"eventually consciousness and qualia will eventually be explained with neuroscience" — GLEN willows
Something can have two descriptions. — GLEN willows
The statement "eventually consciousness and qualia will eventually be explained with neuroscience" is speculative, but no more so that "consciousness and qualia will never be explained by neuroscience." — GLEN willows
describing a Beethoven piece as a "variation of wave pressure" is correct right? It's just a different way of describing the same phenomenon — GLEN willows
The point is if your kid asks how that instrument (sax) works — GLEN willows
The statement "eventually consciousness and qualia will eventually be explained with neuroscience" is speculative, but no more so that "consciousness and qualia will never be explained by neuroscience." — GLEN willows
Schoonover, Fink, and their colleagues from Columbia University allowed mice to sniff the same odors over several days and weeks, and recorded the activity of neurons in the rodents’ piriform cortex—a brain region involved in identifying smells. At a given moment, each odor caused a distinctive group of neurons in this region to fire. But as time went on, the makeup of these groups slowly changed. Some neurons stopped responding to the smells; others started. After a month, each group was almost completely different. Put it this way: The neurons that represented the smell of an apple in May and those that represented the same smell in June were as different from each other as those that represent the smells of apples and grass at any one time.
This is, of course, just one study, of one brain region, in mice. But other scientists have shown that the same phenomenon, called representational drift, occurs in a variety of brain regions besides the piriform cortex. Its existence is clear; everything else is a mystery. Schoonover and Fink told me that they don’t know why it happens, what it means, how the brain copes, or how much of the brain behaves in this way. How can animals possibly make any lasting sense of the world if their neural responses to that world are constantly in flux? If such flux is common, “there must be mechanisms in the brain that are undiscovered and even unimagined that allow it to keep up,” Schoonover said. “Scientists are meant to know what’s going on, but in this particular case, we are deeply confused. We expect it to take many years to iron out.”
any claim to 'explain' what judgement is must beg the question, because it must assume what it is setting out to prove. — Wayfarer
Rational inference depends wholly and solely on the relations of ideas — Wayfarer
Judgements based on those simple elements are intrinsic to any rational claim — Wayfarer
they precede scientific analysis — Wayfarer
You can't step outside the process of judgement — Wayfarer
you need to use it in order to show it. — Wayfarer
The statement "eventually consciousness and qualia will eventually be explained with neuroscience" is speculative, but no more so that "consciousness and qualia will never be explained by neuroscience." — GLEN willows
How about grammar? Syntax? Semantics? Do you think they will be explained in terms of neuroscience? — Wayfarer
and without reference to neuroscience, which is the point. — Wayfarer
No, the point was that you claimed judgement about 'judgement' was begging the question, then perfomatively contradicted yourself by making judgements about 'judgement'. — Isaac
‘Rational inference’, which neuroscientists, materialists, and everyone else rely on whenever they use the word ‘because’, neither has, nor requires, a scientific grounding. — Wayfarer
You did so from your armchair, I do so by studying people in more controlled situations and examining brain images. — Isaac
That's not what I said. — Wayfarer
any claim to 'explain' what judgement is must beg the question — Wayfarer
Rational inference’, which neuroscientists, materialists, and everyone else rely on whenever they use the word ‘because’, neither has, nor requires, a scientific grounding. — Wayfarer
part of what will be explain, is the faculty that provides the capacity to explain. — Wayfarer
Mind is patterns in the physical (matter & energy), but then patterns are substrate-independent (punchcards, logic gates, cellphone radio signals, can all encode the same info). Doesn't that imply the mind is, at a minimum, quasi-independent of matter & energy. — Agent Smith
One aspect of the mind that philosophers have traditionally considered particularly difficult to account for in materialist terms is intentionality, which is that feature of a mental state in virtue of which it means, is about, represents,points to, or is directed at something, usually something beyond itself. Your thought about your car, for example, is about your car – it means or represents your car, and thus “points to” or is “directed at” your car. In this way it is like the word “car,” which is about, or represents, cars in general. Notice, though, that considered merely as a set of ink marks or (if spoken) sound waves, “car” doesn’t represent or mean anything at all; it is, by itself anyway, nothing but a meaningless pattern of ink marks or sound waves, and acquires whatever meaning it has from language users like us, who, with our capacity for thought, are able to impart meaning to physical shapes, sounds, and the like.
Now the puzzle intentionality poses for materialism can be summarized this way: Brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, electrical current, and any other physical phenomenon you can think of, seem clearly devoid of any inherent meaning. By themselves they are simply meaningless patterns of electrochemical activity. Yet our thoughts do have inherent meaning – that’s how they are able to impart it to otherwise meaningless ink marks, sound waves, etc. In that case, though, it seems that our thoughts cannot possibly be identified with any physical processes in the brain. In short: Thoughts and the like possess inherent meaning or intentionality; brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, and the like, are utterly devoid of any inherent meaning or intentionality; so thoughts and the like cannot possibly be identified with brain processes. — Ed Feser
If you can explain "the faculty that provides the capacity to explain" from your armchair (using that very capacity), why can the Churchland's not do so from their lab (also using that very capacity)? — Isaac
"eventually consciousness and qualia will eventually be explained with neuroscience" — GLEN willows
Most interesting! — Ms. Marple
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