metaphysical claims have no truth value. — T Clark

:100:

The point of the Wigner's Friend is that both can see the different responses to the same thing and be right, meaning we aren't seeing the same thing yet aren't wrong, at least on the quantum stage not the macro stage. — Darkneos

The point of the forks is that we both can see the different responses to the same thing and be right, meaning we aren't seeing the same thing yet aren't wrong, right there at the table.

The example is spot on.

The example is spot on. — Banno

I don't see that it has anything to do with QM.

Interesting (I guess 'analytical') approach — 180 Proof

Is it reductionist metaphysics? I wonder if I've overstated my case.

Exactly. The supposed problem with objectivity does not involve QM.

Again, no not even close. Your case isn't different responses to the same thing. I'm talking about seeing a spoon where you see a fork.

Like I said not even close.

Don't think that's how it works. — Darkneos

Have you studied biophysics?

It's the world that's wonderful. — T Clark

But how much of it can you see?

metaphysical claims have no truth value. — T Clark

What? They are how we can even derive counterfactuals to test. They are the axiomatic basis of truth claims.

What? They are how we can even derive counterfactuals to test. They are the axiomatic basis of truth claims. — apokrisis

Uhh no they aren't. Metaphysical claims don't have truth values, they are all unfalsifiable and have no impact on reality.

Have you studied biophysics? — apokrisis

A little, but again that's not quantum physics. Doesn't apply here.

A little, but again that's not quantum physics. — Darkneos

That ceased to be a viable claim in 1966.

de Vault, D. & Chance, B. Studies of phosynthesis using a pulsed laser. i. Temperature dependence of cytochrome oxidation rate in Chromatium. Evidence for tunneling. Biophys. J. 6, 825 (1966)

And is a quite ludicrous statement now. Biophysics has all the receipts.

Electron-transfer chain in respiratory complex I
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-017-05779-y

Your case isn't different responses to the same thing. — Darkneos

Yeah, it is. One fork. Left, right.

You haven't made a case for a difference, which leaves the suspicion that you only wish to hide your views behind QM verbosity.

Is it reductionist metaphysics? — T Clark

Instrumentalist? Neo-pragmatist? ...

The point of the forks is that we both can see the different responses to the same thing and be right, meaning we aren't seeing the same thing yet aren't wrong, right there at the table. — Banno

The multiplicity of first person views is what underwrites the unity of the third person point of view.

But then we know how your plain language lumpen realism always conflates this familiar dialectical distinction.

What Banno sees as plain as the nose on his face is what the whole world ought to see with equal incuriosity. :wink:

Cheers, again. :roll:

The point I wish to make is the simple one, quite a commonplace, that folk do indeed describe seeing things differently; and that despite this they are able to agree as to what is the case.

So if the supposed lesson from quantum mechanics is that different folk see things differently, then it is something we already knew to be the case.

Further, that does not count against there being descriptions that apply for any observer. Objectivity is not so much about our all seeing the same thing, as it is about our sharing an explanation of what we see, even if what we see is different.

Like the fork being on the left for you, and on the right for me.

It's a small point, trivial, one supposes, but it might show how QM doesn't deny reality so much as confirm it.

Not sure what you're smoking but those studies don't prove your claim, especially the second one.

To reiterate, it's not quantum physics. Again Biophysics isn't quantum physics.

Yeah, it is. One fork. Left, right.

You haven't made a case for a difference, which leaves the suspicion that you only wish to hide your views behind QM verbosity. — Banno

Again, no. This isn't difference. It's the same object. I explained what I meant with my example. In this case it would be like two people observing and one saying they see a fork and another a spoon. It's not just a simple position change but something entirely different.

Get it through your head.

metaphysical claims have no truth value.
— T Clark
:100:
3 hours ago — 180 Proof

Hohooo! That is false. (There is one truth value already.)

"My spirit is green." metaphysical claim.

"My spirit is green and my spirit is not green." Metaphysical claim that is necessarily false.

"My spirit is green or my spirit is not green. " Metaphysical claim that is necessarily true.

:100: :clap: :strong: :up:

"My spirit is green and my spirit is not green." Metaphysical claim that is necessarily false. — god must be atheist

The statement is not a contradiction, it's conceptually incoherent (i.e. not even false).

The statement is not a contradiction, it's conceptually incoherent (i.e. not even false). — 180 Proof

You are false again. This is an axiomatically wrong thing to claim what you claimed. If you deny the validity of the law of the excluded middle on a philosophy site, then you are truly wrong.
EDIT:
I did not claim contradiction. I claimed that it is necessarily false.

You are 1. wrong and 2. you are trying to explain your report card by mixing apples with oranges.

:roll:

:grimace: :yikes: :worry: :gasp: :sad:

What? — apokrisis

My one unending, drum beating message for almost all the time I've been on the forum has been that metaphysical statements are not true or false. They have not truth value. They are only more or less useful in specific situations. I've written exactly that statement dozens of times in many different discussions.

They are how we can even derive counterfactuals to test. They are the axiomatic basis of truth claims. — apokrisis

Agreed. Axioms are statements not subject to empirical verification. Thus they are not true or false.

"My spirit is green." metaphysical claim.

"My spirit is green and my spirit is not green." Metaphysical claim that is necessarily false.

"My spirit is green or my spirit is not green. " Metaphysical claim that is necessarily true. — god must be atheist

@180 Proof says your statements are "conceptually incoherent." I say they are meaningless. I think we're both saying the same thing.

metaphysical statements are not true or false — T Clark

What's an example you reach for to explain this idea? (This is Collingwood, right?)

:smirk:

I think you might agree with this take I found:

No, it hasn’t proven that, and even when it’s talked about you have to twist your use of the word “reality.” What is reality? I think it’s the sum total of all of our collective conscious experiences. No more and no less. How that reality is “implemented” is really of little consequence.

In the movie The Matrix Neo points out a Asian restaurant inside the Matrix that he’d previously patronized, noted that they had great noodles, and said “I have all these memories. They never happened.” I completely disagree. He had those experiences, and furthermore he shared them with other living thinking human beings (who were also in the Matrix, but that’s not the point). He didn’t dream them in isolation from other humans. So they happened. If a man and woman fell in love in the Matrix, would they be less in love because of meeting inside a simulation? I don’t think so at all.

Physicists say the universe is comprised of quantum fields, among which quanta of energy move back and forth. But they don’t say, or even try to say, what a quantum field is. They just presume such fields exist and describe their interactions. They’ve built a model that we can use to make predictions, which in many cases can be extremely accurate. But there is absolutely no way to know what that model actually is or how it works.

A big debate along these lines today (which I don’t think is even a scientific debate, because science can’t actually answer the question) is whether reality is “materialist” (i.e., made of physical matter and energy from which our minds arise via the laws of physics) or “idealist” (our minds are fundamental and our interactions create our perception of physical things). Does it even matter? The point is that you and I are self-aware and we consciously experience events and interactions with one another (well, not you and me specifically, but you know what I mean).

Usually when someone says there is no objective reality they are professing a position of idealism, the second of the two positions I outlined above. But as I said, I think it’s an empty claim. Reality is what we experience.

Stay safe and well!

Kip

Though I don't get this one:

[Subjective reality is a local perspective adapting to context. This is complementarity in QM. Each causal relation resulting in a contextual interaction is objective. This is a condition to be a valid complement in QM. The generalization of all local positions and contexts is also objective. The shift from local subjective to general objective is split by uncertainty principle.

When you understand Copenhagen Interpretation correctly, questions like this do not occur. They become the play things of those who haven't graduated from philosophy to empirical reality./quote]

180 Proof says your statements are "conceptually incoherent." I say they are meaningless. I think we're both saying the same thing. — T Clark

What I am saying is that you don't need meaning to be necessarily true or necessarily false.

The point here was truth value, not meaning.

The greenness of spirit is not something you can prove; but you can't prove anything to be true or false in the physical world, in a sense. (think of how senses could be deceptive and report to us a false picture of reality.) Truth, absolute truth, can only be done in an a priori way. And for that you don't need a truth that applies to the physical world.

For instance, 1+2=3. There is no physicality in this, this is all conceptual. Yet it's true.

ETC.

You guys, T. Clark and 180 Proof are hung up on something that I don't think has anything to do with what the truth value of anything else. I mean, I don't know what your problem is. The claim by 180 Proof, or by T Clark was that metaphysical claims can't be evaluated for truth or falsehood. I said, that's false, and proved it. You now come back saying that a thing that has no meaning can't be true. That may or may not be true, but saying that a case that a thing that has no meaning AND the case that the thing has meaning is necessarily false.

You start to argue about that? On what basis?

What's an example you reach for to explain this idea? (This is Collingwood, right?) — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, Collingwood. Example - materialism, realism, physicalism, idealism, anti-realism, monism, dualism, solipsism, and all the other ontological isms are metaphysical positions. Determinism and free will are also. I don't know if Collingwood would agree with these examples or not, but he's dead so I can say what I want.

I think you might agree with this take I found: — Darkneos

Yes. I might quibble with one or two points, but that is generally consistent with how I see things. Where is it from?