Public is a shared internal understanding of use, which is internal — schopenhauer1
Is that to say language gives the appearance of us sharing a world but we are actually stuck in an isolated theater of the individual mind? — Paine
And if that is the case, what is this "sharing" you speak of? It seems a lot more possible as something we can observe ourselves doing than to propose an unknown process designed to make us feel like it is happening. — Paine
There is no way to confirm this to be the case. There are models of why it seems to happen in the way you describe. It does not introduce a "Platonic thing" to observe that we can observe many things about our use of language without presupposing a model. I can imagine solipsism but doing that does not make it a fact. It cancels itself as something to be verified.There is nothing outside the individual instantiations. — schopenhauer1
And further, if we were to ever say that something can exist without a mental states, that is not meaning, but some sort of function. It's no more meaningful than some process in nature is meaningful. — schopenhauer1
Is this not the kind of theory that Wittgenstein expressed skepticism about? — Paine
Sure, but this language game (the uses) learned from a community is not some Platonic "thing" but is rather the various instantiations of understanding in each individual (internally). ...Thus the beetle-box actually seems at odds with this, as if internal understanding doesn't count here. — schopenhauer1
If that notion [my understanding] itself is missing, then there is no meaning had, even though, technically "use" can be still had in terms of how the word is being thrown around in the community of language users and acted upon. — schopenhauer1
The past criteria of judgement upon whether a word is correctly used (even if it is the individually learned collective wisdom of a community), and the judging itself, is had within a person's internal mental space. — schopenhauer1
How is it he is advocating for anything other than our inability to be accurate, or our ability to possibly be in error of what others are saying? It's more a "negative" (in the what is flawed) than positive (how to fix). — schopenhauer1
I've heard of Ordinary Language Philosophy, but I believe that came after... — schopenhauer1
If indeed everything is conflated to ordinary language and "Forms of Life", surely, to be a pedantic question-asker without providing any exposition would be abusive to the community of sympathetic listeners. You are always going to convince me this is the only way, and I am always going to say to you that you deem it more clever and necessary than it is. — schopenhauer1
Sure, but this language game (the uses) learned from a community is not some Platonic "thing" but is rather the various instantiations of understanding in each individual (internally). Thus the beetle-box actually seems at odds with this, as if internal understanding doesn't count here. — schopenhauer1
Use to whom? Surely if you get me a slab, there is nothing beyond me finding it "normal" and you finding it "normal" to do X and X. But it is still just "me" and "you" and nothing beyond that. There is no unifying form of "use". — schopenhauer1
You keep conflating the builder's language with other language games. — Fooloso4
All the assistant needs to know is to bring a slab when the builder calls "Slab!". The builder needs to know how to build with slabs, but there are no words for instructing the builder. His knowledge is not based on a language that consists only of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “beam”. — Fooloso4
He will not be an assistant unless or until he learns the language. — Fooloso4
How do I know that you are pointing to running rather than the runner? — Fooloso4
The sensation of pain is only accessible to the owner of the sensation. Therefore the observer of the other person's pain doesn't know if it is pain or pretention of pain. The observer can only guess. Meanings learnt from guessings are bound to be empty and unreal — Corvus
Folk have been at pains to try to get you to understand that language games involve both the world and words. It's not one or the other, but both. — Banno
This is the reality of life. — RussellA
I think we can agree here. I am not saying we have some a priori definitional understanding per se, just that we need some sort of mental experience for meaning to obtain, period. — schopenhauer1
Public is a shared internal understanding of use, which is internal — schopenhauer1
Behaviorist camp where language is a part of an organic system. — Paine
Uses are an expression or activity’s "possibilities" (#90)—what it is capable of (and not). The purpose of Wittgenstein’s term “use” is not to explain anything, it is part of showing that even the same expressions and activities can have different implications, different criteria, different ways it works, which is to contrast with the skeptic’s desire to have things work one way, be judged to have met one criteria. — Antony Nickles
But with some uses of “understand”, there is no “my” understanding, there is no room for it. “If you leave this base you will be courtmartialed. Got it?” “I understand [Yes, Sir!]” and here the criteria (of judgment) is that there will be consequences, whether you understand or even accept them. In fact, most times, when I say something to you in a particular context, there is no question about “your understanding”. It just doesn’t come up because there is nothing to interpret (as intention only comes up when something is weird). — Antony Nickles
Wittgenstein’s method is Ordinary Language Philosophy! He is looking at what we say in situations to learn what matters to us about something, as shown in the criteria we judge it by. This is his philosophical data to learn about the issues of knowledge, thinking, understanding, intention, appearance, essence, etc., and, predominantly in the PI, why we want to run away from the fact that our criteria are based on our interest in them, to an abstract, “pure” place where we are removed from the calculation of precision. If you really want to get into OLP’s method, this is the thread. Heaven help us though. — Antony Nickles
Internal understanding counts to the extent that it can be demonstrated externally. We say that a person understands something to the extent that they are able to demonstrate their understanding. In fact, the external demonstration is all that we usually (non-philosophically) mean by "understanding". Whatever internal understanding there is "left over" that cannot be demonstrated, or that is not included in an external demonstration of understanding, is irrelevant to the meaning of "understanding". Like Wittgenstein's beetle, the internal aspect of understanding itself "drops out of consideration as irrelevant" to the meaning of the word "understanding". This is not to say that we don't have an internal understanding or an internal life or any feelings or thoughts or first-person perspective. Only that these private "inner" things do not determine the public meanings of our words. — Luke
Our finding it "normal" or customary to "do X" is the unifying form of "use". The way "slab" is used in the builder's language game is that one person calls out "slab!" and another person brings them a slab. The same applies to all words, that is, we are trained in their use; we master the (techniques of) language. Whether or not we understand the language is demonstrated by our actions, which may be appropriate/natural or which may demonstrate that we don't understand what was said or that we don't speak the language.
Again though, I don't think there is anything special about meaning or understanding beyond "use". In this way, the difference in meaning and understanding between, say, me and one of those large language models is not some special, qualitative difference but rather just the extent of the functional capabilities. Im sure some A.I have better functional capabilities in some areas than us (e.g. how you can train A.I. to be exceptionally good at chess or go), but none of them have the functional capacities for the kinds of capabilities we think of as having true understanding of certain things, certainly not sentience. Obviously though this is a kind of continuous scale and as they get better, the divide between what we might call understanding and non-understanding becomes blurred, which is probably why there have been discussions recently about whether large language models have understanding - they are just getting better and better. — Apustimelogist
But Wittgenstein - the better interpretation is that he shows the realist/idealist division is flawed. That's why anscombe's paper is so careful. But you can find people that put him in either camp. Idealism is pretty well irrelevant. Wittgenstein to a large extent set up the discussion of realism/antirealism in the nineties and noughties. — Banno
A computer with the most advanced algorithms and computations, and even "error checking" mechanisms that are a kind of "self-check", gets nowhere closer to that thing having "meaning" (to itself), because nothing internal made it "meaning-ful". — schopenhauer1
...Witt can't get beyond his own dissolving acid. My premise is that WItt's PI has two points, one of which negates the other:
Point I: People's interpretation/understanding/sense of meaning can always be in trouble of being misinterpreted, of being in error. Of being mistaken. — schopenhauer1
Point II: If 1 is the case, then the best we can get is how the word is "used". — schopenhauer1
any... overriding theory of meaning ...is still not going to get beyond being one's mere solipsistic (private) interpretation of meaning. Use should not even have been offered as a solution. — schopenhauer1
1)There needs to be an internal aspect for meaning to obtain. If there is no mental aspect, meaning is not meaning. — schopenhauer1
He basically behaved like a computer, he performed a function, he did not garner any "meaning". — schopenhauer1
There is no "public" though. There is no respite from the dissolving acid of personal meaning/perception of something." — schopenhauer1
...as I understand it, it was the next generation (like J.L. Austin) that really started [Ordinary Language Philosophy]. It represents a positive (systematized/construction) aspect of ordinary language. — schopenhauer1
Apart from someone being "right" in a discussion, I might just give up because the other refuses to concede anything, not even acknowledge points of agreement. ;) That is to say, error is not the only measure, nor is mistake, but yes, things can go sideways, of course. I would think that the fact that things go badly is not a matter of contention. — Antony Nickles
Again, you misunderstand that "use" is not a solution to the problem of, let's call it, our human condition (its possibility of failure), it is not an answer to this truth the skeptic records (nor is it a dismissal, or a cure). It is just a term to point out that an expression can have different importance to our culture (thus different criteria) based on the situation. — Antony Nickles
Maybe we can see that the reason you are digging your heels in here about an "internal aspect" is to record that I have a personal relation to our shared criteria; I can defy our shared expectations, extend them into a new context, court madness, call for revolution, etc. That I matter (me personally, individually). The takeaway of the variety of our criteria, even that they have different implications (uses, versions) in different situations, is the realization that our shared judgments and interests (what is meaningful in our culture) are captured and embodied in our ordinary criteria. Usually there is no reason for a conflict with our criteria to come up (there is no need** for "me"), but, as one example, when communication falls apart, it turns on how much these shared criteria matter to me, whether I am willing to be responsible for them, to them--that they do or don't speak for me; whether they are meaningful to me.
**That your picture of "meaning" "needs to be" always present (even when "knee-jerk") is the interlocutor's need, their insistence, which Wittgenstein is investigating. — Antony Nickles
The fact that I am responsible for what I say does not require that at every moment I "mean" what I do or say (or "intend" it), as if I always "cause" it, or even that there was anything about it that was internal (personal or individual). Things usually go smoothly; most times no one has to clarify, or dispute, or ask "What?". However, when something strange happens, or we defy those expectations, then our ordinary criteria and the assumed uses of our activities (e.g., imploring, apologizing, threatening, etc.) are how we judge what you said, and judge you, at which point you can: clear up the "intention" (from their confused inference), or apologize, or make excuses, or clarify (from how they took it; or under which criteria it should be taken, thus how its meaningfulness should be considered, under which "use"). If we look at responsibility as the duty to respond (be judged) for what we say based on the ordinary criteria of a situation, then the event of my saying it (part of why "expression" is important) simply creates a context of criteria and circumstances in which clearing things up is possible (but not guaranteed, assured, certain). — Antony Nickles
The duty is not a lack of transmission of something within you, it is a responsiveness to a confusion in a particular situation. "What did you mean?" is asked because you said something I didn't expect, which is resolved between the situational implications and expectations, not by you looking farther into yourself for a "personal meaning", but that records that the fact that you can defy or stretch those criteria. — Antony Nickles
Moore and Austin were doing their thing at roughly the same time as Wittgenstein (Moore published Defense of Common Sense in 1925; the Investigations were published in 1953; Austin published How To Do Things With Words in 1955). Austin and Wittgenstein did not know of each other's work. Wittgenstein clarified Moore's version of OLP by seeing that it is not a matter that "common sense" or the common person's understanding is a better explanation of philosophical issues. He also sees that skepticism (the temptation of it) is an ongoing part of the human condition, where Austin didn't take it seriously. — Antony Nickles
Well, that debate occurred long after it was written, so that's to be expected. Trying to understand him in those terms is putting the cart before the horse.Thanks for that. That's what I thought, in that the Investigations takes neither side in the realism/anti realism debate. — RussellA
Whereas we are tempted to say that our way of speaking does not describe the facts as they really are. As if, for example the proposition "he has pains" could be false in some other way than by that man's not having pains. As if the form of expression were saying something false even when the proposition faute de mieux asserted something true. For this is what disputes between Idealists, Solipsists and Realists look like. The one party attack the normal form of expression as if they were attacking a statement; the others defend it, as if they were stating facts recognized by every reasonable human being. — ibid. 402
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