Are you a hand-dryer? So much hot air.

Do you actually have a criticism?

Not yet, — neomac

Try harder.

> 1. If moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason reason, then they all have a single source: Reason
> 2. Moral imperatives are imperatives of Reason reason — neomac

Why are you crossing out 'Reason' and replacing it with 'reason'? It's 'Reason' not 'reason'. The source of normative reasons is traditionally called 'Reason' with a capital 'R' (because 'reason' is ambiguous).

What are the reasons to support the first claim? — neomac

Do you mean what reason do we have to think it is true? Why do you think we call them imperatives of Reason? My imperatives are called imperatives of Bartricks. Yours are called the imperatives of a hand-dryer. The mark of a rational imperative - an imperative of Reason - is that it comes from Reason. Now, there are lots more arguments for the unity of Reason - and relatedly, for the unity of morality - but that will do and is sufficient to place the burden of proof on you (and note, you don't discharge a burden of proof by pointing to brute possibilities - so stop asking questions and make an actual argument in support of your arbitrary belief that imperatives of Reason do not have a singular source in Reason - good luck with that).

Why are moral imperatives imperatives of God and not Gods? Why can’t Reason be shared between a plurality of divine entities as much as the divine nature is shared by 3 persons of the Holy Trinity? — neomac

Like I say, you clearly don't really understand how arguments work. They are imperatives of Reason, and Reason is a mind, and the mind in question would have the properties of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence.

Why can't they be imperatives of multiple minds? Because a group of minds is not itself a mind and it is only minds that can issue imperatives. If there were multiple minds, then in virtue of what would their imperatives be the imperatives of Reason? Furthermore, it is a principle of Reason that one should not posit more entities than is needed to get the job done: one mind is sufficient. So, positing several would be a) incoherent and b) ontologically extravagant (there's a big word for you - you can blow that at people in the future). Note as well, that even if one can coherently posit several minds (and one can't) - and it is not ontologically extravagant to do so (and it is) - you would not have refuted divine command theory, for all you will have done is multiply the number of gods!

Why are omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent attributed to Reason as a consequence of Reason being a mind? Also humans have minds but they do not seem omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. Besides Reason can be understood also in kantian terms, and not as a sort of divine entity. — neomac

Kant is never clear about what Reason is. He talks about imperatives of Reason and faculties of reason, but seems confused about what or who Reason itself is. So you'll get no help from Kant on that front.

If Reason is a mind then that mind would be omnipotent because she'd get to determine what is and isn't possible. And she'd be omniscient because she'd get to determine what is and isn't known. And she'd be omnibenevolent because she'd fully approve of how she is. That's why.

The preposition “of” in “imperatives of Reason” is ambiguous b/c it can express both a subjective and objective genitive (i.e. “Reason issues moral imperatives”, “moral imperatives are about Reason”), but depending on how we understand “moral imperatives” (see also the other previous questions) this notion can be compatible maybe with only one of the 2 senses and not the other. — neomac

If I said "let's go to the bank and withdraw some money" would you respond "the word 'bank' is ambiguous as it all depends on whether it has subjective or objective preposterous genitals - do you mean a financial institution, or the side of a valley, or 'turn'?" Yes you would, wouldn't you. You're clearly one of those Dyson hand-dryers that insist you put your hands in a narrow slot and then blow them to the side so that they flap into the dried piss of the previous user's hands - very tedious and annoying.

Imperatives of Reason are imperatives that are emanating from Reason. As is obvious from the argument.

There might be logic links between the 8 premises and the way we question them, but this depends on how these 8 premises are properly spelt out and how they are questioned. So nothing we can really decide a priori just from your 4 deductions. — neomac

What? Gibberish. Only 4 premises can be questioned for all of the others follow logically from them. But you can't see that, can you? Here: $$$<<< =X///$$$$$$$$$$$ There, see now? Or should I put a few boxes and rhomboids in there?

Conclusion: unless the claim that only 4 out of 8 premises are open to question simply means that Bartricks is open to address doubts against only 4 out of 8 premises (which I don’t care, of course), then all 8 premises (not 4, not 5, not 6, not 7, but 8, exactly all 8 premises out of 8 premises!) can be pertinently questioned. Q.E.D. — neomac

Not 'Q.E.D. but 'W.T.F'. I have literally no idea what you are on about at this point.

Now, do you have an actual argument to make that calls into question the truth of any of the four premises of my argument?

Just wondering though, wouldn't it be easier (on our egos among other things) to simply give up the idea of God, come to terms with the Sky Father being merely a figment of our imagination, a sign of our desperation? — Agent Smith

I am trying to figure out what's true, not what it is easiest to believe. God exists, as my argument demonstrates. And the 'problem' of evil is no problem at all, just evidence that we are not God's creations and that we are in a penal colony as just punishment for previous immoral behaviour.

This 'criticism' is one that can be made of any analysis of morality.
— Bartricks

How can you be so sure? And if it were so, one would have to question every prescriptive moral theory. One must then not be afraid of doing so. — spirit-salamander

Well, I showed you how it would apply to non-naturalism. Nothing stops 'the Form of the Good' from issuing a prescription to kill others for fun, does it? So, it applies to non-naturalism.

What about naturalism? Well, if natural features can issue prescriptions - and obviously they cannot, but the naturalist thinks otherwise (or else isn't talking about morality at all) - then what stops the natural world or some relevant part of it (the trees, perhaps) from issuing a prescription to kill others for fun? Nothing. Yet were it to do so, then killing others for fun would be right. So it applies to naturalism.

I take it that you now reject those two kinds of view?

Right, moving on....well, it clearly applies to individual and collectivist subjectivist views, for nothing stops me from issuing a command to others to kill others for fun, and nothing stops a collective from doing the same (apart from the incoherence of thinking that collectives are themselves minds capable of issuing imperatives, of course).

So, I take it that you now reject individual subjectivist views - such as your own - and collectivist subjectivist views?

What about nihilism? Well, most nihilists think that morality is at least capable of existing, they just think it does not. So they think that there is a 'possible world' in which some acts are right and some wrong. But if they admit that there is a possible world in which some acts are right and some wrong, then they should accept that there are other possible worlds in which very different acts are right and wrong, such as killing others for fun. For in these possible worlds one of the above theories about morality will be true, and we've just seen that they can't rule out such possibilities.

So, I take it that you now reject this kind of nihilism as well.

The only view to which the criticism could not be made, would be the view that morality is incoherent and thus is incapable of existing. However, a proponent of that view thinks Hitler actually did nothing wrong. And if one is fine with that view, then it would be somewhat ridiculous to reject views that allow that it is metaphysically possible for Hitler's acts not to be wrong, but that they were in fact very wrong indeed, wouldn't it?!? So I take it that you reject that view too.

So, the criticism can be made of all alternatives worth considering. And it is my view and mine alone that can deal with it.

Note, you are now in the incoherent position of having rejected all possible views about the nature of morality. So, if you are logical, you will now realize that something must be wrong with the criticism, for they can't all be false.

If only there was some kind of instrument that one could use quickly to find out about these matters - a kind of 'searching engine'.
Do your own research grandpa. Paul McCartney has a PhD in music. It's an honorary PhD. Go look at the argument I was addressing and see if the premises were qualified so as to rule out honorary PhDs.

And then try and engage with something relevant to the OP. You people - total lack of focus. I hope none of you are air traffic controllers.

No, God is a person.

The faculty of reason isn't a person, though you could argue that the person of God is flawlessly reasonable. But we know for a fact God is a person, so, no, you're wrong.

I have presented an argument that demonstrates that Reason is a person, God, and that moral commands are the commands of God. Get up to speed and then try and contribute an argument, don't just blurt.

Okay I'll stop blurting.

Blurt
blurt
blurt

If there are blurts, there must be a blurter. The blurts of TheRiddler all have the same source: theRiddler. Only a mind can blurt. Therefore, TheRiddler is a blurting mind.

> try harder

What for?

> Why are you crossing out 'Reason' and replacing it with 'reason'? It's 'Reason' not 'reason'. The source of normative reasons is traditionally called 'Reason' with a capital 'R' (because 'reason' is ambiguous).

Your typo, remember? Anyway, I fixed it.

> is sufficient to place the burden of proof on you

I already proved my point. Suck it up and move on.

> Why can't they be imperatives of multiple minds? Because a group of minds is not itself a mind and it is only minds that can issue imperatives. If there were multiple minds, then in virtue of what would their imperatives be the imperatives of Reason? Furthermore, it is a principle of Reason that one should not posit more entities than is needed to get the job done: one mind is sufficient. So, positing several would be a) incoherent and b) ontologically extravagant (there's a big word for you - you can blow that at people in the future). Note as well, that even if one can coherently posit several minds (and one can't) - and it is not ontologically extravagant to do so (and it is) - you would not have refuted divine command theory, for all you will have done is multiply the number of gods!

Well at least nobody can say you don’t know how to glorify your intellectual failures.
Here some charitable thoughts for you:

• I didn’t claim that a group of minds is a (one) mind but since you suggested it, it’s not even clear why a group of minds can’t issue imperatives collectively like legal/judicial systems as institutional collective bodies or think about the concept of "General Will" by Rousseau or the "Collective Unconscious" by Jung.
• “If there were multiple minds, then in virtue of what would their imperatives be the imperatives of Reason?” whatever that is supposed to mean, should I care? All I can say is that there might be different ways in which “Reason” and “imperatives of Reason” can be understood. So it’s on you to clarify their meaning and support related premises with adequate evidences. I’m not saying you are capable of this or willing to do this (I doubt both), I’m just saying it should be your task, not mine.
• “a principle of Reason that one should not posit more entities than is needed to get the job done” what is the “job” to be done here? The Holy Trinity admits three Persons with the same devine nature. So the number of ontological entities to posit depends on the explanatory role they have to play. In Kant, the practical reason that issues categorical imperatives belongs to a plurality of human beings, so the fact that moral imperatives are universal and categorical is in not per se in conflict with the idea there can be multiple minds equipped of practical reason capable of issuing moral imperatives. And I'm not holding Kant's position or defending its consistency, I'm just using it to prove that your claims can be pertinently questioned.
• "a) incoherent and b) ontologically extravagant" go back to square one
• "ontologically extravagant (there's a big word for you - you can blow that at people in the future)" you aren't that useless after all, thanks! I will return you the favor asap!
• “you would not have refuted divine command theory, for all you will have done is multiply the number of gods!”. If this was my intention (which is a wrong assumption), I still couldn't refute a theory before understanding well enough what it claims and it implies: in your 8 premises there are notions to clarify (what do you mean by Reason, imperatives, moral imperatives, source of moral imperatives, mind, etc.?) which make unclear meaning and truth conditions. Those 8 premises (as they are) are not evidently true for the reasons I already explained. Do you claim otherwise?! Because if you do, then this would just be the third most stupid claim one can find in this thread (which wouldn’t be a coincidence since you made also the first two).

> Only 4 premises can be questioned for all of the others follow logically from them. But you can't see that, can you? Here: $<<<=X///

Indeed, by randomly typing on a keyboard, you immediately look much smarter! So keep practicing!

> If Reason is a mind then that mind would be omnipotent because she'd get to determine what is and isn't possible. And she'd be omniscient because she'd get to determine what is and isn't known. And she'd be omnibenevolent because she'd fully approve of how she is. That's why.

Such unsolicited apodictic claims show how much you are into these old smelly scholastic farts. And that’s a second good reason why it’s pointless to argue with you about your DTC theory (especially if your preposterous terminology has not been adequately clarified). Scholastic junkies are just "ontologically extravagant entities" ;) which a principle of Reason requires me to simply get rid of (or laugh at, if in the right mood).

> Now, do you have an actual argument to make that calls into question the truth of any of the four premises of my argument?

No Fartrrricks. With you it’s not matter of truth. It’s just matter of very poor philosophical taste and lots of intellectual dishonesty. It would be stupid not to see it.

Oh, and Paul McCartney does have a PhD in music. You lose. — Bartricks

Paul has received honorary degrees from several universities, but he never attended college. — EricH

If only there was some kind of instrument that one could use quickly to find out about these matters - a kind of 'searching engine'.
Do your own research grandpa. Paul McCartney has a PhD in music. It's an honorary PhD. Go look at the argument I was addressing and see if the premises were qualified so as to rule out honorary PhDs. — Bartricks

When someone says they have a certain degree in some subject, the default assumption is that they actually attended school and earned the degree. By leaving out "PhD" in your original comment you committed a lie of omission.

But if we are including honorary, then the correct statement should have been that Paul has multiple PhDs in music. And I know that you want to be accurate (as we all do).

I present a proof that divine command theory is true, and your concern is over whether Paul McCartney has a PhD in music. You think that is the issue of pressing philosophical importance that needs discussing. Presumably when you visit the sistine chapel you stare at the floor.

There's no problem there - they come from a mind.

And they do exist - the reason (the faculty of resaon) of virtually everyone tells them that there are ways we ought to behave and ways we ought not to behave. Disagreement exists over exactly what we ought to do and ought not to do, but 'that' we ought to be doing some things and not others is beyond reasonable doubt. — Bartricks

I'm not so sure about that. Just because you ought to do something does not mean there's a moral obligation. For example, if I want to be a champion chess player, then I ought to practice chess, but I'm under no moral obligation to practice chess.

It seems obvious that we ought not torture children for the fun of it, but even there, I can remove the moral component if I stipulate that there are no children- there's only the one mind and what different aspects of it are doing to itself in its dreams. But still, I would agree that even in a dream, children should not be tortured, but not for moral reasons, but because doing things like torturing children and in general behaving like an egotistically ass in this dream we're all having will not help one reach one's goal: to wake up.

Presumably when you visit the sistine chapel you stare at the floor. — Bartricks

Presumably because also the floors are worth watching.
https://www.google.com/search?q=sistine+chapel+floor&tbm=isch&ved=2ahUKEwjKyamp8ZP2AhUEkFwKHcmZC64Q2-cCegQIABAA&oq=sistine+chapel+floor&gs_lcp=CgNpbWcQAzIFCAAQgAQyBQgAEIAEMgYIABAFEB4yBAgAEBgyBAgAEBg6BAgAEEM6BggAEAoQGDoGCAAQCBAeUIYKWPQ0YI09aAVwAHgAgAE-iAG7CpIBAjI3mAEAoAEBqgELZ3dzLXdpei1pbWewAQDAAQE&sclient=img&ei=CiQVYsqcA4Sg8gLJs67wCg&client=firefox-b-d

Just because you ought to do something does not mean there's a moral obligation. For example, if I want to be a champion chess player, then I ought to practice chess, but I'm under no moral obligation to practice chess. — RogueAI

Yes, normative oughts can be generated by any kind of normative reason, not just moral ones. In the chess case the 'ought' is the ought of instrumental rationality, not morality. That is, you have instrumental reason - rather than moral reason - to practice chess.

We can distinguish, then, between instrumental imperatives of Reason and moral imperatives of Reason. But my argument applies to them both. Moral imperatives and instrumental imperatives are imperatives of Reason. They have a different character in that instrumental imperatives tell you what to do to further your own ends, whereas moral imperatives tell you to regulate that instrumental project in ways that respect others (and typically if you do not abide by a moral imperative you deserve to come to harm, whereas if you do not abide by an instrumental imperative you do not deserve to come to harm). But they're all imperatives and they have the same source: Reason. And as they're imperatives they need an imperator. And as only a mind can be an imperator, Reason - the source of all the imperatives of Reason, is a mind.

In other words, it is normativity that is doing the work of getting me to my conclusion. Morality is just a very clear case of something that is essentially normative.

That's why the argument constitutes a proof of God. For though it is possible, coherently, to deny the reality of moral imperatives, it does not seem coherently possible to deny the reality of all imperatives of Reason, for one's basis for doing so would, of necessity, be non-rational and thus count for nothing, or else would confirm what one was seeking to deny.

Yes, and the Mona Lisa has quite a nice frame.

But they're all imperatives and they have the same source: Reason. And as they're imperatives they need an imperator. And as only a mind can be an imperator, Reason - the source of all the imperatives of Reason, is a mind. — Bartricks

:100:

Chapel was pretty cool but my favorite was the Gallery of Maps

Good floor in there was there?

↪neomac
Yes, and the Mona Lisa has quite a nice frame. — Bartricks

Not to mention that there is lots to learn from the history of Mona Lisa frames too:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mona_Lisa#Frame
https://artjourneyparis.com/blog/mona-lisa-story-behind-fame.html