All possible universes is a logical necessity. One is not.

I don't understand your objection. If in all possible worlds A causes B then in all possible worlds if A doesn't happen then B doesn't happen. If in some possible worlds A causes B and in some possible worlds it doesn't then in some possible worlds if A doesn't happen then B doesn't happen and in some possible worlds it is not the case that if A doesn't happen then B doesn't happen.

You don't understand that the all possible world is a logical necessity by definition and the other isn't?

I didn't think causality would be the main topic. I thought the object nominalism was more controversial as most people aren't willing to dispense with the reality of everyday objects like chairs and apples.

Yes, I just don’t understand the point you’re trying to make. What does it have to do with the counterfactual theory of causation?

Yes, I just don’t understand the point you’re trying to make. What does it have to do with the counterfactual theory of causation? — Michael

The counterfactual theory doesn't say whether B is necessitated by A, which the traditional notion of A forcing B to happen entails. Therefore, we can't know that B will follow A in the future under the counterfactual.

The counterfactual theory doesn't say whether B is necessitated by A, which the traditional notion of A forcing B to happen entails. — Marchesk

And what does it mean to say that A forces B to happen if not just that if A didn't happen then B wouldn't have happened?

Your account is just replacing the word "cause", first with "makes happen" and now with "forces". These are just synonyms that don't offer any actual explanation. The underlying meaning behind each of these phrases is what the counterfactual theory of causation is trying to make sense of.

Therefore, we can't know that B will follow A in the future under the counterfactual. — Marchesk

The counterfactual theory of causation is about token events, not types. There is only ever one A and one B.

If you want to talk about A and B as being types then you're right, we can't know that A-type events will always cause B-type events, and that's because sometimes they don't. Sometimes when I kick a ball at a window it will cause the window to break and sometimes it won't.

But knowing whether or not A will cause B has no bearing on what it means for A to cause B. The counterfactual theory of causation is an account of the meaning of causation. Whether or not A will cause B, and whether or not we can know this, is a separate matter.

And what does it mean to say that A forces B to happen if not just that if A didn't happen then B wouldn't have happened? — Michael

It means we have an explanation for how A causes B to happen. In physics, the electromagnetic force is the explanation for chemical bonds. Chemistry happens because there is an EM force.

The counterfactual theory of causation is an account of the meaning of causation. — Michael

It is one meaning of causation. It is not the classical meaning. It is a Humean formulation.

But knowing whether or not A will cause B has no bearing on what it means for A to cause B. The counterfactual theory of causation is an account of the meaning of causation. Whether or not A will cause B is a separate matter, and whether or not we can know this, is a separate matter. — Michael

Under a Humean understanding of causation. Not the traditional one. I disagree with Humean causation becues it leads to the problem of induction, and it provides no explanation for why B follows A. It makes everything in the universe contingent.

It is one meaning of causation. It is not the classical meaning. It is a Humean formulation. — Marchesk

Under a Humean understanding of causation. Not the traditional one. — Marchesk

I'm not sure what you're saying here. Are you saying that Humean causation isn't the counterfactual theory of causation?

it provides no explanation for why B follows A

It's not supposed to. The counterfactual theory of causation just explains what it means for A to cause B. We need something else to explain why A causes B.

I disagree with Humean causation becues it leads to the problem of induction

And perhaps there is a(n unsolvable) problem of induction. How can empirical facts allow for deductive inference? They're not a formal system with axiomatic principles.

It makes everything in the universe contingent. — Marchesk

You seem to be conflating epistemology with ontology. That we can't know that the universe will always behave a certain way isn't that it won't.

I'm not sure what you're saying here. Are you saying that Humean causation isn't the counterfactual theory of causation? — Michael

It is. I'm disagreeing with it on those grounds.

It's not supposed to. The counterfactual theory of causation just explains what it means for A to cause B. — Michael

As a Humean account. Non-humeans call that contingency.

And perhaps there is a(n unsolvable) problem of induction. How can empirical facts allow for deductive inference? — Michael

Physicists seem to manage. Newton said gravity caused mass to attract. Newton didn't have an explanation for how it worked. So a good example of B always following A. But relativity says it's because mass curves space, changing the trajectory of objects. Now we have an explanation for why B follows A.

You seem to be conflating epistemology with ontology. That we can't know that the universe will always behave a certain way isn't that it won't. — Michael

I realize this. But Humean ontology makes it so we can't know. The problem of induction exists because Hume stated that causality was a habit of thought, not something empirical. That's the skeptical bullet he bit.

Physicists seem to manage. — Marchesk

They just make the same assumptions as the rest of us; that the world will continue to behave as it has always done. See time-variation of fundamental constants.

It's not supposed to. The counterfactual theory of causation just explains what it means for A to cause B. We need something else to explain why A causes B. — Michael

If so, it is not a theory or explanation of causation, but a definition.

When Carrol asked about physical laws, Azzouni stated that just because we can generalize some of the world in science doesn't mean there has to be an explanation for why the generalization works. It may be brute, and we have to live with the problem of induction. — Marchesk

I don't think this type of reasoning is persuasive. Even if we admit brute facts, they have to be brute because of something - a property, a law, a feature - of the universe causes this to be brute.

We may lack the cognitive capacities to figure out why such generalizations work, that can be granted without much problem. But I think there has to be a reason, otherwise, anything goes - because there are no reasons why this should be a brute fact as opposed to something else. It's a brute fact in virtue of the reason it is the way it is.

His argument against the necessary consistency of arithmetic is that this is only necessary as syntax, and going beyond that is to import meaning into the formalism. — Marchesk

When I speak of math, I'm out of my league. But it is misleading to say that the consistency of arithmetic is a "syntax". Natural language has quite different properties than a good deal of math. In fact, we may have derived out ability to do math through language. Or maybe not. To say it is a "syntax" is to use a metaphor that doesn't help.

And why is Sean Carrol so on board with this kind of radical nominalism if he thinks the wave function is real and describes many worlds? — Marchesk

It's a good question, I should listen to the entire podcast sometime. In general it seems to me that many modern day philosophers are not sympathetic to universalist arguments. I think they should be evident, otherwise, science doesn't make sense, nor would we share virtually identical manifest images of the world.

Great post.

But I think there has to be a reason, otherwise, anything goes - because there are no reasons why this should be a brute fact as opposed to something else. It's a brute fact in virtue of the reason it is the wat it is. — Manuel

Agreed. I also think science without universals doesn't work.