I'm not claiming that there is any universal subjective present. — Janus
When you say that x is present for me, what do you mean? Do you mean that it appears present to me, but may or may not actually be present? Or do you mean that it actually is present for me - that my impression that it is present constitutes its being present? — Bartricks
No, if materialism is true, then our impressions of presentness are systematically inaccurate.
So, if p, then q. — Bartricks
The default is that our impressions are not systematically inaccurate.
So: not q.
Therefore not p. — Bartricks
q does NOT = “The default is that…” — Luke
Is materialism the default? No. What our sensations tell us is the default. That’s the position of idealism. — Luke
When I say it is present for you, I mean that it appears present for you and that it actually is present for you. Being present has no more than a relative sense. — Janus
If a theory about reality implies that a whole load of our appearances are actually false, then that's a black mark against that theory. It is evidence - default evidence - that the theory is false.
:rofl:Again with the six second comprehension span! That's called 'individual subjectivism' about the present.
It's a form of idealism about the present. — Bartricks
No, as I said in the OP, appearances enjoy default justification. That is, if something appears to be the case, then that is default evidence that it 'is' the case.
That's not idealism.
[…]
One follows the evidence. That is, one follows the appearances.
Now, if one does that where the appearance of presentness is concerned, one will arrive at idealism. — Bartricks
Therefore, if materialism is true we cannot always trust our senses, and if idealism is true we can always trust our senses. You are arguing that we cannot always trust our senses, so you are arguing for the truth of materialism, not idealism. — Luke
if materialism is true, then our appearances of presentness are all - all - illusions of presentness. — Bartricks
Yeah that’s making my point: accepting the appearances wrt presentness leads to idealism. — Luke
Materialism does not accept the appearances, right? — Luke
Which one do you think you’ve been arguing for? — Luke
Then your modus tollens argument is faulty. Christ! — Luke
This is a bit of a strange way to try to justify idealism. — Count Timothy von Icarus
This is a bit of a strange way to try to justify idealism. I don't know of a single ancient creation mythos that appears to represent any sort of idealist ontology. " — Count Timothy von Icarus
I can see the claim that idealism is more parsimonious than physicslism, or that it has fewer explanatory gaps, but that it's more intuitive/follows more from appearances? Then why are gods in all the creation stories making the world out of mud, fire, etc.? — Count Timothy von Icarus
if materialism is true, then our impressions of presentness are systematically inaccurate.
So, if p, then q.
The default is that our impressions are not systematically inaccurate.
So: not q.
Therefore not p. — Bartricks
my sensations of the presentness of any event supports idealism, not materialism. — Bartricks
No, as I said in the OP, appearances enjoy default justification. That is, if something appears to be the case, then that is default evidence that it 'is' the case. — Bartricks
One follows the evidence. That is, one follows the appearances. — Bartricks
I read the OP. It just seems like a very similar argument could be made where materialism comes out on top under a quite similar yardstick. — Count Timothy von Icarus
The other issue you may want to consider is why so many other idealists have dropped absolute time. I haven't come across any post-relativity idealists who deny the theory of relativity and who demand an absolute present. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Really? What argument is that?
If a theory about reality implies that a whole load of our appearances are actually false, then that's a black mark against that theory. It is evidence - default evidence - that the theory is false.
Incidentally, if there's no absolute present, there's no present.
The objects we experience appear to exist outside of us and independently of us. Idealism, at least in its subjectivist versions, says this common naive belief is wrong. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Not what proponents of relativity are really arguing. Yes, there is no present, because there is no time. There is only space time. — Count Timothy von Icarus
You're saying your opponents are speaking nonsense and contradicting themselves, but if I'm following you correctly, this is because you are assuming a premise they don't accept is a given. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I don't start with a worldview. I do philosophy. I follow reason. — Bartricks
I am content to put the whole upon this issue; if you can but conceive it possible for one extended moveable substance, or in general, for any one idea or any thing like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause…. But say you, surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and no body by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it: but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you your self perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shows you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but it doth not shew that you can conceive it possible, the objects of your thought may exist without the mind: to make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and doth conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind; though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in it self
45. Fourthly, it will be objected that from the foregoing principles it follows things are every moment annihilated and created anew. The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees therefore are in the garden, or the chairs in the parlour, no longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them. Upon shutting my eyes all the furniture in the room is reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening them it is again created – In answer to all which, I refer the reader to What has been said in sect 3, 4, &c, all I desire he will consider whether be means anything by the actual existence of an idea distinct from its being perceived. For my part, after the nicest inquiry I could make, I am not able to discover that anything else is meant by those words and I once more entreat the reader to sound his own thoughts, and not suffer himself to be imposed on by words. If he can conceive it possible either for his ideas or their archetypes to exist without being perceived, then I give up the cause; but if he cannot, he will acknowledge it is unreasonable for him to stand up in defence of he knows not what, and pretend to charge on me as an absurdity the not assenting to those propositions which at bottom have no meaning in them.
46. It will not be amiss to observe how far the received principles of philosophy are themselves chargeable with those pretended absurdities. It is thought strangely absurd that upon closing my eyelids all the visible objects around me should be reduced to nothing; and yet is not this what philosophers commonly acknowledge, when they agree on all hands that light and colours, which alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight, are mere sensations that exist no longer than they are perceived? Again, it may to some perhaps seem very incredible that things should be every moment creating, yet this very notion is commonly taught in the schools. For the Schoolmen, though they acknowledge the existence of matter, and that the whole mundane fabric is framed out of it, are nevertheless of opinion that it cannot subsist without the divine conservation, which by them is expounded to be a continual creation.
if materialism is true, then our impressions of presentness are systematically inaccurate.
So, if p, then q.
The default is that our impressions are not systematically inaccurate.
So: not q.
Therefore not p. — Bartricks
Nothing that I sense to be present is actually present. — Bartricks
I don't see how you conclude not-p when you are strongly arguing for q. — Luke
So perhaps you can explain here then what the difference is between these two propositions...
"there appears to be a present in which events are occurring"
"there appears to be an external world made of mind-independent material objects" — Isaac
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.