Seems pretty obvious to me, but perhaps not to all. That creatures (not just humans) do this doesn't seem to be your point. Your point seems to be the utility of accepting this.Beliefs which are mostly held tacitly. — Mikie
A fair example. A creature that doesn't resist death is probably less fit than one that does, so fear of death is a trait that gets selected.because death is considered bad — Mikie
Depends on what goals/result one is after. Yes, one can learn more about human behavior by viewing it this way, but such academic knowledge is perhaps not the goal. Maybe the goal is some kind of self improvement, which implies a scale of some sort against which 'improvement' can be measured.Is it useful to view human behavior this way? — Mikie
Is it useful to view human behavior this way? — Mikie
Is it useful to view human behaviour this way? — Mikie
Depends on what goals/result one is after. Yes, one can learn more about human behaviour by viewing it this way, but such academic knowledge is perhaps not the goal. — noAxioms
Beliefs can be embedded to the point of being instincts. Or traditions. Or superstitions. Or habits. Or, rarely, reasoned and practiced efforts. — Pantagruel
This extends down to bodily reactions to stimuli. One looks at a corpse and instantaneously reacts with fear. If examined from one point of view, this reaction is conditioned by the environment -- namely, the milieu -- and at bottom is nothing more than an embedded belief that corpses are to be feared, or that they are aversive objects, because death is considered bad. It is not truly instantaneous at all -- there are judgments and interpretations being made despite appearing as natural reflexes. — Mikie
Of course, and I think we should all try our best to be aware of our implicit biases and subconscious conditioning. — praxis
This extends down to bodily reactions to stimuli. . . . It is not truly instantaneous at all -- there are judgments and interpretations being made despite appearing as natural reflexes. — Mikie
It is popular these days in psychological ( Haidt) and anthropological circles to posit that cultural values and ethical norms originate in inherited evolutionarily adaptive affective preferences , such as disgust. — Joshs
One looks at a corpse and instantaneously reacts with fear. — Mikie
The corpse is deemed aversive fundamentally not due to a belief but an inherited affective response, and the socially constructed beliefs are overlayed onto this biological ground. — Joshs
It is popular these days in psychological ( Haidt) and anthropological circles to posit that cultural values and ethical norms originate in inherited evolutionarily adaptive affective preferences , such as disgust. — Joshs
The way you phrased this ('It is popular these days...') suggests you take issue with the view. I have no dog in this fight but is there a better account? — Tom Storm
Phenomenologically-informed enactivist psychology preserves the emphasis on affectively-based values in organizing and situating cognitive appraisals and beliefs. But it avoids the biological essentialism of inherited affect modules and programs. — Joshs
Not only human behaviour, I would go so far as to say this is what characterizes consciousness as such. — Pantagruel
Take the "seeking and sucking" behaviour of a new-born mammal. It certainly seems to be embedded but I would be reluctant to attribute that to a belief — Ludwig V
Of course, and I think we should all try our best to be aware of our implicit biases and subconscious conditioning. — praxis
It is popular these days in psychological ( Haidt) and anthropological circles to posit that cultural values and ethical norms originate in inherited evolutionarily adaptive affective preferences , such as disgust. — Joshs
Not sure. What do we do with this view and how can it help? — Tom Storm
Take the "seeking and sucking" behaviour of a new-born mammal. It certainly seems to be embedded but I would be reluctant to attribute that to a belief
— Ludwig V
Neither would I. But still a great deal of human behavior can be viewed in this light. It's not the only light, of course. — Mikie
I don't consider animals as having beliefs, tacit or otherwise. I think that's an anthropomorphic projection. — Mikie
Yes, and perhaps the answers to philosophical questions that these beliefs imply. — Mikie
I wouldn't go that far. I don't consider animals as having beliefs, tacit or otherwise. I think that's an anthropomorphic projection. — Mikie
The point is this: if we look around the world of human activity, even actions which seem far-removed from enculturation can ultimately be traced back to beliefs and values instilled in one over time, even if long forgotten or completely unconscious. — Mikie
It is popular these days in psychological ( Haidt) and anthropological circles to posit that cultural values and ethical norms originate in inherited evolutionarily adaptive affective preferences , such as disgust.
— Joshs
Indeed that is popular. The point being? — Mikie
I don't consider animals as having beliefs, tacit or otherwise. I think that's an anthropomorphic projection — Mikie
I hadn't thought of that possibility. Can you give me an example? — Ludwig V
Actually, there is quite a bit of research on animal beliefs. I don't think they have a lot of them or that they are overly complex, mostly related to what we would call practical reason. Lower order of beliefs, lower order of consciousness. — Pantagruel
The. you’re going to have to clarify what you mean by belief. — Joshs
On the other hand, both humans and other animals are guided by conceptual understanding in which expectations are formed that can be validated or invalidated. — Joshs
It created this thread, didn't it? — Outlander
I don't see animals as having concepts either. Again I feel most of this is anthropomorphism. — Mikie
Animals don't operate on beliefs. Animals don't have language. So I've never been very impressed with views that try to explain animal behavior in this way. Don't see the usefulness of it. — Mikie
I don't see animals asking questions, let alone answering them. — Mikie
Whether one believes the world is fundamentally hostile or not can determine how one treats others. — Mikie
I predict that eventually we will come to see that the cognitive differences between us and other higher species is more a matter of degree than of kind. — Joshs
Lower order of beliefs, lower order of consciousness. — Pantagruel
And insisting on an irreparable gap between human capacities and those of other animals could be deemed a classic form of anthropocentrism — Joshs
How many claimed distinctions between anthropos and other animals have fallen by the wayside in recent years? Only humans use tools, only humans have emotions or can feel pain, or can empathize, only humans have cognitive capacities and can calculate. — Joshs
I predict that eventually we will come to see that the cognitive differences between us and other higher species is more a matter of degree than of kind. — Joshs
Since we essentially evolved from animals, do you think that there is a jump somewhere from having no beliefs to having beliefs? I would imagine the capacity evolved by degrees. — Pantagruel
I don't see animals asking questions, let alone answering them.
— Mikie
Have you never seen a dog or a horse tentatively sniffing at something? For me, that often amounts to asking the question whether the something is edible - which is confirmed when they eat, or turn away. — Ludwig V
If there were people claiming that animals don't feel pain, I'd love to hear it. Seems ridiculous. — Mikie
But I'd be happily proven wrong if there's a shred of evidence suggesting other animals have language. They communicate, of course, but they don't have language. There's been a lot of research on that as well, with primates. They simply cannot acquire it, no matter how it's tried….we're left as the only species on earth with the capacity for language. — Mikie
all of this is based on our paradigmatic example of a person - a human being, with all the complex legal and moral questions that follow. What else could it be based on? The question is about how far that paradigm can be extended to similar cases, what kinds of similarity are required and how far and under what circumstances extension can go…we are agreed - aren't we? - that there is a real need to separate attribution of beliefs (and hence knowledge?) from articulation of beliefs in language, whether externally, by saying something or internally, by saying something to oneself.
In that case, surely we need to think of explanations of (rational) action as a structure to be completed, rather than a process, whether internal or external. The pratical syllogism is the only paradigm we have for this, so perhaps our question turns into an exploration of that. — Ludwig V
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