Beliefs which are mostly held tacitly. — Mikie

Seems pretty obvious to me, but perhaps not to all. That creatures (not just humans) do this doesn't seem to be your point. Your point seems to be the utility of accepting this.

because death is considered bad — Mikie

A fair example. A creature that doesn't resist death is probably less fit than one that does, so fear of death is a trait that gets selected.

Is it useful to view human behavior this way? — Mikie

Depends on what goals/result one is after. Yes, one can learn more about human behavior by viewing it this way, but such academic knowledge is perhaps not the goal. Maybe the goal is some kind of self improvement, which implies a scale of some sort against which 'improvement' can be measured.

Is it useful to view human behavior this way? — Mikie

Not only human behaviour, I would go so far as to say this is what characterizes consciousness as such.

The question then becomes that of the accessibility of beliefs. Beliefs can be embedded to the point of being instincts. Or traditions. Or superstitions. Or habits. Or, rarely, reasoned and practiced efforts. We are our beliefs. To what extent are we shaping our own beliefs?

Is it useful to view human behaviour this way? — Mikie

Depends on what goals/result one is after. Yes, one can learn more about human behaviour by viewing it this way, but such academic knowledge is perhaps not the goal. — noAxioms

Beliefs can be embedded to the point of being instincts. Or traditions. Or superstitions. Or habits. Or, rarely, reasoned and practiced efforts. — Pantagruel

It depends what counts as useful, what goals one has in mind. Or there is the point that common life often attributes beliefs in circumstances when the philosophical paradigm of reasoned effort is clearly not plausible. At least, the philosophical paradigm focuses almost exclusively on beliefs that can be expressed in language by the believer with an occasional condescending nod to animals. But common sense attributes a wide range of beliefs to animals, not to mention infants who have not yet learned language. So perhaps academics would do well to take the issue seriously.

Not that it is particularly easy. The range of what might be considered embedded beliefs is very wide and it is unlikely that they will all fall into the same classes when accounts of them are given. In other words, much might depend on how you define "embedded".

Take the "seeking and sucking" behaviour of a new-born mammal. It certainly seems to be embedded but I would be reluctant to attribute that to a belief; it seems more plausible to classify it as a reflex, which will, no doubt, soon become a conditioned reflex. Its origin, presumably, will be genetic, since evolution must surely favour the new-born with a seeking and sucking reflex over one that doesn't; hence, an instinct. The ability to form conditioned reflexes itself must surely also have a genetic, and therefore an evolutionary, basis, though I'm not sure I would call it an instinct. Why not? I don't know. But I do know it is purposive, even though not an action in the paradigm sense.

Habits are another interesting kind of case. Is stopping at a red light a reflex or a habit or an action. Take stopping at a red light; I can think of reasons why it might be classified as any of those - it depends on the circumstances.

Mikie's example is different from either of these and no doubt will need a different kind of explanation, again.

Traditions and superstitions are in a different class, I suppose. But actions in accordance with them do not, in my opinion, qualify as paradigm cases of actions.

Is it useful to view human behavior this way? — Mikie

Of course, and I think we should all try our best to be aware of our implicit biases and subconscious conditioning.

This extends down to bodily reactions to stimuli. One looks at a corpse and instantaneously reacts with fear. If examined from one point of view, this reaction is conditioned by the environment -- namely, the milieu -- and at bottom is nothing more than an embedded belief that corpses are to be feared, or that they are aversive objects, because death is considered bad. It is not truly instantaneous at all -- there are judgments and interpretations being made despite appearing as natural reflexes. — Mikie

It is popular these days in psychological ( Haidt) and anthropological circles to posit that cultural values and ethical norms originate in inherited evolutionarily adaptive affective preferences , such as disgust.. The corpse is deemed aversive fundamentally not due to a belief but an inherited affective response, and the socially constructed beliefs are overlayed onto this biological ground. According to this approach, values
are subjective and relative because they don’t originate from propositional beliefs, which can be judged as correct or incorrect.

Of course, and I think we should all try our best to be aware of our implicit biases and subconscious conditioning. — praxis

It would be very helpful if there was a way of encouraging people to try to acknowledge and confront biases and subconscious conditioning. Many/most people are, I think, really quite reluctant to do that. It pays, I've found, to listen carefully to what other people say - even if it isn't comfortable.

This extends down to bodily reactions to stimuli. . . . It is not truly instantaneous at all -- there are judgments and interpretations being made despite appearing as natural reflexes. — Mikie

It is popular these days in psychological ( Haidt) and anthropological circles to posit that cultural values and ethical norms originate in inherited evolutionarily adaptive affective preferences , such as disgust. — Joshs

We need to go very carefully here. In the end, detailed analysis and explanation will have to be based on empirical science.

There is good reason for distinguishing between paradigmatic action - the paradigmatic considered, even planned, action and a reaction, which occurs without conscious thought. Amongst reactions, there is a significant difference in stimulus-response reactions which may have a genetic basis, a cultural basis, or even a basis in individual experience. I guess those reactions which have a genetic basis would not be open to explanation through beliefs, but only through evolutionary pressure.

One looks at a corpse and instantaneously reacts with fear. — Mikie

The corpse is deemed aversive fundamentally not due to a belief but an inherited affective response, and the socially constructed beliefs are overlayed onto this biological ground. — Joshs

For what it's worth, the one time that I actually saw a human corpse, I didn't react with fear or even disgust, but with something more like curiosity. I'm pretty sure that wasn't a culturally based reaction. But then, it might depend on the exact circumstances. I've seen and handled a number of animal corpses (pets), but experienced no fear of them, either.

Is it useful to view human behavior this way? — Mikie

Not sure. What do we do with this view and how can it help?

It is popular these days in psychological ( Haidt) and anthropological circles to posit that cultural values and ethical norms originate in inherited evolutionarily adaptive affective preferences , such as disgust. — Joshs

The way you phrased this ('It is popular these days...') suggests you take issue with the view. I have no dog in this fight but is there a better account?

The way you phrased this ('It is popular these days...') suggests you take issue with the view. I have no dog in this fight but is there a better account? — Tom Storm

Phenomenologically-informed enactivist psychology preserves the emphasis on affectively-based values in organizing and situating cognitive appraisals and beliefs.But it avoids the biological essentialism of inherited affect modules and programs.

“… emotions are said to be enabled by genetically endowed, hard-wired neural modules, the existence of which can, at least in principle, be associated with selection pressures flowing from the survival or reproductive advantages produced by the action potentials and states of preparedness these capacities bestowed: to fight off predators (anger), manage changes in social status (sadness), prepare for something unexpected (surprise), cement a social bond (happiness),
avoid something toxic (disgust) or retreat from something dangerous (fear).”

In contrast to this account of affect and cognition , enactivism believes that :

“Sense-making comprises emotion as much as cognition. The enactive approach does not view cognition and emotion as separate systems, but treats them as thoroughly integrated at biological, psychological, and phenomenological levels. The spatial containment language of internal/external or inside/outside (which frames the internalist/externalist debate) is inappropriate and misleading for understanding the peculiar sort of relationality belonging to intentionality, the lived body, or being-in-the-world. As Heidegger says, a living being is ‘in’ its world in a completely different sense from that of water being in a glass (Heidegger 1995, pp. 165–166)

“...appraisal and emotion processes are thoroughly interdependent at both psychological and neural levels (see also Colombetti and Thompson 2005). At the psychological level, one is not a mere means to the other (as in the idea that an appraisal is a means to the having of an emotion, and vice-versa); rather, they form an integrated and self-organizing emotion-appraisal state, an ‘emotional interpretation’.”

Thank you. I've flitted about on the periphery of this approach once or twice. It's very interesting material.

Phenomenologically-informed enactivist psychology preserves the emphasis on affectively-based values in organizing and situating cognitive appraisals and beliefs. But it avoids the biological essentialism of inherited affect modules and programs. — Joshs

This is challenging conceptual space. Essentialism is attractive to so many thinkers.

Phenomenologically-informed enactivist psychology — Joshs

I like this much better than the "popular view". Can you suggest anything I could read to learn more about it?

I like this much better than the "popular view". Can you suggest anything I could read to learn more about it? — Ludwig V

Anything by Matthew Ratcliffe or Evan Thompson, especially the latter’s ‘Mind in Life, Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind’.

Not only human behaviour, I would go so far as to say this is what characterizes consciousness as such. — Pantagruel

I wouldn't go that far. I don't consider animals as having beliefs, tacit or otherwise. I think that's an anthropomorphic projection.

Take the "seeking and sucking" behaviour of a new-born mammal. It certainly seems to be embedded but I would be reluctant to attribute that to a belief — Ludwig V

Neither would I. But still a great deal of human behavior can be viewed in this light. It's not the only light, of course.

Of course, and I think we should all try our best to be aware of our implicit biases and subconscious conditioning. — praxis

Yes, and perhaps the answers to philosophical questions that these beliefs imply.

It is popular these days in psychological ( Haidt) and anthropological circles to posit that cultural values and ethical norms originate in inherited evolutionarily adaptive affective preferences , such as disgust. — Joshs

Indeed that is popular. The point being?

Not sure. What do we do with this view and how can it help? — Tom Storm

Good question. My personal opinion is that it helps us understand the importance of philosophical questions, particularly ones surrounding the nature of being human, and being in general. So much of our behavior depends on them -- and yet they are rarely questioned. This extends all the way to our societal systems and structures -- none of them are accidents. So every major thing we do -- where we live, what we eat, what we do for leisure, where we work, who we associate with, etc., are not accidents either and in fact follow from how our society functions.

Take the "seeking and sucking" behaviour of a new-born mammal. It certainly seems to be embedded but I would be reluctant to attribute that to a belief
— Ludwig V

Neither would I. But still a great deal of human behavior can be viewed in this light. It's not the only light, of course. — Mikie

I'm sorry I wasn't clear. The idea was to suggest an example that might have been an embedded belief, but wasn't, as a way of exploring the boudaries, not as a counter-example to the idea.

I don't consider animals as having beliefs, tacit or otherwise. I think that's an anthropomorphic projection. — Mikie

There is a danger of anthropomorphic projection in attributing beliefs to animals. But they are sentient and conscious, like human beings. So they are distinct from inanimate objects. It's a question of where to draw the line. I don't have a problem attributing some beliefs to them. .

Yes, and perhaps the answers to philosophical questions that these beliefs imply. — Mikie

I hadn't thought of that possibility. Can you give me an example?

Thanks for the references. Very interesting and I'll certainly follow them up when I can.

I wouldn't go that far. I don't consider animals as having beliefs, tacit or otherwise. I think that's an anthropomorphic projection. — Mikie

Actually, there is quite a bit of research on animal beliefs. I don't think they have a lot of them or that they are overly complex, mostly related to what we would call practical reason. Lower order of beliefs, lower order of consciousness. Fits my hypothesis.
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2020/06/200617145957.htm#:~:text=Summary%3A,and%20empirically%20investigate%20animal%20beliefs.

Thanks for that. Very interesting. I like the piece about AI working out what penguins believe.

Being only a philosopher, I can't resist commenting that, strictly speaking, these experiments only reveal what the animals know. To identify what they believe, you would have to catch them when they behave in a way appropriate to some "information" that they have got wrong. That would be a tougher call, but I wouldn't put it past them.

The point is this: if we look around the world of human activity, even actions which seem far-removed from enculturation can ultimately be traced back to beliefs and values instilled in one over time, even if long forgotten or completely unconscious. — Mikie

It is popular these days in psychological ( Haidt) and anthropological circles to posit that cultural values and ethical norms originate in inherited evolutionarily adaptive affective preferences , such as disgust.
— Joshs

Indeed that is popular. The point being? — Mikie

The point is this: if we look around the world of human activity, even apparently belief-based actions which seem far removed from our biology can ultimately be traced back to values instilled in one as a result of evolutionarily adaptive affective feelings, even if completely unconscious.

I don't consider animals as having beliefs, tacit or otherwise. I think that's an anthropomorphic projection — Mikie

The. you’re going to have to clarify what you mean by belief. Many psychologists and philosophers argue that neither humans nor animals pursue goals on the basis of belief if belief is defined in a formal way as propositional knowledge of the form S is P, that is , statements of truth or falsity. On the other hand, both humans and other animals are guided by conceptual understanding in which expectations are formed that can be validated or invalidated. The difference between human and animal conceptualization is that ours is linguistically mediated, which frees us from the confines of the immediate situation.

Is it useful to view human behavior this way? — Mikie

It created this thread, didn't it?

I hadn't thought of that possibility. Can you give me an example? — Ludwig V

Whether one believes the world is fundamentally hostile or not can determine how one treats others. If one answers that question with "Yes, the world is a hostile place," then it'll be no wonder that they are suspicious, paranoid, untrusting, etc.

The question regarding human nature -- "What is a human being? What am I?" -- and its answer determines a great deal as well, including how we shape society.

Actually, there is quite a bit of research on animal beliefs. I don't think they have a lot of them or that they are overly complex, mostly related to what we would call practical reason. Lower order of beliefs, lower order of consciousness. — Pantagruel

Animals don't operate on beliefs. Animals don't have language. So I've never been very impressed with views that try to explain animal behavior in this way. Don't see the usefulness of it.

The. you’re going to have to clarify what you mean by belief. — Joshs

Here I mean the implicit answers to certain questions. I don't see animals asking questions, let alone answering them.

On the other hand, both humans and other animals are guided by conceptual understanding in which expectations are formed that can be validated or invalidated. — Joshs

Not sure what this means, but I don't see animals as having concepts either. Again I feel most of this is anthropomorphism.

It created this thread, didn't it? — Outlander

What did? Beliefs?

Not sure this thread is useful, either.

I don't see animals as having concepts either. Again I feel most of this is anthropomorphism. — Mikie

And insisting on an irreparable gap between human capacities and those of other animals could be deemed a classic form of anthropocentrism. How many claimed distinctions between anthropos and other animals have fallen by the wayside in recent years? Only humans use tools, only humans have emotions or can feel pain, or can empathize, only humans have cognitive capacities and can calculate. We didn’t even accord such capacities to the young of our own species.
Infants were nothing but a blooming, buzzing confusion.

I predict that eventually we will come to see that the cognitive differences between us and other higher species is more a matter of degree than of kind.

Animals don't operate on beliefs. Animals don't have language. So I've never been very impressed with views that try to explain animal behavior in this way. Don't see the usefulness of it. — Mikie

Since we essentially evolved from animals, do you think that there is a jump somewhere from having no beliefs to having beliefs? I would imagine the capacity evolved by degrees.

I don't see animals asking questions, let alone answering them. — Mikie

Have you never seen a dog or a horse tentatively sniffing at something? For me, that often amounts to asking the question whether the something is edible - which is confirmed when they eat, or turn away.

Whether one believes the world is fundamentally hostile or not can determine how one treats others. — Mikie

Have you never seen a bird constantly looking round to ensure that no predator is looming?

I predict that eventually we will come to see that the cognitive differences between us and other higher species is more a matter of degree than of kind. — Joshs

I'm not sure that we will necessarily all come to see that. It isn't a straightforwardly empirical question, but an issue whether to include animals in the scope of complex language game, that is, whether to interpret their behaviour in certain ways. But there are certainly differences. With any decision like this, there will always be borderline, difficult cases.

If you can accept that animals and other creatures are sentient, then it seems to me that the question whether they have beliefs and if so, what beliefs is at least open. I don't think that anyone would suggest that animals believe that the earth is round, or flat. I think that lobsters do feel pain, but I'm not at all sure that they feel fear, which involves the belief that something is dangerous.

Lower order of beliefs, lower order of consciousness. — Pantagruel

One has to be very careful about how one describe the complex similarities and differences between human and animals and animals and fish and so on. "Lower" here is a metaphor and somewhat dangerous. In the past, it has been interpreted in ways that most people would find completely unacceptable now. I suppose one must have some way of summarizing the complex differences between animals and humans as far as sognition foes, but I prefer "simpler".

And insisting on an irreparable gap between human capacities and those of other animals could be deemed a classic form of anthropocentrism — Joshs

Birds can fly, unlike other species. Is that aviancentrism?

Insisting there's a gap between human capacities and those of other animals is done because there is a gap between human capacities and other animals. Namely, language. It's insisting on a truism.

How many claimed distinctions between anthropos and other animals have fallen by the wayside in recent years? Only humans use tools, only humans have emotions or can feel pain, or can empathize, only humans have cognitive capacities and can calculate. — Joshs

If there were people claiming that animals don't feel pain, I'd love to hear it. Seems ridiculous.

But I'd be happily proven wrong if there's a shred of evidence suggesting other animals have language. They communicate, of course, but they don't have language. There's been a lot of research on that as well, with primates. They simply cannot acquire it, no matter how it's tried.

Primates using a stick to gather ants or whatever is interesting, but it's on par with learning some signs.

I predict that eventually we will come to see that the cognitive differences between us and other higher species is more a matter of degree than of kind. — Joshs

It can be both. We've clearly evolved -- I don't dispute that. So it is a matter of degrees, in a way. On the other hand, language and other capacities are also of a different kind compared to other species.

Since we essentially evolved from animals, do you think that there is a jump somewhere from having no beliefs to having beliefs? I would imagine the capacity evolved by degrees. — Pantagruel

I think the jump was when humans acquired language. That may have been a unique neural event. But even if it was a matter of degrees, whatever species that existed as a transitional form has died off. Either way, we're left as the only species on earth with the capacity for language.

I don't see animals asking questions, let alone answering them.
— Mikie

Have you never seen a dog or a horse tentatively sniffing at something? For me, that often amounts to asking the question whether the something is edible - which is confirmed when they eat, or turn away. — Ludwig V

To me, it amounts to questioning if...they can ask the question. But they aren't doing that. They're not thinking to themselves, "I wonder if this is edible?" Of course not.

So why not claim that water is "questioning" when it flows down a hill? Or that it's "feeling its way" around? We could, I suppose -- but it's a waste of time.

If there were people claiming that animals don't feel pain, I'd love to hear it. Seems ridiculous. — Mikie

How soon we forget.

“The idea that animals might not experience pain or suffering as humans do traces back at least to the 17th-century French philosopher, René Descartes, who argued that animals lack consciousness.[14][15][16] Researchers remained unsure into the 1980s as to whether animals experience pain, and veterinarians trained in the U.S. before 1989 were simply taught to ignore animal pain.[17] In his interactions with scientists and other veterinarians, Bernard Rollin was regularly asked to "prove" that animals are conscious, and to provide "scientifically acceptable" grounds for claiming that they feel pain.” ( Wikipedia)

But I'd be happily proven wrong if there's a shred of evidence suggesting other animals have language. They communicate, of course, but they don't have language. There's been a lot of research on that as well, with primates. They simply cannot acquire it, no matter how it's tried….we're left as the only species on earth with the capacity for language. — Mikie

Apparently they can acquire it, but only with aggressive interaction with humans, and only if begun at a very young age.

“Elisabeth Lloyd (2004) shows that the fortuitous success of the bonobo Kanzi in acquiring a rudimentary linguistic capacity has changed the terms in which these issues should be addressed (Savage-Rumbaugh, Shanker, and Taylor 1998). Kanzi inadvertently participated in experiments on language acquisition because his mother was a research subject, and he was too young to be separated from her. While his mother struggled with the experimental protocol, Kanzi did much better despite not being initially targeted for instruction. Eventually, Kanzi acquired not only a substantial vocabulary of symbols but also the ability to produce novel, intelligible syntactic recombinations. The experimenters plausibly characterized his eventual linguistic capacities as in some respects comparable to those of a thirty-month-old normal human child. The interpretation of these data is controversial, but I follow Lloyd in her insistence that Kanzi's achievement shows that the neurological capacity for linguistic understanding is homologous between humans and bonobos and probably extends further to common ancestors.”(Joseph Rouse)

Apparently they can acquire it, but only with aggressive interaction with humans, and only if begun at a very young age. — Joshs

No, they can’t. Which is why we can’t talk to primates.

The interpretation of these data is controversial, — Joshs

And ridiculous.

If so how can we say these behaviors are done based on ones belief or structure of beliefs overtime and not recently gained knowledge or an axiomatic system?

We've got into a very complex and difficult debate. It isn't just a matter of empirical research, but of interpretation of the results and the principles of interpretation are contested. I suppose that everyone will agree that all of this is based on our paradigmatic example of a person - a human being, with all the complex legal and moral questions that follow. What else could it be based on? The question is about how far that paradigm can be extended to similar cases, what kinds of similarity are required and how far and under what circumstances extension can go.

In the background, we have another complex problem, which is also already live - extension to machines. This depends on a different range of similarities, centring on linguistic capacities.

Also, I'm inclined to think that the issue is not simply metaphysical, but also ethical.

If it is possible, I wonder if we could return to the question we started with - the question of embedded beliefs? I'm happy, for present purposes, to shelve these larger issues for the time being and to restrict our discussion to human beings.

For example, we are agreed - aren't we? - that there is a real need to separate attribution of beliefs (and hence knowledge?) from articulation of beliefs in language, whether externally, by saying something or internally, by saying something to oneself.

In that case, surely we need to think of explanations of (rational) action as a structure to be completed, rather than a process, whether internal or external. The pratical syllogism is the only paradigm we have for this, so perhaps our question turns into an exploration of that.

all of this is based on our paradigmatic example of a person - a human being, with all the complex legal and moral questions that follow. What else could it be based on? The question is about how far that paradigm can be extended to similar cases, what kinds of similarity are required and how far and under what circumstances extension can go…we are agreed - aren't we? - that there is a real need to separate attribution of beliefs (and hence knowledge?) from articulation of beliefs in language, whether externally, by saying something or internally, by saying something to oneself.

In that case, surely we need to think of explanations of (rational) action as a structure to be completed, rather than a process, whether internal or external. The pratical syllogism is the only paradigm we have for this, so perhaps our question turns into an exploration of that. — Ludwig V

Let me try a hypothesis that links opinion about human-animals differences back to models of embedded beliefs. You mentioned rationality and the syllogism in connection to belief. Many approaches in psychology and philosophy take the propositional statement as their starting point for the understanding of judgement , interpretation , belief and value. I identify with those writers who critique this assumption. Their argument is basically this. Propositions of the form ‘S is P’ and their derivatives indicate that something is or is not the case, that a statement about the world is true or false. This leaves out the fact that when we relate two events we are not just determining what is or is not the case. We are at the same time determining ‘how’ they are the case. Interpretation of events reveals how things seem to us, how they are relevant , how they matter to us, what their significance is in relation to our immediate contextual goals and purposes, how enticing they are.

Even the seemingly most cut and dry statements of truth or falsity show up an aspect of the world in a new way for us, so that it is never simply a matter of something’s being the case or not. Propositional logic is thus not at all the starting point for human belief, it is a narrowly conceived , abstract derivative of basic human interpretive , intentional activity. A much better model of the fundamental ground of cognition and belief is perception. In perceiving anything in our environment, we blend expectations drawn from memory with what is actually in front of us , and synthesize out of that pairing of recollection and anticipation an interpretation of what we are experiencing. Put differently, we believe we are seeing a chair as a result of this mesh of memory, anticipation and actual sensation. Thus all perception involves belief. Not of the propositional form ‘S is P’, but of the hermeneutic form ‘S AS P’. We see something as something, which means we don’t simply regurgitate a copy of something from memory and compare back and forth between this self-same thing and another self-same thing to see if there is a match(truth or falsity). We build our computers to do this computational trick .

We are not computers. Contra Chomsky, we are not computational, representational rationalists. Seeing something as something is recognizing that thing. Recognition is a creative act , not a representational comparison. To recognize a thing is to see it as both familiar and novel in some freshly relevant way. Belief is thus fecund rather than calculative. It is also affective. Things matter to us in affectively valuative ways.
Enactivist psychologists will tell us that we get this way of organizing perceptual interpretation not from an act of God or evolution blessing humans with some unique capacity not available to other animals , but to the basis feature of all living organisms as autopoietic self-organizing systems as functionally unified sense-makers.

Living systems are normatively goal-oriented, and in this sense the are affective and value-forming. They form their own environmental niche and guide and determine the ‘rightness’ of their functioning in their world in accordance with how the feedback from their constructed niche accords or fails to accord with their aims. Thus , all living systems have ‘beliefs’ in that they are purposive in relation to their niche, anticipating forward into their world and adjusting those ‘beliefs’ in relation to feedback from it.

Of course this is along way from human language, but how necessary is language to belief? If belief is a perceptual phenomenon, present in newborns prior to language-learning, then what does language add to belief? I have been arguing that since we are not computers, and belief is not a matter of abstract symbol manipulation like the early cognitive scientists thought , and many on this forum still believe, what language does is allow us to synthesis sources of information from many modalities into words. Animals are also synthesizing many modalities. When a hungry cat hears the can opener, the sound is a form of language that activates the memory of the sight and smell of the food that is in the can, as well as anticipation of the actions of the pet owner that will bring the can of food into the cat’s dish. So a whole sequence of sensations and actions are evoked by the one simple sound of the can opener. It acts as a proto-language. But it will not occur to the cat to reproduce the sound, to share it with others. Why not?

There is substantial limitation to a cat’s memory when it comes to contextually synthesizing in a much more global and complex way a whole range of information that allows humans to share events through language.
So memory is the limiting factor for animals when it comes to language, not some ‘rational’ or ‘propositional’ capability. There are humans with brain injuries which prevent them from holding items in memory long enough to do the ‘S is P’ calculative thing , but they still have language thanks to an overarching ability to remember complex associations.

In sum, in its most basic form, what we call belief is not logical symbol manipulation but the purposive , normative, goal-oriented anticipatory character of perceptual interpretation, which animals share with us. The higher , more abstract forms of belief we achieve through language is unavailable to other. animals due to sever memory limitations. They care about their world and make their way through it on the basis of more temporally constricted , immediate contextual beliefs. They plan, decide and disambiguate within more narrow parameters of time and space.

Some here think only humans are clever enough to figure out what to do with a syllogism. I follow those psychologists and philosophers who think we should take a cue from other animals and be clever enough to get rid of the syllogism as the paradigm of ‘rational belief’.

“For us, agency is about disposition and action, and not about belief. In this we follow the traditions of American Pragmatism and Continental Phenomenology in their critiques of a belief-oriented, representation-centric, model-building mind, in favor of an action-oriented, affordance-centric, world-navigating mind.”(Anthony Chemero)