Okay, I understand what you are saying now. And I don't like it. Give me a moment.

Insofar as we humans are a eusocial species, it seems to me that implicit promises e.g. (a) not to harm one another, (b) not to burden-shift / free ride and (c) to help one another constitute our eusociality in practice and that these implicit promises entail that we ought to behave in ways which fulfill them — 180 Proof

You are claiming that the implicit promises somehow entail that we ought behave in ways that fulfill them. In what way do these implicit promises entail within themselves that we ought follow them, exactly? Because it is natural, given we are eusocial? That is both circular and fallacious - to assume that we ought, in a moral sense, follow through on these promises merely because our eusociality is predicated on such implicit promises is to claim that what is natural is right. That is a mistake.

thus, they are moral facts because, unlike institutional facts (e.g. money, citizenship, marriage) which are explicit constructs (e.g. contracts), these promises are implicit to – habits for – adaptively cohabitating with others in a shared/conflicted commons. — 180 Proof

These implicit promises might result in a reasonably structured society, but it doesn't follow that these are moral facts merely because they are not explicit like institutional facts. There is nothing that says that moral facts need be implicit. You also conflate moral facts with useful norms of behavior here.

Contrary to the typical conception of "moral realism" which ToothyMaw is incorrigibly fixated on, isn't it more reasonable to conceive of moral facts as performances, or practices, (i.e. norms / grammars) instead of the objects of propositions (i.e. "claims")? — 180 Proof

If you make the claim that no moral propositions exist, you are committed to the claim that no moral claims can be true. This, for the third time, leads to no grounds for resolving moral disagreements. If that is okay with you, then more power to you, 180.

But don't think you have any moral grounds for objecting to being slapped with a fish.

By the way, I think promises are incredibly important and provide traction for a reasonable morality.

Whatever. You reformulate what I've written just to shadowbox with strawmen. That's masturbatory, TM.

And you jerk yourself off every time you write a post, you sad little man.

I'm not familiar enough with Searle's notion to know whether or not I agree with it. I've been watching Searle's lectures though.

My own personal notion of what counts as a moral fact is different. Moral things can be talked about in two very distinct ways. The most common one is that "moral" is equivalent to good, so it's used as a means for assent or to condone behaviour whereas immoral is used to condemn some behaviour or another.

Another use of "moral" is as a means to discriminate between kinds of things, whereas all moral situations/circumstances/facts involve what counts as acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. That approach is riddled with difficulty, but it seems worth the effort.





So, because you cannot charge me with violating Hume's guillotine, it is somehow a problem?

Okay. :up:

Now your projection is showing ...

No, I'm saying that saying that if you promise to do something, and then say that there ought be a phenomenal manifestation of that promise being followed through on, isn't so much a moral fact in itself but rather a claim about whether or not there should be a manifestation of what a promise entails if a promise is made. You are only making a descriptive claim about the consequences of a promise followed through on; furthermore, it doesn't report a moral fact in the sense of a normative statement or more abstract moral claim like "torture is wrong" - the latter of which doesn't offend Hume's Guillotine. What other form could moral facts take?

Maybe a promise creates an obligation, but that also doesn't propel it into facthood.

edit: going to resolve this elsewhere than the actual thread

Doubting the existence of moral facts, as well as unicorns, is of course reasonable, but to rule them out (the moral facts) is not, imo. — ToothyMaw

I'm not a philosopher but this seems reasonable. I'm interested to understand (in theory) how would a moral fact ever be identified? Would it need to have a transcendent source?

You advocated for relativism, even if you said that you would argue your ethics are superior, which makes no sense. — ToothyMaw

Really? Perhaps it's no different to having a view on the merits of a novel. There is no 'correct' assessment of any book, but some assessments are better argued, are more illuminating and make more sense. All humans can do is try things and argue their merits. There's no foundational guarantee for anything I am aware of unless you happen to be some kind of fundamentalist or Platonist.

If we take a goal we can all or mostly agree upon - say the flourishing of conscious creatures - we can make assessments about morality - what we ought or ought not to do. I would argue this is superior to consulting gods, say.

I'm not a philosopher but this seems reasonable. — Tom Storm

lmao, neither am I

Really? Perhaps it's no different to having a view on the merits of a novel. There is no 'correct' assessment of any book, but some assessments are better argued, are more illuminating and make more sense. — Tom Storm

Given a basic text to interpret, yes. But the only objective common ground we seem to have is some putative universalized claims and human nature to work with.

If we take a goal we can all or mostly agree upon - say the flourishing of conscious creatures - we can make assessments about morality - what we ought or ought not to do. I would argue this is superior to consulting gods, say. — Tom Storm

Agreed. That would be a good goal to converge on, but, again, there is so much seemingly intractable disagreement. Look at my discussion with 180.

I'm interested to understand (in theory) how would a moral fact ever be identified? Would it need to have a transcendent source? — Tom Storm

Maybe. Moral realists are split on this. Moore's Open Question argument seemed to indicate moral facts would be transcendent, but some advances have shown that it might not have to be that way.

As for identifying them, I don't know. Maybe science will eventually give us some answers on that one, as philosophy doesn't seem up to the task.

edit: what I am saying here is that I don't think we can come to an understanding of moral facts merely through thinking about them, and that rather science, which often seems to be the first mover of our understanding of truth, might stand a chance of revealing some sort of fact about morality. Not claiming we can get an "ought" from an "is".

Fair points. I guess some thinkers might locate morality within some kind of evolutionary framework. Obviously this can be problematic and still requires interpretation.

Definitely.

Not claiming we can get an "ought" from an "is". — ToothyMaw

Indeed. We can leave that task to Sam Harris. :razz:

Indeed. We can leave that task to Sam Harris. :razz: — Tom Storm

I have mixed feelings about that man.

edit: he is right about free-will and on religion, that is true, so I think he has been a force for good. But I know he has made some mistakes here and there on philosophy.

What other form could moral facts take? — ToothyMaw

That skirts the key question here, does it not? Before we can make any sense of what counts as a moral fact, we must already have some criterion for what counts as a fact, for a moral fact is a kind/species of fact.

What do all facts have in common - if anything - such that having it is what makes them count as a fact, rather than not?

It seems to me that your standard amounts to all facts are true statements. Is that right?