Tangentially, to clarify something on my part in case this does need clarifying:

Beliefs - at least as I’ve so far tentatively defined and understood them - which will never waiver irrespective of evidence or reasoning will presume an unwarranted infallibility. And I again fully agree with @Ken Edwards that such a species of belief is most often, if not always, detrimental to at the very least an accurate understanding of reality. But the observation of this species of belief sometimes occurring in others does not signify that all beliefs are thereby just such a species of belief. Hence my disagreements in this thread.

(To my fallibilist mind, the alternative is to hold all beliefs to at the end of the day be fallible, and thereby remain open to revising them if evidence or reasoning gives warrant to so doing.)

I think you are splitting hairs. Do you believe the words you typed above are correct? — universeness

I know that is the way things seem to me; there is no belief involved.

Do you disagree with these definitions, and, if you do disagree, what do you instead recommend? — javra

I don't disagree with the definitions. Believing something is "holding it to be true". That is not what I'm talking about; I'm talking about entertaining the idea that seem most plausible, not holding ideas to be true.

Indeed, but only after already having a belief system intact. Suspending one's judgment is a metacognitive endeavor. Metacognition is existentially dependent upon pre-existing belief. — creativesoul

It seems to me most plausible to think that judgements are made on the basis of, abstracted from, embodied precognitive orientations to the world. I don't know if that is true, but I accept it as a working model until and unless something that seems better shows up.

"Anything that is not known but seems reasonable can be accepted and entertained provisionally for pragmatic reasons;" is what it means to believe anything. All you've done is show that you can't escape believing anything. — Harry Hindu

No, believing something means holding it to be true. The only things I hold to be true are the things I know. There are things we know, which cannot honestly be doubted by anyone; and I don't count such things as being matters of belief. Matters of belief are things we hold to be true despite the fact that they can be doubted. If we don't hold any such thing to be true then we can't rightly be said to believe anything, as I see it. How can you be wrong about something which is merely a matter of definition?

Believing something is "holding it to be true". That is not what I'm talking about; I'm talking about entertaining the idea that seem most plausible, not holding ideas to be true. — Janus

“Most plausible” to me signifies “most likely to be real or conformant to reality”; to deem X most plausible is hence to provisionally accept X’s reality, thereby constituting a belief.

How can S deem X plausible without deeming X to be likely real or else likely conformant to what is real? Thereby in some way attributing reality to X, which would then be an act of believing.

For instance, to believe that extraterrestrial intelligence occurs and that humans therefore are not the only sapient species in the universe is neither a) to know that extraterrestrial intelligence occurs nor b) to be uncertain and fully agnostic about the matter but, rather, c) to deem its occurrence most plausible - hence most likely real.

In short, how else should I understand “plausible” in the contexts we’re using?

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To address a previous notion, a justified and true idea that one cognizes but does not hold to be true is not a personal instance of knowledge. As one example, a theist may hold the idea of atheism, may be aware of the justifications for it, and it might in fact be the case that atheism conforms to what is real; still, if this theist doesn’t hold the idea of atheism to be true, this justified and true idea of atheism which the theist holds awareness of will not be an instance of the theist’s knowledge. On second thought, if you deem that it is not possible to either know that there is no divinity or else that there is divinity, the same argument can be presented of numerous other propositions, such as that of “the house is over the hill”: the idea might be justified and true, but if one doesn’t hold it to be true then it cannot be something which one knows.

“Most plausible” to me signifies “most likely to be real or conformant to reality”; to deem X most plausible is hence to provisionally accept X’s reality, thereby constituting a belief. — javra

As I said, it all depends on how you define belief. Deeming X to be most plausible is not the same as X seeming most plausible. My point is simply that I know X seems most plausible to me, but I don't deem it to be most plausible, per se, because there are no absolute criteria for "most plausible". There is thus, no need for believing anything.

To put it another way, I don't see it as having anything to do with "reality"; I think that term is altogether too overblown. "The most plausible" is just what seems to be the best explanation; the one that fits best within a general network of perspectives that I find explanatorily workable.

While it may not have been the best example I could have offered, you’re still overlooking a key ingredient that was stipulated from the beginning: lack of knowledge. You do not know what caused the movement in the dark corner. You haven’t clearly seen anything but a movement; you haven’t seen a small animal, never mind seeing a rat. But you’re mind inferentially predicts that the movement might either have been caused by wind-blown leaves or by a small animal (but not both). Which one is real is to you not known, and hence not a psychological certainty. — javra

I guess the example is unclear because it lacks specificity. The unknown critter is referred to as both an experience-based prediction and also an inference. In the example, I assume that something in the environment, some pattern of sense data, subconsciously resulted in a prediction that a small animal may be present, even though it couldn't be verified visually or otherwise. After the prediction was conscious it could then be consciously considered or reasoned with. At that point, other information may come to mind, like that there's been an increase in rat sightings in the area because of a nearby construction project, for example. That may favor the conclusion that there is a small animal. IN ANY CASE, there's no reason to "hold it to be true." More evidence to the contrary conclusion, all things being equal, would not be resisted.

common to all three types of belief is some variant of “the attribution of reality to”. — javra

I think belief is all about the 'holding to be true', which is really about holding to shared meaning and identity. We can provisionally accept and entertain both knowledge and fiction for pragmatic reasons, but we don't need to maladaptively hold to them.

Example:
We provisionally accept and entertain the fiction that a $100 bill has value beyond its physical properties, but under different circumstances, like if we were stranded on a desert island with a group of goofy castaways, we would no longer accept or entertain the fiction.

To put it another way, I don't see it as having anything to do with "reality"; I think that term is altogether too overblown. "The most plausible" is just what seems to be the best explanation; the one that fits best within a general network of perspectives that I find explanatorily workable. — Janus

Best explanation for what if not for what is real or else what is really the case? But if you think the notion of reality is too overblown, even though I disagree, I won’t argue with you.

I guess the example is unclear because it lacks specificity. The unknown critter is referred to as both an experience-based prediction and also an inference. — praxis

There were two competing alternatives rather than the one scenario of an unknown critter. Then again, I don’t get how experience-based predictions can be anything other than inferences based on some experience.


Maybe it’s just me not being up to par. All the same, I’m going to likely call it a day.

I don’t get how experience-based predictions can be anything other than inferences based on some experience. — javra

The rain in Spain falls mainly on the mountains
- My Fair Lady

You can't always get what you want
But if you try sometimes, well, you just might find
You get what you ask for
- Rolling Stones

A penny saved is a penny wasted
- Benjamin Franklin

Between these three examples I think it’s likely that you’ve just experienced at least one prediction error. The error didn’t occur because of good or bad reasoning but simply because the examples don’t follow a pattern that you’ve been conditioned to recognize.

(To my fallibilist mind, the alternative is to hold all beliefs to at the end of the day be fallible, and thereby remain open to revising them if evidence or reasoning gives warrant to so doing.) — javra

This to me is a crucial prerequisite to all beliefs. Believing is not the problem. Even belief held with such fervor that it might even be labeled obsessional. Such strongly held beliefs can be great motivators for the good as well as the bad. I hold a very very strong belief that a system that creates rich people and poor people is fundamentally unjust and must be defeated. But if you hold any belief, including that one as a belief that is absolutely unchallengeable and if you claim your belief was always true, is true and will always be true then you are not a balanced individual. You must be willing to look at valid empirical evidence that suggests a particular belief you hold may be flawed, no matter how deeply it runs through you. Otherwise, you are a fool, who can and will be infected by the viewpoints of nefarious b*******.

I know that is the way things seem to me; there is no belief involved. — Janus

What is the difference between you knowing something and the way something seems to you?

What is the difference between the way things seem to you and you having a delusion or hallucination?

What terms can we use to refer to the way things seem to you and the way things are? Belief and Reality.

What is the difference between belief and knowledge? Belief is when you only have an observation OR reason to support a particular view. Knowledge is when you have both observation AND reason to support a particular view.

Thank you for corecting my spelling. I have always been a bad speller and spelling is important.

I agree.

I told you that that fucking word - "believe" is tricky as hell. — Ken Edwards

I don't agree. I think that there are ways of using "belief" and related terms that make for a more holistic and consistent discussion. I think that not only does a clear use of these terms lead to a better understanding of what is going on here, but that it will better support the intuition you express in the OP - that excessive fervour leads to immoral acts.

So if you will bear with me I'll outline a grammar that will clear up some of the issues. Set aside your previous notions for a bit and consider this alternative.

We can differentiate between some statement being true, and our believing that it is true. This is a commonplace; it's a distinction worth making because it allows us on occasions to be wrong - for example when you believe the keys are in your pocket but the truth is they are still in the locked car, or when what you took to be an ass is actually a mule. Without this distinction we could not differentiate between what we hold to be the case and what is actually the case, and hence we could not correct our view of how things are.

What this shows is that we need the notion of "belief" in order to make a basic distinction between what we think is true and what is actually true.

There's a myriad of debates here, of course, concerning those who mistakenly hold that what we think is true is what is actually true, as if we were omniscient, or those who think that we can never be certain of our beliefs, as if that made them all false, and so on. Doubtless there will e replies to this post arguing for these oddities. In some cases they are correct, in others wrong, but generally they must accept the distinction between belief and truth in order to make their case. So that distinction stands.

It's also apparent that there are some things that we must set aside from doubt, in order to get on with our lives. You can't make a pot unless you set aside any doubts you might have as to the clay or the wheel. Such things are taken as givens. We might doubt them, as when a batch of clay turns out not to be up to the task, or a wheel refuses to turn, but we bring such things into doubt only as we have reason to do so. So while we might doubt almost anything, we take most things as granted.

Talking at this level, the notion of "belief" is clear, and necessary. And at this level it is absurd to claim one believes in nothing; even stating that one believes in nothing is a performative contradiction, since it displays confidence in the words used in order to make the very statement.

There's no mess here.

It might also be clear that very few of the things one holds to be the case are ever made explicit. We tend only to set out our beliefs when there is some question as to their truth. That, indeed, is the very point of differentiating beliefs from truths. For the most part our beliefs remain implicit. Nevertheless, it remains possible to set out our beliefs in words, should the need arise.

It's also apparent that you and I and anyone else hereabouts will agree on the vast majority of beliefs. While we might disagree as to the finer points of aesthetics, we will agree that there are pots and wheels and dishes and shelves and so on. We tend to emphasis our points of disagreement because these are the most interesting.

All this by way of showing that the notion of belief is inescapable, pivotal, and vital. So if someone proposes that they do not have beliefs, they are not using "belief" in the relatively clear way set out here.

Most of the discussion in this thread stems from failing to make the distinctions noted above, or form failing to grasp their consequences.

I'll pause there for comment.

What is the difference between you knowing something and the way something seems to you?

What is the difference between the way things seem to you and you having a delusion or hallucination?

What terms can we use to refer to the way things seem to you and the way things are? Belief and Reality.

What is the difference between belief and knowledge? Belief is when you only have an observation OR reason to support a particular view. Knowledge is when you have both observation AND reason to support a particular view. — Harry Hindu

There are two kinds of doubt: ordinary doubt and radical doubt. When it comes to taking the perspective of radical doubt, pretty much anything can be doubted, which means we don't know anything, or at least we don't know that we know anything. But that kind of artificial doubt is abstract and has nothing to do with our actual lives.

When it comes to our actual lives there are countless things which are beyond reasonable doubt, and we can think of these as knowledge. If something is open to reasonable doubt then it is not knowledge. In such cases there will be two or more alternative possibilities, and we can either adopt one and hold it as a belief, or suspend judgement and accept provisionally what seems most likely to be the case or what seems most workable. We don't have to believe such acceptations, we merely have to entertain them.

That's the way I see things, and it seems to be consistent and to work for me. I don't require or expect anyone to agree with my view.

Best explanation for what if not for what is real or else what is really the case? — javra

The best explanation is what makes a situation seem most intelligible. You say "what is real or else what is really the case"; why not just 'what seems most likely to be the case'?

We know countless things like "Paris is the capital of France", "The Earth is roughly spherical", "There is a greater surface area of water than of land on our planet", "Humans are usually bilaterally more or less symmetrical", "There are many muscles in the human face" and so on and so on. It makes no sense to doubt such things, so they count as knowledge, and I find it muddies the waters to speak about believing such things; we can be said to not merely believe, but to know them on account of there actually being no reasonable doubt.

Now, think of a criminal trial. The purported criminal is found guilty or innocent depending on which is considered to be beyond reasonable doubt. But we maybe in many cases can't count this conviction as knowledge because the purported "beyond reasonable doubt" may be more or less based on wishful thinking or prejudice.

Spelling is not that impotant. More important are things that people ask you (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/703817) and you chose to ignore. Most probably because you don't want to change your beliefs.

Indeed, beliefs are very strong, sometimes stronger than knowledge.

We can differentiate between some statement being true, and our believing that it is true. This is a commonplace; it's a distinction worth making because it allows us to on occasions to be wrong - ...What this shows is that we need the notion of "belief" in order to make a basic distinction between what we think is true and what is actually true. — Banno

I don't see how it necessarily follows. If I have a method of cleaning windows, I can conceive of a better method that might one day become apparent. I don't have to have a concept of the method by which windows are cleaned in order to have a concept of a better method by which windows are cleaned.

Likewise with your keys. I can have a a concept of a better assumption as to where the keys are without having to have a notion of the truth of where the keys are. It seems to me to be perfectly possible to use the idea of better models absent of any notion that one such model is the model.

We know countless things like "Paris is the capital of France", — Janus

There is the more nuanced observation that the capital of France is 'F,' personal interpretation can always offer a different perspective.

There are two kinds of doubt: ordinary doubt and radical doubt. When it comes to taking the perspective of radical doubt, pretty much anything can be doubted, which means we don't know anything, or at least we don't know that we know anything. But that kind of artificial doubt is abstract and has nothing to do with our actual lives. — Janus

Too vague. What do you mean, "actual lives"? There are many that seem to spend much of their "actual lives" on these forums expressing doubt in "radical" ways. We have experienced what it's like in holding a particular view only to find it was wrong, and this happens during our "actual lives". These types of "actual life" experiences are what cause us to question everything we know. So, I don't see a distinction you're making between radical and ordinary doubt. Doubt is doubt. It's just that we can doubt different things with different degrees. Questioning our purpose and whether we know anything is just like any other doubt. It's just that questioning foundational knowledge brings everything that was built on that foundation into doubt as well.

That's the way I see things, and it seems to be consistent and to work for me. I don't require or expect anyone to agree with my view. — Janus

I don't see how this is any different than the way I explained the differences between belief and knowledge. When others disagree with your view does that not instill doubt in your views? I know that it makes me want to understand the reason for their disagreement and whether or not it is a valid disagreement.

Belief is like holding a view without either some observation or logic to support it. Belief in God is an example. Also what some theory of physics seems to show without having been verified by observation would also qualify as a belief. Only when the belief has been shown to stand up against observational AND logical inquiry can it be categorized as knowledge.

I might suggest here that "Believe" is a verb and is a frequent activity or an action of human brain cells. — Ken Edwards

but then some beliefs....

I carefully avoid believing anything at all. — Ken Edwards

Believing half truths or carefully concocted lies kills thousands of people here and now every single day. — Ken Edwards

Believing carefully concealed lies and partial truths killed millions of people in both world wars. — Ken Edwards

Once, long ago, those words were believed my millions. Evil words, sinful words. Death words. — Ken Edwards

and then there must be many beliefs that lead you to trust the sources of information that led to these assertions of belief.

At least, I am assuming you believe your statements in the OP to be true.

There is the more nuanced observation that the capital of France is 'F,' personal interpretation can always offer a different perspective. — universeness

A pointless comment eliciting this otherwise pointless response.

Too vague. What do you mean, "actual lives"? There are many that seem to spend much of their "actual lives" on these forums expressing doubt in "radical" ways. — Harry Hindu

They don't live their radical doubt and that is what I mean by "actual lives".

— Janus

I don't see how this is any different than the way I explained the differences between belief and knowledge. When others disagree with your view does that not instill doubt in your views? — Harry Hindu

In that case you'll agree with me that it is better not to speak of believing things about which there can be no serious doubt, but of knowing them, and you'll also agree with me that when it comes to things we don't know, there is a distinction between adopting and holding one of the alternatives and declaring it to be the truth, and remaining undecided or provisionally adopting what seems most plausible, and seeing how it pans out.

Lies to children. Both correcting a falsehood and improving a process are examples of back propagation, but I decided to keep the argument in terms of belief and truth in line with the OP.

Further, in your example, windows and dirt are taken as given. Hence in your example, Ken's "I carefully avoid believing anything at all" is again an error, since in order to better clean a window, there must be a window.

This leads back to our agreeing that neuroscience assumes that there are brains. Something must be taken as a background against which belief, window cleaning or neuroscience might occur.

What this shows is that we need the notion of "belief" in order to make a basic distinction between what we think is true and what is actually true. — Banno

Jane asks, "Where are the keys?"

Bob replies, "The keys are in my pocket."

"Are you sure? Please check."

Bob probes his pockets and says, "Huh, I must have left them in the car."

-----

Bob thought the keys were in his pocket but they were actually in the car. :chin: Or perhaps they were not in the car either. Maybe after searching for a while Bob remembered that he put the keys on the upstairs dresser.

It would seem that Bob never needed to declare his belief or hold any location of the keys to be actual or true. It would be rather odd and unhelpful if he did insist that the keys were in any of the places that they weren't, actually.

I can't think of any situation where a declaration of belief is required.

I see. I thought your response to the OP was a good summary of why it's mistaken, but I didn't see where 'truth' came in - hence the query.

I am as baffled by the "I don't believe anything" species of epistemology as I am by the "I assess everything rationally and derive thus the 'truest' facts". They seem as gross a misunderstanding of the dynamic and collaborative nature of belief as each other. The former (the example of which we have here) seems the more eccentric of the two. I can't think of a reason why anyone would want to profess such a view. I get that it makes one sound ever so slightly Solomonesque - devoid of bias - which I think is the root motivation behind claims to epistemological purity, but surely this self-image of dispassion is only of any use if others are tempted to enquire of your judgement at some future time. At which point our OP would have to say "I don't judge"... Anyway, idle psychologising.... Thanks for the clarification.

I can't think of any situation where a declaration of belief is required. — praxis

The comment to which you're replying was about the notion of belief, not the declaration of one.

...required... — praxis

It's not required. Not sure why that is relevant.

It is the case that Bob believed the keys were in his pocket, yet his belief was false.

If we instead look at it being true that the keys were in his pocket, this could not be false without a contradiction. If it were true, Bob could not be wrong.

I guess I am not sure what your point is.

I thought your response to the OP was a good summary of why it's mistaken, — Isaac

Thanks.

I am as baffled by the "I don't believe anything" species of epistemology as I am by the "I assess everything rationally and derive thus the 'truest' facts". — Isaac

I suppose that historically the idea that we ought not believe anything derives from the notion that doubt is a virtue. It is found in the naive version of fablsificationism, which supposes that no statement is ever proven, only disproven. It is implicit in Pragmatism, with Peirce's odd notion of truth only being approached asymptotically. It's in some coherence epistemologies, which claim that statements are never true, only consistent with other statements.

All of these grossly oversimplify the situation.

Note the ought not? This is supposedly a moral position, as can be seen in the OP. Hence such discussions are fraught with over-reaction.

I suppose that historically the idea that we ought not believe anything derives from the notion that doubt is a virtue. — Banno

Which could lead to all sorts of poor heuristics. We don't really have a quality like doubt. We engage in an activity of doubting. So, how often? on what grounds? in what way? what should trigger this activity? did the person who came up with that as a virtue doubt their conclusion? how much? how often?

Yep.

The intuition behind it- not believing something without good reason - is Ok in some places, but absurd in others. It works in the examples given in the OP, but not in the examples you and I provided. And it needs to be balanced by the contrary that one need not doubt without reason.

The next step us to map out the relations between truth, belief, certainty and faith. Seems as there is some confusion as to the last two. There's a tradition that treats certainty as what is not subject to doubt, and faith as belief not despite doubt, but in the face of the facts. But small steps.

The next step us to map out the relations between truth, belief, certainty and faith. — Banno

As to have faith you have to have the certainty that your belief equals with the truth.

No. I have in mind Kenny's "Faith, then, resembles knowledge in being irrevocable, but differs from it in being a commitment in the absence of adequate evidence" Faith is unwarranted belief.

Knowledge, Belief, and Faith.