Needless to say, they do not realize that Reason is God. — Bartricks
If you like. It's just that you seem to be annoyed at a newbie for not responding, when their thread has been hijacked - you are upset a the wrong thing. — Banno
Skeptical are we? — Bartricks
How would my telling you those things do anything to reduce your skepticism? — Bartricks
Anyone could just make up such answers. — Bartricks
Here's a more reliable test: try and refute my argument. — Bartricks
It is uncontroversial that moral norms are norms of Reason. — Bartricks
Fair enough. Been there. Feel a bit sorry for SwampMan being chastised by TC for not following through, though. — Banno
try and do some philosophy and stop making things personal. — Bartricks
troll — EricH
I think that merits Mod intervention. — Banno
Banno likes to stick his nose in cause he thinks he's all wise and stuff, but you'll notice he rarely has anything substantive to say. This exchange is a case in point. — T Clark
With the new research, theorists have begun to question whether moral emotions might hold a larger role in determining morality, one that might even surpass that of moral reasoning — ZzzoneiroCosm
All morality depends upon our sentiments; and when any action, or quality of the mind, pleases us after a certain manner, we say it is virtuous; and when the neglect, or non-performance of it, displeases us after a like manner, we say that we lie under an obligation to perform it. A change of the obligation supposes a change of the sentiment; and a creation of a new obligation supposes some new sentiment to arise. — Hume, T 3.2.5.4, SBN 517
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And Kant also commits the fallacy of supposing that This ought to be means This is commanded. He conceives the Moral Law to be an Imperative. And this is a very common mistake. This ought to be, it is assumed, must mean This is commanded; nothing, therefore, would be good unless it were commanded; and since commands in this world are liable to be erroneous, what ought to be in its ultimate sense means what is commanded by some real supersensible authority. With regard to this authority it is, then, no longer possible to ask Is it righteous? Its commands cannot fail to be right, because to be right means to be what it commands. Here, therefore, law, in the moral sense, is supposed to be analogous to law, in the legal sense, rather than, as in the last instance, to law in the natural sense. It is supposed that moral obligation is analogous to legal obligation, with this difference only that whereas the source of legal obligation is earthly, that of moral obligation is heavenly. Yet it is obvious that if by a source of obligation is meant only a power which binds you or compels you to do a thing, it is not because it does do this that you ought to obey it. It is only if it be itself so good, that it commands and enforces only what is good, that it can be a source of moral obligation. And in that case what it commands and enforces would be good, whether commanded and enforced or not. Just that which makes an obligation legal, namely the fact that it is commanded by a certain kind of authority, is entirely irrelevant to moral obligation. However an authority be defined, its commands will be morally binding only if they are—morally binding; only if they tell us what ought to be or what is a means to that which ought to be. — G E Moore, Chapter IV: Metaphysical Ethics.§ 76
I don't believe he's a troll — EricH
AFAICT his positions seem consistent. — EricH
1. Moral imperatives are imperatives of reason
2. Imperatives of reason have a single source: Reason
3. Only a mind issues imperatives
4. Therefore, moral imperatives are the imperatives of a single mind
5. The single mind whose imperatives are the imperatives of reason will be omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (God). — Bartricks
If m then r If r then s If i then n ————— p q
He constantly ruthlessly insults (almost?) everyone he talks to. — ZzzoneiroCosm
G E Moore, Chapter IV: Metaphysical Ethics.§ 76 — Cuthbert
My view is, clearly, a form of divine command theory and, where moral imperatives are concerned, it is equivalent to William of Ockham's. — Bartricks
On the other side is an extreme voluntarism that says that natural law consists entirely in a command or prohibition coming from God’s will, a view that Suárez attributes to William of Ockham (DL 2.6.4). On this view, what one ought or ought not to do is wholly determined by God’s legislative acts and, furthermore, God’s legislative acts are unconstrained. That is, there is no act that is intrinsically bad such that God is compelled to prohibit it or even prevented from commanding it and no act that is intrinsically good such that God is compelled to command it. Had God commanded us to murder and steal, then doing so would have been obligatory and good. — spirit-salamander
Hitler is an excellent example. According to Salamander's view, Hitler did nothing wrong. That's silly. — Bartricks
Now, your view entails that Hitler did nothing wrong. Which is stupid. Hitler was a jerk. — Bartricks
The view that moral imperatives are our imperatives entails Hitler did nothing wrong. It is thus absurd and can be rejected — Bartricks
Suárez, on the other hand, thinks that God’s commands and prohibitions are constrained by natural goodness and badness. As befits a perfect being, God prohibits some actions precisely because they are evil. Suárez thinks it absurd to suggest that there are no actions such that they are too evil for God to command or even just to permit. To this extent, then, Suárez agrees with the naturalist; the obligations of natural law are rooted in natural goodness and badness." https://iep.utm.edu/suarez/#SH3i — spirit-salamander
BTW since he is using quantifiers (e.g."single source", "single mind") — neomac
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