And now explain to me how an event can occur at t1 and yet not be present at t1? Explain what 'occurs' means in this context without mentioning it being present or now at t1.

So whose present is the real present? — Janus

Presentness is not individually subjective. You, like virtually everyone here, keep confusing 'appears to me to be' with 'is'.

There is 'the' present. There isn't your present and my present. There's 'the' present.

The event is present to you in both the temporal sense and in the sense of presenting itself to you when you experience it. There's not much more to be said about it than that. You want to stipulate that presentness is not individually subjective, but you haven't presented any argument for that, just that it seems absurd to you to think that it is. Einstein disagrees with you, but he was a fuckwit, right?

You're like a little kid with your "arguments": you present them, and then when others present you with reasonable objections, it's like you stick your fingers in your ears and go "Lalalalalalalalalalalala"."I'm not listening" "You're not responding to my argument" "you don't have much capacity for rational thought, do you?", and then you spray insults all over the place. I don't think I've ever seen you concede a point yet, and I've seen many points that tell against your contentions presented to you..

I think you have a lot of growing up to do, man, or should I say, boy.

Toughen up, snowflake. Now, the present is not individually subjective.

Let's say it is, though. That would then amount to a form of idealism about the present.

So your objection is unreasonable for two reasons. First, you have conflated the impression of the present with the present. For if you try and defend individual subjectivism you will commit that mistake. Second, idealism is also known as subjectivism. So, if individual subjectivism is true, then materialism about the present is false. And I am arguing that it is indeed false. So what you've done is say "yeah, but bartfuckstupididiottricks is wrong because he's right".

But, bartfuckstupididiottricks, I'm not claiming that there is any universal subjective present. What is present for me is not present for you, i.e.,that there is no objective present is what I'm saying. And that conclusion is not only consistent with materialism, but is entailed by it. It is also consistent with idealism (although not entailed by it), so your whole argument is a non-starter.

I'm not claiming that there is any universal subjective present. — Janus

Look, to be honest I don't think you can hold onto a view for more than 6 seconds.

When you say that x is present for me, what do you mean? Do you mean that it appears present to me, but may or may not actually be present? Or do you mean that it actually is present for me - that my impression that it is present constitutes its being present? Or has your attention span not extended to the end of that sentence?

When you say that x is present for me, what do you mean? Do you mean that it appears present to me, but may or may not actually be present? Or do you mean that it actually is present for me - that my impression that it is present constitutes its being present? — Bartricks

When I say it is present for you, I mean that it appears present for you and that it actually is present for you. Being present has no more than a relative sense. If I yell my yelling is present for me as I yell, but for you one kilometer away it will be present for you when you hear it about three seconds after I yell. There is no objective meaning to "being present" beyond that. You can spit the dummy and spray all the insults you like; it's not going to improve your position.

No, if materialism is true, then our impressions of presentness are systematically inaccurate.

So, if p, then q. — Bartricks

Okay, q = “our impressions of presentness are systematically inaccurate”.

The default is that our impressions are not systematically inaccurate.

So: not q.

Therefore not p. — Bartricks

q does NOT = “The default is that…”

Is materialism the default? No. What our sensations tell us is the default. That’s the position of idealism. Therefore, if materialism is true we cannot always trust our senses, and if idealism is true we can always trust our senses. You are arguing that we cannot always trust our senses, so you are arguing for the truth of materialism, not idealism.

q does NOT = “The default is that…” — Luke

Yes, I know. The time lag argument is not decisive, for it is at least possible that our impressions of presentness are systematically inaccurate.

I expressed the hard form so that it was clear to you that I am not arguing that p, I am arguing that 'not p' and I am doing so by showing how p implies something that we have reason to think is false. Christ!

Is materialism the default? No. What our sensations tell us is the default. That’s the position of idealism. — Luke

No, as I said in the OP, appearances enjoy default justification. That is, if something appears to be the case, then that is default evidence that it 'is' the case.

That's not idealism.

Idealism is the view that the external sensible world is made of sensations.

See the difference?

When doing philosophy - at least, doing it properly - one does not assume a worldview at the outset. For if one does that, the same worldview will turn up in one's conclusions, for all one will be doing is interpreting data through your worldview and rejecting that which does not fit with it. That's not philosphy - that's dogmatism.

One follows the evidence. That is, one follows the appearances.

Now, if one does that where the appearance of presentness is concerned, one will arrive at idealism. For if materialism is true, then our appearances of presentness are all - all - illusions of presentness.

To follow the appearances is to respect them - to take them at face value. If one assumes that a whole range of appearances are systematically mistaken simply becuase one's favourite worldview implies such a thing, then one is a dogmatist. One should not assume they are mistaken, but one should assume that they are accurate. And if one does that, then one will arrive at idealism, becuase it is if idealism is true that they will indeed be accurate.

A simple example (though knowing this place, my providing it will derail the discussion into a discussion about cats). A cat appears to be on my dining room table. That's default evidence there's a cat on my dining room table.

Perhaps there isn't and I'm hallucinating. Ok, but that's not the default. The default is that appearances are accurate. If that's the default then which of these two theories is supported by the appearances:

Theory a: there's a cat on my dining room table
Theory b: there's not a cat on my dining room table?

It's a, yes? Not b. A. A is what the appearances support.

Likewise with presentness. If event A appears to be present, then that's good default evidence that A is present. It is not default evidence that it is not present. It is default evidence that it 'is' present.

If materialism is true, it would not be present, but past. Thus, the evidence does not support materialism. Just as my visual sensation of a cat on my dining room table supports theory a and not b, my sensations of the presentness of any event supports idealism, not materialism.

When I say it is present for you, I mean that it appears present for you and that it actually is present for you. Being present has no more than a relative sense. — Janus

Again with the six second comprehension span! That's called 'individual subjectivism' about the present.

It's a form of idealism about the present.

It's a really stupid view, so I'm not surprised you hold it. I imagine you hold it about everything. Morality, aesthetics, truth - anything remotely tricky. It's the go-to view of those who can't reason but are pluckily giving it a go.

But it's not a materialist view of the present.

Again: it's stupid and false. But if it were true, it'd support my conclusion not materialism.

If a theory about reality implies that a whole load of our appearances are actually false, then that's a black mark against that theory. It is evidence - default evidence - that the theory is false.

This is a bit of a strange way to try to justify idealism. I don't know of a single ancient creation mythos that appears to represent any sort of idealist ontology. "Naive realism," is "naive," because its how most, if not all the world thought about things at first. "The things I see are not me and exist outside me," is quite intuitive, hence seeing it as a core concept everywhere in history.

To be sure, idealism also pops up very frequently in history, but in every case I am aware of it emerges as a rebuttal to naive realism, not as the primary ontology.

I can see the claim that idealism is more parsimonious than physicslism, or that it has fewer explanatory gaps, but that it's more intuitive/follows more from appearances? Then why are gods in all the creation stories making the world out of mud, fire, etc.?

q does NOT = “The default is that…”
— Luke

Yes, I know. — Bartricks

Then your modus tollens argument is faulty. Christ!

Again with the six second comprehension span! That's called 'individual subjectivism' about the present.

It's a form of idealism about the present. — Bartricks

:rofl:

Don't be stupid, Bloatricks; try exercising those few neurons of yours that might be working and you might find that other idle neurons join in and after a bit of practice you may even become capable of a coherent and consistent thought.Do you want to spend the rest of your life being an incorrigible fuckwit?

You might call it "individual subjectivism" and as I already acknowledged it is consistent with such a view. But it is also Einstein's view and he was no idealist. And as I said before, the materialist understanding that information about events takes time to emanate out from the source, from the actual event "in itself', is not only consistent with, but entailed by, a materialist understanding.

And it's not merely "individual subjectivism" anyway, unless you broaden the concept of "subject" to include material objects. So, from "the point of view" of the ground or the tree which is struck by lightning the event of the lightning striking is present, but again the inception of the event is not, because it is five kilometres up in the sky, or whatever.

No, as I said in the OP, appearances enjoy default justification. That is, if something appears to be the case, then that is default evidence that it 'is' the case.

That's not idealism.

[…]

One follows the evidence. That is, one follows the appearances.

Now, if one does that where the appearance of presentness is concerned, one will arrive at idealism. — Bartricks

Yeah that’s making my point: accepting the appearances wrt presentness leads to idealism.

Materialism does not accept the appearances, right?

Therefore, if materialism is true we cannot always trust our senses, and if idealism is true we can always trust our senses. You are arguing that we cannot always trust our senses, so you are arguing for the truth of materialism, not idealism. — Luke

Which one do you think you’ve been arguing for?

if materialism is true, then our appearances of presentness are all - all - illusions of presentness. — Bartricks

Yeah that’s making my point: accepting the appearances wrt presentness leads to idealism. — Luke

That's not what you said. You implied that the idea that appearances are default justified 'is' idealism. No it isn't. It's an epistemological thesis that, if applied diligently, will lead to idealism. Though that is, of course, contested. But I am simply showing that it implies idealism.

Materialism does not accept the appearances, right? — Luke

I don't even know what that means. Materialism conflicts with the appearances. People accept or reject things. Theories don't.

Again: materialism is an 'ontological' thesis - a thesis about what exists. The idea that appearances enjoy default justified status is an 'epistemological' thesis.

An example to help you understand. A detective's method is to follow the evidence. The evidence implicates Tom as the murderer. That doesn't mean that 'following the evidence' and 'Tom is guilty' are the same thesis, even though adopting the former will lead to the latter.

Which one do you think you’ve been arguing for? — Luke

I haven't the faintest idea, but I was arguing that the appearance of presentness will be systematically mistaken if materialism is true. You were taking issue with that by maintaining that just because an event occurs at time t1, that does not mean it is present at t1, even though it blindingly obviously does (and you've yet to explain how it doesn't).

I don't think you know what you're arguing now.

Then your modus tollens argument is faulty. Christ! — Luke

No, it was to help you see that I was arguing 'not p' rather than 'p'.

If someone is arguing that if p, then q - and then they proceed to explain why the evidence implies not q, then.....they......are......arguing.....that.....not p. Jesus!

This is a bit of a strange way to try to justify idealism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So?

This is a bit of a strange way to try to justify idealism. I don't know of a single ancient creation mythos that appears to represent any sort of idealist ontology. " — Count Timothy von Icarus

So?

I can see the claim that idealism is more parsimonious than physicslism, or that it has fewer explanatory gaps, but that it's more intuitive/follows more from appearances? Then why are gods in all the creation stories making the world out of mud, fire, etc.? — Count Timothy von Icarus

See OP for details of how the case works.

Let’s go back to your argument:

if materialism is true, then our impressions of presentness are systematically inaccurate.

So, if p, then q.

The default is that our impressions are not systematically inaccurate.

So: not q.

Therefore not p. — Bartricks

If materialism is true then our impressions of presentness are inaccurate. And if our impressions of presentness are accurate then:

my sensations of the presentness of any event supports idealism, not materialism. — Bartricks

So, if materialism is true (p) then our sensations are systematically inaccurate (q). However, our sensations are not systematically inaccurate (not-q). Therefore, materialism is false.

This is your argument, correct?

If materialism is false, then so is the fact that our sensations are systematically inaccurate (q). Time lag supports materialism, not idealism.

No, as I said in the OP, appearances enjoy default justification. That is, if something appears to be the case, then that is default evidence that it 'is' the case. — Bartricks

So naive idealism? Ancient skepticism would have a field day with this approach.

One follows the evidence. That is, one follows the appearances. — Bartricks

The stick appears bent in water. The honey appears to taste bitter to the sick. The tower looks small form a distance. The sun appears to move around the Earth. Lightning and thunder appear to happen at the same time when the storm is near. An optical illusion appears to be colored a certain way.

I read the OP. It just seems like a very similar argument could be made where materialism comes out on top under a quite similar yardstick.

The other issue you may want to consider is why so many other idealists have dropped absolute time. I haven't come across any post-relativity idealists who deny the theory of relativity and who demand an absolute present. You might be able to deal with the observations that led to relativity without ditching absolute time, but it will lead to non-absolute distances, with lengths stretching or shrinking for different observers. In general, I suppose this seems more problematic than opting for a subjective present. Also, even when you get past relativity, you still need to explain all the empirical evidence for the subjectivity of time from psychology.

Contemporary physicslism has ditched absolute time. You're taking absolute time as a given and saying the fact that physicalism has ditched absolute time, when it is a given, is a point against it. I'm not sure how this isn't begging the question.

Is an ontology that claims the world isn't flat also necessarily weaker because our senses tell us the world is flat? But then isn't it empiricism, data from our senses, that also told us that time is relative and that the world is round? Which data from the senses are being violated then? The reason space-time was accepted as a new paradigm was because it explained both the old way we saw things and new observations that didn't fit the old paradigm. One of the best arguments in favor of idealism is that so much of what we know, perhaps all of it, comes from the world of first person experience, but here you seem to be privileging naive conceptualizations based on those senses over models that cohere with more of our observations.

Space-time itself is a creaky, wounded paradigm, so I don't know if I'd accept it as the final word in any case, more of a predictive placeholder.

I don't think idealism necessarily has a harder time explaining these things, but it seems like it would if it kept hold of absolute time.

Just as an example of how this can work: even Hegel's pre-relativity idealism would have the present as the event horizon of the past, the line of continual becoming. In the sense certainty of the absolute present there is only abstraction, and so really contentless nothing. This isn't absolute, it's a contradictory period from which we get the emergence of lived experience.

I read the OP. It just seems like a very similar argument could be made where materialism comes out on top under a quite similar yardstick. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Really? What argument is that?

The other issue you may want to consider is why so many other idealists have dropped absolute time. I haven't come across any post-relativity idealists who deny the theory of relativity and who demand an absolute present. — Count Timothy von Icarus

So what? That's not how philosophy works.

Incidentally, if there's no absolute present, there's no present. And those who think time is relative are utterly confused individuals. If you want to explain to me what evidence there is that time is relative, by all means present it and I'll show you how it implies no such thing.

Anyway, you seem not to be remotely concerned with the soundness of the argument in the OP.

Really? What argument is that?

If a theory about reality implies that a whole load of our appearances are actually false, then that's a black mark against that theory. It is evidence - default evidence - that the theory is false.

The objects we experience appear to exist outside of us and independently of us. Idealism, at least in its subjectivist versions, says this common naive belief is wrong.

Incidentally, if there's no absolute present, there's no present.

Not what proponents of relativity are really arguing. Yes, there is no present, because there is no time. There is only space time.

Generally, the view of time taken vis-á-vis relativity is eternalist. That is, the past, present, and future all exist simultaneously. The illusion of a definite present is the result of how our bodies work, the terms themselves are arbitrary. See also: "the block universe," and "thermodynamic arrow of time."

You're saying your opponents are speaking nonsense and contradicting themselves, but if I'm following you correctly, this is because you are assuming a premise they don't accept is a given.

Obviously, even if there is an objective present there is still also a subjective sense of time. Anyone who has had to endure a road trip with a child aged 4-10 and has heard "are we there yet, we've been driving for days!" over, and over, can attest to this phenomena.

The objects we experience appear to exist outside of us and independently of us. Idealism, at least in its subjectivist versions, says this common naive belief is wrong. — Count Timothy von Icarus

No it doesn't. You're attacking a straw man. Berkeley concluded that the objects of experience exist outside of our own minds. And he concluded this precisely because they are represented to have 'outness' (his term...or perhaps it was Malebranche's). Thus, they exist in the mind of another - the master mind.

The externality of the sensible world is respected by idealism, then. And certainly that's my view too.

Not what proponents of relativity are really arguing. Yes, there is no present, because there is no time. There is only space time. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Right, so that's a black mark isn't it - for obviously there is time.

You're saying your opponents are speaking nonsense and contradicting themselves, but if I'm following you correctly, this is because you are assuming a premise they don't accept is a given. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I don't think you're following correctly.

Do you agree that to assume a worldview right at the outset and then to interpret all appearances in light of it - rejecting as illusory those appearances that, if taken at face value, would imply the falsity of the worldview and accepting as non-illusory those appearances that are consistent with the worldview - is stupid? It's not philosophy, is it?

You would, I am sure, reject it when the worldview is a religious one. If I just started out by assuming the Christianity is true and then rejected any appearances that seem to conflict with it as illusions sent to test the failthful, you'd recognize the dogmatism inherent in such an approach.

Recognize the pattern. Identify the fault. What is it? Christianity? No, the dogmatic assumption of a worldview at the outset.

Isn't it dumb to decide that time doesn't exist because its existence is an inconvenience for one's favourite worldview? I think so. Arrogant, dumb, and not philosophy.

Now, I am not like that. I don't start with a worldview. I do philosophy. I follow reason.

If you do that, you'll arrive at idealism. You won't arrive at materialism. But by all means try and show me wrong. Just don't do it by assuming materialism at the outset.

Now again, you've said nothing whatever to challenge the argument I presented in the OP. Follow. The. Argument. Don't ignore it and just tell me everything you know about idealism (which seems mistaken anyway). Follow. The. Argument.

I don't start with a worldview. I do philosophy. I follow reason. — Bartricks

So perhaps you can explain here then what the difference is between these two propositions...

"there appears to be a present in which events are occurring"

"there appears to be an external world made of mind-independent material objects"

Why is one labelled a 'worldview' and bad philosophy to start with, but the other is labelled an 'instinct' and is good philosophy to start with. How do they differ in form such that you can identify such a significant difference between the two?

Berkeley doesn't think external objects exist when no one is perceiving them (naive realism). See the Principles:

I am content to put the whole upon this issue; if you can but conceive it possible for one extended moveable substance, or in general, for any one idea or any thing like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause…. But say you, surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and no body by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it: but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you your self perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shows you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but it doth not shew that you can conceive it possible, the objects of your thought may exist without the mind: to make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and doth conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind; though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in it self

His responds to the objection that his theory has it so that our office furniture disappears whenever we close the door to our offices, only to reappear when we open the door. He does not say, as you suggest, "no, you misunderstand, the office furniture exists the whole time (as in objective idealism)." He says, in so many words, "so what?"

Which is fine for his purposes, but definitely runs into the problem I highlighted above, where this does not jive with naive appearances.

45. Fourthly, it will be objected that from the foregoing principles it follows things are every moment annihilated and created anew. The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees therefore are in the garden, or the chairs in the parlour, no longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them. Upon shutting my eyes all the furniture in the room is reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening them it is again created – In answer to all which, I refer the reader to What has been said in sect 3, 4, &c, all I desire he will consider whether be means anything by the actual existence of an idea distinct from its being perceived. For my part, after the nicest inquiry I could make, I am not able to discover that anything else is meant by those words and I once more entreat the reader to sound his own thoughts, and not suffer himself to be imposed on by words. If he can conceive it possible either for his ideas or their archetypes to exist without being perceived, then I give up the cause; but if he cannot, he will acknowledge it is unreasonable for him to stand up in defence of he knows not what, and pretend to charge on me as an absurdity the not assenting to those propositions which at bottom have no meaning in them.

46. It will not be amiss to observe how far the received principles of philosophy are themselves chargeable with those pretended absurdities. It is thought strangely absurd that upon closing my eyelids all the visible objects around me should be reduced to nothing; and yet is not this what philosophers commonly acknowledge, when they agree on all hands that light and colours, which alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight, are mere sensations that exist no longer than they are perceived? Again, it may to some perhaps seem very incredible that things should be every moment creating, yet this very notion is commonly taught in the schools. For the Schoolmen, though they acknowledge the existence of matter, and that the whole mundane fabric is framed out of it, are nevertheless of opinion that it cannot subsist without the divine conservation, which by them is expounded to be a continual creation.

You are not reading him or me carefully. I did not claim that the external sensible world exists unpercieved, and nor does he.
He argues, as would I, that it exists external to our minds.
Not 'all' minds. Our minds. That is, those minds whose sensations represent the world they are sensations of to have outness. It appears external. He concludes that it is. That does not mean it exists unpercieved.
Have you actually read the principles or are those cherry picked quotes from a website?
Because if you actually read him he's very clear about this. Those quotes are taken out of context. Willfully. Read him and see.
He doesn't think your desk disappears when you stop perceiving it. He does think it can't exist unpercieved. Read the actual principles, not misleading quotes taken out of context.
Read paragraphs 1-7. He references 3 and 4 himself - read them.
Then read my op. Then address it.

if materialism is true, then our impressions of presentness are systematically inaccurate.

So, if p, then q.

The default is that our impressions are not systematically inaccurate.

So: not q.

Therefore not p. — Bartricks

I don't see how you conclude not-p when you are strongly arguing for q.

For example:

Nothing that I sense to be present is actually present. — Bartricks

If p, then q. You are strongly arguing for q. Therefore, you are strongly arguing that materialism is true.

I don't see how you conclude not-p when you are strongly arguing for q. — Luke

Oh bloody hell, will you get with the programme!? I am arguing that 'if p, then q'. I am then arguing that not q. Not q here means I am arguing that our impressions of presentness are NOT systematically mistaken. That then gets me to the 'not p' conclusion.

You don't seem to understand what 'if' means. That's worrying.

So perhaps you can explain here then what the difference is between these two propositions...

"there appears to be a present in which events are occurring"

"there appears to be an external world made of mind-independent material objects" — Isaac

The mind-independent material objects bit. That's a worldview. That's not an appearance.

There appears to be an external sensible world, yes?

Whether that external sensible world is independent of all minds is not something one can see. How would you 'see' that?? You need to 'conclude' such things from premises whose content is appears to be true. (And as Berkeley argues, you can't even conceive of such a thing).