Consciousness and qualia will never be explained by neuroscience because actually they can be considered already explained by neuroscience, but we realize that the neuroscience explanation is unable to meet our subjectvity.
They can be considered already explained: they are simply a product of the activity of our neurons. What else do you want to be explained?
I will tell you what else: your inner feeling of being a "I", a subject. Any explanation cannot but be objective and, as such, will always make you feel unsatisfied.
So, actually, we are just pretending that they have not been already explained.

"eventually consciousness and qualia will eventually be explained with neuroscience" — GLEN willows

How about grammar? Syntax? Semantics? Do you think they will be explained in terms of neuroscience?

Actually one of the well-worn Einstein sayings comes to mind here - '“It would be possible to describe everything scientifically, but it would make no sense; it would be without meaning, as if you described a Beethoven symphony as a variation of wave pressure.”


It's also worth noting that the *only* time you read the word 'qualia' is in connection to this particular clique of American academic philosophers, of whom the Churchlands comprise about half.

"We" are just pretending? Who is we.

And what does "neuroscience explanation is unable to meet our subjectvity" mean?
....

describing a Beethoven piece as a "variation of wave pressure" is correct right? It's just a different way of describing the same phenomenon. But when materialists say the same thing about consciousness and neuronal activity
it's rejected. It's like saying "it's just air blowing through a bent tube" regarding John Coltrane playing sax. Something can have two descriptions.

". How about grammar? Syntax? Semantics? Do you think they will be explained in terms of neuroscience?"

Why not? And qualia and quale have been used by philosophers of mind, for many years. And Churchlands are Canadian, to be anal about it!

Something can have two descriptions. — GLEN willows

I think you are right. And maybe there are many descriptions for the same thing. What is interesting is that some descriptions of things upset or trigger people. Generally this is when the description appears to violate their value system. Tip: avoid using the word spiritual on an atheist forum.

The statement "eventually consciousness and qualia will eventually be explained with neuroscience" is speculative, but no more so that "consciousness and qualia will never be explained by neuroscience." — GLEN willows

Probably true. But here's the thing. People keep talking about how the 'miracle' of consciousness is one the barriers to accepting physicalism as a viable worldview. But I suspect that even if we can demonstrate that consciousness and our sense of self is a product of the brain, the way digestion is the product of the stomach, there will still be people unconvinced, or who will find other ways to advocate for some notion of soul. And visa versa.

describing a Beethoven piece as a "variation of wave pressure" is correct right? It's just a different way of describing the same phenomenon — GLEN willows

But it's pointless. That's the point! But if you don't see the point, then there's no point.

I couldn't agree more. Just as some people still don't accept evolution, quantum entanglement and there's a growing movement of "flat earthers." No joke.

The serious point is that when something is scientifically disproven, we simply move along. Dualism is a hard one, I admit. It forces us to admit that there's only one thing, the brain, and everything is matter. All out thoughts and ideas, our appreciation of beauty, are just the result of a piece lumpy grey matter. Definitely takes the romance out of things (ha), but I'm still surprised that so many philosophers cling to the notion that consciousness is in a special category, a mystical or at least special thing.

The point is if your kid asks how that instrument (sax) works, you can explain it. By that logic there's no point in explaining the mechanics behind anything. "That watch is beautiful...how does it work? "It's pointless to tell you!"

The point is if your kid asks how that instrument (sax) works — GLEN willows

Neuroscientists, and neuroseurgons, need to understand the workings of the brain, but that tells us nothing about the problems of philosophy. So, yes, I've heard of the Churchlands, and I agree with their numerous critics. Over and out.

"We" is anybody thinking that neuroscience has not explained consciousness and qualia.
"Meet our subjectivity" is my formulation of what is considered not explained by those who think that neuroscience has not been able yet to explain consciousness and qualia.

The statement "eventually consciousness and qualia will eventually be explained with neuroscience" is speculative, but no more so that "consciousness and qualia will never be explained by neuroscience." — GLEN willows

I think you'll find a lot of people here who are sympathetic to the position you support. I certainly am. At the same time, I can understand why people resist. Consciousness is so personal, intimate, fundamental, experientially mysterious. How could it all just be mechanical. How the heck do electrical impulses become the movies I see in my head? The brain is outside, but I'm here inside. They are obviously different types of things. They are in different categories.

I strongly believe that everything I experience results from processes that take place in my body, primarily in the nervous system. If I may steal a concept from another discipline, there are no hidden variables. But saying that "explains" consciousness is like saying chemistry explains life. And the answer is (drumroll) emergence. Yes, it has become a cliche, but that doesn't mean it's not true. Saying I can break down (analyze) mental phenomena into biological processes isn't the same as saying I can build (synthesize) mental processes up from biological leggo blocks. It doesn't work both ways. That is the hallmark of strong emergence. As P.W. Anderson wrote, "More is Different."

We've had lots of discussions about this here. If you're lucky, Apokrisis will come along and explain downward constraints in hierarchical systems.

The philosophical argument is simply this. ‘Rational inference’, which neuroscientists, materialists, and everyone else rely on whenever they use the word ‘because’, neither has, nor requires, a scientific grounding. Rational inference depends wholly and solely on the relations of ideas - ‘is’, ‘is not’, ‘is greater than’, ‘is the same as’, and so on. Judgements based on those simple elements are intrinsic to any rational claim about anything whatever, including the claim that thought can be explained in physical terms. Yet those very same elements of thought are not the object of scientific analysis, because they precede scientific analysis - in order to engage in scientific analysis, such judgements are needed in the first place. You can't step outside the process of judgement to show what judgement is in a completely objective sense; you need to use it in order to show it. So it's not objective, or rather, any claim to 'explain' what judgement is must beg the question, because it must assume what it is setting out to prove.

A practical example. Consider a neurological expert who claims that data shows that some area within the brain performs a function. You won’t see anything like ‘a function’ when you look at the data, which presumably consists of graphical images of neural activity and so on. You must take the experts word for it that this data means such-and-such. That ‘meaning’ is always internal to the act of judgement - you won’t see that in the data, not unless you are likewise trained in the interpretation of what the data means.

See also this article on the neurology of mice.

Schoonover, Fink, and their colleagues from Columbia University allowed mice to sniff the same odors over several days and weeks, and recorded the activity of neurons in the rodents’ piriform cortex—a brain region involved in identifying smells. At a given moment, each odor caused a distinctive group of neurons in this region to fire. But as time went on, the makeup of these groups slowly changed. Some neurons stopped responding to the smells; others started. After a month, each group was almost completely different. Put it this way: The neurons that represented the smell of an apple in May and those that represented the same smell in June were as different from each other as those that represent the smells of apples and grass at any one time.

This is, of course, just one study, of one brain region, in mice. But other scientists have shown that the same phenomenon, called representational drift, occurs in a variety of brain regions besides the piriform cortex. Its existence is clear; everything else is a mystery. Schoonover and Fink told me that they don’t know why it happens, what it means, how the brain copes, or how much of the brain behaves in this way. How can animals possibly make any lasting sense of the world if their neural responses to that world are constantly in flux? If such flux is common, “there must be mechanisms in the brain that are undiscovered and even unimagined that allow it to keep up,” Schoonover said. “Scientists are meant to know what’s going on, but in this particular case, we are deeply confused. We expect it to take many years to iron out.”

That's mice, right? With smells. So good luck with working out the neurology of Justice, or Truth, or Beauty!

any claim to 'explain' what judgement is must beg the question, because it must assume what it is setting out to prove. — Wayfarer

And yet you've just waffled on for half a page 'explaining' to us exactly the sort of thing 'judgement' is...

Rational inference depends wholly and solely on the relations of ideas — Wayfarer

Judgements based on those simple elements are intrinsic to any rational claim — Wayfarer

they precede scientific analysis — Wayfarer

You can't step outside the process of judgement — Wayfarer

you need to use it in order to show it. — Wayfarer

...all statements about the nature of judgement, presumably arrived at using judgement. So it seems you can use judgement to explain some things about judgement after all. Which means it's the method you object to, not the mere fact of using judgement of reach conclusions about the nature of judgement.

Are you jealous of my fMRI?

The statement "eventually consciousness and qualia will eventually be explained with neuroscience" is speculative, but no more so that "consciousness and qualia will never be explained by neuroscience." — GLEN willows

How else could it be explained? We are what we eat. Material! A huge and complex collection. With a face that can smile, arms and legs, a brain to be aware and think, etc. It's the nature of the material thats important.

How about grammar? Syntax? Semantics? Do you think they will be explained in terms of neuroscience? — Wayfarer

Of course. They can be explained as neuronal structured dynamic parallel patterns of spike potentials. Every process in the physical world can be simulated and ordered or analyzed or used or creatively varied into new patterns. Which happens in structured ways. All perceptions are related and partially shaped by other one. With appropriate constraints, usually holonomic.

...all statements about the nature of judgement, presumably arrived at using judgement — Isaac

and without reference to neuroscience, which is the point.

Are you jealous of my fMRI? — Isaac

Do you believe in God, or is that a software glitch?

and without reference to neuroscience, which is the point. — Wayfarer

No, the point was that you claimed judgement about 'judgement' was begging the question, then perfomatively contradicted yourself by making judgements about 'judgement'. You did so from your armchair, I do so by studying people in more controlled situations and examining brain images. So I'm asking - if the whole 'judgement about judgement' issue is now cast aside, then all you're left with is an objection to my methods. So what's so damn special about your armchair that trumps my lab?

No, the point was that you claimed judgement about 'judgement' was begging the question, then perfomatively contradicted yourself by making judgements about 'judgement'. — Isaac

That's not what I said. I said

‘Rational inference’, which neuroscientists, materialists, and everyone else rely on whenever they use the word ‘because’, neither has, nor requires, a scientific grounding. — Wayfarer

You did so from your armchair, I do so by studying people in more controlled situations and examining brain images. — Isaac

And what I'm saying is that, in order to do that, you need to employ judgement. You have to judge what the data means, and so on. So if you're claiming to explain the entire cognitive function of man - which is the claim that is at stake - then you are employing the very faculty which you're attempting to explain.

Of course, if you're merely conducting neuroscientific research, then you're not doing that. But that is not what is at issue.

That's not what I said. — Wayfarer

You said it right here...

any claim to 'explain' what judgement is must beg the question — Wayfarer

As to...

Rational inference’, which neuroscientists, materialists, and everyone else rely on whenever they use the word ‘because’, neither has, nor requires, a scientific grounding. — Wayfarer

I agree. Since when has scientific inquiry proceeded only on the ground that such an inquiry was 'required'? I don't think even the Churchland's are making the claim that their inquiry is 'required' (though I wouldn't put that past them, I've no great sympathy for their approach).

Where do I begin? First perhaps by confessing my abject ignorance on the matter.

That out of the way, this is where I'm at on consciousness vis-à-vis materialism:

1. Physical: matter & energy

2. For consciousness to be physical, those who think so beed to demonstrate that it is either matter or energy or some combination of both. If this is impossible to do, nonphysicalism is still a viable alternative as to the nature of mind.

3. That consciousness is matter (has mass & volume) seems a bit farfetched. Does the thought I'm entertaining as I pen this post have mass & volume? Shouldn't I be gaining and losing weight continuously then and shouldn't my brain swell and shrink. "A bit naïve," a (neuro)scientist might say, "that's an (over)simplification." My response: Possibly, but the ball is in your court as to what precisely is meant by mind is physical in the sense that it is matter.

4. Next energy. Heat is energy, it can do work (steam engines) and it can be measured (joules). If the mind is energy then explain how it can e.g. lift a feather off the table and how many joules is it?

5. Mind is patterns in the physical (matter & energy), but then patterns are substrate-independent (punchcards, logic gates, cellphone radio signals, can all encode the same info). Doesn't that imply the mind is, at a minimum, quasi-independent of matter & energy. It can be transferred, like me Xeroxing a document, from one substrate to another. That's a win in my humble opinion for nonphysicalism for the simple reason that as per physicalism the mind persihes with the body at death.

You said it right here... — Isaac

And I stand by it. If the claim is

eventually consciousness and qualia will eventually be explained with neuroscience — GLEN willows

Then part of what will be explained is the faculty that provides the capacity to explain.

part of what will be explain, is the faculty that provides the capacity to explain. — Wayfarer

Yep. The apparent circularity of which you've just shown to be unproblematic by your doing exactly that from your armchair.

So the question remains. If you can explain "the faculty that provides the capacity to explain" from your armchair (using that very capacity), why can the Churchland's not do so from their lab (also using that very capacity)?

Mind is patterns in the physical (matter & energy), but then patterns are substrate-independent (punchcards, logic gates, cellphone radio signals, can all encode the same info). Doesn't that imply the mind is, at a minimum, quasi-independent of matter & energy. — Agent Smith

One aspect of the mind that philosophers have traditionally considered particularly difficult to account for in materialist terms is intentionality, which is that feature of a mental state in virtue of which it means, is about, represents,points to, or is directed at something, usually something beyond itself. Your thought about your car, for example, is about your car – it means or represents your car, and thus “points to” or is “directed at” your car. In this way it is like the word “car,” which is about, or represents, cars in general. Notice, though, that considered merely as a set of ink marks or (if spoken) sound waves, “car” doesn’t represent or mean anything at all; it is, by itself anyway, nothing but a meaningless pattern of ink marks or sound waves, and acquires whatever meaning it has from language users like us, who, with our capacity for thought, are able to impart meaning to physical shapes, sounds, and the like.

Now the puzzle intentionality poses for materialism can be summarized this way: Brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, electrical current, and any other physical phenomenon you can think of, seem clearly devoid of any inherent meaning. By themselves they are simply meaningless patterns of electrochemical activity. Yet our thoughts do have inherent meaning – that’s how they are able to impart it to otherwise meaningless ink marks, sound waves, etc. In that case, though, it seems that our thoughts cannot possibly be identified with any physical processes in the brain. In short: Thoughts and the like possess inherent meaning or intentionality; brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, and the like, are utterly devoid of any inherent meaning or intentionality; so thoughts and the like cannot possibly be identified with brain processes. — Ed Feser

If you can explain "the faculty that provides the capacity to explain" from your armchair (using that very capacity), why can the Churchland's not do so from their lab (also using that very capacity)? — Isaac

There's something they're not acknowledging, because of the blind spot of science. Because in a lab situation, you're concerned with objective and measurable phenomena. First person consciousness is not objective, it is 'what observes'. That is why Churchlands, Dennett, et al, are called 'eliminativists' - it is the first-person nature of consciousness which they are obliged to deny. Hence, the blind spot.

"eventually consciousness and qualia will eventually be explained with neuroscience" — GLEN willows

Yes, in the same way that one day, neuroscience will eventually be explained by neuroscience.

Went out for a bit and came back to all these comments, I wasn't expecting this. Remember the last time I tried this topic I was told I'd be eaten for breakfast.

I just want to make this point - if you read my first post my statement for discussion was roughly "saying neuroscience can explain consciousness is speculation," but so is "neuroscience will never explain consciousness." At this point no one understands consciousness - everything is speculation. That's why I find it the most interesting aspect of philosophy/science.

I'm being careful NOT to claim it WILL be explained by science, just that it could. I would argue that inductively speaking, science has proven many phenomena in history that were considered "mystical" or simply outside of the realm of the scientific method. At one point the concept of "life" was thought of that way.

Don't forget Einstein thought quantum entanglement was "spooky."

Sorry Wayfarer but I have to agree with your critics.

Isaac - I agree Wayfarer is attributing claims to the Churchland's that they aren't making. If he read their actually writings, they believe consciousness isn't one thing that will just "reveal itself." No aspect of the brain is that simple. For instance "sight" is spread all over the brain, with different parts doing different jobs. Same with memory. I'm not going to put any links in here, but trust me that there are a lot of new experiments that are revealing aspects of processes that may explain parts of consciousness.

I'm actually curious about what it is about their method that you dislike?

Fantastic....and very interesting. Holonomic...that's a new one.

Most interesting! — Ms. Marple

The issue you refer to (intentionality/aboutness) is what AI researchers are presently struggling with. It appears that computers, present state-of-the-art AI, can, in a certain sense, "understand", syntax. Even a cheap PC can be programmed in such a way that they'll make, at the most, say one grammatical error in (hyperbole alert) 10¹⁰⁰ years. It's with semantics that AI and computers in general trip up.

An aside: An interesting corollary of this fact is that it's likely that syntax evolved way before semantics in the primate brain. Yet, oddly, there's what's called broken English (an inability to get the grammar correct). It's quite a puzzle.