If the picture is that the cat is on the mat, then Davidson's criticism applies. If the picture is "the cat is on the mat", then it doesn't. — Banno
Hegel's idealism is not the metaphysical, Berkeleyan claim that only minds and ideas exist, but rather the negative anti-realist claim that we have no way of talking about input ab extra.
Although experience comes in from the outside in some sense, when we try to pin down what this means, it ends up becoming 'an otherness which is superseded in the act of grasping it.' — Braver
We can no longer talk of things at all,i.e.,of something that would be for consciousness merely the negative of itself.
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Thought is always in its own sphere; its relations are with itself, and it is its own object. — Hegel
I think in the Tractacus he's presenting that as the way we normally imagine things: propositions corresponding to the world the same way a photograph corresponds to a scene. — Tate
But the picture can never be in the picture. When we present a theory of propositions, we've strayed beyond what language good for, into nonsense. We're just so enthralled by the theory that we don't realize this. We've forgotten that some things can't be explained. We should pass over them in silence. — Tate
But the picture can never be in the picture. When we present a theory of propositions, we've strayed beyond what language good for, into nonsense. — Tate
I want to urge that this second dualism of scheme and content,
of organizing system and something waiting to be organized, cannot be made intelligible and defensible. It is itself a dogma of empiricism, the third dogma.
to call empiricism. — Davidson: On the very idea...
But it seems to me that at least some sentences are true or false, and that we sometimes even know which ones. — Banno
It seems that way to me too, but I'd bet my hat we don't have the same list of sentences. — Isaac
what's happening when a sentence 'seems to you' to be true? — Isaac
But this is pragmatism (which I take it is not up your street). — Isaac
So if we attempted complete lists of our beliefs, our lists would be tediously similar, but include a small number of much more interesting exceptions. — Banno
T-sentences show pretty much all there is to say about truth. — Banno
No, not if it is taken as a theory of truth. As a way of deciding what we might do well to believe, it's fine. As a theory of truth, it sucks. — Banno
It would seem that neural nets are the experts on expediency. Truth doesn't matter to them, I guess. — Banno
I think we use 'true' and 'truth' to carry an awful lot more meaning that T-sentences encompass.
If I say "you must believe me...It's true, I tell you!" I'm not using 'true' just to mean that the state of affairs is as I describe them. I added 'true' to implore, to add weight. It's indicating the strength of my belief, or the urgency with which I need you to agree. It has nothing to do with (on this occasion) the correspondence of the phrase to the state of affairs. — Isaac
Thus to the extent that we live in a world of language, we live in a moral social world in which the truth has value and falsehood is destructive of meaning of society and of our world. — unenlightened
My personal opinion of "truth" is that it should unambiguously tell us whether we are animals or creation of god. — SpaceDweller
But the lie is dependent on the truth-telling of the community. — unenlightened
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