Would you care to address Bradley's regress? — Banno

FH Bradley argued against the existence of relations in the world

Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of Language requires relations in the world
4.461 The proposition shows what it says
4.023 A proposition is a description of a fact
4.012 It is obvious that we receive a proposition of the form aRb as a picture

The main theme in the Tractatus is that the sole purpose of language is to mirror reality, showing reality rather than saying what reality is. We cannot say with language what is common between language and the world, rather, it must be shown, because any language we use will also rely on the same relationship, meaning that we cannot step out of language using language itself. For Wittgenstein, propositions refer to relationships of objects in the world, sharing a logical form with reality. Logical form of language can only be shown, but not spoken about.

As Wittgenstein assumes the existence of facts, he is also assuming the existence of relations in the world. I know relations exist in my mind, in that I know the relation "the apple is green". If relations do exist in the mind, but don't exist in the world, then propositions cannot share the same logical form with reality, meaning that there is no foundation to Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of Language.

The world in the Tractatus may exist in the mind of whoever is doing the thinking
It is my belief that the Tractatus can be read such that the "world" exists in the mind of whoever is doing the thinking, meaning that the Picture Theory is relating one part of the mind to another part of the mind, rather than the mind to the world.

Forces don't establish relations
Science accepts a world of fundamental particles and fundamental forces. Taking a particular example, if relations exist in the world there is a relation between a particular rock on the Earth and a particular rock on Alpha Centauri. The rock on Earth may be hit by a photon emitted by the rock on Alpha Centauri. Whether the photon came from a rock on Alpha Centauri or elsewhere in the Universe makes no difference to the effect it has on the rock on the Earth. There is no information within the photon as to its source. Any changes to the rock on Earth is due to the photon and not its source. The relation between the rock on Earth and the rock on Alpha Centauri is irrelevant to any changes occuring to the rock on Earth.

I am not saying that I know that relations don't exist in the world, rather, that as relations have no affect on physical changes that may occur in the world, they serve no useful purpose in our world ontology.

Leibniz's Regress Argument of 1676
Leibniz pre-dated Bradley's Regress argument. He wrote: "Suppose, for example, that there is a relation between a and b, and call it c; then, consider a new relation between a and c: call it d, and so forth to the infinite. It seems that we do not have to say that all these relations are a kind of true and real ideas. Perhaps they are only mere intelligible things, which may be produced, i.e., that are or will be produced."

Bradley's questioning the nature of properties
The nature of an object's properties is problematic. Bradley starts with the example of a lump of sugar. He notes that there appears to be such a thing as a lump of sugar and this thing appears to have qualities such as whiteness, sweetness, and hardness. But, asks Bradley, what is this “thing” that bears properties? On the one hand, he thinks it is odd to assume that there is something to the lump of sugar beside its several qualities, thus implying that postulating a property-less bearer of properties is incoherent. On the other hand, he notes that the lump cannot merely be its qualities either, since the latter must somehow be united.

For Bradley, unity or “coexistence” of qualities presupposes relations, which is why he questioned our concept of relations.

Bradley's Regress Argument
Bradley’s original formulation of the regress arguments can be found in his book Appearance and Reality (1893). Bradley’s worry seems to be that if relations are conceived of as independent from the terms that they relate, they themselves will become just like the terms that need relating and this way they will lose their relating power.

He wrote in 1893: "Let us abstain from making the relation an attribute of the related, and let us make it more or less independent. ‘There is a relation C, in which A and B stand; and it appears with both of them.’ But here again we have made no progress. The relation C has been admitted different from A and B, and no longer is predicated of them. Something, however, seems to be said of this relation C, and said again, of A and B. And this something is not to be the ascription of one to the other. If so, it would appear to be another relation D, in which C, on one side, and, on the other side, A and B stand. But such a makeshift leads at once to the infinite process."

Conclusion
Whether relations exist in the world or not has significant implications. If relations don't exist in the world, objects such as apples don't exist, properties such as greenness don't exist. These things only exist in the mind. The fact that thought requires relations does not presuppose that a world of elementary particles and forces also needs relations.

As relations in the world, even if they existed, make no changes to the physical world, they may be removed from our world ontology.

First, I don't know about you. but for me, "meaning as use" has it's limitations. It seems rather obvious that not all "uses" of a word, equate to meaning. — Sam26

What is often overlooked is what I have bolded:

PI 43For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

In terms of the Tractatus meaning (Bedeutung) is the thing that is referred to in a proposition. Logic is the transcendental condition that makes this possible.

In the Investigations reference is problematic when it comes to such things as sensation. If I am in pain I am not referring to some public thing that can be pointed to for others to see or experience. But this does not mean:

Therefore, that is what a sensation is; what the word "sensation" can only refer to: its public expression. — Luke

I can be in pain whether I express it or not. If there is a tribe in which no one feels pain, to be told that I am in pain is meaningless. It does not refer to anything they have any acquaintance with. But if I tell you I am in pain, you know what I mean. It does, in that sense, refer to something. Sometimes we need to stop doing philosophy. If a child tells you they are in pain the appropriate response is not to point out the ways in which this is philosophically problematic. We may ask where it hurts and respond accordingly.

PI 43For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

Right, I wasn't suggesting that W. was dogmatic about the connection between meaning and use. In fact, meaning can be associated with an object also in the PI.

In terms of the Tractatus meaning (Bedeutung) is the thing that is referred to in a proposition. Logic is the transcendental condition that makes this possible. — Fooloso4

In the Tractatus meaning is associated with the object, i.e., the name in the proposition is directly connected with the object in a fact. It sounds like you're saying that meaning is found in the proposition, but that can't be the case. The proposition gets its meaning by reflecting or mirroring the fact, which is W.'s picture theory of meaning.

In the Investigations reference is problematic when it comes to such things as sensation. If I am in pain I am not referring to some public thing that can be pointed to for others to see or experience. But this does not mean: — Fooloso4

We know, for the most part, when someone is in pain (having the sensation of pain) because of their very public cries, screams, moans, and other bodily or linguistic acts. There is a difference between the inner experience and the outward manifestation.

I wasn't suggesting that W. was dogmatic about the connection between meaning and use — Sam26

I quoted the text in order to support what you said.

quote="Sam26;720827"]It sounds like you're saying that meaning is found in the proposition ...[/quote]

If that is what it sounds line then I failed to express what I was saying clearly. The meaning is not found in the proposition but in what the proposition points to. That is:

In terms of the Tractatus meaning (Bedeutung) is the thing that is referred to in a proposition. — Fooloso4

The thing a proposition refers to is not itself.

There is a difference between the inner experience and the outward manifestation. — Sam26

I agree. What I was objecting to is this:

It appears to me that Wittgenstein is saying that language takes its meaning entirely from behaviour, from use, and only from a third-person, external standpoint. Pain and other sensations do not refer directly to the private feelings but to the public expression of those feelings; to how you (and others) act when experiencing those sensations. Therefore, that is what a sensation is; what the word "sensation" can only refer to: its public expression. — Luke

Pain and other sensations do not refer to anything. The expression of those sensations refer to the sensations, which can be expressed in various ways. The problem is that referring to what my own sensations is not like referring to something public. I cannot point to it. But if no one felt pain what we might consider pain behavior would not be considered pain behavior. The experience of pain itself enters the picture.

Thought has a transcendental logical structure. You cannot think illogically (3.03) The relations of simple objects share this logical structure. The movement of tectonic plates is accidental.

6.37 There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logical necessity.

6.41 For all that happens and is the case is accidental. — Fooloso4

The accidental only makes sense in light of the determined or predicted. Saying that something is accidental implies that there is a way things are supposed to be but something unintended happened that made things different. Accidents only come about when something was predicted to happen but didn't. If you dont make a prediction then there can be no accidents.

Convention? — bongo fury

...a mental entity

Saying that something is accidental implies that there is a way things are supposed to be but something unintended happened that made things different. — Harry Hindu

No. It means that the way things are is not by necessity.

...a mental entity — Harry Hindu

Not an entity, that's the thing. A linguistic regularity. A pattern.

No. It means that the way things are is not by necessity. — Fooloso4

"Accident" is not a synonym of unnecessary. "Accident" is not the correct term to convey what you actually mean. So it is necessary to use the appropriate terms if your goal is to communicate your ideas efficiently. It would also seem necessary to learn a language before you can use it. If those are necessary causes for communication to happen then why wouldn't other relations in the world not be causal in the same way? What's so special about language use when language use is simply another process in the world?

Not an entity, that's the thing. A linguistic regularity. A pattern. — bongo fury

Entities are patterns of properties.

"Accident" is not a synonym of unnecessary. "Accident" is not the correct term to convey what you actually mean. — Harry Hindu

It is not what I mean, it is what Wittgenstein said. In an earlier response to you I quoted the following from the Tractatus:

6.37 There is no compulsion making one thing happen because another has happened. The only necessity that exists is logical necessity.

6.41 For all that happens and is the case is accidental. — Fooloso4

lol, what did you mean by quoting Wittgenstein? For you to quote Witt, Witt had to write something that you found meaning in an wanted to share with us. So how did you come to quote Witt if the compulsion of Witt writing something, you finding meaning in it and you wanting to share, did not happen?

So how did you come to quote Witt if the compulsion of Witt writing something, you finding meaning in it and you wanting to share, did not happen? — Harry Hindu

Obviously it happened. It is not, however, necessary that this would happen thought. His notebooks might never have been published. It is not necessary that I quoted him or that I discuss him or post on this forum or that forum exist.

"Wanting to share" is, as you say, something I wanted to do. It is a choice not a necessity.

Obviously it happened. It is not, however, necessary that this would happen thought. His notebooks might never have been published. It is not necessary that I quoted him or that I discuss him or post on this forum or that forum exist.

"Wanting to share" is, as you say, something I wanted to do. It is a choice not a necessity. — Fooloso4

I don't see how you could have shared it if you didn't want to, or intend to.

What about:
"The world is determined by the facts, and by these being all the
facts.

For the totality of facts determines both what is the case, and
also all that is not the case"

It appears that the world is necessarily determined by all the facts.

It's strange to say that all the facts determine what is both the case and not the case. What is not the case can only exist in a mind as imaginary. Imaginings and lies are what are not the case. All facts determine only what is the case. The totality of facts could only determine what isn't the case when minds evolved to imagine and lie.

I wonder if you are familiar with What the Tortoise Said to Achilles?

The argument there proceeds as follows.

We have
(A) Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other.
(B) The two sides of this Triangle are things that are equal to the same.
(Z) The two sides of this Triangle are equal to each other.

You, I and Achilles will suppose that if A and B are true, one must accept Z.

But the Tortoise has a different idea. He doesn't yet accept Z. He doesn't accept:

(C) If A and B are true, Z must be true.

And challenges Achilles and us to force his agreement. He points out that (C) is a hypothetical, and hence that before he accepts (C) we must first show him that if A, B and C are true, he must accept Z:

(D) If A,B and C are true, Z must be true

...and so it begins.

Now I think the Tortoise makes an interesting point, but that there is something very important that is missing from his thinking.

Now I think we might cast Bradley in the place of the Tortoise. What The Tortoise wants to do with modus ponens Bradley would have us do with relations.

And I think the answer is the same: there is a way of understanding an inference that cannot be set out in a deduction, but is instead performed in implementing the inference. Understanding modus ponens involves making that move from A and B to Z in the face of the infinite regress.

And understanding relations involves making the move to aRb without putting in place the relations between a and R and b and R.

Entities are patterns of properties. — Harry Hindu

At a stretch. Ok. If mental entities include linguistic conventions, then no one counseled dispensing with them.

I don't see how you could have shared it if you didn't want to, or intend to. — Harry Hindu

Wanting to does not mean I have to. Intending to does not mean I would necessarily end up doing what I intend to do.

It appears that the world is necessarily determined by all the facts. — Harry Hindu

That is logically necessary, but:

1.21 Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same.

2.0271 Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing
and unstable.
2.061 States of affairs are independent of one another.

2.062 From the existence or non-existence of one state of affairs it is impossible to infer the existence or non-existence of another.

It's strange to say that all the facts determine what is both the case and not the case. What is not the case can only exist in a mind as imaginary. — Harry Hindu

What is not the case exists in the logical space of what is possible. Logic is transcendental. It makes possible not only states of affairs but the possibility to think of states of affairs. We cannot think illogically:

3 A logical picture of facts is a thought.

3.03 Thought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we should have to think illogically.

What the Tortoise said to Achilles — Banno

The puzzle of the Tortoise and Achilles is what the Tractatus is trying to solve
4.1212 " What can be shown, cannot be said"
4.461 "Propositions show what they say"
As Bertrand Russell wrote: "This is perhaps the most fundamental thesis of Mr. Wittgenstein’s theory. That which has to be in common between the sentence and the fact cannot, he contends, be itself in turn said in language. It can, in his phraseology, only be shown, not said, for whatever we may say will still need to have the same structure."

The puzzle of the Tortoise and Achilles points out the main theme in Tractatus, in that what can be shown cannot be said. As you wrote "before he accepts (C) we must first show him that if A, B and C are true, he must accept Z", meaning that before the Tortoise accepts (if A is true and if B is true then Z is true) he must be shown that (if A is true and if B is true then Z is true).

In other words, before the Tortoise accepts what he is told to be true, the Tortoise must be shown that it is true.

Knowledge by description and acquaintance
This takes us back to Bertrand Russell's distinction between knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance. In his paper On Denoting 1918, whereas knowledge by description is something like ordinary propositional knowledge (e.g. "I know that snow is white"), knowledge by acquaintance is familiarity with a person, place, or thing, typically obtained through perceptual experience, such as "I know Sam". According to Bertrand Russell's classic account of acquaintance, knowledge by acquaintance is a direct causal interaction between a person and some object that the person is perceiving.

Wittgenstein studied philosophy under Russell at Cambridge in 1912 and 1913, and Wittgenstein's Picture Theory, completed 6 years later in in 1918, is a development of knowledge by acquaintance.

Language needs acquaintance with the world
As you wrote: "Look up a word in the dictionary to find its meaning. You get more words. Look up the meaning of those words. You get more words. Since the dictionary is finite, and since word is defined in terms of other words, the definitions must be circular". So language only as description is problematic. It may be coherent, but sooner or later, in order for it to be intelligible it needs some fixity with the world it is attempting to describe. It needs some correspondence with the world, it needs some direct acquaintance with the world.

Someone may tell me the colour of an object is "nyekundu", but until they physically point it out to me, I can never know what they mean.

Language needs more than acquaintance, it also needs description
A language based on knowledge by acquaintance only would be too limiting, in that I only know of the 1969 moon landing by description, as I was not personally there. A language of knowledge by description must be founded on a language of knowledge by acquaintance. Knowledge by description is imagining new combinations of things one already knows by acquaintance. I already know by acquaintance the moon, a rocket, and one object falling onto another object. I can imagine a new combination (a rocket) + (one object falling onto another) + (the moon). As an aside, knowledge by description is not knowledge of the world, as the combination exists only in my mind. If I said "I know about the 1969 moon landing", what is mean is "I believe there was a 1969 moon landing".

To be more terminologically accurate, there is knowledge by acquaintance and belief by description.

Relations are, in Kant's words, "a priori intuition"
Bertrand Russell wrote: That the world is my world appears in the fact that the boundaries of language (the only language I understand) indicate the boundaries of my world.
5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
5.61 Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits, We cannot say in logic: This and this there is in the world, that there is not. For that would apparently presuppose that we exclude certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case since otherwise logic must get outside the limits of the world: that is, if it could consider these limits from the other side also.

Relations exist in the mind, in that I know the apple is green. I would argue that a belief in relations is an innate part of the structure of the brain, in the same way that Kant described time and space as a priori intuitions. We cannot observe the world independently of those beliefs that are inherent within the structure of the brain. A kettle can only do what a kettle can do. The brain can only do what the brain can do.

Whether relations exist in the world or not , we have a visceral belief in their existence as they are, in Kant's words, a priori pure intuition.

Relations in the world can only be said, not shown
Consider a table consisting of a table top and table legs. There are two kinds of relations, i)
the physical relation between spatially separated masses in the world and ii) the relation between the table legs and table top we perceive in our minds.

As regards the first kind of relation, consider an object above the Earth. The force between the object and Earth may be expressed as GmM/r2.. There is a relationship between the two masses as well as a spatial relationship between them. These relationships may be called The Laws of Nature, and exist. As Laws of Nature, they can only be inferred, as Hume noted, by constant conjunction, in that they can be said but not shown.

As regards the second kind of relation, the relation we perceive is independent of relations within the Laws of Nature. Even if ontological relations did exist in the world, such relations make no contribution to physical changes within the world. As they have no effect on the world, we can remove them from our world ontology. As they cannot be shown, they can only be talked about.

Conclusion
Achilles tells the Tortoise that "the apple is green", but the Tortoise won't accept this, as "the apple is green" means no more than "the apple is green".

Wittgenstein provides a solution is his Tractatus, pointing out that there is a distinction between what can be said and what can be shown. The Picture Theory in Tractatus is explaining language as knowledge by acquaintance, where propositions show the facts because they have the same logical form, such that "the apple is green" is true iff the apple is green.

For Bradley, it is insufficient to say that "relation C relates table top A to table legs B", it needs to be shown. The problem being that as relation C is independent of its relata A and B, a further relation D needs to be shown relating relation C with relata A and B, leading to the conclusion that relations independent of their relata are not possible.

IE, for the Tortoise, saying something is true is insufficient, for Wittgenstein's Tractatus, saying cannot show the truth but showing can and for Bradley, saying that relations are true is insufficient if it cannot be shown that they are true.

I wonder if you are familiar with What the Tortoise Said to Achilles? — Banno

My attempt:

Can ignore (A) which is a hypothetical and redundant.

From (B), which is not hypothetical:

Let side one of the Triangle have length a
Let side two of the Triangle have length b

There is a length c that is equal in length to side one of the Triangle
Length c is also equal in length to side two of the Triangle

Therefore c = a and c = b
From which it follows that a = b

If a = b then (Z) follows.

The solution may be easier if shown rather than said.

Thanks for the reply, @RussellA

The main theme in the Tractatus is that the sole purpose of language is to mirror reality — RussellA

Almost. The temptation here is to downplay the importance of what cannot be said. From a letter to Russell,

The main point is the theory of what can be expressed (gesagt) by propositions i.e. by language (and, what comes to the same, what can be thought) and what cannot be expressed by propositions, but only shown (gezeigt); which, I believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy.

Wittgenstein did not think that Russell had grasped what he was up to.

While Wittgenstein's distinction between saying and showing is doubtless related to Russell's knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description, Wittgenstein's distinction is far broader, stepping outside what might be considered knowledge. Russell's "knowledge by acquaintance" remain propositional, but Wittgenstein's notion of what can be shown is not propositional - that's rather the point.

The Tortoise is attempting to put into propositional terms the act of accepting modus ponens, and so gets itself into a regress. It mistakes what can only be displayed for what can be put into propositional form.

You proceed by replacing Wittgenstein's argument with Russell's. But they are not the same.

I've been unable to understand why Kant was brought into the proceedings. Wittgenstein's account of logic is far clearer Kant's a priori intuitions. Poor old Kant was working with a very primitive formalisation of logic, while Russell and Wittgenstein have the advantage of Frege's work. For them there is no need for a fraught appeal to intuition.

Relations in the Tractatus are of the form aRb; they set out states of affairs. Sure, the relation is mental, but the state of affairs is not. The use of "mental" here is also fraught with confusion and not found in the Tractatus. Better, perhaps, to see the state of affairs as part of the world and the relation as part of the picture.

So relations can be said. That's what "aRb" is.

That a given relation does or does not set out some state of affairs is shown, not said.

For Bradley, it is insufficient to say that "relation C relates table top A to table legs B", it needs to be shown. The problem being that as relation C is independent of its relata A and B, a further relation D needs to be shown relating relation C with relata A and B, leading to the conclusion that relations independent of their relata are not possible. — RussellA

Well, no. For Bradley, the relation between a and Rb, and between aR and b, must be said. That's where he demands that we say what can only be shown.

Again, Bradley was working with a logic scarcely better than that used by Kant. He treats relations as if they were individuals. This is a grammatical error that cannot be reproduced in predicate logic. Individuals are distinct from predicates. The individuals are given by a,b,c... and predicates by f,g,h... and have an entirely distinct grammatical place. One may write f(a,b) for the relation f between a and b, but there is no well-formed way to replace "a" with "f", or "g". Bradley's argument cannot be given a reasonable parsing in first order logic.

You believe that I am experiencing in my mind the colour red, but you can never know, as it is not possible to know what is in someone else's mind. — RussellA

...and hence the very notion of that you "experiencing in my mind the colour red" is senseless.

But that's more Investigations than Tractatus.

Wanting to does not mean I have to. Intending to does not mean I would necessarily end up doing what I intend to do. — Fooloso4

But what would it mean that you wouldn't necessarily end up doing what you intended if not that there was some other necessary condition that prevented you from doing it? If there were no other conditions preventing you from doing it, wouldn't you be doing it? If not, then you never intended to do it in the first place. Do any of your posts appear on this screen without you having intended to post them?

What is not the case exists in the logical space of what is possible. Logic is transcendental. It makes possible not only states of affairs but the possibility to think of states of affairs. We cannot think illogically — Fooloso4

How would you know what is possible if everything that is the case is an accident? What is not the case isn't necessarily possible. What is not the case is just as much probable as improbable, because you have no evidence to support the probability nor improbability. There is no evidence for what is not the case. So if what you mean by "logical space" is "imaginary" then I guess we agree.

Entities are patterns of properties.
— Harry Hindu

At a stretch. Ok. If mental entities include linguistic conventions, then no one counseled dispensing with them. — bongo fury

Not at all. You recognize entities, like your pet or your friend, by their pattern of properties - patterns of sensory properties - their color, shape, the sound of their voice, the feel of their touch, their smell, etc., just as you are able to distinguish between coffee and water, but the pattern of color, smell, taste, etc.

My question was simply what is left if we can dispense with mental entities, and you've ended up showing that we cannot dispense with mental entities. Linguistic conventions are patterns of scribbles and sounds - mental entities.

But what would it mean that you wouldn't necessarily end up doing what you intended if not that there was some other necessary condition that prevented you from doing it? — Harry Hindu

I might have a better offer. I might forget. I might change my mind and conclude that I am wasting my time.

But if no one felt pain what we might consider pain behavior would not be considered pain behavior. The experience of pain itself enters the picture. — Fooloso4

I take your point, and that almost completely clarifies my confusion here - thanks. However, according to W:

304. “But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour with pain and pain-behaviour without pain.” — Admit it? What greater difference could there be? — “And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a Nothing.” — Not at all. It’s not a Something, but not a Nothing either! The conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the same service as a Something about which nothing could be said. We’ve only rejected the grammar which tends to force itself on us here. The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts — which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or whatever. — Philosophical Investigations

This indicates that pain itself is "a Something about which nothing could be said". Therefore, nothing could be said about "pain" itself. What do you make of this inability? Can it be dispelled by a "radical break with the idea" that language must be used to describe or to convey thoughts (about pain)?

Bradley's argument cannot be given a reasonable parsing in first order logic. — Banno

Are ontological relations in a mind-independent world individuals

Terminology
In modern usage, an internal relation is not an ontological addition, such that the cherry is the same shade of red as the strawberry. An external relation is an ontological addition, such that the cherry is 1m distance from the strawberry.

Relations in logic
Grammar, first-order logic and predicates are mental things, part of mathematical and linguistic language. The relation (r) between a rock on Earth (a) and a rock on Alpha Centauri (b) may be expressed as
r (a,b), where r is a relation, not an individual.

Relations in a mind-independent world
However, Bradley is questioning the nature of relations in a mind-independent world. What exactly are relations ? Can they be individuals ? In a mind-independent world, if relations are independent of their relata, Bradley proposes that this leads into an infinite regress, which suggests that relations cannot be independent of their relata. If relations are grounded in their relata, then this is the modern usage of internal relations, and which presents no ontological addition.

Either way, Bradley is proposing that ontological relations don't exist in a mind-independent world.

Russell's Theory of Descriptions may be more suitable than Frege's First-Order Logic
However, if Bradley was being expressed using logic, perhaps RTD would be more suitable than Frege's First Order Logic, as it does not depend on the subject-predicate form. For First Order Logic, there is a relation between a and b. For RTD, there is something, a relation, that relates to a and relates to b, in which case the relation is an individual.

A relation relating leads back into Bradley's problem of infinite regression.

Two questions about the ontological existence of relations in a mind-independent world
We know that relations exist in the mind, as we talk about ghosts, unicorns, governments, ethics, the sweet smell of success, the tree swaying in the wind, tables, apples, etc. Science tells us that a world of elementary particles and forces, a world of gravity, the photo-electric effect, volcanos, rain, etc are explainable by the Laws of Nature.

Q1: If relations exist in a mind-independent world, how can the mere fact of a relation between a rock on Earth and a rock on Alpha Centauri cause changes to either ?
Q2: If relations don't cause changes in the world, then why do we think that relations exist in the world ?

I think Wittgenstein is still working to disentangle the confusion of the Tractarian logic. When he says pain in not "a Something" ,I take this to mean it is not a thing or object existing in the world that is represented in thought or propositions.

But this picture of language does not originate with the Tractatus. He begins the Investigations by quoting Augustine and says:

PI 1 These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names.——In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands ...

If you describe the learning of language in this way you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like "table", "chair", "bread", and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself.

But the remaining kinds of words do not take care of themselves when this picture holds us captive.

The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts — Philosophical Investigations

The purpose of the statement: "I am in pain" is not to convey the thought that I am in pain. The sentence does not have the same logical/grammatical form as sentences about things.

I might have a better offer. I might forget. I might change my mind and conclude that I am wasting my time. — Fooloso4

Which was my point that there would be other necessary, non-accidental conditions that led to different conditions. You're proving my point, not yours.

You're confusing what was, is, or will be the case with your ignorance of what was, is, or will be the case.

Since this is a thread on Wittgenstein, we need to be clear as to what he is saying about necessity and accident.

Your own view seems to be along the lines that whatever happens happens by necessity. This is something he rejected:

5.135 There is no possible way of making an inference from the existence of one situation to
the existence of another, entirely different situation.
5.136 There is no causal nexus to justify such an inference.
5.1361 We cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present.
Belief in the causal nexus is superstition.

He is not simply denying that we can know what will happen, but that it is necessary that this rather than that will happen. If that rather then this it is not because the latter is the necessary outcome rather than the former.

Since this is a thread on Wittgenstein, we need to be clear as to what he is saying about necessity and accident. — Fooloso4

Good luck with that. It's like trying to be clear on what the authors of the Bible are saying. I'm not really rejecting anything Witt is talking about. I'm taking issue with his improper use of language.

Your own view seems to be along the lines that whatever happens happens by necessity. This is something he rejected — Fooloso4

For what reason? And by giving a reason you end up proving my point that reasons are necessary to accept or reject any assertion of what the case is. Logical necessity is just as much a part of the world as any other causal relation.

5.135 There is no possible way of making an inference from the existence of one situation to
the existence of another, entirely different situation.
5.136 There is no causal nexus to justify such an inference.
5.1361 We cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present.
Belief in the causal nexus is superstition.

He is not simply denying that we can know what will happen, but that it is necessary that this rather than that will happen. If that rather then this it is not because the latter is the necessary outcome rather than the former. — Fooloso4

Yet all you did was infer that you'd either submit your posts or not based on what conditions existed prior to submitting your post or not. The same can be said of Witt having written his books. Witt disproves his own assertions by writing his books for others to read. Did he not infer that others would read his book only after he wrote it? Did he think that others could read his book if he never wrote it? Seems like you and Witt believe that others can read Witts book if he never wrote it.

Yet he is asserting a belief in the causal nexus of reasons and conclusions. Again the relationship between reasons and conclusions are as much a part of the world as any other causal relation. Everything is process, relations, or information. In this sense, there is no difference between reasons and conclusions (logical necessity) and any other causal relation. By rejecting one you reject all the other relations. By accepting one causal relation and rejecting all others youd be exhibiting a form of favoritism. There would be no reasons for any conclusions. As a matter of fact reasons are based on observations of what is the case and their conclusions are inferred based on prior observations. So I don't see how you could have any reasons to infer some conclusion if you didn't make any observation.

No one is saying that we can predict everything, or that knowledge has a monopoly of truth, or is even related to truth. Every event is unique, but that does not mean that they arent similar, or else we wouldn't be able to make any predictions at all. Also our predictions are tied to our goals. Much of the time, any prediction we have is tied to the goal at hand which isn't always necessary to know everything to make a successful prediction.

Russell's Theory of Descriptions may be more suitable than Frege's First-Order Logic — RussellA

Russell's theory of descriptions uses Frege's first order logic.