I wonder how you describe imagination.

Imagination seems to me to be the dynamic medium in which and along which all of our other facilities flow, how we synthesize reason & experience.

So yes.

If thought is referential, then all thought is at the very least a capacity to think of something else, and to think of something else is to imagine it.

For example, a thought of infinity might not just be the use of the word but also an evoked experience, by which infinity is imagined as something without a beginning and without an end. In this sense, I think, imagination plays a major role in thought, including philosophy and a search for truth.

What is an example of thought in which imagination does not play a major role? I'd say obscure thought or expression tends to inhibit the possibility to imagine and arrive at conclusions. It pushes you to blindly invent your own interpretations, or comply to what some alleged expert tells you to think. Some continental "theory" is covertly authoritarian in this way.

can philosophy be considered "seeking after the truth", or no? — Noble Dust

Also the nature of philosophy is a philosophical question, e.g. whether it is the search after the truth, therapeutic contemplation, or love of wisdom. I believe that the latter is the generally accepted definition.

can philosophy be considered "seeking after the truth", or no? — Noble Dust

Also the nature of philosophy is a philosophical question, e.g. whether it is the search after the truth, therapeutic contemplation, or love of wisdom. I believe that the latter is the generally accepted definition. — jkop

In ancient philosophy 'seeking after the truth' was one of the first definitions, so it has attained rather more prominence than it should now. Philosophical truth in the current era is rather formally defined as the property of a statement--or derived from a statement--or a natural quality that is necessarily inherent in a statement-- or some other association to a statement, depending on one's epistemology. I just wrote something on this yesterday, defining three basic forms of truth, and the consequences, as follows. I apologize for its laxity, I only just formulated it.

{1}Tautological truths within formal systems, such as mathematical equations. These are established by syntactic consistency with core axioms. The core axioms themselves describe the formal systems, and so truths at this level are necessarily true, in accordance with first-order formal logic. These systems can be extended to create propositional logic, which defines rules of deduction and inference without introducing meaningfulness and causality.

{2}Empirical truths, which are determined via ratification by observation of material states and events, as long as the propositions describing material states and events are logically coherent. If the observation verifies the proposition, then the RESULT of the observation is factually true, but the proposition itself without empirical ratification remains a proposition that is neither true nor false, and is simply a statement. The specific and exact nature of truth itself depends not on facts, but on the epistemological factors relating the proposition to the material world in different metaphysical systems, most predominantly in the theories that define the relation of subject and predicate to objects, states, and events in the physical world. These theories add semantics (the meanings of words) to the syntactic relationships described in first-order logic.

{3}Causal truths, which again first must be consistent within first-order formal logic, and secondly must not contain any causal fallacies as defined in second-order formal logic. These are the most complicated forms of truth, and the basis of science. They are the most complicated because causal relationships cannot ever be proven necessarily true. They can only be proven not to be false. That distinction remains one of the least understood aspects of truth in the current world, because causality is so often claimed yet logical errors in statements of causal truth are so frequent. The metaphysical factors of causality are better understood if they are known to exist, but only a small number of people even know that there are metaphysical factors involved. Those who do know the metaphysical factors understand that the relation of the subject and predicate's in the cause, to the subject and predicate of the result, is an abstraction that can be very complex.

While these are the *basic* forms of truth, the truth of many statements rely on combining two or more these forms together. For example, most commonly believe they know that the sun will rise tomorrow. This is based on empirical observations of many prior days where the sun did rise, leading to the simple second-order deduction that it will rise again tomorrow. Logically, one cannot know whether the belief is true that the sun will rise tomorrow until after the event has occurred. But in most cases, when sufficient empirical validation of many prior similar events has occurred, it is loosely assumed true that the same future event will occur again in the same circumstance. This 'axiom of probabilistic certainty'  is the foundation of prediction in much scientific theory.

Beyond that, there are some other very specific forms of truth in philosophy. For example, there are 'self-generating' truths in linguistics, such as promises, statements of intent, contracts, and some statements of belief, which all become existent by their own statement. One should be aware these kinds of truth have limitations. For example, after making promises, it becomes true that promises were made, but the truth of the promise itself remains an indirect proposition, and still must be determined within the rules for the three basic forms of truth described above.

Does imagination play a role in philosophy?

I'd say 'Of course'. We use imagination to generate examples, concoct problem cases, conduct thought-experiments, invent novel arguments and probably in of most of the things philosophers do.

This one is quite good. You should find a large portion is free to read online.

https://books.google.com/books?id=b-g_yf7kVeIC

My view is that the whole 'possible worlds' idea is dependent on imagination. Although not usually expressed that way, a 'possible world' is in my view just a set of circumstances that we can imagine.

Imagination seems to me to be the dynamic medium in which and along which all of our other facilities flow, how we synthesize reason & experience. — Cavacava

That's an interesting definition (it sparks my imagination), but it's not the way I would describe it. I see that as one function among others that imagination performs. I think of the imagination of children; the ability to be ridiculous. The artist Makoto Fujimura, who's painting "Walking On Water" is in my avatar, says that imagination and creativity are gratuitous. He's willfully repurposing that word here (repurposing being an action that artists regularly perform; philosophers seem to dread it). In other words, imagination serves no utilitarian purpose. I would amend that to say that imagination is not confined by a utilitarian purpose, and as such is free to serve any purpose, including the ones you describe. But fundamentally, it's completely free and not bound by anything.

I'd say obscure thought or expression tends to inhibit the possibility to imagine and arrive at conclusions. — jkop

What's an example?

Also the nature of philosophy is a philosophical question, e.g. whether it is the search after the truth, therapeutic contemplation, or love of wisdom. I believe that the latter is the generally accepted definition. — jkop

That's just the literal etymology of the word, though. It's prosaic to assume that that's what it has to mean now. The meanings of words change, which is beautiful and an important thing to embrace.

In ancient philosophy 'seeking after the truth' was one of the first definitions, so it has attained rather more prominence than it should now. — ernestm

Can you explain your reasoning here? Are you saying that the fact that it was one of the first definitions means it shouldn't be such a prominent way to define it now? If so, you'll need to explain why that is.

Philosophical truth in the current era is rather formally defined as the property of a statement--or derived from a statement--or a natural quality that is necessarily inherent in a statement-- or some other association to a statement, depending on one's epistemology. — ernestm

This makes no sense.

I also see no need to go into such detail on what exactly truth is, and the perceived many shades of it. Nikolai Berdyaev says "pure undistorted truth burns up the world". Your thoughts on truth aren't burning up the world.

I'd say 'Of course'. We use imagination to generate examples, concoct problem cases, conduct thought-experiments, invent novel arguments and probably in of most of the things philosophers do. — yazata

True, but I've seen so many horrible straw mans and uselessly unrealistic theoretical scenarios dreamed up by philosopher types. It seems to me a gross misuse of a stunted imagination when I see it. And this is an example:

My view is that the whole 'possible worlds' idea is dependent on imagination. Although not usually expressed that way, a 'possible world' is in my view just a set of circumstances that we can imagine. — andrewk

does imagination play a role in the process of seeking after the truth? — Noble Dust

I would say so, but it's important to understand the meaning of 'imagination' appropriately. Not as merely a kind of day-dreaming or imagining scenes or stories, but of dwelling within a realm of ideas. Some of those ideas can be represented pictorially but others can only be intuited and depicted symbolically.

I read the collective biography of The Inklings last year, the group which included Tolkien and C S Lewis. Surely both The Lord of the Rings and Narnia are imaginative masterpieces. But both authors were deeply immersed in the 'imaginaire' of the realms they were creating, through life-long immersion in the languages, tropes and mythic lore of Europe. Tolkien was a lectured in old Icelandic, Middle English, and many other subjects - his workload was tremendous. But more than that, he was able to intuitively create an entire kingdom replete with its own languages, creatures, and histories.

Of course Lord of the Rings was not philosophy; but Tolkien wouldn't have wanted anything to do with what was taught as 'philosophy' at Oxford and Cambridge where he lived and taught. He disdained the modern world and the state of Western culture; indeed I read the other day that the all-seeing eye of Sauron is a metaphor for today's scientific materialism.

So to craft his story Tolkien had to create imaginary worlds, but, like the great myths, these imaginary realms convey ideas which can't be communicated in quotidian and analytical terms; 'myths truer than history', I have heard it said.

I think that is why so much of what is called philosophy nowadays is a specialist lexicon which is comprehensible only to those who are admitted into its professional ranks. Because the conception of truth has shrunken to the merely utilitarian or technical, then there is no requirement for any kind of imaginative leap, only the kinds of technical linguistic skills employed by professionals such as scientists and accountants, albeit with no external reference beyond what the peer group validates as appropriate to the discipline.

Whereas I think the last of the idealist philosophers, Hegel and Schopenhauer were tremendously imaginative in their respective ways, as their philosophy demanded re-imagining the nature of what we think we know about life - which after all was the real purpose of philosophy at the outset.

Not as merely a kind of day-dreaming or imagining scenes or stories, but of dwelling within a realm of ideas. — Wayfarer

But I think the fancy of daydreaming or imagining stories is the very basis for all artistic work, or at least all pure artistic work. Artistic creation involves that gratuitousness that I mentioned earlier via Fujimura. The distinction though, and maybe the distinction you're making, is that that fanciful element isn't the end but merely a means. The childlike quality of imagination becomes a problem when we stay there and refuse to apply it further (in short: refuse to continue to use our imaginations). A childlike imagination should never be an excuse to tune out the harsh realities of the real world. But the untested courage of the child, the assumed trust of the good and of right action of the child, is something that we often lose when we reach adulthood, and therefore something that we should strive to regain or reimagine within the context of adulthood.

I read the collective biography of The Inklings last year, the group which included Tolkien and C S Lewis. — Wayfarer

I haven't read it (which book?), but I'm very familiar with the lives and works of Tolkien, Lewis, Barfield, Williams, and to a lesser extent Sayers. I can't remember who else was occasionally a member, off the top of my head.

Tolkien was a lectured in old Icelandic, Middle English, and many other subjects - his workload was tremendous. But more than that, he was able to intuitively create an entire kingdom replete with its own languages, creatures, and histories. — Wayfarer

Indeed, Tolkien more than anyone else in the group took this approach. It's an interesting topic at hand, as I'm just finishing up a re-reading of The Lord of the Rings. I'm currently slogging through the over-long ending.

I read the other day that the all-seeing eye of Sauron is a metaphor for today's scientific materialism. — Wayfarer

Do you have a link? My impression of Tolkien is that he eschewed all attempts at allegory or direct metaphor in his work. I guess, if my impression is in fact accurate, you can take it with a grain of salt, as you should with the words of any artist.

So to craft his story Tolkien had to create imaginary worlds, but, like the great myths, these imaginary realms convey ideas which can't be communicated in quotidian and analytical terms; 'myths truer than history', I have heard it said. — Wayfarer

Right. On a more technical level, though, my understanding is that Tolkien was responding to the lack of a fleshed out "myth" of the English people, as opposed to the especially Greek, and somewhat the Roman myths with all of their detail and narrative. So, apparently the entire world he created was a pet project of sorts to imagine what a mythical English prehistory would be. Which comes full circle to my admonishment that fantastical, childlike forms of creativity can be valuable. I can't think of a more anti-utilitarian form of creativity than making up an entire world of English mythology simply because it doesn't actually exist in reality.

I think that is why so much of what is called philosophy nowadays is a specialist lexicon which is comprehensible only to those who are admitted into its professional ranks. Because the conception of truth has shrunken to the merely utilitarian or technical, then there is no requirement for any kind of imaginative leap, only the kinds of technical linguistic skills employed by professionals such as scientists and accountants, albeit with no external reference beyond what the peer group validates as appropriate to the discipline.

Whereas I think the last of the idealist philosophers, Hegel and Schopenhauer were tremendously imaginative in their respective ways, as their philosophy demanded re-imagining the nature of what we think we know about life - which after all was the real purpose of philosophy at the outset. — Wayfarer

I agree completely.

http://a.co/io6f3rV

My reticence about 'day dreaming' is probably more a reflection on the unending series of CGI-based 'superhero' movies from Hollywood which are generally devoid of meaning - science fantasy. They're not always so - I think to give credit where it's due, Star Wars has tried to incorporate proper mythological ideas, as is well known, Lucus drew heavily on Hero with a Thousand Faces for the initial story. There are some great sci-fi movies, but also a lot of empty ones.

I can't recall where I read that idea about Sauron, but I'll trawl through my internet history when I get home. Oh, I remember now - it was in a Catholic essay on the evils of modernity. I'll find it somewhere.

Thanks for the link.

My reticence about 'day dreaming' is probably more a reflection on the unending series of CGI-based 'superhero' movies from Hollywood which are generally devoid of meaning - science fantasy. — Wayfarer

i would view that type of fantasy as a watered down form of the likes of Tolkien, et al. Not to keep tooting the Tolkien horn, but my understanding is that he was more or less one of the first to bring a fantastical fantasy world into the mainstream, and especially with such precision. After him, I'm not really aware of anyone who's topped his vision. Not that it's a competition. But so far, other works have been fairly derivative, it seems. It's also slightly ironic, because Tolkien is not a great writer. He has flashes of brilliance in his writing craft, but it's clear when reading LotR what his academic focus was (all his intense research into myth and linguistics). But he also seems to have had the natural poetic genius about him; it was just less exercised.

There are some great sci-fi movies, but also a lot of empty ones. — Wayfarer

Right, when it comes to fantasy and sci-fi, these are very new genres of fiction and cinema that pretty much are a product of the last 100 years or so. But childlike imagination is different from these artistic genres, I think. There may be analogues, but the seemingly limitless imagination of a child is more in line with the best of adult artists, regardless of genre, I think. There's an element in artistic creation that involves the ridiculous, the unheard-of, and the seemingly impossible. And to tie it back to my discussion topic, how might these aspects of artistic creation apply to a philosophical perspective? Or do they even need to?

My view is that the whole 'possible worlds' idea is dependent on imagination. Although not usually expressed that way, a 'possible world' is in my view just a set of circumstances that we can imagine. — andrewk

Andrew, I was only the other day thinking the very same. Of course the notion has been taken up by logicians, who would require any given world to be defined in some way, and literalists, who can't make the leap into an imagined world without deciding it has to be there.

apparently the entire world [Tolkien] created was a pet project of sorts to imagine what a mythical English prehistory would be. — Noble Dust

That's exactly what the book I mentioned said. What a labour, though - took him 40 years to write it.

And to tie it back to my discussion topic, how might these aspects of artistic creation apply to a philosophical perspective? Or do they even need to? — Noble Dust

I think in classical culture, there was relationship between art, literature, and philosophy, but that since Nietszche (not simply because of Nietszche, he was in some ways simply a bellwether), the idea sounds hopelessly nostalgic and out of date. Our age is wrestling with the whole issue of meaning and its lack, the possibility that the Universe is really just fluke; so that myths have that meaning that the flatland of modernity grants them, an edifying absence of reality.

The total character of the world, however, is in all eternity chaos—in the sense not of a lack of necessity but of a lack of order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever other names there are for our aesthetic anthropomorphisms... Let us beware of saying that there are laws in nature. There are only necessities: there is nobody who commands, nobody who obeys, nobody who trespasses. Once you know that there are no purposes, you also know that there is no accident; for it is only beside a world of purposes that the word "accident" has any meaning.

Nietszche, God and Doomsday, Henry Bayman.

Another way of saying it would be: does imagination play a role in the process of seeking after the truth? — Noble Dust

I'm definitely seeking after wisdom, of which 'the truth' may or may not form an important part.

On the Uni course I'm currently on I attended a lecture course on 'Imagination' for pleasure. In the analytic world this rather surprisingly means examining the artistic/creative imagination and puzzling over fictionality and aesthetics.

I'm interested in the notion (which I think would be Continental but there you go) that there are different *kinds* of imaginative world, overlapping, but broadly understandable in their divisions. Then the sort of thing that Wayfarer is arguing against would be the result of philosophers becoming preoccupied with 'the scientific imagination', and mistaking the ideas in that imaginative sphere for the totality of ideas, or at least for an unthought-through predominance.

I think then one could postulate 'the religious imagination', 'the artistic imagination', 'the historical imagination' and 'the political imagination' (in the way that Landru in our old forum would describe various 'discourses'), together with whatever others one desires to discourse about, without insisting that a scientific view predominates. I trust that Streetlight and Pierre-Normand can explain that various French people have been thinking this way for some time :)

Oh. Well what I am thinking is that there are now very exact formal definitions of logical truth, and that in modern philosophy, that is the preferred definition. I wrote a short summary of them in another thread 'what is truth?' However, if you believe that nonsense, then I can't really discuss anything with you further, because it has made sense to me for 40 years now, and I'm not really able to explain it to people who only want to find it wrong.

Earlier I posted a book by Sartre, who also accepted such definitions, and who believed that imagination is the basis of phenomenological knowledge. Note that it is knowledge, not truth, that Sartre was talking about. Truth is the result of evaluating the validity of a proposition, and the sum of known propositions by any one person constitutes their knowledge.

Truth is the result of evaluating the validity of a proposition, and the sum of known propositions by any one person constitutes their knowledge — ernestm

Truth may be the result of evaluation, but back at logic, that would be quite different from validity. One can make a valid argument and end with up with false conclusions; to be valid and true, you need soundness, the successful transmission of the truth-value you hope you started with.

I see that as one function among others that imagination performs. I think of the imagination of children; the ability to be ridiculous. The artist Makoto Fujimura, who's painting "Walking On Water" is in my avatar, says that imagination and creativity are gratuitous. He's willfully repurposing that word here (repurposing being an action that artists regularly perform; philosophers seem to dread it). In other words, imagination serves no utilitarian purpose. I would amend that to say that imagination is not confined by a utilitarian purpose, and as such is free to serve any purpose, including the ones you describe. But fundamentally, it's completely free and not bound by anything.

It seems at least apparently on one level that you are looking at kinds of imagination, not imagination itself. The "imagination of children", the "imagination and creativity" of the artist. Yes, I think these are related and that they share aspects of what is meant by having an imagination. Whether or not our imagination has a purpose or not, I think is closer to question of what constitutes the imagination.

I look at Makoto Fujimua's "Walking On Water" and I think how watercolors behave. If you put pigment on a brush and then brush it on to very wet paper, the pigments 'explodes' on the surface the way it does on Fujimua's work. The explosion of color, creates what we see, it has a sudden quality to itself, reminds me of how a film's latent image 'magically' appears when you put it in a tray of developer.

Imagination brings sense and intellect together, it is the 'medium' of our interaction with the senses. The imprint of a sense experience on the memory is recalled, how pigment behaves on wet paper, along with its 'explosive' behavior is recalled and reimagined. There is no reason why the paint walks on water the way it does, similarly a work of art does not have a reason beyond itself, a purpose beyond what it is.
The recollection and re-imagining of our experiences is basic to how we experience and make sense of the world. Imagination does not have a reason, it is a functional part of what it means to reason, it expresses the movement from sensing to understanding, it is movement of thought regardless of its truth or falsity, its utility or gratuity, its seriousness or its "ability to be ridiculous".

Imagination does not have a reason, it is a functional part of what it means to reason — Cavacava

That is a very good observation and an excellent post.

Yes, name an abstract concept that is not a bodily feeling or sense that can even be postulated without making use of the imagination. The term "reason" itself is a case in point. Philosophically, the imagination is primary not derivative.

Truth may be the result of evaluation, but back at logic, that would be quite different from validity. One can make a valid argument and end with up with false conclusions; to be valid and true, you need soundness, the successful transmission of the truth-value you hope you started with. — mcdoodle

Thank you, I think that's a good correction.

I'm definitely seeking after wisdom, of which 'the truth' may or may not form an important part. — mcdoodle

Can you explain further? How could wisdom and truth be so far apart that one might not necessarily be connected to the other? What makes wisdom wise if not truth? What makes truth true if not wisdom?

On the Uni course I'm currently on I attended a lecture course on 'Imagination' for pleasure. In the analytic world this rather surprisingly means examining the artistic/creative imagination and puzzling over fictionality and aesthetics. — mcdoodle

Yup...

I'm interested in the notion (which I think would be Continental but there you go) that there are different *kinds* of imaginative world, overlapping, but broadly understandable in their divisions. Then the sort of thing that Wayfarer is arguing against would be the result of philosophers becoming preoccupied with 'the scientific imagination', and mistaking the ideas in that imaginative sphere for the totality of ideas, or at least for an unthought-through predominance. — mcdoodle

Yes, I'm very interested in this too. This gets very close to the heart of what I'm trying to understand. But, I don't think of it in terms of overlapping divisions. That to me is just an abstraction that makes the confusing aspects of imagination convenient. Imagination is primary. So, a "scientific imagination", as you say, is a derivation of imagination generally.

I think then one could postulate 'the religious imagination', 'the artistic imagination', 'the historical imagination' and 'the political imagination' (in the way that Landru in our old forum would describe various 'discourses'), together with whatever others one desires to discourse about, without insisting that a scientific view predominates. — mcdoodle

I appreciate your last sentence here about not insisting that a scientific view needs dominate; but in relation to what I just said, I don't see these different "forms" of imagination as being necessary. They sound to me like theoretical postulations that don't have any grounding in the real imagination as experienced. The imagination as experienced is absolutely fluid. It's not categorical at all. Assigning categories to imagination is just a function of human reason trying to give meaning to the imaginative experience. So it's an interpretation, not an actual accurate expression of the experience. The real experience of imagination is an experience of generation, of creation; so by definition, it doesn't avail itself to any invented categories.

And this goes back to my critique of . So, within the context of truth, imagination is not a subsidiary of truth, rather, imagination gives birth to truth, because imagination is primary. And so these categories of truth that have been concocted by humans are not a primary form of truth, but just an abstraction based on an inability to grasp imagination as a primary function that gives birth to primal truth.

What would happen if we actually caught the truth?

Would philosophers bat it around back and forth like a proud cat who captured and killed a mouse?

Would we leave it on the porch and go seeking after more?

Can you imagine?

Imagination is absolutely necessary in philosophy. It's necessary for thought too I reckon... Otherwise we would just exhibit basic reactions to basic stimulus, like so many uninteresting animals...

I think in classical culture, there was relationship between art, literature, and philosophy, but that since Nietszche (not simply because of Nietszche, he was in some ways simply a bellwether), the idea sounds hopelessly nostalgic and out of date. — Wayfarer

Right, this ties in to the problem of specialization. The way thought is moving right now is towards more and more precise splinterization of specific disinclines. This leads to deeper and deeper isolation between not only professional disciplines, but ways of thinking about the world. And ways of thinking about the simplest concepts, like "truth".

Oh. Well what I am thinking is that there are now very exact formal definitions of logical truth, and that in modern philosophy, that is the preferred definition. — ernestm

I do appreciate you listing your definitions, and I'm sorry if it came off otherwise. Any contribution is welcome. But, first of all, this thread is primarily about imagination. Second of all, when it comes to the concept of truth, I take a less philosophical and more a religious perspective. I can't think of a plainer way to describe it, and I'm having trouble thinking of adequate ways of describing my thoughts on truth to you in general (partially because it's 4am). I think truth is intuitive, and tied up with imagination in that way; in other words, in the way that imagination is primary in our thinking, so too truth is tied up with that primacy. Imagination, the human ability to see within the mind, and then bring the thing seen into reality...this, in a sense, is real truth. What is truth if not a form of reality solely dependent on the human mind itself? And what is the primary function of the human mind? The imagination.

So no, I don't want to find your expression of truth to be wrong, I just intuit it as insufficient.

It seems at least apparently on one level that you are looking at kinds of imagination, not imagination itself. — Cavacava

Wait, but that's exactly what I was making an argument against. I'm making an argument against kinds of imagination. When I talk about functions of imagination, I'm talking about, for instance, things I can do with my hand. I can pick up, I can throw, I can hold, I can drop. But all with my hand. My hand is imagination; the various actions I perform with my hand are the kinds, as you're calling them. But they're all things that the hand does. All things that the imagination does. So, the imagination of the artist or the child, these are all functions or actions, not kinds. The reason I have a problem with kinds is that it suggests an actual difference; a real difference.

Imagination brings sense and intellect together, it is the 'medium' of our interaction with the senses. — Cavacava

I can see this in my mind and entertain the possibility, but I never think of imagination as a "medium", and this is something I see on philosophy forums in general, and I can't reconcile it. A medium is something in which something else is passed. But imagination is the something that needs being passed. Or rather, the idea that imagination brings into being is the something. So in that sense, maybe it is a medium. But not the same medium you're describing.

There is no reason why the paint walks on water the way it does, similarly a work of art does not have a reason beyond itself, a purpose beyond what it is. — Cavacava

I disagree. See my problems with the discussion here on truth. If a work of art truly does not have a meaning beyond itself, then it is, necessarily, meaningless.

Imagination does not have a reason, it is a functional part of what it means to reason, it expresses the movement from sensing to understanding, it is movement of thought regardless of its truth or falsity, its utility or gratuity, its seriousness or its "ability to be ridiculous". — Cavacava

Now here I tentatively agree; I make the distinction between art and imagination. I tie imagination back to Berdyaev's concept of freedom, which is utterly boundless, similar to Bohme's ungrund. Imagination is almost...a function of freedom. Don't quote me on that. But there is a connection there. Thanks for your thoughts, Cavacava, they're very stimulating.

Philosophically, the imagination is primary not derivative. — Baden

Yes.

What would happen if we actually caught the truth? — VagabondSpectre

Your question seems to suggest that no one has. I disagree with that assumption.

Would philosophers bat it around back and forth like a proud cat who captured and killed a mouse? — VagabondSpectre

No, they wouldn't know it if it batted them in the eye.

Imagination is absolutely necessary in philosophy. It's necessary for thought too I reckon... Otherwise we would just exhibit basic reactions to basic stimulus, like so many uninteresting animals... — VagabondSpectre

Again, the philosophical perspective seems to subjugate imagination to reason. And I've already said, as have others in this thread, but I guess this is where I need to make it clear: I think imagination is primary. Imagination is not a tool for philosophers to use when convenient. Imagination is the genesis of philosophical thought.

I'm saying it's the genesis of all thought.

I guess I'm causing a slight distortion in my discussion of this topic. I've seen in the past the attempt to subjugate imagination to various philosophical schools, as happens to be convenient. So I do agree with you, then, that it's the genesis of all thought. But even here (and this is where I've neglected until now to make the distinction), I'm cautious, because it still seems to me that you're labeling imagination as the genesis, but only the genesis. Perhaps I'm wrong? I still get the sense that imagination is primary, but only a seed, if you will, that gives birth, necessarily, to something else ("reason", for instance). And this is where I disagree. I see imagination as not only the genesis of all thought, or as "primary", but as continually that genesis, through all other forms of thought, up until the realization of "Truth". Imagination, actually, is tied to Eternity. It's not a part of evolution, or a part of how we perceive time, but rather a constant throughout any process.

How could wisdom and truth be so far apart that one might not necessarily be connected to the other? What makes wisdom wise if not truth? What makes truth true if not wisdom? — Noble Dust

I do feel minimalist or 'deflationary' about this truth business. We are what we do, so wisdom for me is something to do with right action. After recent personal explorations of Aristotle I'd say this can come in (a) a practical form, phronesis or practical reason being about right action, and (b) a thoughtful form, sophia or contemplative wisdom being about right thinking. This 'rightness' is not an ethic I would press upon others, it's right for me, though I might recommend the process of arriving at it to others.

I don't feel this relates to 'truth' in anything more than an ordinary language fashion, in my own imagination.

I don't see these different "forms" of imagination as being necessary. They sound to me like theoretical postulations that don't have any grounding in the real imagination as experienced. The imagination as experienced is absolutely fluid. It's not categorical at all. Assigning categories to imagination is just a function of human reason trying to give meaning to the imaginative experience — Noble Dust

I am thinking about different aspects of the imagination as having different aspects because they are different language-games in which different things matter and we think differently.

Example one. I've been wondering about the basis of the philosophy of language lately, with a view to a serious project, and why there is such a gulf between mainstream philosophy of language and speech act theory. It might be, on my model, that where people think of language as related to logic, formality and truth-conditions they are talking about language as it relates to the 'scientific image', and where people think of language as related to dialogue and speech acts they are talking about language as it relates to the 'manifest image'. (To use Sellars' terminology)

This gives us two 'images' to 'imagine', to start with. Then - having been a struggling artist most of my life - I would certainly like to add artistic imagination. I am struck by how poorly critical analytic language relates to the practice of art. Clever practitioners can bridge the gap, but often critics of art and explicators of art-practice seem to be talking different languages.

These are the lines I'm thinking on!

I do feel minimalist or 'deflationary' about this truth business. We are what we do, so wisdom for me is something to do with right action. — mcdoodle

So, wisdom has to do with actuality then? And truth has nothing to do with actuality?

After recent personal explorations of Aristotle I'd say this can come in (a) a practical form, phronesis or practical reason being about right action, and (b) a thoughtful form, sophia or contemplative wisdom being about right thinking. This 'rightness' is not an ethic I would press upon othe — mcdoodle

I disagree with Aristotle here; why should contemplative wisdom only be "about" right thinking? What's the point of contemplative wisdom if it doesn't apply to action? We are what we do, as you say. So, in that case, what we "are" only applies to our practical reason, using Aristotle's concepts. Wisdom necessarily plays no role in action in this scenario. This is totally unnecessary and foolish.

This 'rightness' is not an ethic I would press upon others, it's right for me, though I might recommend the process of arriving at it to others. — mcdoodle

What does this even mean?

This gives us two 'images' to 'imagine', to start with. Then - having been a struggling artist most of my life - I would certainly like to add artistic imagination. I am struck by how poorly critical analytic language relates to the practice of art. — mcdoodle

Now here I'm with you, as a fellow struggling artist. This is a topic I was addressing somewhat in earlier posts. And I don't think you need to feel like you would "certainly like to add artistic imagination" to the scenario. I would encourage you to embrace your experience as an artist as primary in understanding imagination itself. Trust yourself. As an artist, your imagination is the primary mode of your thinking. Embrace that, instead of sabotaging yourself into thinking you need to come up with some other way of thinking in order to understand that very part of yourself that is so primary.