At the moment, this is what I see you doing, in order:

1. Observing what "is" through scientific methods
2. Pruning what you observed to remove the things you don't like and leave only those you like based on your values.
3. Presenting this as what "is" and claiming scientific methods. However it is not a scientific observation, it is a pruned version filtered by your values. You have already introduced imperative oughts here, but done so through the back door.
4. Deriving an "ought" from what you presented as an "is" in step 4. This runs into the is/ought problem — PhilosophyRunner

Items 2., 3., and 4. are inaccurate.

More correctly,

1. Observing what "is" through scientific methods – Specifically that the function (the principle reason they exist) of past and present cultural moral norms is that they solve cooperation problems.

2. Proposing that

what is morally normative to be “what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people” (similar to Gert’s SEP definition of normativity https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/morality-definition/ ). — Mark S

3. Providing reasons that the “consequentialist definitions of morality combined with the limitation that behaviors to achieve them solve cooperation problems” is more likely to meet the above normativity criterion (what all well-informed, rational people would advocate…) than the bare consequentialist definitions of morality.

That’s it. I see no derivation of ought from is or "Pruning what you observed to remove the things you don't like."

For convenience, the reasons that “Morality as Cooperation Strategies is complementary to consequentialism” are:

First, bare consequentialism has an implied over-demandingness feature: that it is moral for one person to suffer a huge penalty, of either increased suffering or reduced well-being, so many can gain a tiny benefit. The new consequentialist/cooperation morality requires moral behaviors to be parts of cooperation strategies and “cooperation” implies a lack of coercion. The absence of coercion in moral behavior implies that the over-demandingness as so-called ‘moral’ behavior has been eliminated. Moral principles without over-demandingness are more likely to be judged morally normative as “what all well-informed, rational people would advocate as moral regarding interactions between people”.

Second, bare consequentialism can lack innate motivational power because it is an intellectual construct. But the moral ‘means’ of the new consequentialist/cooperation moral principles are innately harmonious with our moral sense because these cooperation strategies are what shaped our moral sense. This innate harmony provides motivating power to incline us to act morally even when we have reasons not to.

The presence of innate motivating power in the MACS part of the new consequentialist/cooperation moral principles provides a second reason that these claims are more likely than bare consequentialism to be judged normatively moral.

Third, the problems that MACS solves are as innate to our universe as the simple mathematics that define them. Everywhere those mathematics hold in our universe, from the beginning of time to the end of time, intelligent beings must solve the same problems in order to form highly cooperation societies. MACS’ feature of cross-species universality and application could be intellectually satisfying and attractive for rational people. MACS cross-species universality provides a third reason that the new consequentialist/cooperation morality claims would be more likely to be judged normative than bare consequentialism. — Mark S

This thread seems to fall to the same criticism as the other - deriving an ought from an is, but not in a good way. — Banno

I derive no 'oughts' from 'is' in either OP's thread.

You might read my above reply to PhilosophyRunner which rebuts your claim.

The OP is on the right track. Not just consequentialism, even Kantian deontological ethics is about cooperation. "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law." ~ I. Kant (Categorical Imperative). However, in me humble opinion, cooperation is morally ambiguous (re the Italian Mafia, the Chinese Triad, the Japanese Yakuza, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Communist Russia, etc.).

I’m wondering how you would respond to Jesse Prinz’s moral relativist argument, which grounds moral values in innate emotional responses which become culturally conditioned to form an endless variety of moral values across the cultural landscape. — Joshs

I agree with Prinz that our moral judgments (values) are initially grounded in innate emotional responses. But my consideration of higher levels of causation for these phenomena causes me to part company with Prinz.

Why do we have these strange emotional responses which often motivate acting in ways (moral ways) that can appear to be against our best interests, at least in the short term?

We have these emotional responses because they are parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems. Our predecessors who experienced these emotions were better cooperators, left more descendants, and became the vast majority of our ancestors. Our predecessors who did not experience these emotions almost all died out.

What is the source of these cooperation problems? Their source is in the nature of our universe which can be expressed in the simple mathematics of game theory's cooperation/exploitation dilemmas.

From the same basic observation, Prinz makes a moral relativist argument and I see the basis of a species and time-independent universal morality.

Prinz would
argue that no cooperative meta-theory could bridge
the gap in values between core Trump supporters and social leftists. The best that could be hoped for is the use of rational argument to persuade both parties that neither side’s values are THE objectively correct values, and therefore each side’s perspective needs to be tolerated and even respected.

Do you think that MACS can achieve some better mutual understanding than this? — Joshs

I doubt that MAGA people who benefit from the domination (exploitation) moral norms and values they find so attractive will be convinced by any rational argument. However, the MAGA supporters being exploited - the poor, women, the elderly, immigrants, and other outgroups could be motivated (once they realize how they are being exploited) to understand and advocate for rational arguments that explain what is being done to them. So yes, MACS could be a powerful force (at least on the side of the exploited outgroups) in arguing against domination moral norms.

The OP is on the right track. Not just consequentialism, even Kantian deontological ethics is about cooperation. "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law." ~ I. Kant (Categorical Imperative). However, in me humble opinion, cooperation is morally ambiguous (re the Italian Mafia, the Chinese Triad, the Japanese Yakuza, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Communist Russia, etc.). — Agent Smith

Claiming something like “Cooperation is moral” fails for just the reasons you describe. People can, and too often do, cooperate to exploit outgroups.

The recast claim “Solving cooperation problems is moral” does not suffer the same failure.

This recasting can recognize the cooperation and self-sacrifice within criminal organizations as moral, while rejecting the goal of that cooperation, the exploitation and harm to outgroups, as immoral based on it creating cooperation problems – the opposite of the function of cultural moral norms.

I agree with Prinz that our moral judgments (values) are initially grounded in innate emotional responses. But my consideration of higher levels of causation for these phenomena causes me to part company with Prinz.

Why do we have these strange emotional responses which often motivate acting in ways (moral ways) that can appear to be against our best interests, at least in the short term?

We have these emotional responses because they are parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems — Mark S

Perhaps these ‘strange, higher level emotional responses’ you are referring to have something in common with Martha Nussbaum’s rendering of emotion as involving “intentional thought or perception directed at an object (as perceived or imagined by the person who has the emotion) and some type of evaluative appraisal of that object made from the agent's own personal viewpoint. This appraisal ascribes importance to the object in terms of the agent's scheme of goals and ends.”
Like you, Nussbaum’s approach is a form of moral universalism, which determines her cognitive appraisal model of emotion as rationalistic. That is to say, if emotions ground our moral values, then moral universalism considers our emotion-based appraisals in terms of correctness or incorrectness in relation to universal valuative norms we can arrive at to solve cooperation problems.

I am closer to Prinz’s value-relativism than to Nussbaum’s universalist rationalism. Like Prinz, I believe that rational goals cannot be divorced from the underlying affectively-based values that make them intelligible, and thus affective values are relative to the individual.
Unlike Prinz, I don’t attribute affective values to a combination of innate emotional programs or modules and social conditioning. I believe our motives for cooperation as well as competition and hostility arise out of social interaction, but not in a blind conditioning fashion. Rather, humans are cognitively and perceptually oriented toward anticipative sense-making.

I doubt that MAGA people who benefit from the domination (exploitation) moral norms and values they find so attractive will be convinced by any rational argument. However, the MAGA supporters being exploited - the poor, women, the elderly, immigrants, and other outgroups could be motivated (once they realize how they are being exploited) to understand and advocate for rational arguments that explain what is being done to them. So yes, MACS could be a powerful force (at least on the side of the exploited outgroups) in arguing against domination moral norms — Mark S

Cooperation is a means to an end, and that end is the expansion of our ability to anticipatively make sense of our world. Put differently, we derive pleasure and joy from events that we are able to assimilate meaningfully into our ways of understanding the world. We perceive events we cannot assimilate and make sense of coherently as threatening, and we strive avoid or destroy such alien stimuli. We are able to function socially with others in a community to the extent that we are able to anticipatively construe their behavior. We may relate to their perspective but never arrive at the very same outlook as theirs, which explains the unavoidable strife and violence within families and among friends.

Political polarization like that between MAGA and the left is a result of incompatible worldviews. Each side not only sees the world through a different schematic lens, but is unable to subsume the other side’s perspective as a variation of their own. This leads to accusations of bad intent , immorality , stupidity and irrationality that each side constantly charges the other side with. Because you fail to grasp the pragmatic rationality of MAGA adherents relative to their way of looking at the world, you blame them for your failure of understanding and reify this hostility as ‘correctly scientific rationality’ which you will then attempt to shove down their throats with the blessing of your fellow scientists. Just rinse and repeat and we have a perfect recipe for the perpetuation of intercultural violence.

Each side not only sees the world through a different schematic lens, but is unable to subsume the other side’s perspective as a variation of their own. — Joshs

Is this similar to Lakoff's frames?

This leads to accusations of bad intent , immorality , stupidity and irrationality that each side constantly charges the other side with. Because you fail to grasp the pragmatic rationality of MAGA adherents relative to their way of looking at the world, you blame them for your failure of understanding and reify this hostility as ‘correctly scientific rationality’ which you will then attempt to shove down their throats with the blessing of your fellow scientists. — Joshs

I think this is an important insight. People slide into 'they're sociopaths, morons' alarmingly quickly. If a worldview doesn't make sense to us, anger and denigration are easy responses. I've done it myself many times in the past.

Any quick ideas for how we break this worldview impasse?

Claiming something like “Cooperation is moral” fails for just the reasons you describe. People can, and too often do, cooperate to exploit outgroups.

The recast claim “Solving cooperation problems is moral” does not suffer the same failure.

This recasting can recognize the cooperation and self-sacrifice within criminal organizations as moral, while rejecting the goal of that cooperation, the exploitation and harm to outgroups, as immoral based on it creating cooperation problems – the opposite of the function of cultural moral norms. — Mark S

True that. I guess one is moral to members of a group you belong to to be immoral to members of other groups. Basically its some kinda military pact between individuals and between groups against other individuals and other groups. However, this is the current version of morality that people are questioning the validity of - animal rights, speciesism, vegetarianism, veganism, eco-movements, etc. are attempts to rectify the problem (from pirates to Jains, we must become).

Each side not only sees the world through a different schematic lens, but is unable to subsume the other side’s perspective as a variation of their own.
— Joshs

Is this similar to Lakoff's frames? — Tom Storm

I believe Lakoff’s approach isnt as relativistic as mine, but we have in common the treatment of ideological and political differences in terms of holistic schemes expressing a unitary logic.

Any quick ideas for how we break this worldview impasse? — Tom Storm

I think there is an evolutionary trajectory to cultural understanding, so societies will eventually find more pragmatically useful ways of making sense of others. We just have to be patient.

Thanks Joshs.

I think you are flitting between two similar but different systems - one with pruning of observations and one without.. Addressing the system you described in the post I am replying to, which does not prune:

1. We observe that past societies had moral rules that helped cooporations. These took many forms, including humans sacrifice, murdering and raping the outgroup, etc.

2. What was observed in 1. is what was morally normative in that society.

3. Consequential definitions of morality combined with the limitation that behaviors to achieve them solve cooperation problems, include the human sacrifice, murder and raping of the outgroup.

Of what use is this? Perhaps dictators and gangs have got it right morally, since they are very strict about cooperation?

It doesn't help with us solving today's moral issues, because of the is/ought problem. The above says nothing about would ought to be done - if it did it would be advocating gangs and dictators. But it doesn't advocate for anything, because it is a review of what is.

True that. I guess one is moral to members of a group you belong to to be immoral to members of other groups. Basically its some kinda military pact between individuals and between groups against other individuals and other groups. However, this is the current version of morality that people are questioning the validity of - animal rights, speciesism, vegetarianism, veganism, eco-movements, etc. are attempts to rectify the problem (from pirates to Jains, we must become). — Agent Smith

These are “circle of moral concern issues”.

From my "What if cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies?" post’s OP: “What about its limits? ,,, It is silent about who should be in our “circle of moral concern” (as Peter Singer describes it) and who (or what) can be ignored or exploited.”

MACS’s strategies are silent on all those circle of moral concern issues you bring up.

Science is inadequate to answer those questions. We must look elsewhere.

Indeed, that is the right question? How we answer it depends on facts and how pragmatic they are.

You are more familiar with Prinz and Nussbaum’s work than I am.

But I would reiterate how revealing it is to move up a few levels of causation from emotions being the ultimate source of moral judgments (close to Prinz and Nussbaum’s positions?) into what caused these emotions to exist. It is much more revealing and useful for resolving disputes about moral norms to understand the ultimate source of cultural moral norms not in our emotions but in strategies that solve cooperation problems.

Because you fail to grasp the pragmatic rationality of MAGA adherents relative to their way of looking at the world, you blame them for your failure of understanding and reify this hostility as ‘correctly scientific rationality’ which you will then attempt to shove down their throats with the blessing of your fellow scientists. Just rinse and repeat and we have a perfect recipe for the perpetuation of intercultural violence. — Joshs

You misunderstand me. As I have said, I don’t expect the MAGA adherents who benefit from their ‘morality’ to be swayed by MACS arguments. I expect the MAGA people being exploited or concerned by those arguments (women, gay people, people of color, average people in MAGA areas) to use them as an intellectual moral cudgel they have not had against the oppressors. What I am after is providing intellectual weapons for resolving “intra” cultural (within MAGA) disputes about morality.

I suggest you reread my first post.

“What if cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies?”.

It will help clarify that the examples you mention are Domination and Marker norms, not Partnership moral norms.

As I describe in my next post: "Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies"

Partnership moral norms conform to MACS’ moral principle, “Act to solve cooperation problems” and are universally moral.

Domination moral norms (and sometimes Marker moral norms) violate MACS’s “Do not act to create cooperation problems”. These violations make them immoral in an absolute sense.

I did read your first post, it runs into the same problems. You are flitting between 2 similar but different theories, as per the description in my previous post.

For example:

"Domination moral norms (and sometimes Marker moral norms) violate MACS’s “Do not act to create cooperation problems”. These violations make them immoral in an absolute sense. "

That is not what is observed. Observation of past societies show that domination moral norms are just as effective at cooperation. However you are pruning away the domination moral norms by using some other "ought" based morality, but then presenting it as if it were an "is" observation.

So this is the version with pruning.

Observation of past societies show that domination moral norms are just as effective at cooperation. However you are pruning away the domination moral norms by using some other "ought" based morality, but then presenting it as if it were an "is" observation. — PhilosophyRunner

Thanks for posting again, I think I understand you better this time.

Yes, I must show how domination moral norms are pruned (nice turn of phrase) to not be a part of MACS. And there must be no hidden moral oughts involved in that pruning.

From my OP,

... the new consequentialist/cooperation morality claims become:

“Behaviors that increase well-being by solving cooperation problems are moral” and

“Behavior that minimize suffering by solving cooperation problems are moral.” — Mark S

Here, I am claiming that “solving cooperation problems is moral ‘means’". (Note I also claim the implied “creating cooperation problems is immoral ‘means’".)

What may not be obvious is that these principles innately exclude domination moral norms – no sneaky separate pruning required. Domination moral norms are excluded because their goals of exploiting outgroups are excluded. Exploiting outgroups creates cooperation problems for the outgroup and are therefore immoral (even while solving cooperation problems for the ingroup).

What is the objective source of the moral claims:
• Solving cooperation problems is moral and
• Creating cooperation problems is immoral?

That source is the observation that the function of past and present cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems. These cooperation/exploitation dilemmas are present everywhere in our universe and must be solved to enable forming highly cooperative societies.

What is the objective source of their imperative bindingness? There is none. This is a claim about what moral behavior ‘is’ in our universe, not a claim about what it ought to be. What ought to be moral is 1) a different category of thing and 2) the focus of traditional moral philosophy.

What may not be obvious is that these principles innately exclude domination moral norms – no sneaky separate pruning required. Domination moral norms are excluded because their goals of exploiting outgroups are excluded. Exploiting outgroups creates cooperation problems for the outgroup and are therefore immoral (even while solving cooperation problems for the ingroup). — Mark S

But this is not what is observed in past societies

Let's take a step back and look at your original question in the other thread: "What if cultural moral norms track cooperation strategies?" I agree, in the "is" form, cultural moral norms often track cooperation strategies, often to the exclusion of the out group. That is what is observed.

So the foundation of your theory, is based on observing past societies. And in this observation we see that total cooperation including the outgroup is not what is the moral norm, rather the moral norm includes domination of the outgroup.

And so your pruning of the domination moral norm is not justified by the method you use. You claim that the "is" excludes domination moral norms. But the "is" that is observed includes domination moral norms.

If I were to base my morality on past societies, it would be to form an in-group and then dominate the out group - that is what many of the great past civilizations did. To get around the problem, I need a moral theory based on "oughts" - just because past successful civilizations dominated the out group doesn't mean I should too.

So the foundation of your theory, is based on observing past societies. And in this observation we see that total cooperation including the outgroup is not what is the moral norm, rather the moral norm includes domination of the outgroup.

And so your pruning of the domination moral norm is not justified by the method you use. You claim that the "is" excludes domination moral norms. But the "is" that is observed includes domination moral norms.

If I were to base my morality on past societies, it would be to form an in-group and then dominate the out group - that is what many of the great past civilizations did. — PhilosophyRunner

You are not recognizing the innate pruning of domination norms by MACS’ ultimate source. The ultimate source of MACS is not past and present cultural moral norms. Past and present cultural moral norms are only a signpost pointing to MACS’ ultimate source.

We find MACS’ ultimate source by answering “Why do cultural moral norms exist?”

As I have been saying, cultural moral norms exist because they were selected for by their ability to solve cooperation problems. Domination norms which exploit outgroups are creating cooperation problems for the outgroup – the opposite of MACS’ function and therefore automatically excluded (pruned) from the start.

MACS’s moral principles are not based on the morality of past societies. MACS’s moral principles summarize solutions to cooperation problems that are present everywhere in our universe from the beginning to the end of time. That is a much grander and more insightful view of morality,

We find MACS’ ultimate source by answering “Why do cultural moral norms exist?”

As I have been saying, cultural moral norms exist because they were selected for by their ability to solve cooperation problems. Domination norms which exploit outgroups are creating cooperation problems for the outgroup – the opposite of MACS’ function and therefore automatically excluded (pruned) from the start. — Mark S

But this is not correct. Cultural moral norms exist because they were selected for by their ability to solve cooperation problems in the in group. The out group is often disposable for cultural moral norms, historically. This is what is observed as "is."

I think your mistake here is saying that observing how cultural moral norms are selected is in their ability to solve universal cooperation problems for everyone. That is simply not what is observed. Rather we see many instances of cultural moral norms that are selected to strengthen cooperation in the in group, while dominating the out group.

So what you claim as "is", is not really what is observed as "is."

I think your mistake here is saying that observing how cultural moral norms are selected is in their ability to solve universal cooperation problems for everyone. That is simply not what is observed. Rather we see many instances of cultural moral norms that are selected to strengthen cooperation in the in group, while dominating the out group. — PhilosophyRunner

Yep. We keep coming back to the idea that cooperation is not of itself a sound or neutral moral position, but may be used to dominate, subjugate and murder. Are there not ethical considerations or questions that need to be asked before one can get to morality as a cooperation strategy? Which cooperation strategies are morally virtuous and which ones are not? How can we tell?

Cultural moral norms exist because they were selected for by their ability to solve cooperation problems in the in group. — PhilosophyRunner

This may be true in a sense but is not relevant.

You are still focused in the weeds of our diverse, contradictory, and strange past and present cultural moral norms. You will find all sorts of cultural adaptations such as cooperating to exploit outgroups, markers of membership ingroups, and respect for authority and sacred objects. None are innate to what morality ‘is’ at a its most fundamental level.

Cultural moral norms are only signposts to MACS’s source in the cooperation problems that are innate to our universe.

It would help to briefly describe how those cooperation problems, which can be understood as cooperation/exploitation dilemmas, arise in our universe.

Cooperation is commonly beneficial everywhere in our universe. However, cooperation is vulnerable to exploitation because exploitation is virtually always the winning short-term strategy and can be even in the long term. Unfortunately, exploitation destroys motivation to cooperate in the future and its potential benefits. These circumstances create the cooperation/exploitation dilemma.

Our ancestors chanced across reciprocity strategies that can solve this dilemma. The solve the dilemma by motivating punishment of people who exploit others. In this way, our ancestors chanced across morality.

Don’t kill, steal, or lie are moral norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment. Why? Because they are violations of reciprocity within a society. That unstated reciprocity agreement is “I will not kill, steal, or lie (even when I really want to) and I expect no one will kill, steal, or lie to me”.

Solutions to this innate to our universe cooperation/exploitation dilemma are the ultimate source of MACS’ moral principles:

Act to solve cooperation problems.
Do not create cooperation problems.

Exploitation (of an outgroup by an ingroup) cannot be part of those principles because that would contradict the function of what morality at its most fundamental level ‘is’ - preventing exploitation.

We keep coming back to the idea that cooperation is not of itself a sound or neutral moral position, but may be used to dominate, subjugate and murder. Are there not ethical considerations or questions that need to be asked before one can get to morality as a cooperation strategy? Which cooperation strategies are morally virtuous and which ones are not? How can we tell? — Tom Storm

Tom, please read my above response to PhilosophyRunner on the same topic.

And consider MACS's actual proposed moral principles rather than some kind of "Cooperation is Moral" idea which I agree would be poor moral advice. MACS's principles are short on exploitation and bad behavior:

Act to solve cooperation problems.
Do not create cooperation problems.

You ask a relevant question "Which cooperation strategies are morally virtuous and which ones are not? How can we tell?"

That question I answer in "Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies" as

“What is morally normative regarding the means of interactions between people is what all well-informed, mentally normal, rational people would advocate as moral.”

Yep.

"Which cooperation strategies are morally virtuous and which ones are not? How can we tell?"

That question I answer in "Normativity of Morality as Cooperation Strategies" as

“What is morally normative regarding the means of interactions between people is what all well-informed, mentally normal, rational people would advocate as moral.” — Mark S

...cis white hetro middle class males...

Mark apparently can't see the joke.

“What is morally normative regarding the means of interactions between people is what all well-informed, mentally normal, rational people would advocate as moral.” — Mark S

Sorry Mark, but I can't seem to follow what you are advocating. The language seems really unclear to me.

So is your model predicated on making moral choices about those who we decide can make moral choices? How do you determine 'well informed mentally normal or rational'? I think you might find that many of Hitler's prominent supporters fit this description. This is what makes cultural expressions of evil so challenging for us to understand. Morality is complex.

I need to see this in action or it continues to remain a strangely opaque theoretical ideal.

Can you tell me how would you assess capital punishment as a penalty for, say, killing someone? Is capital punishment morally sound - how do you go about answering or contextualizing this using your method?

Tom,

You bring up important issues about my adaptation of Gert’s definition of morally normativity – how to judge the normativity of moral claims.

Are Gert’s definition and my adaptation perfect? No, they are just the best I know of.

Without them, I am left with personal preference regarding which moral claims I adopt and advocate. Personal preference is not so culturally useful making that choice method less preferred.

But attempting to resolve such issues about normativity is too complex and important to try to append to the end of this thread.

How about I start a new thread only about Gert’s definition? People can share what they think about normativity.

Can you tell me how would you assess capital punishment as a penalty for, say, killing someone? Is capital punishment morally sound - how do you go about answering or contextualizing this using your method? — Tom Storm

MACS’s claimed universal moral principles about moral ‘means’ are:

• Act to solve cooperation problems.
• Do not create cooperation problems.

The morality of capital punishment can be a mixed bag depending on circumstances.

Capital punishment is part of a strategy that solves cooperation problems. It punishes reciprocity violations about not killing each other with the intended outcome of reducing future killing. Capital punishment can thereby increase or maintain the future benefits of cooperation in societies. This is why it has commonly existed.

But capital punishment also creates cooperation problems by 1) itself being a reciprocity violation about not killing each other and 2) potentially reducing trust and its resulting cooperation in the society by motivating revenge or other bad behavior by friends and family of the executed person.

The morality of capital punishment comes down to if it will, on balance, increase or reduce the trust needed for a cooperative society.

In advanced societies, I expect the answer is that capital punishment is immoral – on balance it reduces trust and cooperation in society. Other remedies, such as long prison sentences, are morally preferable.

A simpler answer would have been nice, but morality is complicated.

Banno, no I don’t see the joke and I expect neither would Bernard and Josuha Gert who have maintained the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the definition of morality for over 20 years. All I see is your assumption of bigotry.

A simpler answer would have been nice, but morality is complicated. — Mark S

That's why I chose this issue, to see how the idea works in practice with a more complex issue. That's a helpful summary, thank you.

Capital punishment is part of a strategy that solves cooperation problems. It punishes reciprocity violations about not killing each other with the intended outcome of reducing future killing. Capital punishment can thereby increase or maintain the future benefits of cooperation in societies. This is why it has commonly existed. — Mark S

Another take is that it provides retribution and consequences for a bad deed, which people seem to find psychologically satisfying in a way which may not be easy to measure - psychological wellbeing might be one approach. But I understand your position here.

The morality of capital punishment comes down to if it will, on balance, increase or reduce the trust needed for a cooperative society. — Mark S

How do you determine which of these it does? How would a state set up a mechanism to assess all potential moral choices people could make in society?

Another take is that it provides retribution and consequences for a bad deed, which people seem to find psychologically satisfying in a way which may not be easy to measure - psychological wellbeing might be one approach. But I understand your position here. — Tom Storm

Like past and present cultural moral norms, our psychologically satisfying inclination for retribution for evil deeds such as murder is part of cooperation strategies. Specifically, our feeling or righteous indignation motivates the punishment of violation component that is a necessary part of reciprocity strategies. Indeed, our moral senses’ judgments and our other moral emotions of empathy, gratitude, loyalty, shame, and guilt are also explained as parts of cooperation strategies.

In these three threads, I was trying to simplify my argument by not mentioning the shared origins of the biology underlying our moral sense and past and present cultural moral norms.

How do you determine which of these it does? How would a state set up a mechanism to assess all potential moral choices people could make in society? — Tom Storm

I don’t foresee states “setting up a mechanism to assess all potential moral choices”.

MACS’s principles can be additional criteria for judging how to refine cultural moral norms to meet human needs and preferences better.

MACS’s principles can be additional criteria for judging how to refine cultural moral norms to meet human needs and preferences better. — Mark S

How does that operate in a culture? Surely you would need a panel or body which can understand the model and help to implement it? I suppose at heart I am asking - 'Ok so you have a model what ideally would happen next?"

Like past and present cultural moral norms, our psychologically satisfying inclination for retribution for evil deeds such as murder is part of cooperation strategies. Specifically, our feeling or righteous indignation motivates the punishment of violation component that is a necessary part of reciprocity strategies. Indeed, our moral senses’ judgments and our other moral emotions of empathy, gratitude, loyalty, shame, and guilt are also explained as parts of cooperation strategies. — Mark S

So I am now confused. How does your model decide then if capital punishment is morally good or bad?

I may well be missing something but I still struggle to see how a cooperation strategy is of itself useful or even entirely comprehensible to a diverse community, where cooperation is understood differently and where society is understood differently. A Muslim culture, for instance. Or an atheist culture. When we get to issues like abortion or capital punishment or gay rights, or whether creationism should replace evolution in school learning - how do we determine what is right?