There is some help in understanding or identifying a bedrock belief (or hinge-propositions) — Sam26

Does Wittgenstein claim that there are bedrock beliefs? In PI he says:

Once I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do."

The context is justification for following a rule.

As I understand it, according to OC, a hinge proposition is one, as the name suggests, one's on which other propositions turn. They are neither prelinguistic nor non-empirical:

341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

It is not that they cannot be doubted but that they are not doubted.

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in
deed not doubted.

343. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason
we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

Hinge propositions are bedrock. Instead he uses the analogy of the river and its banks:

94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it
because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I
distinguish between true and false.
95. The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their
role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning
any explicit rules.
96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were
hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid;
and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became
fluid.
97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I
distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself;
though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.
99. And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an
imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or
deposited.

Rather then bedrock beliefs he says:

166. The difficulty is to realise the groundlessness of our believing.

I've answered this question already in the posts, and even in the paper I wrote on Hinge-propositions. The paper is on page 9 - 'Hinge Propositions and Their Epistemic Importance.'

The contention of this paper is that hinge-propositions are prelinguistic or nonlinguistic — Sam26

How can a proposition be prelinguistic or nonlinguistic? A proposition is by definition linguistic.

It is this system that is foundational or bedrock to hinge-propositions or hinge-beliefs, these beliefs give life to language, and to our epistemological language-games. — Sam26

Consider the following:

108. "But is there then no objective truth? Isn't it true, or false, that someone has been on the
moon?" If we are thinking within our system, then it is certain that no one has ever been on the
moon. Not merely is nothing of the sort ever seriously reported to us by reasonable people, but our
whole system of physics forbids us to believe it.

This is interesting for two reasons. First, the example no longer works. The river banks have changed. It is no longer certain that no one has ever been on the moon. Second, note "our system" includes "our whole system of physics". It is not that the system is foundational to hinge propositions but that hinge propositions form part of the system. As he says at the end of 105, the system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life. The system is the whole of it - what we believe, what we accept without question, language, what we are told, what we learn, what we discover, hinge propositions, and what turns on them.

The foundation then of our epistemic system is ... [our] subjective certainties — Sam26

At 305 he says:

Here once more there is needed a step like the one taken in relativity theory.

Just as there is no fixed point from which we can observe the motion of the universe, there is no fixed foundation for our knowing. Our subjective certainties are not fixed and unchanging. Our subjective certainties are not the foundation. That we are subjectively certain of something is not prior to but occurs within our epistemic system.

l

but hinge-propositions are not traditional propositions. — Sam26

So you have said, but where does W. say this?

They are beliefs, but very basic beliefs that can be shown in our actions. — Sam26

That may be true in some cases but I do not see where W. says that all hinge propositions are like this.

Bedrock beliefs (hinge-propositions) are not part of a noetic structure, they are probably formed causally based on our interactions with the world around us. — Sam26

I don't think they are causally based. When I have more time I will try to find relevant passages.

I know you haven't read this thread because it's a lot to read, but I don't want to re-write the thread to answer your questions. One thing to keep in mind, not all of my conclusions are based on what Wittgenstein said in OC - some are some aren't.

[

All propositions are beliefs — Sam26

A proposition may express a belief but it is not a belief.

All beliefs, if they are said to be beliefs, are reflective of states-of-mind, no minds, no beliefs. However, not all beliefs are confined to language, that is, there are other kinds of actions that can and do reflect states-of-mind. Thus, the act of picking up a cup of coffee, or the act of brushing your teeth, or the act of digging for worms, all reflect states-of-mind — Sam26

Are you claiming that there is a picking up a cup of coffee state of mind or the act of brushing your teeth state of mind?

If I pick up my tooth brush, that act shows my belief about the tooth brush, that there is a toothbrush. — Sam26

I do not pick up a toothbrush because I believe there is a toothbrush. My belief about the toothbrush is not simply that there is a toothbrush but that it is used to brush teeth and that brushing my teeth is an important part of hygiene.

My conclusion based on these ideas is that many bedrock beliefs or hinge-propositions are causally formed, that is, there is a causal connection between the reality around us, our sensory experiences, and our mind. This, it seems to me, is what triggers the belief. — Sam26

Do you think that this is in line with or contrary to Wittgenstein's claim about the spade being turned at bedrock?

Do I see the duck-rabbit one way or another because something causes me to see it one way or the other? Can the cause of seeing one way be the same as seeing it the other?

475. I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but
not ratiocination.

476. Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc.,etc. - they learn to fetch books,
sit in armchairs, etc.,etc.

478. Does a child believe that milk exists? Or does it know that milk exists? Does a cat know that a
mouse exists?
479. Are we to say that the knowledge that there are physical objects comes very early or very late?

480. A child that is learning to use the word "tree". One stands with it in front of a tree and says
"Lovely tree!" Clearly no doubt as to the tree's existence comes into the language-game. But can the
child be said to know: 'that a tree exists'? Admittedly it's true that 'knowing something' doesn't
involve thinking about it - but mustn't anyone who knows something be capable of doubt? And
doubting means thinking.

That there are things in the world is not something a child believes, but neither is it something she doubts.

402. In the Beginning was the Deed.

My conclusion based on these ideas is that many bedrock beliefs or hinge-propositions are causally formed, that is, there is a causal connection between the reality around us, our sensory experiences, and our mind. This, it seems to me, is what triggers the belief. — Sam26

Supposing a speaker, perhaps a schizophrenic, behaved in a certain fashion while talking in a contradictory manner about his actions (much like a politician). Whereabouts is the contradiction between his actions and his words? Is it in the speaker's mind? or does the contradiction purely concern linguistic convention, with any confusion being solely in the mind of the listener as a result of misinterpreting the speaker?

Supposing a speaker incorrectly guesses the lottery numbers. What is the difference between saying "the speaker's guess about the lottery outcome was wrong" versus saying "the speaker's 'guess' was correct, for he didn't really intend to win the lottery, for his report was in fact a causal response to his environment and we mistook his words for a prediction" ?

The problem is, there aren't any conceivable means for distinguishing the content of a bedrock belief from the content of a verbal belief apart from appeals to linguistic convention. And if beliefs, whether bedrock or verbal, are causal responses, then they cannot be objectively falsified, since behavioral goals are also interpretable in terms of causal responses to immanent environmental conditions.

A proposition may express a belief but it is not a belief. — Fooloso4

I agree, but I'm talking about propositions in the context of OC, specifically in the context of someone saying or writing out their belief. I should have been clearer.

Are you claiming that there is a picking up a cup of coffee state of mind or the act of brushing your teeth state of mind? — Fooloso4

My claim is that the act of picking up the cup shows that we have beliefs about cups, or beliefs about toothbrushes - not that there is a cup of coffee state-of-mind.

I do not pick up a toothbrush because I believe there is a toothbrush. My belief about the toothbrush is not simply that there is a toothbrush but that it is used to brush teeth and that brushing my teeth is an important part of hygiene. — Fooloso4

I didn't say that you pick up a toothbrush because you believe there is a toothbrush. I said, that the act of picking up a toothbrush shows that I believe there is a toothbrush to pick up. The other reasons you give are linguistic reasons.

Do you think that this is in line with or contrary to Wittgenstein's claim about the spade being turned at bedrock?

Do I see the duck-rabbit one way or another because something causes me to see it one way or the other? Can the cause of seeing one way be the same as seeing it the other? — Fooloso4

I'm not trying to be in line with or against Wittgenstein's ideas, I'm developing a theory of epistemology based on some of his ideas, and my interpretation of where some of his ideas lead.

I don't understand what the duck rabbit idea has to do with what I'm saying.

Your questions don't reflect a clear understanding of what I'm trying to say, which maybe a fault of mine, I'm not sure at this point.

As I mentioned to Fooloso4, to get a clear picture of what I'm trying to say you have to read the material, not just quote me out of context and give a response. I say this because I don't see the connection between the quote you used, and your responses. Part of the problem is that much of what I'm saying is new, although there are some philosophers working on some of the same ideas.

The following is a link to some similar ideas to mine, although not entirely similar, but close.

https://www.academia.edu/7298912/Hinge_Propositions_and_the_Logical_Exclusion_of_Doubt

I said, that the act of picking up a toothbrush shows that I believe there is a toothbrush to pick up. — Sam26

On this we disagree. I do not think belief enters into the picture unless someone asks whether I believe that what is see in front of me is a toothbrush. When I put my foot on the ground and stand up or walk I do not believe the ground is solid and that I can stand and walk on it. I simply do what I have always done ever since I learned to stand and walk. We stand and walk long before we form beliefs about such things. I take it that this is W.'s point regarding children and animals. Consider the rooting reflex. A newborn has not formed a belief.

The other reasons you give are linguistic reasons. — Sam26

That is my point. I do not just pick up anything, I pick up the toothbrush to brush my teeth. I do not do that unless I believe in the benefit of brushing my teeth.

I'm not trying to be in line with or against Wittgenstein's ideas, I'm developing a theory of epistemology based on some of his ideas, and my interpretation of where some of his ideas lead. — Sam26

This is problematic because it is not always clear where you are interpreting him and where you are developing your theory. Your "interpretation of where some of his ideas lead" is ambiguous. It is an interpretation of his ideas or an interpretation of where his ideas lead? In the former case the question arises as to how convincing of your interpretation is, in the latter whether you have understood him correctly need not come into question, except you say that what you are doing is "an expansion of his thoughts". However interesting or important your theory is, it cannot be an expansion of his thoughts if you have misrepresented his thoughts.

I don't understand what the duck rabbit idea has to do with what I'm saying. — Sam26

It speaks to your claim that many bedrock beliefs or hinge-propositions are causally formed. There is nothing that causes me to see it one way or the other. The same goes for whatever you might claim is a bedrock belief or hinge-proposition. If you did not know what a duck or a rabbit was you would not see a picture of a duck or rabbit but that does not mean that knowing what a duck or rabbit is causes you to see it that way.

The following is a link to some similar ideas to mine, although not entirely similar, but close.

https://www.academia.edu/7298912/Hinge_Propositions_and_the_Logical_Exclusion_of_Doubt — Sam26

That is pretty close to what i thought you were saying. I wasn't questioning your views, just pointing to directions of further discussion.

I understand.

Does Wittgenstein give any specific examples of hinge propositions?

When he says:

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in
deed not doubted.

we should not overlook "in deed". I take this to mean, in practice. It is not that these things are indubitable, but that a great deal hangs and pivots on them. If they are doubted then everything that depends on them becomes doubtful. That does not mean that they cannot be doubted but that they are not doubted. They are fixed, but not in some absolute unchangeable way.

The sun revolves around the Earth may have at one time been a hinge proposition. There is much that hung on it, including astronomical calculations and existential beliefs. One was as certain of it as one was that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. It belonged to the logic of their scientific investigations that this was in deed not doubted.

Moore's propositions are in fact hinge propositions. It is because of Moore's argument with the skeptics that set Wittgenstein notes in motion. "I know this is my hand," is an example, 2+2=4 is also a hinge, that my body is separate from other bodies is also a hinge. There are many many hinges. The rules of chess are hinge to the game of chess. The board and pieces are also hinges. There are too many to list.

In terms of OC 342 Wittgenstein points out that any investigation, including scientific investigations, there are certain things that are not doubted. For example, our sensory perceptions are generally trusted, without which we would not get very far. The deed is at the bottom of this trust.

It would not be possible to doubt without somethings standing fast for us. Doubts are parasitic on that which is not doubted.

Some hinges can change over time, but other hinges stand fast.

Moore's propositions are in fact hinge propositions. — Sam26

I have seen some commentators who treat them as such, but I have found nothing in On Certainty or other texts of Wittgenstein's that make that identification.

What hangs on "know this is my hand"? What role does it play in any of our ordinary language games? Where does it even occur? Why would anyone even say such a thing except in extraordinary circumstances or when one is "doing philosophy?

I am skeptical of the explanations we find in the literature that rely on some theory.

The one example of a hinge is:

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of
incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your
dispute can turn."

I have seen some commentators who treat them as such, but I have found nothing in On Certainty or other texts of Wittgenstein's that make that identification. — Fooloso4

The whole book is about Moore's propositions, and the fact that they are hinge propositions. If any commentator said otherwise he would be laughed at. I would challenge you to find someone who said otherwise, especially a philosopher. I've been studying this book for years, and have read papers on the subject from philosophers all over the world, and I have not found one commentator who would make such an assertion.

The whole book is about Moore's propositions, and the fact that they are hinge propositions. If any commentator said otherwise he would be laughed at. — Sam26

Laughter is no substitute for evidence and philosophical argument. Again, what hangs and pivots on Moore's claim that he knows he has hands? The whole book is about doubt and certainty. It was prompted by discussion with Malcolm about Moore's propositions, but it does not follow that Moore's claim to know he has hands stands as a hinge. Not everything we accept serves as a hinge. Further, the problem of how this claim serves as a hinge when Wittgenstein finds it so problematic must be addressed.

I would challenge you to find someone who said otherwise, especially a philosopher. — Sam26

If you were to raise this challenge against some of the more recent readings of Wittgenstein fifty years ago, would you have found someone who agreed with these readings?

The literature on hinge propositions is not very extensive and fraught with disagreement and is based on an incomplete first draft of issues W. was thinking his way through.

152. I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

So, how does the proposition "I know that here is one hand" serve as an axis? Moore's proposition: "The earth existed for a long time before my birth" might function in this way, but just because I don't doubt that I have hands does not mean it is a hinge.

[Edit]: More precisely it is not Moore's claim that the earth existed for a long time before my birth that serves as a hinge, but rather, propositions that inform it. Propositions about the age of the earth.

So, how does the proposition "I know that here is one hand" serve as an axis? Moore's proposition: "The earth existed for a long time before my birth" might function in this way, but just because I don't doubt that I have hands does not mean it is a hinge. — Fooloso4

What would make one a hinge but not the other?

What would make one a hinge but not the other? — Luke

I edited my post soon after posting it:

[Edit]: More precisely it is not Moore's claim that the earth existed for a long time before my birth that serves as a hinge, but rather, propositions that inform it. Propositions about the age of the earth. — Fooloso4

The age of the earth informs geology, evolution, astronomy, and so on. I know that here is a hand serves no such function.

I'm still trying to get clear on this distinction. It seems like a hinge is something in the background; a presupposition of sorts, or what Wittgenstein refers to at OC 153 as something which "only gets sense from the rest of our procedure of asserting" ..?

From an earlier post:

As I understand it, according to OC, a hinge proposition is one, as the name suggests, on which other propositions turn.

341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in
deed not doubted.

343. But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason
we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.

]

I think the best way to think of a hinge, is to think of them as beliefs — Sam26

In that case why doesn't he just call them beliefs?

Propositions are beliefs, they are statements that are true or false. The only time they wouldn't be beliefs is if you're giving one as an example or something where they're not attached to someone.

Is the one example of a hinge proposition given - 12x12=144, a belief? Isn't that proposition true whether one believes it or not? If it is true (or false) whether I believe it or not, then at least one hinge proposition, the only one given, is not a belief.

If it is a belief then what does one believe when he believes 12x12=144? That he has done the calculation correctly? That there are numbers? That 12 and 144 are numbers? That numbers can be multiplied? Are each of these things hinge beliefs? Are hinges based on hinges? Is there a first in the series or does each depend on the other?

Is 12x12=144 non-epistemic, as you claim hinge propositions must be? Or is it something known? Something that can be rationally demonstrated?

Is 12x12=144 pre-linguistic as you claim hinge propositions must be? Does one hold a pre-linguistic belief that there are numbers and they can be multiplied? It should be kept in mind that Wittgenstein held that mathematics was a human invention. Can a pre-linguistic humans invent mathematics?

/

Propositions are beliefs, they are statements that are true or false. The only time they wouldn't be beliefs is if you're giving one as an example or something where they're not attached to someone. — Sam26

I tend to agree with Fooloso4 here that propositions are not necessarily beliefs. A proposition could be about something absurd and/or probably false, such as: there are twelve dogs in the Andromeda Galaxy. Nobody needs to believe this for it to be a proposition.

As I said, there are examples of propositions that aren't beliefs, but in terms of OC we're talking about Moore's propositions, and those are beliefs, Moore's beliefs. I don't disagree with what you're saying, but I don't think I ever said that propositions are necessarily beliefs.