All of these things are said as if there is a Platonic "public" judging this.. It is just people's internal "beetles" judging this. — schopenhauer1
202. That’s why ‘following a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is following a rule is not to follow a rule. And that’s why it’s not possible to follow a rule ‘privately’; otherwise, thinking one was following a rule would be the same thing as following it. — Wittgenstein, PI 202
202. That’s why ‘following a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is following a rule is not to follow a rule. And that’s why it’s not possible to follow a rule ‘privately’; otherwise, thinking one was following a rule would be the same thing as following it. — Wittgenstein, PI 202
That logic makes no sense. Someone else’s beetle may think they understand what I’m doing, find it “normal” or not, but it’s just their beetle reacting to something. That doesn’t confer anything outside of solipsism. How is there a public to Witt if there’s no certainty to ontology? It’s all anti foundational. You can’t start positing an external confirming entity. — schopenhauer1
So there are no rules? No rules of chess or any other game/sport? No road rules? — Luke
Im saying you can’t have both uncertainty, anti foundationalism but then claim that there’s X (rules, games, use) — schopenhauer1
Most of PI is devoted to ambiguities, misunderstandings, and errors :lol:. It certainly matters to him to demonstrate this as a point, not as an aside. — schopenhauer1
There you are again, sneaking in some externality. "Culture" is now used instead of "public" and "practice". Culture is an individual's perception of something. — schopenhauer1
You can't get to a foundation by appealing to a public sphere of agreement. It is all individuals agreeing, there is no public. — schopenhauer1
Responsibility for what? What is it an appeal to? We can always be wrong... — schopenhauer1
I don’t follow why there needs to be either foundationalism or certainty in order for there to be rules. — Luke
Someone else’s beetle may think they understand what I’m doing, find it “normal” or not, but it’s just their beetle reacting to something. — schopenhauer1
(201) For what we thereby show is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of application, is exhibited in what we call “following the
rule” and “going against it”.
That doesn’t confer anything outside of solipsism. — schopenhauer1
How is there a public to Witt if there’s no certainty to ontology? — schopenhauer1
As long as we avoid private language and rule following I'm okay. — Antony Nickles
So, what about this paragraph? It does not fit into your 'reduction of skepticism' model:
420. ...Seeing a living human being as an automaton is analogous to seeing one figure as a limiting case or variant of another; the cross-pieces of a window as a swastika, for example. — Paine
As long as we avoid private language and rule following I'm okay. — Antony Nickles
This is like saying when studying mathematics, I'm okay with the subject as long as we avoid multiplication and division. You can't be serious. — Sam26
For now I'm just going to work on the other thread. — Sam26
The skeptic imagines the other's body blocks us from knowing their pain, but it is our unwillingness (to accept anything but pure knowledge) that shields their humanity from us; — Antony Nickles
I don't understand this quest for "pure knowledge" angle. What I took from the passage is that means of discrimination have consequences far beyond the subjects they entertain. — Paine
So do we start a seperate thread for the latter half of the PI? I suppose if we make the OP specific enough we might engage mod support in not simply transferring this dog's breakfast over to it. — Banno
This strikes me as a precursor to the notion of "hinge" propositions; here, being a chief hinges on being conscious...419. In what circumstances shall I say that a tribe has a chief? And the chief must surely have consciousness. Surely he mustn’t be without consciousness!
I was saying it was not a "point" because it is already assumed (no need to make a point of it, we all agree). He is not "demonstrating" it; he is looking at when it happens to see the ordinary criteria are different for each thing, that they come into play as markers of our interests in that practice. — Antony Nickles
We share criteria as we share our lives together. This is not some "agreement" (in the past or in each instance), but just that we can all recognize what an apology looks like, what a joke is, etc. We share the same ways of checking off the list if necessary of what makes a mistake different from an accident because we have all been brought up into our... whatever you want to call it, society? — Antony Nickles
You are right, there is no MUST here. But then the only thing getting in the way is you (or me), and not because the thing I get doesn't match the thing you have, but that we refuse, give up, resort to violence, etc. Wittgenstein finds that insisting on having something inside me is to remove "me" (what I do next) as the most important part; it is the desire to have knowledge take our place. This is why "I cannot know what is going on in him" (p. 225) is a choice when I see someone writhing in pain (a "conviction" he says). Their feelings are not "hidden" (as you say, "internal"), I am refusing to accept them, to see them as a person.
And also, as I said above, our criteria can in a particular case, not matter to me, become a burden, oppressive, exclude me, be dead to degenerate times, etc. I either continue to carry the interest in our criteria or not, but for that I can be judged (this is why I am culpable in the social contract I never agreed to). — Antony Nickles
means of discrimination have consequences far beyond the subjects they entertain. [Wittgenstein] was proposing a measure of fragility not commonly observed. A way of thinking about what one could reasonably expect that was not all that it seemed. — Paine
I don’t follow why there needs to be either foundationalism or certainty in order for there to be rules.
— Luke
Because it posits a public entity — schopenhauer1
Because what posits a public entity? What "public entity"? I don't see the problem. — Luke
The beetle box deigns that you can ignore individual representations of meaning as "functionally" it's all "use". Well, that poses problems due tot he "public" nature of the "functionality of use". That requires a metaphysics of entities such as "public" that goes beyond the individual. — schopenhauer1
Something has to obtain in the world called "public". — schopenhauer1
I think that, because you assume there can be nothing but private representations, your complaint is that there must be for Wittgenstein some public representation (or public mind) that is the arbiter of all rules and games and language. And who does that public representation belong to? The short answer to your conundrum is: it belongs to the public. That is, to other people, to accepted authorities, to rule books and other references, to convention, to general agreement; to things that are necessarily outside of one person but not necessarily outside of all people. — Luke
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