I think you have put your finger on a sore-point of Philosophy & Science : the necessity to take some "facts" for granted without empirical proof. The only evidence to support such unproven premises (axioms) is logical consistency. But, even that assumption is based on the presumption that the human mind and the real world are inherently logical, hence share a firm foundation. I suppose Aristotle's Universal Principles are the metaphysical analog of physical atoms : not reducible to anything more fundamental. First Principles are simply labels for First Causes : the cornerstone of all practical knowledge. Example : the distinction between Substance (matter) and Essence (form ; qualities).A) Which are the “first principles” Aristotle is referring to?
B) If they are not need to be proven... their premises are universal affirmative? (According to Aristotle's syllogisms) — javi2541997
First Principles are simply labels for First Causes : the cornerstone of all practical knowledge. Example : the distinction between Substance (matter) and Essence (form ; qualities). — Gnomon
Apparently, Aristotle's First Principles were presumed "self-evident", based on his self-confidence in his own reasoning ability. But quantum scientists are no longer so self-assured, regarding their ability to make sense of the evidence — Gnomon
Aristotle thinks that knowledge begins with experience. We get to first principles through induction. — javi2541997
It means "coming face-to-face with" something, and it belongs not to the dianoia, by which we make connections and figure things out, but to the nous, the contemplative intellect. [Joe Sachs,The Battle of the Gods and the Giants,12]
It is not something worked out by reason (dianoia) but something the intellect (nous) sees. — Fooloso4
But there is no certainty to the generalizations of induction. The "Problem of Induction" is the question How we know when we have examined enough individual cases to make an inductive generalization. Usually we can't know.
A) Which are the “first principles” Aristotle is referring to? — javi2541997
Part 1
"THERE is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes
which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not
the same as any of the so-called special sciences; for none of these
others treats universally of being as being. They cut off a part of
being and investigate the attribute of this part; this is what the
mathematical sciences for instance do. Now since we are seeking the
first principles and the highest causes, clearly there must be some
thing to which these belong in virtue of its own nature. If then those
who sought the elements of existing things were seeking these same
principles, it is necessary that the elements must be elements of
being not by accident but just because it is being. Therefore it is
of being as being that we also must grasp the first causes...."
In part 2:
"...And there are as many parts of philosophy as there are kinds of substance, so that there must necessarily be among them a first philosophy and one which follows this. For being falls immediately into genera; for which reason the sciences too will correspond to these genera. For the philosopher is like the mathematician, as that word is used; for mathematics also has parts, and there is a first and a second science and other successive ones within the sphere of mathematics."
"Now since it is the work of one science to investigate opposites, and plurality is opposed to unity-and it belongs to one science to investigate the negation and the privation because in both cases we are really investigating the one thing of which the negation or the privation is a negation or privation (for we either say simply that that thing is not present, or that it is not present in some particular class; in the latter case difference is present over and above what is implied in negation; for negation means just the absence of the thing in question, while in privation there is also employed an underlying nature of which the privation is asserted):-in view of all these facts, the contraries of the concepts we named above, the other and the dissimilar and the unequal, and everything else which is derived either from these or from plurality and unity, must fall within the province of the science above named." — Aristotle, Metaphysics Book IV
Part1
WE are seeking the principles and the causes of the things that are, and obviously of them qua being. For, while there is a cause of health and of good condition, and the objects of mathematics have first principles and elements and causes, and in general every science which is ratiocinative or at all involves reasoning deals with causes and principles, more or less precise, all these sciences mark off some particular being-some genus, and inquire into this, but not into being simply nor qua being, nor do they offer any discussion of the essence of the things of which they treat; but starting from the essence-some making it plain to the senses, others assuming it as a hypothesis-they then demonstrate, more or less cogently, the essential attributes of the genus with which they deal. It is obvious, therefore, that such an induction yields no demonstration of substance or of the essence, but some other way of exhibiting it. And similarly the sciences omit the question whether the genus with which they deal exists or does not exist, because it belongs to the same kind of thinking to show what it is and that it is.
"And since natural science, like other sciences, is in fact about one class of being, i.e. to that sort of substance which has the principle of its movement and rest present in itself, evidently it is neither practical nor productive. For in the case of things made the principle is in the maker-it is either reason or art or some faculty, while in the case of things done it is in the doer-viz. will, for that which is done and that which is willed are the same. Therefore, if all thought is either practical or productive or theoretical, physics must be a theoretical science, but it will theorize about such being as admits of being moved, and about substance-as-defined for the most part only as not separable from matter. Now, we must not fail to notice the mode of being of the essence and of its definition, for, without this, inquiry is but idle. Of things defined, i.e. of 'whats', some are like 'snub', and some like 'concave'. And these differ because 'snub' is bound up with matter (for what is snub is a concave nose), while concavity is independent of perceptible matter. If then all natural things are a analogous to the snub in their nature; e.g. nose, eye, face, flesh, bone, and, in general, animal; leaf, root, bark, and, in general, plant (for none of these can be defined without reference to movement-they always have matter), it is clear how we must seek and define the 'what' in the case of natural objects, and also that it belongs to the student of nature to study even soul in a certain sense, i.e. so much of it as is not independent of matter.
"That physics, then, is a theoretical science, is plain from these considerations. Mathematics also, however, is theoretical; but whether its objects are immovable and separable from matter, is not at present clear; still, it is clear that some mathematical theorems consider them qua immovable and qua separable from matter. But if there is something which is eternal and immovable and separable, clearly the knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science,-not, however, to physics (for physics deals with certain movable things) nor to mathematics, but to a science prior to both. For physics deals with things which exist separately but are not immovable, and some parts of mathematics deal with things which are immovable but presumably do not exist separately, but as embodied in matter; while the first science deals with things which both exist separately and are immovable. Now all causes must be eternal, but especially these; for they are the causes that operate on so much of the divine as appears to us. There must, then, be three theoretical philosophies, mathematics, physics, and what we may call theology, since it is obvious that if the divine is present anywhere, it is present in things of this sort. And the highest science must deal with the highest genus. Thus, while the theoretical sciences are more to be desired than the other sciences, this is more to be desired than the other theoretical sciences. For one might raise the question whether first philosophy is universal, or deals with one genus, i.e. some one kind of being; for not even the mathematical sciences are all alike in this respect,-geometry and astronomy deal with a certain particular kind of thing, while universal mathematics applies alike to all. We answer that if there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider being qua being-both what it is and the attributes which belong to it qua being. — Aristotle, Metaphysics VI
Part 1
"REGARDING this kind of substance, what we have said must be taken as sufficient. All philosophers make the first principles contraries: as in natural things, so also in the case of unchangeable substances. But since there cannot be anything prior to the first principle of all things, the principle cannot be the principle and yet be an attribute of something else. To suggest this is like saying that the white is a first principle, not qua anything else but qua white, but yet that it is predicable of a subject, i.e. that its being white presupposes its being something else; this is absurd, for then that subject will be prior. But all things which are generated from their contraries involve an underlying subject; a subject, then, must be present in the case of contraries, if anywhere. All contraries, then, are always predicable of a subject, and none can exist apart, but just as appearances suggest that there is nothing contrary to substance, argument confirms this. No contrary, then, is the first principle of all things in the full sense; the first principle is something different. — Aristotle, Metaphysics XIV
I'm just pulling quotes from The Metaphysics which mention first principles and first philosophy, because that's what I thought was referred to be Aristotle as "the first principles" — Moliere
then I think it'd be fair to say it was be a Subject, and not a Predicate. — Moliere
They seem to be at the top of the species-genus chain, and somehow explain how everything is made of or comes from some primary thing, — Moliere
Completely agree and you are, of course, on the right path because the paper I have read was referring and quoting to The Metaphysics. So, I appreciated all the big quotes you shared with us. The paper I used is not that complete and drafted. — javi2541997
. I did, however, check the physics and the prior analytics for "first principles" as well, just out of curiosity, and didn't find as much that seemed to grab me as relevant. — Moliere
And the last time I read Aristotle in real depth was over 10 years ago. — Moliere
All contraries, then, are always predicable of a subject, and none can exist apart, but just as appearances suggest that there is nothing contrary to substance, argument confirms this. No contrary, then, is the first principle of all things in the full sense; the first principle is something different. — Aristotle, Metaphysics XIV
God thinking the universe and himself into existence is the unmoved mover, and would seem to count, right? But that's not exactly a universal affirmation, ala the logic. — Moliere
It's a metaphysical proposition about the nature of reality and how everything relates back to something fundamental that predicates it all. — Moliere
Yes. If we couldn't agree on some universally applicable First Principles (starting point for reasoning), Philosophy & Science would be a political contest of whose personal opinions should rule. Most of Aristotle's principles have held-up to skeptical scrutiny over the years. But, logical reasoning from abstract principles can still be questionable. For example, even if you accept a particular axiom, as the first of a series of logical causes & effects, you could still go wrong.Nevertheless, I think Aristotle's principles of logic are still important in some ways. — javi2541997
what we should consider as "fundamental" which predicates it all? — javi2541997
Undecidable (à la problem of the criterion). What matters is (Peirce, Wittgenstein et al might say) "Aristotle's first principles" work ... until they don't, just like other "first principles" in domains other than logic (vide S. Haack's foundherentism as critique and alternative to foundationalism of "first principles").[ ... ] If they are not need to be proven... their premises are universal affirmative? (According to Aristotle's syllogisms) — javi2541997
So, who do you trust : Aristotle or Augustine? :joke: — Gnomon
I think the question is a bit foolish and undecidable — Moliere
"Aristotle's first principles" work ... until they don't, just like other "first principles" in domains other than logic (vide S. Haack's foundherentism as critique and alternative to foundationalism of "first principles"). — 180 Proof
I think there are not "foolish" question when someone is asking with aim of learning... — javi2541997
The desire to know, and intellectual curiosity, are good things! — Moliere
But it is possible for human beings to want to know something that they are unable to know. — Moliere
there must be reasons for which there do not need to be further reasons: Reasons which do not need to be proven. — javi2541997
The force is strong with this one. — Master Yoda
The Gödel sentence G is true but, here's where it gets interesting, unprovable — Agent Smith
Never had the time nor the brains to dig deeper into Kant's ideas. — Agent Smith
That's true it can happen a scenario where Aristotle's "first principles" don't work. In this context, the paper I read yesterday, shows diverse solutions according to different philosophers., for example: — javi2541997
I like to think of a community trying to rationally settle what they ought to believe. — Pie
They'll just generally establish more complex and doubtful claims by working from those that are less so, — Pie
True & False are opinions, not facts. They don't exist apart from human minds. That's why Kant labeled them "synthetic" (artificial instead of natural). But, all animals have an interest in determining which appearances are Real (true & natural) from which are Unreal (artifacts of mind).↪javi2541997
I believe this :point: What makes an observation true or false will be helpful!
Synthetic a priori? — Agent Smith
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