So, wisdom has to do with actuality then? And truth has nothing to do with actuality? — John

I didn't say it had 'nothing to do with actuality', no. The wisest way to act in actuality is with the best possible knowledge, related to context. I will use the word 'true' in talking to people as much as the next person, I should think. But I don't use the word 'truth' as having a Capital Letter implicit in it, if that's what you mean.

I disagree with Aristotle here; why should contemplative wisdom only be "about" right thinking — Noble Dust

Well, to be fair to Aristotle, I think he does think contemplative wisdom just *is* right thinking, though its nature is obscure: my recent tutor suggested that the gods discussed quadratic equations all day, for Ari's gods haven't got Platonic perfection to discuss, so what on earth can they talk about?

What does this even mean? — Noble Dust

I don't respond well to questions like that, but indeed, such a remark demonstrates that even in talking about 'truth' none of us can resist a rhetorical trick or two. What I meant was, I don't try and proselytize about my personal ethics. I do, however, in the political arena, campaign as a Green, because I think an ecological approach would be a better way forward than either the course we're on, or the other options on offer.

I was mostly a playwright, and I think this has greatly contributed to a pluralism of view at the heart of me. I distrust the effort to unify ideas that don't look unifiable to me. Sometimes a scientific approach is best; sometimes an artistic approach is best; sometimes a political one. Univocalism emerged, to my mind, from monotheism, and as I'm a hardline (though pro-religious) atheist, I don't see the need for it. Chasing after a theory of everything, for instance, feels like building pointless castles in the air to me. Trying to unify ways of thinking which I find it useful to separate doesn't help me, I'm afraid. I like having different aspects of me :)

I didn't say it had 'nothing to do with actuality', no. The wisest way to act in actuality is with the best possible knowledge, related to context. I will use the word 'true' in talking to people as much as the next person, I should think. But I don't use the word 'truth' as having a Capital Letter implicit in it, if that's what you mean. — mcdoodle

I really don't see what capitalization of the word 'truth' has to do with the questions I asked. I was responding to the passage below as a whole and I probably should have made that more clear:

I do feel minimalist or 'deflationary' about this truth business. We are what we do, so wisdom for me is something to do with right action. After recent personal explorations of Aristotle I'd say this can come in (a) a practical form, phronesis or practical reason being about right action, and (b) a thoughtful form, sophia or contemplative wisdom being about right thinking. This 'rightness' is not an ethic I would press upon others, it's right for me, though I might recommend the process of arriving at it to others. — mcdoodle

You say wisdom has to do with "right action". What for you, then, does "rightness" consist in? Are you perhaps recommending a pragmatic account? The same question applies as to what is "right" in relation to thinking; what does the rightness that constitutes contemplative wisdom consist in. I don't yet see how you can be sensibly "deflationary" about this; a deflated rightness seems on the face of it as though it would be no better than a deflated truth, or a deflated tyre that will not roll smoothly.

Or, again, in the earlier quoted passage. you say that the "wisest way to act in actuality is with the best possible knowledge, related to context". What exactly qualifies some knowledge as "the best possible knowledge"? I take it you are not saying that it is any kind of true knowledge, defined as knowledge which is in accordance with actuality?

So, if you are recommending deflationism in relation to truth (and presumably hence also "rightness" and actuality); what exactly do you understand to be the state of inflation that you are thinking it must be wise to deflate? Do you want to deflate any old 'correspondence' notion or are you having a go at bigger fish like religious fundamentalism, or what?

You say you don't want to press your ethics on others; does this mean that you recommend subjectivism?

I apologize for asking so many questions, but it just is not at all clear to me what you are wanting to say.

So, within the context of truth, imagination is not a subsidiary of truth, rather, imagination gives birth to truth, because imagination is primary. And so these categories of truth that have been concocted by humans are not a primary form of truth, but just an abstraction based on an inability to grasp imagination as a primary function that gives birth to primal truth. — Noble Dust

We can imagine things both true and untrue, or good and evil. Imagination is simply the production of images or patterns. It has no value in itself, so I don't think it can be right to say that it is prior to reason or truth (where "prior" is taken, not in the temporal sense, but in the sense of significance or importance). Without reason imagination is a purely passive, receptive faculty.

I can't agree that imagination gives birth to truth. There is truth and then there is knowing truth. I would say that truth simply is; it is like actuality. Knowing truth is not always an activity of certainty; we may know a truth without knowing that we know it, at least when it comes to empirical matters. Reason is always involved in knowing truth; and is thus more important than imagination. I say this because imagination is basic; like digestion. If your digestive system is not functioning you will not be able to employ reason and know truth any more than you will if your imagination is not functioning.

When it comes to poetic truth the case is not essentially different. Poetic truths cannot be known without reason; and that's why poems must be read carefully and contemplatively. Of course the exercise of reason is in a somewhat different mode when it comes to the arts than it is with the sciences, but it is no less essential.

I'm a believer in Capital T Truth. I think it's a state of being, or a 'station', in the terminology of some esoteric orders.

What's happened with Aristotle and Greek philosophy, generally, is that there is a subtext behind it, which is what we would now categorise as 'religious' - with a caveat. It is not like Biblical religiosity in the OT tradition of prophecy, but more a form of philosophical spirituality. But when Platonists talk of 'contemplation', I think they're referring to something which we nowadays would categorise as being on the religious end of the spectrum; when they say they are contemplating the 'ideas in the divine Intellect', they're doing that in a way which is nowadays quite foreign to us, I suspect.

But the difficulty is, writing in the post-Enlightenment world, such views are no longer part of the assumed background of the culture. Much of that sensibility has been redacted out of Plato and Aristotle by secular interpretations - not so much by the neo-scholastics, as they maintain a generally religious type of sensibility. But they are generally nowadays always viewed through the lenses of politics and science rather than the kind of mystical theurgy that categorised much philosophical thinking in those times (as explicated at length by Pierre Hadot.)

Actually an interesting word to reflect on in this context is 'sapience'. Sapience and 'the sapiential tradition' is that aspect of philosophy that is concerned with timeless truths - capital T truth. You won't find much reference to it in the modern academy, however, outside comparative religion departments.

I think imagination absolutely has a an indispensable role in philosophy, and not just speaking historically or solely about Continental as opposed to Analytic. It's difficult for me to conceive of how any kind of problem solving would NOT rely to some extent on imagination.

Once you get outside a very strict realm- say the realm of simple mathematics- logic doesn't immediately supply or infer an answer...I would say it plays 'gatekeeper' for possible answers. Take as an example the kind of modal realism subscribed to by Lewis. In formulating this theory of modality, philosophers started with the problem of what modal terms REFER to, which I think is a much more complicated answer than what "red", for example, refers to. They had to come up with a picture of existence that answers their problem and is also logically consistent with other premises or methodological approaches (such as Occam's theorem). The result- that all possible worlds are equally 'real', that the world we are in is not the only 'actual' one (though it might be from our point of view), etc. was a result of imagination constrained by reason.

Logic, inference, consistency, etc. act as bounds of imagination in cases such as this but don't supply 'answers'. It can, put very simply, tell us what is wrong but cannot tell us what is right. In a sense, consistency is imagination's editor but doesn't really have any output in the realm of metaphysics especially.

I tend to agree with Spinoza that we know things in different ways via three faculties; which, in order of importance are: imagination, reason and intuition. So, the kind of contemplative knowledge you are referring to would be intuition I think.

I don't think the ancient ways of knowing via rational intuition can really be "foreign to us": if they were we would not be able to conceive of them. It is true that modern conceptions of knowing are mostly confined to thinking of it in terms of just imagination (empirical knowledge) and reason (rational knowledge) and that intuition is undervalued, and often conflated with mere imagination or feeling. I think it's also true that the three 'faculties' are not separate from, or independent of, one another. Without reason, for example, intuition just is imagination, and believing in images without adequate reason leads to naive superstitions and fundamentalism.

"Sapient" is usually defined as 'possessing wisdom' or 'being of sound judgement'. We think of ourselves as Homo sapiens insofar as we think we possess capacities for wisdom or judgement that other hominids do not. Aren't we lucky? >:)

We think of ourselves as Homo sapiens insofar as we think we possess capacities for wisdom or judgement that other hominids do not. — John

I honestly believe that the definitional status of 'sapience' is undermined by materialism. Materialism says we're not 'sapient' - because there is no sapience possible, it has no subject matter. According to them, we're 'homo faber', 'man who makes'.

What is the absolute problem at the heart of esotericism, according to Leo Strauss? The problem concerns the self-sufficiency of reason or, put another way, the inescapable and necessary tension between theory and practice. The theological-political predicament of modernity stems from the modern commitment to the self-sufficiency of reason that, Strauss argues, results in reason’s self-destruction.

Similar point is made, from a completely different perspective, by Max Horkheimer.

To be honest I'm not too much concerned about materialism unless you mean the belief that the good life consists in owning material things, which I think is certainly a pernicious and greatly mistaken idea. If 'sapience' is coterminous with 'wisdom', as I think it is generally believed to be; then can it make sense for materialists to deny that there can be different degrees of wisdom manifested by different people? I would be highly skeptical about that being the case.

I tend to agree with Spinoza that reason is self-sufficient when it comes to metaphysics. Reason reveals what our ideas (if they are coherent and consistent) tell us about reality; being, substance, or whatever you want to call it. I can't see how there can be anything else to be said about metaphysics beyond what our most consistent and coherent reasoning tell us. I think Spinoza is right to count intellectual intuition (knowing things "under the aspect of eternity") as the highest form of reason. For me this consists simply in knowing the most coherent logical meanings of ideas.

I also think that our ideas about 'how things in the broadest sense are and how they hang together' is rightly informed (but definitely not prescribed or proscribed) by scientific understanding of nature, including human nature. The understanding of human nature I think should also be informed by the arts and religion (mostly in a phenomenological sense only, though, except where surpassing sublimity might convince us that divine revelation is at work). I do think it's right to acknowledge the limits of reason and to take some things on faith.

Philosophy is the process of creating a cohesive picture in your mind’s eye. The picture is a collection of ideas. The ideas are a vision and representation of a heart’s desire. I reach with my mind to build a coordinated mass that I can love. My greatest companion and light on this dark, lonely journey is imagination.

We can imagine things both true and untrue, or good and evil. Imagination is simply the production of images or patterns. It has no value in itself, so I don't think it can be right to say that it is prior to reason or truth — John

Hmm, I think more what I mean to say is that creativity gives birth to truth. So the distinction being that creativity is the act of creating, whereas imagination is a passive faculty, as you said. The idea is that God began the process of creation, and that truth is born out of that divine process. Not something handed from on high, and not something beholden to strict logical rules, but something generative. Everything is generative. Now as human persons with consciousness, we're developing the divine faculty of creation. I was inboxing Augustino on this; he brought up that Nietzsche saw two "movements" in philosophy (not as in schools, but as in literal movements, as an analogy). The first is purgation, ascetics, morals, seeking truth. Most philosophy stays here, but the second movement is participation in creation. Berdyaev, similarly, describes three epochs, that each correspond with a member of the Trinity. The first is the Law (The Father; Old Testament). The Second is the Redemption (Jesus; New Testament). The third is Creativity (The Spirit; our world now). According to Christian tradition, this also coincides with which person of the Trinity was present here on earth. But the point Berdyaev makes is that these Epochs overlap; Christianity is still living very much in the first Epoch of the Law, and somewhat in the Epoch of the Redemption. Berdyaev says, similarly to Nietzsche, that God awaits a revelation from Man. The creative act is Man's revelation to God. So I interpret the Death of God as only the Silence of God. God awaits Man's revelation.

Any kind of Philosophy is grounded in some kind of logic plays a major part.

Hence something like imagination plays an extremely important role: it can give us totally new approaches to the question, totally new ideas. You can imagine something first, then start to reason it.

Hence something like imagination plays an extremely important role: it can give us totally new approaches to the question, totally new ideas. You can imagine something first, then start to reason it. — ssu

I don't really agree with this, although I do see that sort of imaginative thinking as theoretically having some limited use. But I think it also leads to a lot of bad philosophical ideas. P-zombies, for instance, are a misuse of imagination (using it to "give us totally new approaches to [a] question"). It's a bad argument against physicalism, but I'm not so much worried about that as I am worried that it's a misuse of imagination. Imagination is not a mental tool in the same way that logic is. But with possible world arguments, for instance, it seems that philosophers are assuming they can use imagination in the same way. It's an attempt to harness creativity and subdue it within the constrains of a logical argument. But creativity (the act that imagination performs) is generative; when we use imagination in philosophy we generate new ideas. So in a sense, when I come up with a new possible world scenario, I actually create that world within this one; the world now exists in the form of an idea. But the problem is it's a bad idea. It leads to incorrect thinking. And thinking itself determines our perception of reality, which determines how we live within the world. So our thinking literally alters reality. So when we use creativity to form ideas about the world, we are using our creativity to shape reality. And so creativity is generative. We don't fully seem to realize the power of imagination; the world of ideas with all of it's complexities and disagreements, especially within academia, is so often a product of unwieldy attempts to harness imagination to generate theoretical ideas that will take care of existing philosophical problems. But if creativity is generative, then those problems were originally creatively generated themselves, and now we're attempting to correct them by just generating more philosophical problems. We're like toddlers playing with fire. What makes it worse is that this misuse of creativity is often not even something philosophers are conscious of. All of this points to the immense potency of creativity, and the pervasive misuse of it within the world of ideas.

I don't really agree with this, although I do see that sort of imaginative thinking as theoretically having some limited use. But I think it also leads to a lot of bad philosophical ideas. — Noble Dust

Oh, I totally agree with you – bad philosophical ideas should be outlawed. We should have a committee to approve and discard ideas. Let’s see – who will be on the committee? We will make it democratic; so it will be run by the government. I vote for me to be editor-in-chief. And now that I am chief – I am taking away your “fire” because you scare me. ;)

Oh, I totally agree with you – bad philosophical ideas should be outlawed — woodart

I didn't say that, I made an argument for why I think a certain type of philosophical way of thinking is bad. You haven't addressed that argument.

We should have a committee to approve and discard ideas. Let’s see – who will be on the committee? We will make it democratic; so it will be run by the government. I vote for me to be editor-in-chief. And now that I am chief – I am taking away your “fire” because you scare me. ;) — woodart

The rest of this doesn't follow since it's based on the erroneous assumption that I want to outlaw bad philosophical ideas.

You say you don't want to press your ethics on others; does this mean that you recommend subjectivism? — John

I'm about to go on holiday, for a little contemplation, so I can't go into all your questions. What I still can't pick out of what you're asking is how 'truth' should, as you see it. enter into these questions. Your questions imply a position but you don't state one.

I would certainly *recommend", if pressed, a form of virtue ethics. There are certain values that I weigh when I am acting, or when I am expecting good standards of behaviour of others, both people and organisations. The best judgment as to how to act, or to think, is based on certain values weighed in the balance, and deliberation based on valid and sound reasoning.

I know Wayfarer, whom I regard as an online friend even though we disagree about many things, is keen on Truth (indeed with a capital T). My improved knowledge of the ancients in the last few years has not made me feel any clearer about how they are supposed to be talking about 'truth', which is for instance a poor translation of aletheia - hence the attempts by Heidegger in particular to reintroduce terms related to 'disclosing' and 'unhiding' to reach back to the originals. (His terminology does not of course lead to greater clarity, rather the reverse)

This feels like it belongs in a thread devoted to something other than 'imagination', to me. I'd be happy to engage in one, but won't be here much for ten days or so while I soak up the sun :)

Ever since reading Steiner in more depth recently in response to Barfield's enthusiastic belief in his surpassing greatness, I am wary of evolutionary models of human spiritual growth. Such models tend to imagine objectified and pre-determined processes of development. It's the thing I found I could not swallow in Aurobindo many years ago and, more recently, in Hegel. So I am likewise a little skeptical of Berdyaev's notion of the stages of Christianity. The idea certainly has some symbolic spiritual significance, I just can't accept it as constituting an historical telos.

Having said that I have long thought that there may be a kind of immanent telos in dialectical unfoldings; an internal logic that determines, or at least mediates, the historical trajectories of ideas, whether they be visual, musical, poetical or philosophical ideas. So, Hegel, if interpreted that way, is more acceptable to my way of thinking. I tend to see any ideas of God as desiring, planning, waiting, and so on as examples of human projections, but on the other hand I don't deny the profundity of some mystical experiences that find him that way, either. I think Berdyaev has said that God needs humanity as much as humanity needs God (or perhaps I am thinking of Meister Eckhardt or Boehme).

In any case it is on account of the importance I attribute to the internal logics of creative activities and human activities in general, that I think logos is first and foremost, and that without it, imaginatio will only produce trivialities. It is only in the critical fire of logos that imaginatio becomes significantly creative, and that the Word may become Flesh.

Enjoy your holidays, mcdoodle; these questions of the nature of truth are indeed interesting and nuanced, and I will be happy to take them up in another thread when you return. :)

Ever since reading Steiner in more depth recently in response to Barfield's enthusiastic belief in his surpassing greatness, I am wary of evolutionary models of human spiritual growth. Such models tend to imagine objectified and pre-determined processes of development. It's the thing I found I could not swallow in Aurobindo many years ago and, more recently, in Hegel. So I am likewise a little skeptical of Berdyaev's notion of the stages of Christianity. The idea certainly has some symbolic spiritual significance, I just can't accept it as constituting an historical telos.

Having said that I have long thought that there may be a kind of immanent telos in dialectical unfoldings; an internal logic that determines, or at least mediates, the historical trajectories of ideas, whether they be visual, musical, poetical or philosophical ideas. So, Hegel, if interpreted that way, is more acceptable to my way of thinking. I tend to see any ideas of God as desiring, planning, waiting, and so on as examples of human projections, but on the other hand I don't deny the profundity of some mystical experiences that find him that way, either. I think Berdyaev has said that God needs humanity as much as humanity needs God (or perhaps I am thinking of Meister Eckhardt or Boehme).

In any case it is on account of the importance I attribute to the internal logics of creative activities and human activities in general, that I think logos is first and foremost, and that without it, imaginatio will only produce trivialities. It is only in the critical fire of logos that imaginatio becomes significantly creative, and that the Word may become Flesh. — John

You know I am not quite sure what you are saying. Although I think that may be part of your intention – I do not know. In the little I have read of you in this thread, I see a person who can focus keenly, but veers off on tangents with references to other thinkers and methodologies that may or may not pertain to the question at hand – imagination. I am not sure if you are trying to impress yourself – an audience – or both. I would like to parse the role of imagination in philosophy. I think you have something to say. I would like to hear what you have to say. If your idea is strong, you do not need to use a pedantic vocabulary or compact your concepts so close together and/or reference a lot of other thinkers. Any idea can be expressed clearly. What I have noticed with many philosophers – is they make ideas more complex because they are not quite sure what they think. I know this from experience. I always find it beneficial to admit my uncertainty and lack of knowledge to myself first and in a place like this – to you. In the final analysis it strengthens my argument - I wish the same for you.

No doubt Barfield was a bit too keen on Steiner; Anthroposophy has a cult-like feel, although I don't think it can really be classified as one. There does seem to be room for independent critical thinking within it, at least. It seems like Steiner was a very charismatic person, and the sorts of ideas he was espousing were definitely en vogue at the time in Europe. I've only read Steiner's The Philosophy of Freedom, and I remember there being some pretty solid philosophy of mind in the first half, but then he just jumps off the deep end into his theosophical ideas.

I am wary of evolutionary models of human spiritual growth. Such models tend to imagine objectified and pre-determined processes of development. — John

That's fair; I personally don't hold a view of spiritual evolution that has a pre-determined process. And I'm still toying with the idea at all. But I also believe in the primacy of freedom. I think humans, invited by God to participate in creation itself have the floor to enact spiritual evolution in an un-determined way. But any pre-determined content would be, for instance, morality. I'm still working through the concepts, which is why I occasionally post threads like this one.

I tend to see any ideas of God as desiring, planning, waiting, and so on as examples of human projections, but on the other hand I don't deny the profundity of some mystical experiences that find him that way, either. — John

I'm not sure if those are projections; I suppose they might be, but if so, I don't see them as particularly harmful. The harmful type of projection I think is more specific concepts applied to God that create a much more concrete image in our minds which then leads us astray. The Angry Judge, for instance. But the assigning of the simply passive action of waiting to God I don't think distorts our ideas of God too badly. If that's the game, then we can't really say anything about God. Which is also a perfectly valid argument to carry out, you'd just have to do so.

I think Berdyaev has said that God needs humanity as much as humanity needs God (or perhaps I am thinking of Meister Eckhardt or Boehme). — John

That's Berdyaev, yeah. I tend to agree with him there.

In any case it is on account of the importance I attribute to the internal logics of creative activities and human activities in general, that I think logos is first and foremost, and that without it, imaginatio will only produce trivialities. It is only in the critical fire of logos that imaginatio becomes significantly creative, and that the Word may become Flesh. — John

Can you elaborate on why? I think you might have somewhere else, sorry. To me, even just the idea of Christ being the Word (logos) suggests something more than simply logic or reason being the primary faculty. And if we're dealing with that intro to John passage...it's a wirey one. It reads as poetry to me. I'm not completely sure how to interpret it. There's an aspect of it that's almost a re-writing or rephrasing of Genesis 1, which I think was intentional.

Enjoy your holidays, mcdoodle; these questions of the nature of truth are indeed interesting and nuanced, and I will be happy to take them up in another thread when you return. :) — John

Of course I may be bored by the heat and people lying around the pool all day and find there's good wifi :)

Much of this depends for me on what one thinks about 'knowledge' or whatever it is one bases one's action on. The little academic course I've been on for two years included access to colloquia with talks by quite well-known people. The very first was by an Italian Leibniz scholar who are argued that the 'justified true belief' account of knowledge is pretty much a 20th century invention. She proposed that a profounder tradition going back to Plato has knowledge and belief as separate sorts of beast. And almost the most recent talk was by Timothy Williamson, who argues very analytically for a 'knowledge first' epistemology, that 'knowing' is sui generis.

Anyway, more anon perhaps.

The very first was by an Italian Leibniz scholar who are argued that the 'justified true belief' account of knowledge is pretty much a 20th century invention. She proposed that a profounder tradition going back to Plato has knowledge and belief as separate sorts of beast. — mcdoodle

I think a lot of modern epistemology holds the same. Wittgenstein also liked Leibniz, but I haven't read him and I don't know what he says about knowledge in detail.

I would agree that a lot of presumed knowledge is imagined. It goes into the problems with causality. Many people believe they know something because of causes that are not possible to prove in absolute terms. But to the person believing they know something, there is no distinction in their minds as to what they know which is true, and what they know which is questionable.

Is it my imagination or are philosophers insecure? No, it is not my imagination - it seems to me everyone is insecure, but philosophers, are, more so. Why? Because they question everything more than most. The process of asking the “hard” questions is daunting. Most people hate philosophy – that’s why they join a church. What I mean to say is that questioning “things” is unsettling. The questions and the answers make us nervous. The more one questions, the more insecure one becomes. One could argue that a really good philosopher is not insecure because they have examined the big questions in detail, many times, and are secure in their positions. I think the answer to this is both yes and no – because the more we know – we understand there is more to know. . I think a really good philosopher can have equanimity, but still be insecure in what they don’t understand.

There are many great philosophers that have come before us and live with us now. However, in my estimation, the best thinkers, both past and present, still struggle, bitterly, with the hard questions. I think the best thinkers admit their struggle and uncertainty. However, not always. Many time’s we disguise our uncertainty with bravado and arrogance. So, I think it is appropriate to ask here – what is a disguise? It is a mask, a projection of who we want to be – an avatar. It is more than what we think we are – in other words it is dishonest in varying degrees. Now, do I think it is wrong to want to be a super hero, a savior, or just a really good person? No. However, if I say I am a really good person and I don’t hurt anybody. I don’t think I have examined myself close enough. If I project myself as really smart, smarter than most, does that mean it is not so? No, I may be the smartest person in the room, campus, state or planet. Let’s just say for argument sake, I am the smartest person on the planet, today. Whew, I am glad we got that established. How smart does that make me? Let’s see, humans, in their present format, have been around for 200,000 years. In terms of evolution, by my calculation, that puts us about six weeks out of the cave. Do you think humans in 10,000 generations will be reading what any of us write today? What about a million generations? We have no idea how far we can evolve. Perhaps in the future we will not read at all. Maybe we will absorb knowledge and communicate by some sort of mind meld. I certainly hope so.

So what is my main point? We are insecure – all of us – particularly philosophers. Because we know, that we do not know, very much! And the more we know, we find out there is more to know. So, we cover up our insecurity, dress it up – put on a disguise. Use a lot of difficult language, references and complexity. We play hide and seek with each other. But most importantly, we play hide and seek with ourselves. I do not find this behavior particularly courageous; as a matter of fact I find it cowardly. Many thinkers, especially in the ivory tower and churches, are guilty of this sin. In addition many of these sinners are intentionally a bully. Sometimes the intention is to bully passively. Like a man 6 foot 6 with bulging biceps with a tattoo – BORN TO KILL. This is a use of imagination in a very negative way.

I do not wish to offend anyone – nor do I wish to be offended. I wish to communicate. Very few of us will have even one significant original idea in our lifetime. To make a real contribution to human knowledge is not that easy. Therefore, a little humility is in order along with our clarity.

I was specifically responding to Noble Dust, and I was confident from previous conversations that he is familiar with the thinkers I referenced. I referenced them to establish a context that I believed he would understand. If you have any specific questions concerning uncertainties you may have about anything i said there I will be happy to answer them, but I don't have any interest in unwarranted and more or less vague speculations about my psychological motives. Thanks for you kind, even if somewhat presumptuous and condescending thoughts and wishes, in any case.

Can you elaborate on why? I think you might have somewhere else, sorry. To me, even just the idea of Christ being the Word (logos) suggests something more than simply logic or reason being the primary faculty. — Noble Dust

Actually, I wasn't thinking specifically of the idea of Christ as logos, but of the more general idea of the world (flesh) being a symbolic representation or expression of the spirit (word). I'm sure I have encountered that idea in Berdyaev somewhere, but it is also prominent in Hegel. For Hegel the world is, moreover, a rational expression of the spirit. So, I have in mind the most all-inclusive definitions of logic and reason here.

On this interpretation, poetry is a matter of reason as much as mathematics is. I take it for granted that the imagination has a great role to play in both mathematics and poetry, although of course it is quite different in each. But it is the logic of a discipline which allows the deliverances of imagination within it to possess significance, or you could even go further to say that logic allows the deliverances of imagination to even come to be at all.

I'm not sure if those are projections; I suppose they might be, but if so, I don't see them as particularly harmful. The harmful type of projection I think is more specific concepts applied to God that create a much more concrete image in our minds which then leads us astray. The Angry Judge, for instance. But the assigning of the simply passive action of waiting to God I don't think distorts our ideas of God too badly. If that's the game, then we can't really say anything about God. Which is also a perfectly valid argument to carry out, you'd just have to do so. — Noble Dust

I think what you say here really amounts to saying that projections are harmful only when they are not recognized as such. We have no choice but to project; that is what the human mind does. Our projections (which constitute all of the arts and religion, and arguably even much of science and the everyday world) simply make up our lives, and ideally should make our lives ever richer.

Unrecognized projections, which become reified as objectifications, make our lives ever poorer, I beleive.

Well, you know, there are sources of boredom, and then there are sources of boredom. ;)

I'd be interested to hear more about what you are hinting at here.

I also think knowledge is not the same thing at all as any form of belief, whether justified, true or otherwise. It is only the most extreme and artificial forms of skepticism that deflate knowledge completely into belief, and I think that from within that perspective, no re-inflation is possible. I've been reading a fair bit of Spinoza lately; and I think it is interesting and pertinent that it is in regard to this point precisely wherein lies the great difference between him and Descartes. Descartes is all 'How can you know, know that you know, know that you know that you know', and so on. Spinoza says instead ' Before you can know that you know that you know, you must first be able to know'.

As you mentioned him earlier, I want to say that I believe Heidegger denies the possibility of a correspondence theory of truth. In fact I think he denies the possibility any theory of truth at all. As I understand it the idea of truth as aletheia is really the idea of actuality-as-truth. Heidegger acknowledges that the ordinary propositional idea of truth consists in a correspondence account (it is not a theory) of truth. Aristotle expresses this common account or definition of truth (which cannot be reduced further to a theory):

“To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true”

I think Aristotle's statement expresses exactly what truth and falsity, or being true and being false, mean to us. I also believe these meanings are fundamental, irreducible, unanalyzable and indispensable; there can be no meaningful discourse at all without presuming them

Our projections (which constitute all of the arts and religion, and arguably even much of science and the everyday world) simply make up our lives, and ideally should make our lives ever richer. — John

Is a scientific discovery a projection? Is a religious revelation a projection? I can see how projections are ubiquitous in culture, but I don't think they're the be-all and end-all. There is an entire genre of Buddhist literature on 'nonconceptual wisdom', and it's hard to see that in terms of projections.

Where I do agree is where scientific or religious ideas are generalised, or mythologised, and then said to form the basis of some general truth about life. They are often projections, but again, I don't think everything is a projection.

We are insecure – all of us – particularly philosophers. — woodart

Agree. There is an Alan Watts book, The Wisdom of Insecurity, which enlarges on that very point. You also see it in Socrates 'All I know, is that I know nothing', and the Tao, 'He that knows it, knows it not'.

I was specifically responding to Noble Dust, and I was confident from previous conversations that he is familiar with the thinkers I referenced. I referenced them to establish a context that I believed he would understand. If you have any specific questions concerning uncertainties you may have about anything i said there I will be happy to answer them, but I don't have any interest in unwarranted and more or less vague speculations about my psychological motives. Thanks for you kind, even if somewhat presumptuous and condescending thoughts and wishes, in any case. — John

I quite understand you were engaged with noble dust. I have no problem with anything you said. That is your right on a public forum.

It is also my right on a public forum to comment on what you and noble dust articulates. And to add additional comments to the subject matter at hand; along with my commentary about philosophy in general. The subject matter is imagination and philosophy – a pretty board area – no?

So some of my questions and/or critiques are:

Are philosophers more insecure than people in general?

Is insecurity covered, many times, by arrogance and obfuscation?

Is arrogance and obfuscation a mask purposely worn and is it dishonest?

Do the best philosophers know they are insecure and admit they do not know very much?

Are some philosophers bullies?

Is it hard to make a significant contribution to human knowledge?

I do not think these are “vague speculations” about philosophy and/or psychology. Nor do I think these are presumptuous and condescending questions to ask. These are honest questions about how philosophers use their imagination. It is not easy to be a philosopher – we ask hard questions.

Is a scientific discovery a projection? Is a religious revelation a projection? I can how projections are ubiquitous in culture, but I don't think they're the be-all and end-all. — Wayfarer

I did say "much of science and everyday life" not "all of it". Perhaps the same should be said of the arts. Of course we cannot but take it for granted there is always something real going on with all these things. But we cannot get hold of the real in our discourses except in terms of our projections, that is what I really wanted to say.