the face by their adversary as if they needed a justification to punch back the adversary, the whole point for boxers is to punch each other in the face, no matter who starts first. Similarly in a world where hegemonic powers act as competing security maximisers it's preposterous to talk about “provocation” as justification of their preventive defensive moves. And that's not all, the US approach to Russia and China wasn't even far from being as hostile as Russia and pro-Russian propaganda wants to depict it. Indeed, globalization was the US strategy to push potentially hostile authoritarian countries far from confrontational logic: letting the West do business with Russia (and China) in exchange for Westernization was the US gamble to curb hegemonic competition. DO UT DES, I'll give you wealth for decades, you'll give up on competing against the US on world hegemony. The US propaganda found also a common enemy: Islamic terrorism and climate change to re-direct security concerns. That's why Russia should not have been compelled to perceive talks about Ukraine inside NATO as an unbearable act of hostility. Returning the Ukrainian nuclear arsenal to Russia was an ACTUAL act of good will from the US more than the hypothetical future scenario of Ukraine joining NATO. Unfortunately, the more Russia and China grew richer the more they got ambitious in terms of power projection (while the US got weaker). US-led globalization EMPOWERED and BOLSTERED Russia (and China) wrt the US more than any talking about NATO expansion in Ukraine could ever do. If Russia could invade Ukraine is not because of the US provocation but thanks to the US globalization.
Your emphasis about “provocation” to explain Russia is rather myopic and comes from your confused and confusing understanding of Russia’s “rights” and “legitimate” security concerns.
To summarise, as far as legal reasoning is concerned, the genesis of the war is Russia’s violation of the international order as recognized by the West (which also Russia was committed to until it violated it in 2014). As far as strategic reasoning is concerned, the genesis of the war is in Russia’s attempt to exploit an opportunity window to change power balance in its favor at the expense of the US and its allies, given the perceived weakness of the West.

Looking forward to reading your counterarguments to each of my points (I even numbered them).