What about an argument for non-duality (Forms vs earth)? Either everything is one or it is not and hence there are many things, the latter being the existential stance. Substance vs action

If abstractions like words do not exist then this debate is non-existent.

If that is how we are using the term ‘exist’ (another abstract I should add) then maybe the reality of the term ‘exist’ exists less than say the concept of ‘number’? :D

Instead of defending abstract ideas not being real, how would you attack abstract ideas being real? What issues arise if we consider abstract ideas to be real?

Humans group things in their mind in order to see reality from an intellectual perspective and they can get tangled up because we can't see all of reality as it is — Gregory

But there seems to be more to the story than that. If these universals are merely products of our minds, they'd be no more than imagination. However, when someone says a red apple is green, we tell him he's wrong. You can't be wrong if the redness of the apple is just our imagination. Guy just happened to imagine greenness in the apple this time. Nothing wrong with that.

The above description of spin and electrons is full of universals and abstract objects. If you deny the existence of those properties, you have no real terms with which to explain what an electron is. "Electron" becomes a blank.

Descriptions are full of abstract objects and universals, certainly, but the contention for the nominalist is that abstract objects and universals do not exist independently of descriptions. And their inability to exist independent of the descriptions does not limit their usefulness in describing things that do. So the electron can be described in countless fashions, in abstract and concrete terms, never blank.

Instead of defending abstract ideas not being real, how would you attack abstract ideas being real? What issues arise if we consider abstract ideas to be real?

They are without a referent, or at the most co-referential. Wherever they appear they can only prove to exist as products of the mind. How can a realist overcome such a deficit?

Wherever they appear they can only prove to exist as products of the mind — NOS4A2

By disagreeing with you there. A realist thinks they are necessary to explain some phenomena for example:

If these universals are merely products of our minds, they'd be no more than imagination. However, when someone says a red apple is green, we tell him he's wrong. You can't be wrong if the redness of the apple is just our imagination. — khaled

It seems highly unlikely for me that all our minds just happen to author all the same universals. That we all just continuously happen to imagine the same things.

The purpose of my question was to see if you can find any sort of internal inconsistency in realism about universals if it is assumed. But your only problem with it seems that you believe it's unnecessary.

the contention for the nominalist is that abstract objects and universals do not exist independently of descriptions — NOS4A2

A description is an abstract object, since it's made of propositions, so you're confirming the existence of at least one independent abstract object.

Or you can define "description" as a specific action on the part of a specific human, in which case electrons are only negatively charged during those describing activities.

Do you have another option?

If abstractions like words do not exist then this debate is non-existent. — I like sushi

I agree we can't escape the use 9f abstract objects and universals.

Then they must exist in some capacity surely? Just because I cannot hold the number 1 in my hand it does not mean it exists it only means it has no visceral physicality.

I am very much on the side of phenomenology when it comes to this kind of debate. There is no debate. People can argue over this or that but I will always maintain (correctly) that ‘something’ is being argued over and the concept of ‘nothing’ is still something that exists.

Things that do not exist we cannot talk about or refer to. This is one of the most obvious things that Kant pointed out that SO SO many find hard to grasp. The Noumenon is a concept that ‘refers to’ the ‘lack of being able to refer to’ and some find that hard to get their head around.

I believe abstract concepts and universals are necessary for language. I just can’t find them outside of it.

Using a suffix to turn an adjective such as “red” into the noun “redness” is purely an exercise of the mind, not an observation of something in the world. It allows you to equivocate between using an adjective on one hand, and a noun on the other, but they both nonetheless serve to describe the same thing: the apple. We cannot point to or quantify something called “redness”; we can only point to or quantify things that are red, or at least appear red.

A description is an abstract object, since it's made of propositions, so you're confirming the existence of at least one independent abstract object.

It’s not independent, though. You said yourself it’s made of propositions. We make propositions, descriptions, abstract objects, universals, and so they are forever dependent on the human mind. They might manifest as words but they will never manifest anywhere else.

Using a suffix to turn an adjective such as “red” into the noun “redness” is purely an exercise of the mind, not an observation of something in the world. — NOS4A2

If so, then what is the explanation for all of us largely attributing redness to the same things? It sounds as though there is something in common between all the things we describe with the adjective "red" or to which we attribute "redness". What is that thing in common?

We cannot point to or quantify something called “redness” — NOS4A2

Yes we can, what?

Redness is the property of reflecting light of wavelengths around 625-740nm and absorbing other frequencies. That's something in the world is it not?

Forget universals. Do you believe properties exist? Do things have properties?

They might manifest as words but they will never manifest anywhere else. — NOS4A2

How come that we are able to predict the behavior of things in the world using these abstract concepts then? A concept such as "gravity" is certainly an abstract object right? If we just made it up, how come the universe seems to follow our predictions based on this supposed imagination?

I think the more likely explanation is that we discover abstract objects, not create them. Otherwise, how come they are so applicable to the world?

A description is an abstract object, since it's made of propositions, so you're confirming the existence of at least one independent abstract object.

It’s not independent, though. You said yourself it’s made of propositions. We make propositions, descriptions, abstract objects, universals, and so they are forever dependent on the human mind. They might manifest as words but they will never manifest anywhere else. — NOS4A2

A proposition is a state of affairs. Propositions transcend time and space by definition. It's easy to demonstrate that they can't be the product of any particular mind, and if they're products of mind at all, it would be in a Kantian sense. An individual human may give expression to a proposition by uttering a sentence, but in that act, the only thing with spacial and temporal extension is the marks or sounds of the utterance.

But even if you reject the above and opt for some sort of hard behaviorism, you've still given an abstract foundation to descriptions: us.

If so, then what is the explanation for all of us largely attributing redness to the same things? It sounds as though there is something in common between all the things we describe with the adjective "red" or to which we attribute "redness". What is that thing in common?

For apples and other fruits it’s Anthocyanins. For blood it’s Heme. The color is similar because the light bouncing off of these compounds is similar and our biology is similar. They appear red, they can be described as red, but there isn’t something called “red” in Anthocyanins and Heme. We’ve looked.

Yes we can, what?

Redness is the property of reflecting light of wavelengths around 625-740nm and absorbing other frequencies. That's something in the world is it not?

Forget universals. Do you believe properties exist? Do things have properties?

No, things do not possess other things called “properties”. Properties are basically values we put into formulas. The boiling point, for instance, is the temperature at which something boils. There is something about the liquid that causes it to boil at a certain temperature, but there is nothing called “boiling point” in liquid.

A proposition is a state of affairs. Propositions transcend time and space by definition. It's easy to demonstrate that they can't be the product of any particular mind, and if they're products of mind at all, it would be in a Kantian sense. An individual human may give expression to a proposition by uttering a sentence, but in that act, the only thing with spacial and temporal extension is the marks or sounds of the utterance.

But even if you reject the above and opt for some sort of hard behaviorism, you've still given an abstract foundation to descriptions: us.

Propositions do not transcend space and time. I’ve quoted your propositions right here, the product of a particular mind. If it’s easy to demonstrate that a proposition transcends space and time perhaps you might entertain us by doing so.

Is the spin real or not? — frank

Is there a difference between asking if spin is real and asking if things really spin? Is an answer to one also an answer to the other?

Is there a difference between asking if spin is real and asking if things really spin? Is an answer to one also an answer to the other? — Michael

The spin of an electron isn't like a top spinning. Electrons don't actually spin. So to address your question, let's think of tops. One of the properties of tops is that they can spin. The noun/verb issue showing up in this property isn't relevant to nominalism. The nominalist denies that it's appropriate to say that tops have this property.

Propositions do not transcend space and time. I’ve quoted your propositions right here, the product of a particular mind. If it’s easy to demonstrate that a proposition transcends space and time perhaps you might entertain us by doing so. — NOS4A2

It would probably bring clarity if you explained what you think a proposition is.

The nominalist denies that it's appropriate to say that tops have this property. — frank

Do they deny that it’s appropriate to say that tops spin?

Do they deny that it’s appropriate to say that tops spin? — Michael

They would allow that some tops spin some of the time. Their starting point is that there are only individual entities. Think of M. Thatcher saying that there's no such thing as society. She was speaking as a nominalist.

They would allow that some tops spin some of the time. — frank

Which surely is a sufficient account. Tops spinning is a real, concrete thing that can be seen and measured. Tops really do spin (sometimes).

What need and evidence is there for some additional abstract property, above-and-beyond the physical act?

What need and evidence is there for some additional abstract property, above-and-beyond the physical act? — Michael

The argument comes down to insisting that you can't think or communicate without using universals and abstract objects.

It would probably bring clarity if you explained what you think a proposition is.

It depends on the sense in which you use it. If it is a “state of affairs”, then it is a statement. Do you mean it in another sense?

Dear Frank, I'd like to chime in a bit late into the discussion.

I put down my proposition: Abstractions and universals (non-physical things) exist but not in the physical world.

I base my argument on "Cogito ergo sum." It is not I simply who is thinking, but my mind. The mind is not physical. We connect it to the brain, but only out of desperation while and due to not knowing for sure, and out of observing coincidental events in brain activity and thought.

The mind is not physical, yet it exist. Yes, it exist due to knowing non-physicals, as the proof goes, but it can also know physicals.

And as the old saying goes, you can't connect the mind to the brain. Dead brains don't have minds. A dead brain is not much different from a living brain within five minutes of death.

The argument comes down to insisting that you can't think or communicate without using universals and abstract objects. — frank

Even if that were true it doesn’t follow that universals and abstract objects exist in the realist sense. They might play a useful role in language, but that’s all they are.

It depends on the sense in which you use it. If it is a “state of affairs”, then it is a statement. Do you mean it in another sense? — NOS4A2

Propositions are the primary truthbearers. It's the content of an uttered sentence. Multiple sentences can be uttered to express the same proposition. This shows that propositions are not equivalent to sentences or utterances.

If you really want to wade into those thickets, we can, or we can go back to the fact that you provided "us" as the foundation for descriptions. That's an abstract object. No one individual creates language. It's created by humans. See what I mean?

There is another argument against nominalismus.

Take speed. Speed is not a nominal. It has no physical presence. It is invoked by physical objects.

Yet you can measure speed just like you can measure physical objects.

So things that can be measured, exist. For instance Xaveria Hollander and speed.

Furthermore, the qualities of the qualities (non-nominals) also have qualities.

So if one insists that only nominals can have qualities, then their argument can be shown to be wrong.

Even if that were true it doesn’t follow that universals and abstract objects exist in the realist sense. — Michael

I don't know how they exist, although I have speculations. I just know there's a logical problem with denying that they exist, which is the nominalist claim.

put down my proposition: Abstractions and universals (non-physical things) exist but not in the physical world. — god must be atheist

The whole discussion takes place in the shadow of Plato. You're offering his middle period view.

I don't know how they exist, although I have speculations. I just know there's a logical problem with denying that they exist, which is the nominalist claim. — frank

What logical problems? I don’t need to accept the mind-independent existence of some abstract property of spin to accept that tops (and other things) sometimes spin. The concrete behaviour of physical objects is a sufficient account of spin.