If the picture is that the cat is on the mat, then Davidson's criticism applies. If the picture is "the cat is on the mat", then it doesn't. — Banno

The model is my or someone else's contention that there is a cat on the mat in my living room (that there's a fact of the matter). A proposition by itself, without the belief, is just a potential picture of a fact that hasn't been presented as a particular belief about the world. It's neither true nor false.

Hegel's idealism is not the metaphysical, Berkeleyan claim that only minds and ideas exist, but rather the negative anti-realist claim that we have no way of talking about input ab extra.

Although experience comes in from the outside in some sense, when we try to pin down what this means, it ends up becoming 'an otherness which is superseded in the act of grasping it.' — Braver

We can no longer talk of things at all,i.e.,of something that would be for consciousness merely the negative of itself.
...
Thought is always in its own sphere; its relations are with itself, and it is its own object. — Hegel

Added Braver's take (small part of it). Verdict: more of an anti-realist. Hegel rejects bivalence only in a dialectical sense. Philosophers offer partial truths, not wholly true or false, which are synthesized into less partial, more complete truths.

I think in the Tractacus he's presenting that as the way we normally imagine things: propositions corresponding to the world the same way a photograph corresponds to a scene. — Tate

Exactly.

But the picture can never be in the picture. When we present a theory of propositions, we've strayed beyond what language good for, into nonsense. We're just so enthralled by the theory that we don't realize this. We've forgotten that some things can't be explained. We should pass over them in silence. — Tate

Parts of this I agree with, other parts would have to be explained further. I'm not a fan of passing over anything, or much of anything, in silence. This has become a kind of cliché for many philosophers.

But the picture can never be in the picture. When we present a theory of propositions, we've strayed beyond what language good for, into nonsense. — Tate

But this means that his theory doesn't even include its condition of possiblity. A theory of language and meaning that must exclude that theory itself ...fails?

But this means that his theory doesn't even include its condition of possiblity. A theory of language and meaning that must exclude that theory itself ...fails? — Pie

We've built a ladder to nowhere.

I'm not a fan of passing over anything, or much of anything, in silence. — Sam26

That's the intellect's motto. It thinks it can understand everything.

:up:

My unsophisticated understanding of Hegel says truth is approached asymptotically; a notion at odds with my more analytic roots. For Hegel, sentences are neither true nor false, at least while history endures.

Peirce had a similar view.

But it seems to me that at least some sentences are true or false, and that we sometimes even know which ones.

This by way of returning to your OP.

It would be interesting then to apply Davidson's critique directly to the Tractatus and then the Investigations. Another Doctoral Thesis for someone.

The first issue might be to identify where the picture resides. Davidson's critique begins with conceptual relativism, so one might ask if the picture that Jim sees is the same as the picture that John sees. If the answer is to be "no", then the picture theory does seem to be an example of conceptual relativism, and liable to Davidson's criticism. If not, then where is the picture?

.

But it seems to me that at least some sentences are true or false, and that we sometimes even know which ones. — Banno

I agree. Maybe Hegel would too. I've read a fair amount of his work, and I don't recall him disputing relatively simple claims being true or false.

I don't recall him disputing relatively simple claims being true or false. — Pie

Then Hegel seems to be working with more than one sort of truth, with all the problems of consistency that would entail.

So I'll stay with Frege and the analytic approach.

where is the picture? — Banno

The difference might be the fading of the solipsism of the Tractatus in favour of the public language of the Investigations. The picture ceases to be the construction of one mind and becomes the combined work of a community.

Well I wouldn't try to sell anyone on Hegel in 2022, not the whole clump of him anyway.

If I could go back in time, I'd have studied Sellars and Brandom sooner.

The picture ceases to be the construction of one mind and becomes the combined work of a community. — Banno

:up:

Age'll do that to you, make you realize the world is bigger than you.

It seems the further we look at W. the further apart our disagreements become. I'm not really a fan of Davidson's ideas.

Then where do we differ? Thats the interesting bit.

I'm not sure that Davidson and Wittgenstein are at odds. Consider:

I want to urge that this second dualism of scheme and content,
of organizing system and something waiting to be organized, cannot be made intelligible and defensible. It is itself a dogma of empiricism, the third dogma.
to call empiricism. — Davidson: On the very idea...

Now if the world is all that is the case, then aren't the scheme and the content as one? "What is the case" being the scheme, and the world being the content?

From years of discussing antinatalism on this forum, I will say that people only believe in possibility as a condition when it suits them.

If talking about the potential for something to happen based on conditions.. everyone is on board, yay! If it is talking about a possible person, that would be imposed upon had it been born, boo! And the proverbial crowds throw their rotten tomatoes...

But it seems to me that at least some sentences are true or false, and that we sometimes even know which ones. — Banno

But the former half is the very problem I think Peirce is addressing (my knowledge of Peirce coming via a very roundabout route - Ramsey-> Cheryl Misak's work on his Pragmatism -> Peirce so forgive my ignorance of the primary source).

It seems to you that at least some sentences are true. It seems that way to me too, but I'd bet my hat we don't have the same list of sentences. So what do we say about this 'seeing to us'? What is it that 'seems' and what do we say about the differences?

Ramsey puts it down to our experience and our rules (or habits) of thought. But this is pragmatism (which I take it is not up your street). So what do you make of the differences in our list? What, for you, is the 'seeming to you' about the truth of sentences - what's happening when a sentence 'seems to you' to be true?

It seems that way to me too, but I'd bet my hat we don't have the same list of sentences. — Isaac

Of course you are right. But I will also go along with Davidson in pointing out that overwhelmingly, we agree about far more than we disagree. So you and I will agree that this is a sentence of English, in a thread on-line, discussing epistemology; that cats usually have four legs and that four is twice two. The thing about our agreements is that they don't cause us much consternation, and so in order to avoid tedium, occupy little of our conversation. But our disagreements are perturbing, and do occupy our minds and discussions. So we give much more time to our disagreements than to our agreement.

So if we attempted complete lists of our beliefs, our lists would be tediously similar, but include a small number of much more interesting exceptions.

what's happening when a sentence 'seems to you' to be true? — Isaac

In a word, belief. And belief is not truth. T-sentences show pretty much all there is to say about truth. Belief is a different animal. Belief is much more complex. HAppy to go on at length about beleif, but this is a thread about truth,.

But this is pragmatism (which I take it is not up your street). — Isaac

No, not if it is taken as a theory of truth. As a way of deciding what we might do well to believe, it's fine. As a theory of truth, it sucks.

How this fits with your thinking might be interesting. It would seem that neural nets are the experts on expediency. Truth doesn't matter to them, I guess. But that's fine, since for the most part truth is greatly overrated - as is demonstrated by the triviality of T-sentences.

OK, hold up. — Tate

So, no?

My personal opinion of "truth" is that it should unambiguously tell us whether we are animals or creation of god.

In respect to Jesus' saying of truth, I think good start is Lewis Trilemma:
https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Lewis_Trilemma

knowing the "truth" is very powerful because either entire world becomes atheists or entire world converts, and truth if known should not cause any suspicions further.
Truth I think may not be personal thing.

But then, what is "truth"?

So if we attempted complete lists of our beliefs, our lists would be tediously similar, but include a small number of much more interesting exceptions. — Banno

Without question, yes. Not an insignificant point either, but I'm not sure that the volume of agreements caries any semantic weight...?

T-sentences show pretty much all there is to say about truth. — Banno

Do they though?

I think we use 'true' and 'truth' to carry an awful lot more meaning that T-sentences encompass.

If I say "you must believe me...It's true, I tell you!" I'm not using 'true' just to mean that the state of affairs is as I describe them. I added 'true' to implore, to add weight. It's indicating the strength of my belief, or the urgency with which I need you to agree. It has nothing to do with (on this occasion) the correspondence of the phrase to the state of affairs.

"Everything John says is true" is about my faith in John.

"True love" is just really, really intense love.

And so on...

No, not if it is taken as a theory of truth. As a way of deciding what we might do well to believe, it's fine. As a theory of truth, it sucks. — Banno

I can see what you mean. There's something amiss in seeing truth as success in that we understand the concept of a coincidence. I don't think it 'sucks', but I can see the flaws. I'm more of an 'iron them out' person.

It would seem that neural nets are the experts on expediency. Truth doesn't matter to them, I guess. — Banno

Well, I've often been found to say so, yes. But when doing so, I'm talking about a correspondence theory of truth. It matters not one jot to our inference system if it's model of hidden states is how the hodden states are, only that it allows an accurate prediction of the force needed to be applied to them to resist entropic decay.

Where I struggle with that notion is that it imports an idea of 'the way things 'really' are, and as you'll know, I'm allergic to the notion of there being a way things 'really' are.

If we say that the brain's inferences need not be 'true' (ie there's some actual state that the external world is in, which my brain does not care about) then I may come out in hives.

I prefer to see the external world as constraints. Something about it constrains our models of how it is such that they won't work if they're not within those constraints. This is where I have problems with the asymptomatic notion of truth (and also where I think Ramsey diverges from Peirce - but not sure). I don't think of hidden states as have a single 'way they are' at all, only several ways they aren't.

As for 'truth' though, I wouldn't say it referred to any of that. I think it's far more likely to be a socially functional word. It's used to persuade, not identify.

Banno, before I respond further I'm going to do some reading on Davidson. I'm not that familiar with his work. All I have to go on is what's being said in here about him, and that's not enough for me to respond intelligently. It seems I disagree with some of the things he's proposed, but I want to make sure.

I think we use 'true' and 'truth' to carry an awful lot more meaning that T-sentences encompass.

If I say "you must believe me...It's true, I tell you!" I'm not using 'true' just to mean that the state of affairs is as I describe them. I added 'true' to implore, to add weight. It's indicating the strength of my belief, or the urgency with which I need you to agree. It has nothing to do with (on this occasion) the correspondence of the phrase to the state of affairs. — Isaac

This begins to add what seems to me to be lacking in the discussion, which is the moral dimension, which I suggest is inescapably there from the beginning. The monkey tribe has 2 warning calls, one for threats from above - eagles, and one for threats from below - snakes. Meaning is use so the use is to get down from the treetops or get up from the ground according to the danger, and there is already the possibility and the potential use of falsehood; a monkey spots a tasty morsel on the ground and gives a false ground warning cry, the tribe scuttles up the trees, leaving the liar in sole possession of the tasty morsel.

But the lie is dependent on the truth-telling of the community. If falsehood was normalised, the cry would cease to have the meaning of warning of danger, and come to be an alert of something interesting on the ground. Only truth telling can support language, and habitual liars are not worth listening to as their speech has no meaning. Thus to the extent that we live in a world of language, we live in a moral social world in which the truth has value and falsehood is destructive of meaning of society and of our world.

Truth, one might say is redundant just as long as it is adhered to, but what is needed is an account of falsehood, which is parasitic on a community of truth tellers.

Thus to the extent that we live in a world of language, we live in a moral social world in which the truth has value and falsehood is destructive of meaning of society and of our world. — unenlightened

But where I live, it's common to see birds feigning injury. If you walk near their nests, they'll try to lead you away by flapping on the ground. They're just protecting their offspring. So maybe it's not always evil.

My personal opinion of "truth" is that it should unambiguously tell us whether we are animals or creation of god. — SpaceDweller

Don't theist believe that a god created all of the animals and not just us ?

I acknowledge that the God issue is decisive. If there is God (as typically conceived), then are slaves who should maybe not bother with philosophy. I take it for granted that there is not such a God, and that there's only us down here, trying to be less stupid than we were yesterminute.

What is it to take something to be true ? If I believe a pastry is toxic, I (probably) don't eat it. Does 'believe' itself have a kind of absoluteness ? He did X, because he believed Y. Because the world seemed like Y to him. It turns out he was (acting like he was) in the wrong world.

It's indicating the strength of my belief, or the urgency with which I need you to agree. — Isaac

:up:

This may be the redundancy theory with a new attention paid to pragmatics. 'The ice cream is very very cold.' 'It is indeed true that it is indeed true that it is indeed true.'

But the lie is dependent on the truth-telling of the community. — unenlightened

:up:

Does the concept of a belief depend on the concept of a truth in the same way ? Is "seems" a parasite on "is"?