it could be concluded that it is an objective truth that all conscious beings seek optimal freedom from conscious suffering - this despite complexities such as weighing short-term suffering against long-term suffering.

If objectively true that we all seek optimal freedom from suffering - what in western thought could be termed the search for optimal eudemonia - then that means which in fact best liberates us from suffering will be the objectively true goal relative to all conscious beings, irrespective of (or else, in manners independent of) one’s beliefs on the matter.

Since this objectively true goal would in principle satisfy that which all yearn for, it would then be an objective good - a good that so remains independently of individuals’ subjective fancies.

Since this good would be objectively real to one and all, a proposition regarding it could then be conformant to its reality and, thereby, true. — javra

This sounds like a version of the utilitarian claim that the pursuit of pleasure or avoidance of pain is the universal motivator of human behavior. John Dewey had a rebuttal to this notion, as explained by Putnam. Just substitute ‘avoidance of suffering’ for ‘pleasure’.

If “agreeableness is precisely the agreeableness or congruence of some objective condition with some impulse, habit, or tendency of the agent,"

then

"of course, pure pleasure is a myth. Any pleasure is qualitatively unique, being precisely the harmony of one set of conditions with its appropriate activity. The pleasure of eating is one thing; the pleasure of hearing music, another; the pleasure of an amiable act, another; the pleasure of drunkenness or of anger is still another."

Dewey continues,

"Hence the possibility of absolutely different moral values attaching to pleasures, according to the type or aspect of character which they express. But if the good is only a sum of pleasures, any pleasure, so far as it goes, is as good as any other-the pleasure of malignity as good as the pleasure of kindness, simply as pleasure.”

A lack of disagreement doesn't mean that something is objectively true, merely that everyone agrees on it. — ToothyMaw

I wasn't addressing lack of disagreement. I was addressing the possibility of an objectively true psychological reality that universally applies to all psyches. If it were to be somehow discovered, all would have it, true. But it's objective truth wouldn't be a product of agreements.

Yes, one could make moral claims that would be correct, but these claims would still be relative. — ToothyMaw

Would this analogy help?: In parallel, all analytical judgments of correctness will always be relative to those particulars address, yet the notion of correctness remains constant.

I wasn't addressing lack of disagreement. I was addressing the possibility of an objectively true psychological reality that universally applies to all psyches. If it were to be somehow discovered, all would have it, true. But it's objective truth wouldn't be a product of agreements. — javra

Then what would make it right or wrong to reduce conscious suffering? What would tie a shared psychological state to objectively true moral claims about reducing suffering? It would remain that suffering would have to be wrong, or we are just forming propositions based on a shared understanding of something objective that doesn't directly inform morality. That doesn't resolve is/ought.

Would this analogy help?: In parallel, all analytical judgments of correctness will always be relative to those particulars address, yet the notion of correctness remains constant. — javra

I don't know what this means. Not even a little.

John Dewey had a rebuttal to this notion, as explained by Putnam. Just substitute ‘avoidance of suffering’ for ‘pleasure’.

If “agreeableness is precisely the agreeableness or congruence of some objective condition with some impulse, habit, or tendency of the agent,"

then

"of course, pure pleasure is a myth. Any pleasure is qualitatively unique, being precisely the harmony of one set of conditions with its appropriate activity. The pleasure of eating is one thing; the pleasure of hearing music, another; the pleasure of an amiable act, another; the pleasure of drunkenness or of anger is still another." — Joshs

This to me gets into the issue of universals. One could also stipulate that since each and every apple is unique no such thing as the concept of apple can be real or have any import in what we do. This being a different issue to me.

Besides, my principle claim was the following only:

Of course, all this is contingent on there being a) a universal, foundational, (one could add, metaphysically real) drive to all conscious beings in everything we do and b) some means of satisfying it in principle. Yet, if (a) and (b), one could then well make sense of objective ethics and morality – in so far as there being an objective good to pursue by which all actions can be judged as either better or worse. — javra

That morals must work is indisputable, but that some are inborn, or tied to human nature, and others learned, says little about whether or not those morals are justified. That is mostly what I am concerned with.
— ToothyMaw

Isn't the point that TC is arguing there are no moral facts, just ideas which work or don't in context? This means justification is moot and context dependent, for we do not have access to some transcendental realm of moral truths. — Tom Storm

I agree that we don't have access to transcendental moral truths, but we cannot rule them out, which is the point of my OP. Many arguments that are not as cogent as TC's misfire because they argue some newfangled combination of (1), (2), and (3). TC's argument is honest, simple, and makes sense. — ToothyMaw

Here's a broader perspective I find convincing. First, you'll have to put up with another quote from Lao Tzu. This from Derek Lin's translation of Verse 38 of the Tao Te Ching:

Therefore, the Tao is lost, and then virtue
Virtue is lost, and then benevolence
Benevolence is lost, and then righteousness
Righteousness is lost, and then etiquette
Those who have etiquette
Are a thin shell of loyalty and sincerity
And the beginning of chaos

To me this means we know the right thing to do from our hearts, from inside. When people lose touch with their authentic selves, they start to depend on more and more rigid customs, rules, and laws. Somewhere along the path down this ladder of increasing artificiality, the need for rationality, justification comes into play.

I don't want to distract from the questions you want to discuss, so I won't take this any further.

In parallel, all analytical judgments of correctness will always be relative to those particulars address, yet the notion of correctness remains constant. — javra

I have determined that that means that if something is true it is true only with respect to a certain object if it is not related to other things. And things can still be correct.

edit: or maybe it doesn't mean anything

I actually appreciated your contributions. That verse is apt, although I appear to be on the wrong side of it.

I agree that we don't have access to transcendental moral truths, but we cannot rule them out, which is the point of my OP. — ToothyMaw

I hear you, but I rule them out anyway since there is no way we can demonstrate 1) what they are or 2) if they exist. We have no choice but to be pragmatic - for me humans create morality to facilitate social cooperation in order to achieve our preferred forms of order.

To me this means we know the right thing to do from our hearts, from inside. — T Clark

Sounds similar to Christianity where preachers will often say that morality is 'written on the human heart' by god. In other words, we already know what is right and wrong. I've worked with too many hard core criminals to accept this, but I do think in general people inherit moral tendencies - and we are certainly immersed in a moral culture from birth, so it may be hard to escape that process of socialization or even be aware that it exists.

It was about correctness, not truth. Though I grant the two can overlap.

In simplistic terms, when one appraises if 1 + 1 = 2 is correct, one's judgment will be fully relative to that concerned in one's appraisal (differing from, say, if it is correct that 236 - 45 = 6) but in all such cases the notion of correctness remains constant irrespective of that addressed. We furthermore universally deem correct answers good - so that we all seek correct answers to questions, irrespective of what we may deem to be the correct answer in concrete terms (e.g., if we deem it the correct answer that 1 +1 = 1 we will then abide by that answer on account of deeming it correct).

I'm not here arguing that they are; I'm only suggesting that it is possible for ethical judgments to hold the same roundabout property. Always relative to context and it's particulars. Yet always holding a universal and constant good that is universally pursued irrespective of concrete particulars and our biased judgments.

I hear you, but I rule them out anyway since there is no way we can demonstrate 1) what they are or 2) if they exist. We have no choice but to be pragmatic - for me humans create morality to facilitate social cooperation in order to achieve our preferred forms of order. — Tom Storm

Honestly, Sam Harris is the best on this one, imo. If we do what Javra says and try to form some sort of Frankenstein's monster of psychology, ethics, and neuroscience, we could come the closest to having some sort of objective moral project short of throwing our lot in with God.

If we do what Javra says and try to form some sort of Frankenstein's monster of psychology, ethics, and neuroscience, we could come the closest to having some sort of objective moral project short of throwing our lot in with God. — ToothyMaw

Ha. Is this fear before rationality? If converging psychology, ethics, and neuroscience is off-putting to you, then by all means proceed otherwise. Good luck to you.

we could come the closest to having some sort of objective moral project short of throwing our lot in with God. — ToothyMaw

The problem with theistic morality is that it provides no objective basis for right and wrong. Religious people find it almost impossible to agree with each other about morality. Take abortion; the role of women; stem cell research, homosexuality; capital punishment; participation in wars; taxation - you name the issue, they disagree about it - often within the same sect of a given religion. Because in the end, all morality, whether theistic or secular is based on the subjective preferences of the person, their interpretation of scripture or philosophy.

Yes, your phrasing was so confusing I couldn't even comprehend what I was writing as I was writing it.

In simplistic terms — javra

Yes, I am a simpleton.

when one appraises if 1 + 1 = 2 is correct, one's judgment will be fully relative to that concerned in one's appraisal (differing from, say, if it is correct that 236 - 45 = 6) but in all such cases the notion of correctness remains constant irrespective of that addressed. — javra

So I was right: if something is correct it is correct only with respect to a certain object if it is not related to other things. And things can still be correct despite this.

We furthermore universally deem correct answers good - so that we all seek correct answers to questions, irrespective of what we may deem to be the correct answer in concrete terms (e.g., if we deem it the correct answer that 1 +1 = 1 we will then abide by that answer on account of deeming it correct). — javra

So, we blindly pursue correct answers because they are considered "good", and we may not reach correct answers but still call them correct, and also inevitably go with our account of what is correct because we deem it correct (and, thus, "good").

That doesn't seem circular to you? And that seems as much a sociological claim as a philosophical one.

I wasn't speaking ill of such a project.

The problem with theistic morality is that it provides no objective basis for right and wrong. — Tom Storm

It could if God made himself apparent. But that probably won't happen.

It could if God made himself apparent. But that probably won't happen. — ToothyMaw

Perhaps god needs to host a show on Fox News.

So, we blindly pursue correct answers because they are considered "good", and we may not reach correct answers but still call them correct, and also inevitably go with our account of what is correct because we deem it correct (and, thus, "good").

That doesn't seem circular to you? — ToothyMaw

Not necessarily. We perpetually verify and, where possible, falsify: one apple and one apple indeed equate to two apples and not one.

All the same, do you find that appraisal discordant to the way thing are in the world?

I wasn't speaking ill of such a project. — ToothyMaw

We likely then have different sentiments toward Frankenstein's monster. Ok, then.

I have some sympathy for Frankenstein's monster, even if he was grotesque. Kind of relatable, I think.

All the same, do you find that appraisal discordant to the way thing are in the world? — javra

Yes, I think people pursue correct answers and acknowledge when they don't find them. And no one just equates "good" and "correct". That would be like saying that 2 + 2 = 4 could be a moral principle because it is correct.

Perhaps god needs to host a show on Fox News. — Tom Storm

I would hang on every word.

Yes, I think people pursue correct answers and acknowledge when they don't find them. — ToothyMaw

As do I, as I believe I previously expressed via "verification and falsification".

And no one just equates "good" and "correct". That would be like saying that 2 + 2 = 4 could be a moral principle because it is correct. — ToothyMaw

The good, goodness, expands far beyond morality. "That was a good movie / book" isn't about morality. But it yet addresses that which is good. Same with correctness in non-ethical judgments.

Point being, despite all the relative issues involved with correctness, it as thing to be striven for is not relative to the whim of cultures or individuals but, rather, is a universal to all individuals and cultures regardless of whims. Hoping that makes sense.

As do I, as I believe I previously expressed via "verification and falsification". — javra

You shoe-horned that in. Your claims about the reality of people equating good and correct mentioned nothing about people falsifying things. I don't see how your statement about an apple being added to an apple constitutes any serious account of the fact that people often times recognize that they are wrong, and do not just assume that anything they have determined to be correct (whether or not it is actually correct) is good.

So, you acknowledge that people falsify things. But what value does a false thing have if not wrong if good is assumed if a thing is correct?

I don't see how your statement about an apple being added to an apple constitutes any serious account of the fact that people often times recognize that they are wrong, and do not just assume that anything they have determined to be correct (whether or not it is actually correct) is good. — ToothyMaw

You wanted things simple, so I expressed a simple example. That adults take the example for granted does not imply that so do young enough children first learning their maths.

But what value does a false thing have if not wrong if good is assumed if a thing is correct? — ToothyMaw

Could you clarify this question?

Could you clarify this question? — javra

If one says that good is to be associated with correct, then wouldn't wrong be associated with false? And if that is so, then how does falsifying things tie into your assertion that we consider correct answers to be good regardless of their actual correctness? You could have a claim that is believed to be true that may actually be false, and then the values "wrong" and "good" are assigned to the same answer, even if it is unbeknownst to the people reaching the answer. That is, if you believe that perceived correctness actually makes something good.

edit: and even if you don't believe that perceived correctness makes something good, there could still be a contradiction if two or more people disagree on the correctness of an answer.

If one says that good is to be associated with correct, then wouldn't wrong be associated with false? — ToothyMaw

I'd rephrase it: correct (what is right) is good; incorrect (what is wrong) is bad. Don't know, but am thinking this might make significant differences to your question.

And if that is so, then how does falsifying things tie into your assertion that we consider correct answers to be good regardless of their actual correctness? You could have a claim that is believed to be true that may actually be false, and then the values "wrong" and "good" are assigned to the same answer, even if it is unbeknownst to the people reaching the answer. That is, if you believe that perceived correctness actually makes something good. — ToothyMaw

I'm working with the presumption, if one can call it that, that everyone is fallible. If one wants to assume some infallible proclamation of truth, correct proposition, etc., then this departs from my own point of view. I do place a strong emphasis on verification and falsification of all beliefs. This though might end up heading toward epistemology. A different topic than that of this thread.

I'd rephrase it: correct (what is right) is good; incorrect (what is wrong) is bad. Don't know, but am thinking this might make significant differences to your question. — javra

It makes no difference.

I'm working with the presumption, if one can call it that, that everyone is fallible. — javra

Yes, but it remains that if correct means good and incorrect means bad, there would be contradictions, even if people are fallible.

If one wants to assume some infallible proclamation of truth, correct proposition, etc. — javra

I don't see anything outlandish about "correct propositions" existing.

edit: you literally just based your entire thing on correct propositions existing

In short, unless one has his head up in faith land (I don't differentiate between theists and atheists in this), all one knows will be acknowledged fallible. Correct till evidenced otherwise. Akin to how the empirical sciences go about business.

Sounds similar to Christianity where preachers will often say that morality is 'written on the human heart' by god. In other words, we already know what is right and wrong. I've worked with too many hard core criminals to accept this — Tom Storm

I think there are two ways of looking at morality 1) As a set of rules that we can apply fairly rigidly to other people to judge them or 2) As a set of principles we can apply to ourselves to guide our lives. I've never really felt the need for the first of these. I try not to judge people. I've never found it a very useful way of seeing things.

I hear you. I'd privilege the first one over the second, but rewrite it as - a set of rules used to help keep us safe, implemented with minimal judgement and dogmatism. I'm not interested in people's personal codes - I'm more concerned in how we can justly, morally collaborate with others in a shared approach.

In my OP I do at least recognize that some moral axioms could be true, and that some (many?) attempts to refute them don't make sense. — ToothyMaw

Yes, you did. And I don't disagree with you.

I'm not saying true and not-true can logically exist, but rather that an injunction against something like murder could be true and represent a statement claiming something is immoral. — ToothyMaw

This is where one might be mistaking an axiom with reasonableness. An injunction against murder is reasonable and ethical, though we might find that there is not an axiom that specifically calls out that murder is false.

Think: "murder is wrong". — ToothyMaw

This is not an axiom. This is an example of harm principle. Oh yeah, Mill's harm principle is not an axiom -- it is a moral assumption with strong, reasonable backing such as the golden rule.

We have no choice but to be pragmatic - for me humans create morality to facilitate social cooperation in order to achieve our preferred forms of order. — Tom Storm

If the subjugation of a minority resulted in a preferred form of order, would you declare it moral?

If, on the other hand, you under-analyzed this question, and the achievement of a "preferred order" is not the ultimate objective, but it is instead X (whatever that might be), is not X the holy law of morality which you seem to deny existing?

That is, we seem to have 2 options here: (1) admit to no true morality, but to just a code of etiquette unique to our fleeting time and place, or (2) proclaim there is a true morality, elusive to our exact detection as it might be, that applies always and to all.

#1 denies us the right to condemn the seemingly atrocious, but demands we just recognize that some play by different rules than us. Where we draw our boundaries creates further ambiguity in that it's hard to know who I have the right to claim must play by my rules and who gets the pass to do as he chooses.

#2 invokes a transcendent good, which is a difficult leap for those mired in naturalistic and scientific worldviews.

I prefer to say that rape in wrong, regardless of whether it advances or falls to advance some social objective. I also unapologetically judge the rapist, and find those who fail to offer their condemning judgment immoral themselves. The sort of immorality that arises from those who refuse to judge from a sense of misplaced empathy or tortured intellectual nuance is some of the least admiral behavior we endure. There are perhaps some so unsophisticated and limited that they might be excused for not recognizing evil among us, but there is no excuse for those who have actively suppressed their intellectual and moral abilities to allow that which shouldn't be allowed.