Wittgenstein, however, is not attaching straw men. He is addressing problems that arose in his discussions with students and colleagues. — Fooloso4
What is at issue here is not who said what. The philosophical issue is how we are to think about possibilities. — Fooloso4
I figure that saying: "When we do philosophy" includes all the efforts Wittgenstein is making as much as it includes views he is resisting. — Paine
It seems like the wide variance of interpretations are a function of how that gets answered. — Paine
(43)It [philosophy] is concerned with plotting the bounds of sense.
(45)What philosophy describes are the logical relations of implication, exclusion, compatibility, presupposition, point and purpose, role and function among propositions in which a
given problematic expression occurs. Philosophy describes the uses of expressions in our language for the purpose of resolving or dissolving conceptual entanglements.
When we do philosophy we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of civilized men, put a false interpretation on them, and then draw the queerest conclusions from it. — PI, 194
Does the project to dissolve as many problems as possible actually do that? — Paine
251. What does it mean when we say: "I can't imagine the opposite of this" or "What would it be like, if it were otherwise?"—For example, when someone has said that my images are private, or that only I myself can know whether I am feeling pain, and similar things.
Of course, here "I can't imagine the opposite" doesn't mean: my powers of imagination are unequal to the task. These words are a defense against something whose form makes it look like an empirical proposition, but which is really a grammatical one.
But why do we say: "I can't imagine the opposite"? Why not: "I can't imagine the thing itself"?
Example: "Every rod has a length." That means something like: we call something (or this} "the length of a rod"—but nothing "the length of a sphere." Now can I imagine 'every rod having a length' Well, I simply imagine a rod. Only this picture, in connexion with this proposition, has a quite different role from one used in connexion with the proposition "This table has the same length as the one over there". For here I understand what it means to have a picture of the opposite (nor need it be a mental picture).
But the picture attaching to the grammatical proposition could only shew, say, what is called "the length of a rod". And what should the opposite picture be?
((Remark about the negation of an a priori proposition.)) — Philosophical Investigations, 251
255. The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness. — ibid. 255
This might be a good place to start. What quickly becomes evident is that his interpretation of Wittgenstein is grounded on the problems and analysis of propositions, as can be seen in such claims as:
It [philosophy] is concerned with plotting the bounds of sense.
(43)
What philosophy describes are the logical relations of implication, exclusion, compatibility, presupposition, point and purpose, role and function among propositions in which a
given problematic expression occurs. Philosophy describes the uses of expressions in our language for the purpose of resolving or dissolving conceptual entanglements.
(45) — Fooloso4
Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language. (PI 109)
What *we* do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. (PI 116)
119. The results of philosophy are the discovery of some piece of plain nonsense and the bumps that the understanding has got by running up against the limits of language.
The civic status of a contradiction, or its status in civic life — that is the philosophical problem. (PI 125) — Wittgenstein PI
There are other aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy, such as seeing aspects, that are not propositional. — Fooloso4
It is here that we can see continuity between the Tractatus and his later work. It is also here that the limits of Hacker's interpretation of Wittgenstein can be seen. — Fooloso4
The question in hand here is, what happens with the picture theory as Wittgenstein moves on to the Investigations?
Who can give a simple, direct answer to that? — Banno
Not propositional, but still conceptual. — Luke
PPI 251. We find certain things about seeing puzzling, because we do not find the whole business of seeing puzzling enough.
PPI 257. The question now arises: Could there be human beings lacking the ability to see something as something a and what would that be like? What sort of consequences would it have? ... We will
call it “aspect-blindness” - and will now consider what might be meant by this. (A conceptual investigation.)
PPI 261. The importance of this concept lies in the connection between the concepts of seeing an aspect and of experiencing the meaning of a word.
255. The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness.
— ibid. 255
Not what you want to hear riding the gurney. — Paine
The real discovery is the one that enables me to break off philosophizing when I want to. a The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question. - Instead, a method is now demonstrated by examples, and the series
of examples can be broken off. —– Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.
Not propositional, but still conceptual.
— Luke
Does Hacker discuss Wittgenstein on what might be called conceptual seeing - seeing as, seeing aspects, seeing connections? — Fooloso4
There are other aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy, such as seeing aspects, that are not propositional. — Fooloso4
I’m saying that those aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy are not propositional but still conceptual. — Luke
From the Tractatus... — Fooloso4
In one of these cases the proposition is true for all the truth-possibilities of the elementary
propositions. We say that the truth-conditions are tautological. — Fooloso4
But why does David Pears states that those tautologies are empty? — javi2541997
The problem raised by the argument is that he treats every step in it, including its conclusions, as absolutely necessary, without treating them as empty tautologies. — javi2541997
2.06
The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality.
2.061
States of affairs are independent of one another.
2.062
From the existence or non-existence of one state of affairs it is impossible to infer the existence or non-existence of another.
tautologies — javi2541997
Hello folks, I have a question. What is an empty tautology? I am currently reading David Pears' book on Wittgenstein, and the author says: Given that a word has a certain meaning, philosophical analysis can tell us exactly what will necessarily be the case if a statement containing that word happens to be true. Here the necessity will be tautological, or at least definitional, so the analyses will take the form of a statement which has no factual content, and is in that sense empty. For example, the analysis of the phrase 'material object' will take the form, 'if anything is a material object, then the following requirements will necessarily be met...' And this will be an empty tautology.
I would appreciate it if someone could explain to me what David Pears means in that paragraph.
In addition, Pears says: The difficult thing is to understand the status of Wittgenstein's conclusion, and the argument which was supposed to establish it. The problem raised by the argument is that he treats every step in it, including its conclusions, as absolutely necessary, without treating them as empty tautologies.
Why does David see empty tautologies as a problem in an argument? — javi2541997
A tautology, however, has no content because it doesn't tell you anything about the world.
Consider:
"It's either raining or it's not raining"
Etc
This is empty of content, as it tells you nothing about the world. — 013zen
Clear and good example. I am starting to understand the role of tautologies better. I can conclude that tautology can't help me to achieve the truth in a philosophical analysis and this is why it is rejected by logicians and critical thinkers, generally. By the way, thanks for commenting and helping me out with the understanding of tautologies. — javi2541997
A statement is a tautology if it's always true. — 013zen
so the analyses will take the form of a statement which has no factual content, and is in that sense empty. For example, the analysis of the phrase 'material object' will take the form, 'if anything is a material object, then the following requirements will necessarily be met...' And this will be an empty tautology.
agree, but Pears says:
so the analyses will take the form of a statement which has no factual content, and is in that sense empty. For example, the analysis of the phrase 'material object' will take the form, 'if anything is a material object, then the following requirements will necessarily be met...' And this will be an empty tautology.
Maybe it is me, but I think that David Pears sees empty tautologies as a weak statement in an argument. — javi2541997
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