Wittgenstein, however, is not attaching straw men. He is addressing problems that arose in his discussions with students and colleagues. — Fooloso4

Then point them out and don’t just generalize “philosophers” writ large. At least outline the specific schools of thought.

What is at issue here is not who said what. The philosophical issue is how we are to think about possibilities.

What is at issue here is not who said what. The philosophical issue is how we are to think about possibilities. — Fooloso4

I stand by my original response to this. Don’t say “philosophers”, pick out what school of thought you are referencing, quote them or at least charitably paraphrase what they stated, and then provide a rebuttal based on this.

I figure that saying: "When we do philosophy" includes all the efforts Wittgenstein is making as much as it includes views he is resisting. Stating: "so it is not an empirical fact that this possibility is the possibility of precisely this movement" is a philosophical remark.

The aspect of the engineering language is prominent in the paragraph. Does that supply what Wittgenstein is claiming to be missing in some accounts? Does it get closer to the "civilized men" being imagined here?

It seems like the wide variance of interpretations are a function of how that gets answered.

I figure that saying: "When we do philosophy" includes all the efforts Wittgenstein is making as much as it includes views he is resisting. — Paine

I agree.

Criticizing from the inside is different from criticizing as an outsider.

It seems like the wide variance of interpretations are a function of how that gets answered. — Paine

Cryptic. Can you elaborate?

Cryptic. Can you elaborate? — Fooloso4

Guilty as charged.

I will try to put forward a more cogent version next week.

I have looked into Hacker and company, and they have an interesting method. I am reluctant to respond to very particular readings of Wittgenstein passages without access to the work as a whole. It is very expensive by what I have seen. I am a simple caveman stonemason on a very limited budget.

I agree with many of the remarks of the preface I could preview. But they also raise other questions.

Is there an inexpensive way to see the writing upon a larger scale?

This might be a good place to start. What quickly becomes evident is that his interpretation of Wittgenstein is grounded on the problems and analysis of propositions, as can be seen in such claims as:

It [philosophy] is concerned with plotting the bounds of sense.

(43)

What philosophy describes are the logical relations of implication, exclusion, compatibility, presupposition, point and purpose, role and function among propositions in which a
given problematic expression occurs. Philosophy describes the uses of expressions in our language for the purpose of resolving or dissolving conceptual entanglements.

(45)

There are other aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy, such as seeing aspects, that are not propositional. It is here that we can see continuity between the Tractatus and his later work. It is also here that the limits of Hacker's interpretation of Wittgenstein can be seen.

It seems reasonable to ask how far Wittgenstein thinks he has closed the distance between the two groups imagined here:

When we do philosophy we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of civilized men, put a false interpretation on them, and then draw the queerest conclusions from it. — PI, 194

The 'civilized' people are the ones using language. With all the deference paid to them, it is not like their activity is the resolution of the investigation. The crude savages carry on outside of the perimeter. The questions about meaning are uncomfortable.

That thought leads me to wonder how much the work is a version of Kant's Prolegomena of Any Future Metaphysics, establishing the ground of future discussion, or a step back from such ambition.

In continuance of asking the question of solving problems for all times, I wonder if aiming to dissolve problems does not create others. And that gets close to the role of aporia in classical philosophy.

Does the project to dissolve as many problems as possible actually do that?

Since the primitive people interpret what they hear, the difference is that one uses language and the other does not. There is, however, a difference in their form of life. More specifically, the way of life of philosophers (savages) and that of ordinary language users. The gap would be closed by philosophers not imbuing language with metaphysical meaning.

Does the project to dissolve as many problems as possible actually do that? — Paine

I don't think so. The assumption is that philosophical problems are grammatical problems. In some cases they are, but by treating language as the key it would seem that Wittgenstein is among the savages.

That image of operating outside the boundaries can be found in a sibling remark to 195:

251. What does it mean when we say: "I can't imagine the opposite of this" or "What would it be like, if it were otherwise?"—For example, when someone has said that my images are private, or that only I myself can know whether I am feeling pain, and similar things.

Of course, here "I can't imagine the opposite" doesn't mean: my powers of imagination are unequal to the task. These words are a defense against something whose form makes it look like an empirical proposition, but which is really a grammatical one.

But why do we say: "I can't imagine the opposite"? Why not: "I can't imagine the thing itself"?

Example: "Every rod has a length." That means something like: we call something (or this} "the length of a rod"—but nothing "the length of a sphere." Now can I imagine 'every rod having a length' Well, I simply imagine a rod. Only this picture, in connexion with this proposition, has a quite different role from one used in connexion with the proposition "This table has the same length as the one over there". For here I understand what it means to have a picture of the opposite (nor need it be a mental picture).

But the picture attaching to the grammatical proposition could only shew, say, what is called "the length of a rod". And what should the opposite picture be?

((Remark about the negation of an a priori proposition.)) — Philosophical Investigations, 251

Both 195 and 251 question what we learn through experience. But is the comparison between 'pictures' and 'possibility' in 195 equivalent to the question of what is an "empirical" proposition in 251? To say so looks like two means of negation masquerading as a positive. And that observation of 251 is germane in the part of the text where "identity" comes under interrogation.

In any case, the theme of being on the outside is continued nearby in:

255. The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness. — ibid. 255

Not what you want to hear riding the gurney.

Is there an inexpensive way to see the writing upon a larger scale? — Paine

I don't know, sorry.

This might be a good place to start. What quickly becomes evident is that his interpretation of Wittgenstein is grounded on the problems and analysis of propositions, as can be seen in such claims as:

It [philosophy] is concerned with plotting the bounds of sense.

(43)

What philosophy describes are the logical relations of implication, exclusion, compatibility, presupposition, point and purpose, role and function among propositions in which a
given problematic expression occurs. Philosophy describes the uses of expressions in our language for the purpose of resolving or dissolving conceptual entanglements.

(45) — Fooloso4

I don't find evidence in the linked paper that Hacker limits his interpretation of Wittgenstein to propositions. His interpretation might be grounded on the problems and analysis of language, more generally, or of concepts, but I don't believe he limits it to propositions. This would be consistent with passages such as:

Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language. (PI 109)

What *we* do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. (PI 116)

119. The results of philosophy are the discovery of some piece of plain nonsense and the bumps that the understanding has got by running up against the limits of language.

The civic status of a contradiction, or its status in civic life — that is the philosophical problem. (PI 125) — Wittgenstein PI

There are other aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy, such as seeing aspects, that are not propositional. — Fooloso4

Not propositional, but still conceptual. I read those passages as relevant to his remarks on private language. Regarding their conceptual nature, consider PPF 160, 183, 191, 221, 222.

It is here that we can see continuity between the Tractatus and his later work. It is also here that the limits of Hacker's interpretation of Wittgenstein can be seen. — Fooloso4

I agree insofar as any putatitve non-conceptual parts of our private experience must be passed over in silence.

@RussellA @schopenhauer1 @Paine @Fooloso4 @Banno @Antony Nickles

I heard this lecture as a podcast yesterday.



I think it gives a good basic understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Some of the earlier posters in the discussion who expressed skepticism towards W's philosophy might find some value in it. It might also help to answer @Banno's earlier question succinctly, when he asked:

The question in hand here is, what happens with the picture theory as Wittgenstein moves on to the Investigations?

Who can give a simple, direct answer to that? — Banno

At around 13:00, the video states that in his later work, instead of treating language as a picture, [Wittgenstein] wants to treat language as a game.

I'm not sure if this tells us what happened to the picture theory, but it is at least a succinct account of Wittgenstein's different approach in his later work.

Not propositional, but still conceptual. — Luke

Does Hacker discuss Wittgenstein on what might be called conceptual seeing - seeing as, seeing aspects, seeing connections?

PPI 251. We find certain things about seeing puzzling, because we do not find the whole business of seeing puzzling enough.

PPI 257. The question now arises: Could there be human beings lacking the ability to see something as something a and what would that be like? What sort of consequences would it have? ... We will
call it “aspect-blindness” - and will now consider what might be meant by this. (A conceptual investigation.)

PPI 261. The importance of this concept lies in the connection between the concepts of seeing an aspect and of experiencing the meaning of a word.

255. The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness.
— ibid. 255

Not what you want to hear riding the gurney. — Paine

Compare this to 133:

The real discovery is the one that enables me to break off philosophizing when I want to. a The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question. - Instead, a method is now demonstrated by examples, and the series
of examples can be broken off. —– Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.

Physician heel thyself.

Not propositional, but still conceptual.
— Luke

Does Hacker discuss Wittgenstein on what might be called conceptual seeing - seeing as, seeing aspects, seeing connections? — Fooloso4

I wasn’t talking about Hacker here. You said:

There are other aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy, such as seeing aspects, that are not propositional. — Fooloso4

I’m saying that those aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy are not propositional but still conceptual. This is even evident in some of the sections you quoted, e.g. “A conceptual investigation”.

I’m saying that those aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy are not propositional but still conceptual. — Luke

Sorry, I did not catch that you were shifting gears. The passages you cited are helpful in making the case for conceptual seeing. It cuts across the neat division between seeing and saying in the Tractatus.

Hello folks, I have a question. What is an empty tautology? I am currently reading David Pears' book on Wittgenstein, and the author says: Given that a word has a certain meaning, philosophical analysis can tell us exactly what will necessarily be the case if a statement containing that word happens to be true. Here the necessity will be tautological, or at least definitional, so the analyses will take the form of a statement which has no factual content, and is in that sense empty. For example, the analysis of the phrase 'material object' will take the form, 'if anything is a material object, then the following requirements will necessarily be met...' And this will be an empty tautology.

I would appreciate it if someone could explain to me what David Pears means in that paragraph.

In addition, Pears says: The difficult thing is to understand the status of Wittgenstein's conclusion, and the argument which was supposed to establish it. The problem raised by the argument is that he treats every step in it, including its conclusions, as absolutely necessary, without treating them as empty tautologies.

Why does David see empty tautologies as a problem in an argument?

From the Tractatus:

4.46
Among the possible groups of truth conditions there are two extreme cases.

In one of these cases the proposition is true for all the truth-possibilities of the elementary
propositions. We say that the truth-conditions are tautological.

In the second case the proposition is false for all the truth-possibilities: the truth-conditions
are contradictory.

In the first case we call the proposition a tautology; in the second, a contradiction.

4.461
Propositions show what they say: tautologies and contradictions show that they say nothing.
A tautology has no truth-conditions, since it is unconditionally true: and a contradiction is
true on no condition.

Tautologies and contradictions lack sense.
(Like a point from which two arrows go out in opposite directions to one another.)
(For example, I know nothing about the weather when I know that it is either raining
or not raining.)

4.462
Tautologies and contradictions are not pictures of reality. They do not represent any possible situations. For the former admit all possible situations, and latter none.
In a tautology the conditions of agreement with the world—the representational relations—cancel one another, so that it does not stand in any representational relation to reality.

From the Tractatus... — Fooloso4

Thanks @Fooloso4. It is now clear to me what tautology is about.

In one of these cases the proposition is true for all the truth-possibilities of the elementary
propositions. We say that the truth-conditions are tautological. — Fooloso4

OK. But why does David Pears states that those tautologies are empty? Because it seems to me that the problem with Pears is the emptiness of a tautology and not the nature of this condition itself. This is why I was wondering what an empty tautology actually means.

For me, when something is empty it means that have zero substantial significance.

But why does David Pears states that those tautologies are empty? — javi2541997

Because they do not tell us what is the case. They do not tell us anything about the world. It has no factual content.

The problem raised by the argument is that he treats every step in it, including its conclusions, as absolutely necessary, without treating them as empty tautologies. — javi2541997

It has been a long time since I read Pears. I don't know specifically what argument he is referring to, but in general I think he is getting at the following. From the Tractatus:

2.06
The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality.

2.061
States of affairs are independent of one another.

2.062
From the existence or non-existence of one state of affairs it is impossible to infer the existence or non-existence of another.

In other words, propositions about the world are contingent. They are not necessarily true or false. The problem is that if a proposition is not empty, that is, if it tells us something about the world, how can it be absolutely necessary?

Added:

Perhaps he is referring to the formal or logical structure that underlies the world that makes it possible to say anything about it. The one to one correspondence between simple elementary names and simple elementary objects.

I see. Thank you for your explanation. I appreciate your help. I am only on page 60... Maybe I will find more answers and points about Pears, yet it is interesting to highlight that he states that these questions solve nearly nothing when they are answered.

tautologies — javi2541997

Hello folks, I have a question. What is an empty tautology? I am currently reading David Pears' book on Wittgenstein, and the author says: Given that a word has a certain meaning, philosophical analysis can tell us exactly what will necessarily be the case if a statement containing that word happens to be true. Here the necessity will be tautological, or at least definitional, so the analyses will take the form of a statement which has no factual content, and is in that sense empty. For example, the analysis of the phrase 'material object' will take the form, 'if anything is a material object, then the following requirements will necessarily be met...' And this will be an empty tautology.

I would appreciate it if someone could explain to me what David Pears means in that paragraph.

In addition, Pears says: The difficult thing is to understand the status of Wittgenstein's conclusion, and the argument which was supposed to establish it. The problem raised by the argument is that he treats every step in it, including its conclusions, as absolutely necessary, without treating them as empty tautologies.

Why does David see empty tautologies as a problem in an argument? — javi2541997

A proposition is a statement about the world; it tells you how things are or could be. They have content that describes a possible state of affairs.

Consider:

"It is raining"
"This filament has conductive properties"
"The car is black"

A tautology, however, has no content because it doesn't tell you anything about the world.

Consider:

"It's either raining or it's not raining"

Etc

This is empty of content, as it tells you nothing about the world.

A tautology, however, has no content because it doesn't tell you anything about the world.

Consider:

"It's either raining or it's not raining"

Etc

This is empty of content, as it tells you nothing about the world. — 013zen

Clear and good example. I am starting to understand the role of tautologies better. I can conclude that tautology can't help me to achieve the truth in a philosophical analysis and this is why it is rejected by logicians and critical thinkers, generally. By the way, thanks for commenting and helping me out with the understanding of tautologies.

Clear and good example. I am starting to understand the role of tautologies better. I can conclude that tautology can't help me to achieve the truth in a philosophical analysis and this is why it is rejected by logicians and critical thinkers, generally. By the way, thanks for commenting and helping me out with the understanding of tautologies. — javi2541997

Tautologies aren't so much "rejected", as they have their place. A statement is a tautology if it's always true. It tells you what's the case in every "possible world".

Consider:

"The ball is either red or not red"

But, a sound deductive argument is also a tautology.

Consider:

1) "All humans are mortal"
2) "Socrates is a human"
3) "Socrates is mortal"

Interesting. If tautologies tell us what's the case in every possible world, why David Pears argue against them?

Or more specifically, why did Pears argue that 'Tractatus' had empty tautologies, negatively? Following the chapter of his book, around pages 58 to 64, he even states that Wittgenstein never realised that his philosophical analysis on factual language holds some empty tautologies...

A statement is a tautology if it's always true. — 013zen

I agree, but Pears says:

so the analyses will take the form of a statement which has no factual content, and is in that sense empty. For example, the analysis of the phrase 'material object' will take the form, 'if anything is a material object, then the following requirements will necessarily be met...' And this will be an empty tautology.

Maybe it is me, but I think that David Pears sees empty tautologies as a weak statement in an argument.

agree, but Pears says:
so the analyses will take the form of a statement which has no factual content, and is in that sense empty. For example, the analysis of the phrase 'material object' will take the form, 'if anything is a material object, then the following requirements will necessarily be met...' And this will be an empty tautology.

Maybe it is me, but I think that David Pears sees empty tautologies as a weak statement in an argument. — javi2541997

The proposition has no factual content, meaning it tells you nothing about the world or how it could exist. A fact describes a possible state of affairs.

"Material object" is a tautology insofar as an "object" is only ever material; the concept of material is contained within the concept "object" in the same way "mortal" is contained in the concept "human".

Pears is calling attention to the fact that Wittgenstein uses tautologies, which he himself refers to as "sense less" in that they lack "sense", which is a possible state of affairs. They should therefore say nothing, and yet Wittgenstein seems to take them to be saying something. This is a common issue in the tractatus. How to make sense of the fact that Wittgenstein uses statements which he himself takes as lacking sense.

OK! Fair enough, I understand what David Pears is about on the very first pages of his book. I really appreciate your commitment to explaining both tautologies and David Pears' commentary. I probably will have some questions while continuing the reading. So, if you don't mind, I would like to share them with you.

Until then. Nice to meet you and welcome to TPF! :up: