we experience the empirical world (the software) through a "meta-empirical" world (the hardware). Our a posteriori knowledge (the software) is transcended by our a priori knowledge (the hardware). — RussellA
Kant was not able to benefit from Darwin's insights. — RussellA
All empirical theory is suspended, following Kant — Constance
Apriority is transcendental. a presupposition to all empirical thinking — Constance
Not true, it seems to me. For Kant, knowledge needs both empirical observation and rationalism. Kant is not saying that we don't observe the world, but he is saying that what we think we observe is determined by the innate nature of our brain. Innate are the pure intuitions of time and space, a prioiri knowledge that we know independent of experience. He wrote in Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics 1783 - "And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something." Kant postulated that the mind intuits sensory experience, which it then processes in the faculty of the understanding to produce an ordered predictable world.
IE, Kant believed intuition of objects in the external world is the primary source for our understanding. — RussellA
My reading of transcendental is not that of the supernatural, but rather that that there are many aspects of the world that we cannot explain using current scientific knowledge, such as the mind-body problem. This is not to say that such problems cannot be explained by future empirical science. — RussellA
One arrives at the proposition that only what is said empirically and analytically can make sense via his apriori arguments. — Constance
I agree with you that Kant in Critique of Pure Reason argued that we can only understand the truth of the noumena in the world by applying a priori pure intuition to the phenomena we receive from these noumena.
Kant wrote: "Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter. We can cognize only the former a priori, i.e., prior to all actual perception, and they are therefore called pure intuition; the latter, however, is that in our cognition that is responsible for it being called a posteriori cognition, i.e., empirical intuition." (B60)
He also wrote: I call all representations pure (in the transcendental sense) in which nothing is to be encountered that belongs to sensation. Accordingly the pure form of sensible intuitions in general is to be encountered in the mind a priori, wherein all of the manifold of appearances is intuited in certain relations. This pure form of sensibility itself is also called pure intuition. (B35)
However, Kant does not explain the source of these a priori pure intuitions. He does not explain how we are able have these a priori pure intuitions. — RussellA
Direct Realism is the common sense view within the philosophy of mind which states that objects are as they appear to be. All objects are made of matter and that our perceptions are entirely correct, in which case noumena correspond with phenomena.
Indirect Realism is the view that there is an external world that exists independently of the mind, but we can only perceive that world indirectly through sense data. Sense data can only represent the mind-independent world, meaning that we can only ever know a representation of the external world, in which case phenomena can never allow us to know noumena directly.
I personally believe in Indirect Realism. I understand Kant's position as also being similar to that of the Indirect Realist, even though he did not use this terminology — RussellA
Where do our a priori pure intuitions come from? Some would say from a metaphysical god, others would say that there is a physical explanation.
It follows from my belief in Physicalism, where everything in the world is physical, a world of matter and forces, and my belief that we are not born as "blank slates", in that all our behaviour is learned, that we are in fact born with innate a priori pure intuitions. These innate a priori pure intuitions are part of the structure of the brain, part of the hardware of the brain, part of the physical arrangement of neurons within the brain.
It seems clear that the brain has the physical structure it has as a consequence of an evolutionary process lasting over 4 billion years. A process where organisms change and evolve over time, along the lines of the natural selection as set out in Darwin's On The Origin of Species.
IE, our a priori pure intuitions are a direct consequence of a physical evolutionary process. — RussellA
Kant assumed that our a priori pure intuitions are true to the reality of the world. However, would this be the case if as a result of a physical evolutionary process? — RussellA
But that is not Kant. We do not become aware of noumena indirectly. We do not become aware of this at all. This is the trouble with analytic philosophy and the attempt to tall about Kant and transcendental idealism.It does not have any thematic development for this. And I will say this with emphasis: If you are looking for some way to make sense out of Kant's idealism, and to build on this, elaborate on what Kant laid out there, then talk about direct and indirect realism is not a viable alternative as it insists that empirical observation, somewhere in the discoveries through microscopes and telescopes, is going to be relevant. — Constance
Kant said that a priori knowledge is "knowledge that is absolutely independent of all experience". I propose that such priori knowledge is innate within the brain, a product of over 4 billion years of evolution and is part of the physical "hardware" of the brain.
I am curious as to your belief as to the source of this a priori knowledge, this pure intuition of time and space intrinsic in our minds? — RussellA
Kant included causation within the category of pure understanding, an a priori pure intuition, where an effect requires a cause. Given causation as an a priori pure intuition, it follows that the observer must know without doubt that there has been a cause to the phenomenon, and this cause may be called a "noumenon". — RussellA
IE, I am not aware of any justification by Kant as to why a priori pure intuitions should of necessity correspond with the reality of the external world. This is the same problem found in Indirect Realism, in discovering the reality of the external world through internal representations. — RussellA
There must be a distinction between the whole and its parts. When we observe something, we are observing a whole made up from a relationship between parts. As relations don't ontologically exist in the external world, as illustrated by FH Bradley, and relations do ontologically exist in the mind, as illustrated by the Binding problem, we can say that the parts of the object do exist in the external world, but the whole object, as a relation between its parts, can only exist in the mind as a concept. — RussellA
The parts we observe are assembled in the mind into concepts - a table is a table top plus table legs, a house is a roof plus walls plus windows, etc. But many mereological permutations are possible of the parts we observe within the external world - a table top plus table legs, my pen and the Eiffel Tower, etc. We sensibly choose and name those particular combinations that are beneficial to our evolutionary well-being and survival. — RussellA
It follows that if we think of noumena as objects in the external world consisting of a relationship between a set of parts, then it is true that noumena don't ontologically exist in the world, as relations don't ontologically exist in the external world, but only in the mind of the observer as a concept. — RussellA
IE, in my terms, it follows that our understanding of noumena as defined as objects in the external world must be transcendental in that objects in the external world don't ontologically exist. — RussellA
Only one impossible answer: we do in fact experience the (noumenal) world; and our experience is not localized to this grey physical mass. Consciousness is, after all, noumena. Nothing escapes this. Certainly not phenomena. — Constance
We begin with the self, the "I" that is conscious, the "I" that has thoughts. The "I" has thoughts about things external to the thoughts themselves, things that change with time, and these things are called phenomena. All the "I" knows for certain are phenomena - the colour red, a sharp pain, an acrid smell, a sour taste, a crackling noise. The "I" has thoughts about these individual phenomena, but more than that, the "I" combines these individual phenomena in various ways. The "I's" thoughts are about phenomena and various combinations of phenomena. — RussellA
The nature of relations is critical. My belief is that relations do ontologically exist in the mind (the Binding Problem). We call these combinations of phenomena "noumena". We think about particular combinations of phenomena and sometimes we give them a name. The combination of phenomena, the colour red, an acrid smell, a crackling noise we can name "fire", and this "fire" is a noumena. We can say that combinations of phenomena exist in a logical reality, in that noumena exist in a logical reality. A logical reality that exists in the mind. — RussellA
Noumena are combinations of phenomena. But a combination is a relation. As relations only ontological exist in the mind, noumena only ontologically exist in the mind. We can think about the noumena occupying a space, but such a space is only a logical space, nothing more than that. When thinking about space, as we are thinking about the relation between phenomena, we are thinking about a logical space. — RussellA
(FH Bradley's Regress argument). — RussellA
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